

# Knowing the System: Incentives and Education Reforms in Tanzania

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
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
## Education for Self-Reliance

- ▶ Nation-building (globally recognized success)
- ▶ Human capital development (only partially successful)
  - ▶ Physical infrastructure
  - ▶ Teachers
  - ▶ Language


## A Focus on Increasing Enrollment: Primary




## A Focus on Increasing Enrollment: Secondary




## A Focus on Increasing Enrollment: Secondary



## A Focus on Physical Infrastructure



# A Focus on Physical Infrastructure




# Education Reforms are Demand-Driven

Country	Year	Following Election?	New Leader Elected?	Free and Fair?	Victor %	Second %
Malawi	1994	yes	yes	yes	47	34
Ethiopia	1994	no				
Uganda	1997	yes	no	yes	74	24
Lesotho	1999	yes	yes	yes	99	1
Cameroon	2000	no				
Sierra Leone	2001	no				
Tanzania	2001	yes	no	yes	75	17
Zambia	2002	yes	yes	no	28	27
Rwanda	2003	yes	no	no	95	4
Kenya	2003	yes	yes	yes	62	31
Mozambique	2004	yes	yes	yes	64	32
Burundi	2005	yes	yes	yes	54	25
Ghana	2006	no				
Liberia	2006	yes	yes	yes	27	19
Benin	2006	yes	yes	yes	36	24
Congo (Brazza.)	2007	no				

*Note:* See text and appendix for full description of the data and sources. “Following Election” is coded “yes” if an election occurred in the same year or the year preceding a fee abolition. “Free and fair” is coded yes if an election was judged by international observers to have been free and fair as coded by Lindberg (2006). “Victor %” and “Second %” show the proportion of votes garnered by the winner and runner-up, respectively.




## A Focus on Physical Infrastructure




# Matching Inputs with Outcomes

## Education Context in Tanzania

Primary level, PSLE<sup>1</sup>



Secondary ordinary level, CSEE<sup>2</sup>




Although pass rate is not the only indicator for quality of education, currently it is the most reliable one in Tanzania

## Focusing on Learning Outcomes

- ▶ Investing in teachers – training, remuneration, motivation
- ▶ Rationalizing school management – disbursement of capital grants, SMCs, training of school managers
- ▶ Measurement of outcomes (tests and remedial education)
- ▶ Public ranking of schools and incentive system (accountability)

# Bringing it All Together: Accountability Relationships



Design Elements	Principal-Agent (Accountability) Relations			
	Politics	Compact	Management	Voice
<b>Delegation</b>	Voters elect politicians to enact education policy and to hold education sector officials accountable.	GoT manages the education sector through the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) and the President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG). MoEST and PO-RALG are directly responsible for ensuring that school teachers exert the required effort to produce good learning outcomes.	Teachers are responsible for both inputs and outputs. They are required to teach for 30 hours per week over 194 days in the calendar year. They are also evaluated on the basis of the exam performance of their students.	Parents serve as checks on the quality of outputs coming from the education system. Their incentive is to ensure that their children perform well in school.
<b>Finance</b>	The education system in Tanzania is financed through taxes, with considerable donor support for specific projects.	GoT disburses funds directly to schools and entrusts school management committees. Budgetary discretion at the district level allows for some allocation choices at the local level.	Teachers' wages are determined by their characteristics - seniority, education attainment - regardless of their observable effort or effectiveness.	School fees were abolished. Parents are technically not required to provide direct funds for the running of schools.
<b>Information</b>	GoT provides public ranking on school performance both at the national and district levels. District education officers disburse this information to schools in their districts.	The central government monitors the performance of district education officers at the local level. School performance and the effective utilization of financial resources are potential metrics of judging performance.	MoEST and PO-RALG keep teachers accountable by monitoring student performance, as well as the ability to fire or relocate non-performing teachers.	Parents have information on the performance of specific schools through their children and through the government's public ranking of schools.
<b>Motivation</b>	Elected officials have an incentive to perform well in improving learning outcomes in order to win re-election and for the benefit of the country.	Local MoEST and PO-RALG officials are motivated to perform because of the threat of losing their jobs; and due to monitoring efforts by the central government.	The teacher and headteacher promotion and transfer process provide strong incentives for teachers to perform.	Parents want their children to succeed academically. This is a strong motivation for them to agitate for improvement in learning outcomes.

## Our Research Agenda

- ▶ Deployment of teachers
- ▶ Rationalization of school management
- ▶ Measurement of outcomes
- ▶ Public ranking of schools and incentive system