

Evaluation Twaweza: Tanzania

2009-2014



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
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ABBREVIATIONS

BRN	Big Results Now
COSTECH	Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology
CSO	Civil Society Organization
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
LME	Learning Monitoring and Evaluation
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIATV	Made in Africa Television
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee
OGP	Open Government Partnership
OH	Outcome Harvesting
OM	Outcome Mapping
PRI	Policy Research International
PSI	Project Services International
RCT	Randomized controlled trial
Sida	Swedish International Development Agency
SMGL	Sahara Media Group Limited
SzW	Sauti za Wananchi
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TPS	Tanzania Printing Services
TTU	Tanzania Teachers Union
VfM	Value for Money

Kiswahili Words

KiuFunza	Thirst to Learn
Ni Sisi	It's Us
Sauti za Wananchi	Voice of the Citizens
Twaweza	We can make it happen
Uwazi	Transparency
Uwezo	Capability



Executive Summary

Introduction

Twaweza began operations as a “project” in 2009, under the supervision of Hivos and with the support of a number of donors. It was designed as an ambitious initiative dedicated to enhance citizen agency – citizens’ access information, and, to take action to improve service delivery in education, health and water, over a ten-year time frame (2009-2018). Twaweza’s headquarters are in Dar es Salaam and it operates in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The principal activity of Twaweza is the promotion of access to information and expanded space for public action among citizens across East Africa, through research and experimentation, information sharing, brokering new partnerships, learning, and communication. This external evaluation was conducted at the end of 2014 and it focuses on Twaweza’s Tanzanian operations only. It is an independent assessment of what was achieved by the initiative from 2009 to 2014; and it is intended to provide an opportunity for Twaweza and its stakeholders to “take stock” of the initiative, and to provide stakeholders a clearer and deeper understanding of Twaweza’s activities and outcomes. The evaluation is also intended to promote organizational learning for Twaweza and contribute to ongoing improvements to its operations. This evaluation was timely as the founder Head of Twaweza was leaving the organization at the end of 2014 and Twaweza was also transitioning to become an independent East African organization in 2015.

Approach and Organization of the Report

The evaluation approach, methodology and limitations are provided in detail in Section B. The evaluation used mixed methods, including ideas from the Developmental Evaluation approach, particularly suited to social innovations in complex, dynamic environments. Methods included elements of participatory evaluation, outcome mapping (OM), organizational assessment, case studies, and appreciative inquiry. The evaluation built a comprehensive picture of the strengths and weaknesses and future potential of the organization, its outputs and reach, and of the contributions to the overarching goals of the organization. Section C provides background information on Twaweza, including the goals, objectives, outcomes and metrics which it defined for itself. The main findings follow the evaluation questions as defined in the Terms of Reference and are organized along three areas in which the evaluation questions were grouped.

The report then discusses the organization’s development and capacity – its operational, managerial, and governance systems, and its use of resources. This is followed by reports on the activities and outputs (including quantity, quality, and reach), and finally, using elements of Outcome Mapping, it reports on the contribution of Twaweza’s activities to the development goals and objectives. The findings also highlight how Twaweza has “added value” to the work of other organizations in Tanzania. Furthermore, the report identifies key challenges faced by Twaweza, many of which are areas for future

consideration, and it reflects upon important opportunities for organizational learning. The evaluation finishes with conclusions about the initiative's past and recommendations for moving forward.

Background, Context, and Evolution

Twaweza is a joint initiative, funded by multiple donors interested in improving transparency, accountability, and citizen agency in East Africa, and in promoting improved services in education, health and water. Twaweza acknowledged from the beginning that it had set highly ambitious goals – aiming to catalyze deep and systemic changes, on a large scale and across three countries. It estimated that achievement of such changes would require a minimum of ten-years of sustained engagement and in 2008 it set goals, objectives, and targets which reflected this long-term perspective.

Findings

The findings section must be understood within the context that Twaweza evolved during this period, from a set of plans and ideas, to an implementing organization aiming at deep systemic change in the three countries. It set out to tackle several large challenges simultaneously – changing the civic and organizational culture, changing the climate for accountability, and, in the long run, improving basic services. It also aimed to work with five key networks in partnerships to achieve these systemic effects. Many aims and objectives were stated, (as summarized in Section C), but, naturally, some proved more challenging in practice. The level and quality of efforts required had been underestimated at the start in the strategy documents. The main findings follow the evaluation questions.

Achievements – Organizational: Structures, Processes, Systems

- Twaweza has achieved most of the organizational development targets it had set (called benchmarks), and while a few need further work, it is on the way to achieving them.
- Twaweza's governance structures have served it well to ensure legal and statutory compliance and to establish responsibilities, practices, and processes.
- Twaweza's policies, procedures, and workflows are fully documented, computerized and functioning. There are appropriate systems for the management and control of activities, including a sound financial management system, comprehensive programme and project management, and a Monitoring and Evaluation system.
- Twaweza has developed and implemented management structures, processes, and systems that are sound and largely meet the needs of the organization.
- The organizational culture reflects an ethos of transparency. Management controls include a strong focus on cost-control, prevention of corrupt practices and achieving results. Managers are cognizant of these factors in their programming.
- Twaweza's financial management systems and processes, including the procurement processes, carefully steward funds and ensure value for money. Overall, the sub-granting and output-based contracts are producing value for money.

- Twaweza has the internal structures, processes and systems in place to support the change to becoming an independent organization.

Achievements – Activities, Outputs and Reach

Twaweza is engaged in a large and complex set of activities, with multiple planned outputs from each of its various programming units (shown in Section 4.4 with a schematic diagram). Most programmes and organizational units have both individual activities, some of which directly lead to outputs, while many others are comingled with the outputs of other units. Together, the different outputs often combine in a synergistic manner, to generate the outcomes that are observed. To remain true to the formulation of the evaluation questions, the report organizes the findings first by programming units, with some exemplar activities, then by partners - all to address the quantity, quality, reach, and some immediate effects of the outputs.

- The Sauti za Wananchi initiative (housed under the Uwazi unit) is a useful and economically efficient use of a nationally representative mobile phone survey method, which has produced 20 policy briefs using this method.
- The Uwazi unit in Twaweza has engaged in influential research, as in “KiuFunza” or “Thirst to Learn”, a randomized control trial seeking to establish evidence on school-based initiatives that improve learning outcomes in basic education; the reports and policy briefs produced to date have already had an impact on government policies.
- The Uwezo learning assessments were successfully implemented and are the largest national assessment of basic literacy and numeracy in Africa. The outputs provided the high quality evidence required to persuade the public and policy-makers that enrolment does not necessarily imply learning. This work made a direct and major contribution to shifts in perception and policy about education in Tanzania.
- Strategic engagement activities have contributed to several key outcomes, listed under goals, and to others such as the influence to support evidence-based policy in the country, and towards certain government information becoming more available to all.
- Twaweza partnerships agreements in Tanzania over the period 2009 to 2014 provided over 16 million dollars (US) in funds. The majority included media organizations. They resulted in many outputs, disseminated at national scale, repeatedly and creatively delivering development messages. They made highly efficient use of resources and supported innovative ways to increase and widen reach, and influenced the media landscape. An example is the televised MiniBuzz show, which features ordinary citizens debating issues of national importance. Twaweza messages reached 25-30% of the citizens of the country, generating public debate and reflection.
- Innovative partnerships with two “fast moving goods (FMG)” partners are notable. In one, over 40 million school exercise books were produced with the Uwezo test. This partner is continuing to print the test and learning messages in an additional 24 million copies even after the agreement ended. And the Solar Aid distribution of D.Lights (solar lights) through schools in

areas without electricity was notable and produced positive changes in students' study behavior.

- There are multiple outputs under Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation (LME). The majority of the activities have covered the monitoring of Twaweza outputs and capture well questions of quality, distribution, reach and coverage for many initiatives. They provide the necessary support for its management of partnerships and contracts. A selected few have gone further to measure short-term effects. The most notable learning outputs are the evaluation reports on the learning assessments completed in 2013, which led Twaweza to question its programming logic. Many studies are published on the Twaweza website.

Achievements – Goals and Objectives

The following statements represent a high-level outline of Twaweza's major accomplishments along development dimensions (details about each are found in section 6).

- The multiple outputs focused on education and learning, combined, made a direct and major contribution to shifts in perception and policy about education in Tanzania. They have influenced the actions of Tanzania's Ministry of Education, they contributed directly to four out of nine education initiatives within the government's "Big Results Now" priority areas, and it is anticipated that they will contribute to improved payments of capitation grants to schools.
- Strategic engagement activities have contributed to Tanzania's first and second Open Government Partnership (OGP) Plans, to the government's Big Results Now initiative, and to the tabling of the Access to Information bill in parliament.
- Twaweza goals on citizen agency - making information available and supporting voice - have been attained through its research and media partnerships and programming, which delivered multiple and creative development messages; supported innovative ways to increase and widen reach; and generated public debate and thinking, contributing to increased awareness.

Challenges faced and limitations:

The evaluation findings show the following key challenges and limitations that have affected Twaweza's work and contributions:

- The governance structures were found to be inadequate for providing strategic guidance to a complex initiative such as Twaweza. Going forward, an independent Twaweza will need to develop new mechanisms that allow for greater coherence between the stakeholders and for a greater degree of strategic guidance.
- Twaweza's existing descriptive and strategic documents have been substantial and with much useful information, but they lacked sufficient clarity to support future planning, learning, monitoring and evaluation, and also to support greater stakeholder understanding. A key area of weakness was found to be in the Logic Models, partnerships and feedback loops, and "Theory

of Change”, which needed to be better grounded, with realistic and precise output and outcome indicators, progress markers, which reflect adequately what the evidence indicates is achievable. Improved clarity can make for easier communications with stakeholders.

- Although LME activities and results have always been stated priorities for Twaweza, there have been multiple challenges in translating this commitment into practice, beyond monitoring. This was in part due to the early focus on “lean” operations, many gaps in the staffing for the position, the challenges due the weaknesses in the logic model and a simultaneous high demand for monitoring the wide portfolio of activities. On the other hand, external evaluations have focused on large-scale population-based change, missing opportunities to capture significant change at a more focused scale (e.g., among key actors).
- Twaweza has consistently underspent its proposed budget. Careful disbursement of committed funds against outputs is good and it accounts for about one third of Twaweza’s under-spending variance. In addition, the length of time it takes to develop and negotiate good projects with partners accounted for a significant amount of under-spending, especially in the early days. Twaweza should look for ways to improve its budgeting systems moving forward, while maintaining the care with which funds are managed.

Conclusions

It takes enormous effort to launch a new initiative of Twaweza’s scale and to establish a place for it in the mix of existing organizations. Starting with a set of ideas, Twaweza has succeeded in building a functioning organization with significant achievements to its name. What’s more, its organizational structures and work processes have consistently improved over the last few years, becoming better suited to their activities and operating environment.

Twaweza has made its mark in Tanzania and has delivered a number of outstanding results in the areas of its influence on public policy for education and the commitments of the government towards a more open government. It has supported and contributed to the increased climate of greater accountability of government. Delivering creative development messages, supporting innovative ways to increase and widen reach, influencing the media landscape, and reaching 25-30% of the citizens of the country, all with a highly efficient use of resources, could alone be sufficient cause for acclaim. And Twaweza did this not a few times, but again and again. Twaweza has undoubtedly made significant contributions to the question of whether the education system in Tanzania is working to produce outcomes in learning.

Yet, despite Twaweza's success in reaching large numbers of people with development messages, little "measurable citizen action" has been generated, and none have been measured as translated into improvements in the service delivery and related development goals. Twaweza has acknowledged in its own Pivot Note that much remains to be done to achieve its full potential. The evaluation finds that a suitable groundwork has been established and assets have been built, which can be used effectively for future programming. Such improvements require substantial new attention to the theory and the logic models of its programming, the specificity of its goals, setting new and more appropriate targets and

indicators of progress, and benchmarks. It also requires, simultaneously, work on continued organizational improvements. The sets of issues within citizen agency and action; learning; and types of evaluation all need clarity. The evaluation finds that such clarity can allow it to do its work more thoughtfully, with greater synergy and higher quality. It is not a matter of doing more and having more staff, but rethinking organizational processes and the desired numbers of outputs, so as to allow staff more time to work differently. Twaweza should continue its efforts to integrate the work of all the units to make the most of synergies and continue to improve the quality of work across the organization. From the beginning, Twaweza has made an admirable commitment to learning and evaluation in its strategic documents. It has continued to make strides to improve its learning and evaluation functions and that needs further support.

Improved learning connected to improved evaluation can help resolve the tension between quality and thoughtfulness, on the one hand, and scale on the other. Twaweza has often stated that it avoids "all boutique programmes", which it defines as activities at a small scale. But small scale pilots are a proven way to take forward thoughtful and innovative ideas and initiatives. Experimentation is often best done on smaller scales, as Twaweza's own experience attests, and should only be scaled up with adequate evidence. Twaweza has demonstrated its capacity to support innovative interventions from concept, to pilots, through their testing, and then to broader applications. It will need to consider a wider range of projects, in terms of size and partners, beyond the media. Improvements in evaluations will also need to be attuned to potentials for unintended consequences, especially as Twaweza wishes to achieve results over a large scale through the programmes, and, the examination of such possibilities, especially for citizens to exercise options for exit instead of voice, can be included in learning goals.

Going forward, Twaweza proposes to continue to focus on its core information mission. That makes sense as it caters to its core strengths. Here, it must wrestle with the issue of citizen agency, which is an important element of its mission. It defined citizen agency as the capacity *of citizens to act to change, which did not happen*, as its analysis of the pathways of actors, incentives, motivations, and mechanisms that are expected to trigger change was superficial and needs clarity on what will change, where and how. Twaweza also proposes to continue to work on education outcomes and to further the government's commitment to greater openness, transparency, and accountability. This also is reasonable as they are areas where it has had a significant impact. The evaluation found no evidence to support the Twaweza proposal to drop all commitment to health and water as goals. There is an opportunity to utilize capacities that have been developed, together with efforts to increase its depth of knowledge and by improved networking with additional partners.

Donor support for Twaweza has been generous, strategic, and effective. There have been advantages of efficiency in fund administration and reporting in the multi donor arrangements. But the evaluation found weaknesses in coordination between the stakeholders and in strategic advice to Twaweza. The gains from more efficient fund administration and reporting should not be accompanied by losses in

feedback and communications, which could be mitigated through measures that increase donor coordination and improve communications between the donors and Twaweza.

Recommendations

For Donor Partners and Sida, the evaluation recommends that they:

- 1.1 Recognize that no other similar organization exists in the country that can replace Twaweza's work towards improvements in public policy; openness and transparency in government; and in education.
- 1.2 Continue support for Twaweza's efforts to improve and sustain public policy coverage and change, and to find ways of influencing engagement by civic society and the government towards still unattained development goals. Each donor will have its own budgetary and programmatic issues to consider, but based on the informal feedback, four out of five major donor partners expressed their intention to continue support.
- 1.3 Commit to supporting the successful programmes allowing for sufficient support for continued experiments, improved learning for Twaweza and by local partners.
- 1.4 Support Twaweza in the immediate term to revise its programming logic by placing it within context-specific analyses of the conditions, actors and contributions, within the larger systems that it seeks to change, with sharper outcome and goal statements, and markers to demonstrate progress or lack thereof.
- 1.5 Plan for the transitions within Twaweza and design support to encourage and secure commitments of the competent cadre of staff now in place, and the new Executive Director, to maintain momentum.
- 1.6 Allow for operational benchmarks that continue current ratios of staff costs to programmes, in the ballpark of 16-17% as in recent years.
- 1.7 Assess different options for improving the processes for feedback and strategic directions among the key stakeholders. In many cases, with multiple donors supporting a range of complex programming and outputs, appointing an independent reviewer, which can be done in different ways, has been found to be a very useful mechanism for improved governance, strategic directions and feedback. This is common in the World Bank's multi-donor trust funds.
- 1.8 Either through the above process, or through different mechanisms, undertake simpler reviews of Twaweza's work outside Tanzania in 2015; and, also consider regular annual reviews of the whole organization in the future.

For Twaweza:

- 2.1 Increase internal evaluative capacity. Review a range of alternative evaluation methods and adopt those that meet Twaweza's needs and circumstances. Build the organizational skills and confidence to select and apply appropriate methods for learning within Twaweza and among its partners and beneficiaries. Consider Outcome Mapping (OM) and other complexity-oriented approaches in this regard.
- 2.2 In addition to connecting monitoring and evaluation directly to organizational learning and programing adaptations, Twaweza could use experimentation and small scale pilot projects to develop and assess programming choices and improve effectiveness in programme delivery.
- 2.3 Set up behavioral and other markers of change which clearly define the kinds of progress Twaweza intends to help bring about. These could be monitored to provide feedback for developing and implementing strategies and for developing a deeper understanding of the responses by key actors and stakeholders.
- 2.4 Revisit the logic models of the new strategy to detail the full range of social actors the initiative needs to work with, and develop strategies in line with the specific changes Twaweza would like to see in partners and other social actors (beyond the words "collect, curate, transport, engage").
- 2.5 Clarify, define and operationalize the meaning and usage of key words and concepts, such as "citizen agency"; "partners"; "learning"; and, "outcomes".
- 2.6 Further interrogation must include awareness of many different possibilities of "unintended consequences". When one is engaged at scale, the scope for, and effects of "unintended consequences" are necessarily larger than for small experiments or activities, where it is more feasible to engage in much greater levels of detail.
- 2.7 Review the goals for health and water, as the evaluation findings did not provide the evidence that supports the Twaweza decision that with goals that are sharply defined and appropriate efforts, it cannot make positive changes in the above areas. The evaluation suggests that the goals in education are unlikely to be achieved as stated and need refinement.
- 2.8 Improve operational systems as noted and complete the integration of Uwezo. Use opportunities provided by process improvements, increased clarity and goal specifications, to reduce bottlenecks and to reprioritize staff time and activities, in order to have more space for synergies between the activities, deeper partnerships, and improve the quality and timeliness of outputs.

A. Evaluation Overview

1 Introduction

Twaweza, which means “make it happen” in Swahili, describes itself as a citizen-centered initiative that aims for large-scale change in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in East Africa. Twaweza started formally in 2009 with the objective of enhancing “citizen agency and action” to make a difference to development outcomes over a ten-year time frame (2009-2018). Until the end of 2014, Twaweza has been operating as a project (or an initiative as it was first described), but with many characteristics of an independent organization. It is now planned that it would become an independent East African organization in 2015. This independent external evaluation was conducted at the end of 2014, as Twaweza and its stakeholders felt that it was an opportune time for one as it had not been evaluated and its founder Head was leaving the organization. This report includes the evaluation purpose, methods used, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations for the future. This evaluation covers Twaweza’s activities in Tanzania alone over the period 2009-2014.

1.1 Purpose

Two primary purposes were set for this evaluation. The first was to independently assess what has been achieved under this initiative and how efficiently the resources were utilized for these achievements, which largely address an accountability framework, as required by the donors.

The second purpose was to promote learning. How have results been achieved and could they be achieved more effectively? The objective here is to provide Twaweza with information that it can use to improve its performance by contributing to informed decision-making, supporting organisational learning, and allowing for the integration of lessons learned in future programming.

1.2 Key Audiences and the Report

The primary project stakeholders are expected to form the key audience for this evaluation report. These stakeholders include:

- Twaweza’s donors, including the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), which is supporting the evaluation, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID), Irish Aid, SNV (Netherlands Development Organization), Hewlett Foundation, the American Jewish World Service (AJWS) and others
- Twaweza management and staff
- Twaweza’s Advisory and Management Boards, including Hivos¹ of Netherlands.

In addition to the primary stakeholders, East African Government partners and other donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active in the areas of citizen agency, accountability, transparency,

¹ Hivos is the Dutch acronym for the “Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking” or in English, the Humanist Institute for Cooperation.

good governance, social accountability, and innovative use of the media in governance programmes would find this report of interest. This includes civil society organizations (CSOs) that support good public decision-making and help hold governments accountable in East Africa and elsewhere.

Organization of Report:

The remainder of this report is organized into the following sections:

- Section B: Evaluation methodology and limitations
- Section C: Background information on Twaweza, including its goals, objectives, outcomes and other metrics it defined for itself
- Section D: Evolution of the initiative and its funds, budgets, structure, and governance
- Section E: Main findings (key facts, observations and critical reviews reported in earlier sections provide important context)
- Section F: Conclusions
- Section G: Key recommendations to stakeholders

The report has several annexes, which provide the complete Terms of Reference (ToR) and two attached documents from Twaweza; information sources for the evaluation - persons interviewed, references to the documents seen, verifications done; key stakeholders surveyed and/or interviewed and their views.; a short overview of the Theories of Change (ToC); a brief Description of Outcome Mapping (OM), how it was used and possible value to Twaweza in the future; and a list of 60 key “Activities, Outputs and Outcomes” that were provided by Twaweza as being important and which were all reviewed for the report.

1.3 Evaluation Management and Team


The evaluation was contracted and managed by the Embassy of Sweden in Tanzania. The Embassy formed an evaluation reference group including representation from Twaweza, the Twaweza Advisory Board, and DFID. The evaluation was competitively contracted to and conducted by an independent team provided by a consortium of two firms, Policy Research International (PRI) and Project Services International (PSI). This consortium provided for a research team led by Amitav Rath, assisted by experts in relevant fields. Pamela Branch (organizational development), Dunstan Kishekya (Tanzanian Expert in education and OM), Clement Kihinga (Tanzanian Expert in evaluation and health), Terry Smutylo (one of the originators on OM at IDRC) and Kornelia Rassmann (expert in organizational development and OM), all of whom participated in the field work and contributed to the design and implementation of the multi-method evaluation framework used. PRI associates Constance Lim and Yusra Uzair provided additional support in Ottawa for document review, analysis and synthesis of multiple documents and assisted in the coordination of the work. Maya Kovacevic helped turn team members’ hand drawn scribbling from the field into clearer schematic diagrams that illustrate the complex web of Twaweza relations and activities.

All evaluation team members have had no prior links or associations with Twaweza, except for Dunstan Kishekya. He is the Executive Director of the Tanzanian NGO, “Maarifa ni Ufunguo” (knowledge is key)

and Maarifa works on research and advocacy for quality education, in which capacity it has been involved in the Uwezo assessment work of Twaweza.

1.4 Acknowledgments

The evaluation team is grateful to many people for their cooperation and assistance during this process. We record our thanks to those whom we met and interviewed. We also wish to thank the members of the evaluation team of the Swedish Embassy in Tanzania, those in the Evaluation Reference Group for this evaluation, and the members of the governance structure of Twaweza for their time, patience, and thoughtful comments to the team members during their work. Special thanks are due to the staff of Twaweza and the Head, Rakesh Rajani, who provided many detailed comments and suggestions and ensured wide participation within Twaweza. In addition, Mr. Rajani assisted us in setting up meetings with senior officials in government. Finally, we are grateful to Twaweza for providing us with dedicated space, which allowed us to work more efficiently and provided us the opportunity to observe their work in progress. Our direct observations of their working over several weeks, which was always at an intense pace, allowed us to query all contracts and partnerships that we examined in complete detail, using their newly set up and excellent Information Technology and Management Information Systems. The work at the Twaweza offices also provided us with multiple observations of the working of the organization, strengths and challenges, and additional information on the very high demands on the staff, and these observations have been added to our review, and incorporated into our findings and recommendations.



B. The Evaluation

The objectives of the evaluation follows those stated in the complete Terms of Reference (ToR) (provided in Annex 1) for this evaluation.

The overall objective of the evaluation was to provide a comprehensive summary and aggregation of Twaweza's activities over the 2009-2014 period, as well as establish, on a sample basis, the links (substantiated by evidence) between the activities and (a) stated organization's objectives, and (b) other observed changes in the relevant sectors/domains.

The report presents findings and conclusions related to the key objectives of the evaluation, which were grouped into four areas of investigation and analysis, as follows:

1. *The organization and its development:* This area assesses progress against organizational development benchmarks and assesses whether Twaweza has the organizational capacity, including operational, management and governance systems, needed to achieve its objectives. It also assesses whether Twaweza used resources efficiently and effectively.
2. *Achievement of outputs, quality of outputs, and reach:* This area maps outputs, their quality and reach.
3. *Contribution to overarching goals:* This area uses a multi-methods approach, including Outcome Mapping, to highlight some key and notable outcomes and in some cases where the outcomes were less notable. The report also delineates qualitatively the contributions of Twaweza activities and outputs to both the achievements and non-achievements of the goals and objectives.
4. *Integration of findings:* This area synthesizes findings to *draw conclusions, show key results to stakeholders and partners, and make recommendations on the way forward.*

The first three areas together formed the core of the "stock-taking" exercise that the donors requested at the September 2014 Advisory Board meeting of Twaweza. The integration of findings from the first three areas provided for the report on Twaweza's performance by showing key results in a format that is readily understandable to donors and key stakeholders, and that should also serve to improve Twaweza's own understanding and reporting of its activities and achievement of results. The synthesis of the multiple findings from the first three areas provides the basis for the conclusions reached and also guides the recommendations proposed.

The detailed objectives specified for the evaluation were:

1. To assess the organizational development benchmarks outcomes of the Twaweza initiative, as it moved from a project towards becoming an independent organization;
2. To appraise the effectiveness of the management and governance structure of Twaweza as it stands presently and its potential in the future;
3. To assess "value for money (VfM)" particularly focusing on Twaweza's system of sub-granting and output-based contracts, in relation to the changes envisioned;

4. To assess the quantity, quality, and reach of the outputs produced;
5. To assess, to the extent possible, the observed effects and potential contributions of Twaweza's outputs to outcomes and discuss reasons for levels of achievement observed;
6. To document the role of the learning component of the organization – what went particularly well/less well and implications for future programming and future Theory of Change (ToC);
7. To assess the added value to Tanzania (and East Africa) of the Twaweza activities, relative also to other CSO players;
8. To review how donors and strategic partners view Twaweza and its roles; and
9. To make recommendations on the way forward to Twaweza as well as show key results to stakeholders and partners.

Several points are important to note here. The ToR, while specifying the evaluation questions, also provided two reference documents produced by Twaweza in 2013. The first document was prepared to support the first Evaluator's Meeting in October 2013. The second document was the subsequent "pivot note" by Twaweza, which outlined its views of its own successes and challenges and some reasoning for proposing changes mid-strategy (both documents are in Annex 1). While the ToR noted the two Twaweza reports, yet it specified that "[a]n aggregated external evaluation is an opportunity for Twaweza and its development partners to further advance and fine tune the understanding and approach to outcomes before the next strategy period."

We interpreted the ToR and supporting materials as requiring two analytic frameworks. The first is an accountability framework to assess what has been achieved with donor funds and how efficiently it was accomplished and the value for money (VfM). The second, potentially more important, is a learning framework that assesses how these results have been achieved and if they could have been achieved more effectively. In evaluation terminology, the requirements included both a summative component, focusing on what has been achieved, to be combined with formative elements - information useful in improving the programme. We kept the overall guidance from the ToR to be that the evaluation is to provide a "comprehensive summary and aggregation" of Twaweza's activities; and, establish, *on a sample basis*, "the links (substantiated by evidence) between the activities and (a) stated organization's objectives, and (b) other observed changes in the relevant sectors/domains". We also noted in the remarks that this was "not an impact evaluation of Twaweza"² and it was limited to work in Tanzania.

2.1 Methodology

The methodology used for the evaluation has largely been as it was first proposed in the bidding document and the Inception Report. It was tweaked as the evaluation began and as it progressed, in line

² The ToR explained that "Twaweza has, under its Learning, Monitoring & Evaluation portfolio, commissioned a number of independent research institutes/teams to examine the impact of several of Twaweza's core components". We noted and reviewed them.

with many ideas from the Developmental Evaluation (DE) approach³, which is particularly suited to social innovations operating in complex, dynamic environments. We adjusted our approaches, tools, and methods in response to issues, opportunities, and constraints that arose during fieldwork and document analysis to generate timely feedback for an evolving initiative. We ended up adapting and applying elements of participatory evaluation, outcome mapping (OM), organisational assessment, case study, and appreciative inquiry approaches; and we have provided forward looking recommendations for a range of Twaweza stakeholders. Within this “multi-methods” approach, the evaluation team gave priority to case study, organizational assessment, and OM as specified. We have built up a comprehensive picture of the current strengths and weaknesses and future potential of the organization, its outputs and reach, and of the contributions these make to the overarching goals of the organization.

Figure 1 below depicts the activities and the time line for the evaluation. It highlights the multiple points in the evaluation process where the participatory processes were used to sharpen user questions, obtain feedback from key stakeholders, and maintain a Utilization-Focused Evaluation (discussed below). In order to make the multi-methods approach work for the team, team members had to be able to focus on individual pieces, while simultaneously contributing to the parallel and linked areas of evaluation. They also had to be able to share ongoing findings with the stakeholders. To assist the process we came up with several schematic descriptions of our conceptual system map of the evaluation, shown more neatly after several revisions as Figure 2⁴. We found the systems schematic developed in Figure 2 very useful for ourselves, for sharing and discussions within the team, and similarly with the stakeholders, distinguishing organizational development in the upper part and its relationships in the lower half. We have subsequently devised simpler and additional schematics, Figures 3, which focuses on structures; and then Figure 5, which provides additional elements to illustrate activities, outputs and outcomes.

The evaluation approach began with an effort to achieve *improved understanding of the issues* through open-ended stakeholder consultations beginning in the last week of September and continuing until the first week of October. This included joint and individual consultations with key staff from the Swedish Embassy in Tanzania, Twaweza, and the two other principal bilateral donor agencies, DFID and Irish Aid⁵ as well as selected members of the Advisory Board of Twaweza. These consultations⁶ were supplemented by additional document reviews and discussions within the evaluation team to allocate

³ Michael Quinn Patton, 2011. *Developmental Evaluation: Applying Complexity Concepts to Enhance Innovation and Use*; Guilford Press, 2011.

⁴ During the feedback processes, there have been suggestions to improve the schematic representations and many have been incorporated in the revisions. We find there is a balance to be struck between realism and complexities in the schematics; and, the best balance between unnecessary detail and greater “realism” differs considerably. We urge that all the schematic diagrams used here, should *only* be read as a “representation of key elements of the system” being highlighted, and as an aid to comprehension.

⁵ A second round of meetings planned with DFID and Irish Aid could not be held due to scheduling conflicts.

⁶ These consultations assisted in determining the intended users and their specific needs, so as to plan and conduct the evaluation to ensure the use of both the findings and of the process itself to inform decisions and improve performance, an approach developed by Michael Quinn Patton called the Utilization-Focused Evaluation (UFE), see Patton, M.Q. *Utilization-focused evaluation*, 2008, 4th edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. The primary aim of our report is to facilitate decision making, first by Sida and other donors, members of its governance structures now and as it changes, and the Head and staff of Twaweza, to make use of the findings of the evaluation.

team resources and lines of enquiry. At this time we further adjusted our methods. A notable feature of Twaweza is its emphasis on transparency and learning, and the team was provided with over 160 documents at our initial count, which increased to 488 electronic files/documents, some prepared internally and others by external individuals and organizations (listed from an Excel sheet prepared to manage documents in Annex 2).⁷ Given the high quality of many of the documents, and given that many contained reviews of activities, outputs and sometimes outcomes, the evaluation team decided to make greater use of available documents for validation purposes than had originally been anticipated.⁸




Figure 1: Schematic of Evaluation Activities and Time line

The internal document reviews were expanded in stages to include additional key documents, reviews and “state of the art” findings on: the different concepts used by Twaweza, such as “citizen agency”; the links between “agency”, the activities of Twaweza and expected outcomes; and their contributions to longer term goals especially in education and learning. The additional literature reviews focused

⁷ In addition, Twaweza provided the evaluation team a five year matrix of outputs as an Excel sheet (5 year Matrix of Outputs all Units 061014.xls). It contained activities from its management information system in 263 rows, along seven categories, each with up to 30 attributes.

⁸ The team noted that almost always the facts presented were fully validated - data on financial commitments, contracting, outputs produced and most statements of “results”. What was often missing, or was inadequate, include reasons for certain actions taken and not taken; clarity and understanding of the challenges faced by the organization; why some solutions and new and interesting ideas were not implemented, while some others were.

especially on reports and findings that overlapped with the time period of the Twaweza work, and where possible, involved key stakeholders.⁹

In the early discussions with the donor partners and Twaweza, we noted that the donor partners were most interested in the stock-taking, findings on what was achieved, and recommendations for the future. The donor stakeholders emphasized a need to “understand” Twaweza better and to arrive at a simpler narrative of Twaweza. Twaweza staff, on the other hand, was puzzled as to how more information could be provided given the voluminous available documentation of its work (see earlier paragraph on the volume of documentation) and the organization’s priority and emphasis on transparency. One fact established at the inception stage was that, in spite of the copious documentation provided by Twaweza and the focus on transparency, the key stakeholders remained uncertain about what had been achieved and how well the organization functioned.¹⁰

We formed several early hypotheses about what could have reduced the effectiveness of Twaweza’s communication with its donors. An early view was that they did not adequately put themselves in their readers’ shoes, fully understand their needs, or imagine that readers might not know all that the writer knows. This can be due to the curse of different domains of knowledge, including assumptions about jargon and what is commonly or actually known about the diverse fields. A second observation that guided our work was that many seemingly simple issues were very difficult to follow through the hundreds of documents provided.¹¹ Some issues that we were specifically asked to review, such as “governance” and “outcomes”, are contested in Twaweza narratives (see footnote 16 for Twaweza views on outcomes). We planned our work and the report with the goal of meeting both objectives –

⁹ A literature search on the concept of “citizen agency” did not find definitions of the concept that clarified the concept further and Twaweza’s definitions from goal statements (see section 3.1) are used. We did note that some of the early supporters of Twaweza had an interest and desire to expand work in the field of “citizen agency”, but their definitions varied. See for example: “The Changing Face of Citizen Action” by Remko Berkhout and Fieke Jansen, in *Development*, 2012, 55(2), (p154–157), which mentions “historic changes” to citizen action during 2011, (with Arab Spring as the unique event; and, the role of social media and new technologies) and concludes, “knowledge gaps around questions of agency, social mobilization and effective citizen action remain”. Ms. Jansen worked at Hivos on the Twaweza initiative, and was interviewed on this and also completed the survey. She agreed that the Arab spring model was not one that was most relevant for Twaweza. See also “Strengthening citizen agency through ICT: an extrapolation for Eastern Africa” jointly authored by Paul Maassen, of Hivos, who also worked closely on the early development of Twaweza, and was interviewed for this evaluation. Another key actor, the World Bank, has a “Communication for Governance and Accountability Programme (CommGAP)”, which promotes *innovative communication approaches* to improve the quality of the public sphere – by *amplifying citizen voice; promoting free, independent, and plural media systems*, “to demonstrate the power of communication principles, processes and structures in promoting good and accountable governance, and hence better development results”.

¹⁰ The differences in views were noted in the Inception Report of 16 October 2014 shared with stakeholders and additional emphasis was placed on participatory approaches to increase Twaweza’s understanding of the process and findings.

¹¹ Questions have been raised if this is part of the methodology or if it is a finding. We note that the ToR annexed two Twaweza documents, with statements on results and challenges. This meant that from the beginning we were provided with many facts and statements, which needed verification and “understanding”. We mention some early on because the early confirmations of some findings guided our methods, they are mentioned later as relevant and reconfirmed to be important in this evaluation.

stock-taking and “understanding” Twaweza better, and believe that one marker of the success of this exercise will be if all stakeholders find the entire report to be understandable and of value.

Overall, the approach selected included a major focus on the review of documents, contracts, manuals, and processes. This review was unusually rich, and confirmed Twaweza’s adherence to the principles of transparency in its own work and reports. Additional questions were addressed and supplemented through key respondent interviews with donors and partners, advisory members (and a small survey of, and interviews with recent members of the governance structure, see Annex 2 and 3). Twaweza’s work covers several development dimensions, involving unique and novel approaches, and it emphasizes innovation, scale, new partnerships, learning, citizen agency, payment by results, transparency, governance, positive deviance, and others terms and concepts, each with its own theories and approaches, many with rich debates on their value and limitations. As a result, the team has engaged some complex theories (often discussed in footnotes) to assess the relevance and adequacies of the approaches used by Twaweza.

TWAZEZA




Figure 2: System Map and Boundaries for Twaweza as seen in this evaluation

Participatory and Iterative Processes Used

The evaluation was not a ‘participatory evaluation’ --a concept and approach with its own detailed methods. However, care was taken to include participatory processes, within the constraints of time and resources. These processes were employed to obtain participation and feedback by key stakeholders so

as to increase the likelihood of obtaining more accurate and relevant results and to increase ownership of the results. The use of participatory processes in the evaluation was also intended to contribute to Twaweza's future strategy development and learning, a priority for Twaweza. By engaging Twaweza staff in the issues (within major constraints in their availability) and allowing them the opportunity to review and validate evaluation findings, we anticipate future strategy development and implementation of changes are likely to become more meaningful to staff.

Five participatory steps were used. First, the team reviewed the purposes and ToR of the evaluation with the stakeholders to have greater clarity on their different priorities. Second, during the interviews, especially with Twaweza staff, the team attempted to constantly share findings with the interviewees and the stakeholders, within their constraints of time. Third, the Inception Report, which described key assumptions, preliminary hypotheses, and detailed methods, was shared with the stakeholders. Fourth, midway through the evaluation, a very preliminary findings were presented to Twaweza at its Strategic Retreat, where it was reviewing its strategies for 2015. Fifth, there was an early draft report, which was shared with both Twaweza and Sida and then a more finished draft was circulated mid-December. The current report is the final revised version based on feedback and comments from all the stakeholders during January and early February 2015. Given these steps, the diagnosis and prognosis are expected to find wide agreement and support with the key stakeholders, with few surprises.¹²

2.1.1 Area One: The Organization and its Development

This was designed as per the TOR to cover the Evaluation questions (EQ) 1-3.

Organizational Development Benchmark Outcomes of the Twaweza Programme

The team reviewed internal documents (e.g. Board minutes, management reports), as well as policies, manuals, and guides to verify if the programme has reached these benchmarks. Annual plans, reports, and audits were reviewed to assess organizational activities and progress toward the defined benchmarks. The document reviews were supplemented by key respondent interviews.

Effectiveness of the Management and Governance Structure

The team analysed the internal management control, human resources management and procedures and routines for monitoring and evaluation to assess whether these systems and processes meet the current needs of the organization and were fit for the ongoing smooth operation of Twaweza in the future as an independent organization, especially as it makes the transition, with the departure of the founder Head.¹³

¹² These elements are all a part of the methods for a utilization-focused evaluation, referred to earlier. The relevance and value of findings are increased when opportunities are created for engaging stakeholders in interpreting and making sense of the data, information assembled and the effort to understand the larger patterns.

¹³ Twaweza began in 2009 with the founder designated as the Head and another person reporting to the Head, named as the Executive Director (see Board minutes and organization structure of 2009). Both the person and the position of Executive Director disappeared in 2010 documents. The new head, replacing the founder in 2015 has

For this appraisal of the effectiveness of the management and governance structure, we used an organizational assessment tool based on the work of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). We used the tool in a facilitated discussion with the senior management team. This allowed us to examine all aspects of organizational performance, including the enabling environment, institutional capacity, management, financial viability, and staff motivation. As needed, the evaluation team supplemented the facilitated discussion with individual follow up through key respondent interviews, email, and one electronic survey.

Value for Money

In addressing value for money (VfM), the team sought to answer the following questions:

- Does Twaweza have financial and procurement systems in place to ensure that it is procuring the right inputs (supplies, services, etc.) in the right quantity and quality and for the right price?
- Is Twaweza using the funds provided to it efficiently to produce development outcomes? The cost of specific development outcomes varies widely depending on context and methodology, but which aspects of Twaweza's work can be benchmarked and used as proxy for the efficiency of Twaweza's use of funds?

The team approached these questions qualitatively and with indirect metrics as we saw VfM as largely conditional on an organizational culture and ethos that promotes effectiveness and efficiency and management systems and procedures that operationalize activities. We used a mixture of document review, key respondent interviews, benchmarking, and financial analysis to address the questions. We also determined rough and robust numerical approximations to the monetary values of some of the outcomes achieved that could be traced to Twaweza contributions.

The TORs specifically asked the team to look at sub-granting and output-based contracts in terms of VfM. Key questions for this dimension of VfM include:

- What systems and processes are in place for identifying and assessing potential grantees and sub-contractors?
- Has the use of sub-granting and output-based contracts resulted in any problems (e.g. lack of qualified applicants, delays, and under-achievement, under-spending)?
- How has Twaweza dealt with these problems? How does Twaweza mitigate the risk that partners cannot deliver or cannot pre-finance activities?
- How do partners view their experience working with this approach?

Assessing VfM in this context required the evaluation team to interview key staff and select and review a purposive sample of sub-grants and output based contracts in order to assess the degree to which Twaweza's system of sub-granting and output contracts is effective in contributing to the intended development results, efficient in its use of resources to achieve those results, and economic in terms of ensuring that Twaweza is procuring the right resources for the right price. We identified segregated

been designated as Executive Director (comment by Twaweza) and the interim head has been designated as the Acting Executive Director (Twaweza web site).

samples covering commercial entities like media partners, those in the fast moving goods sector, others involving monitoring of deliveries, and, other civil society partners. Almost always, all were often paid in tranches, after delivering on stipulated milestones, and usually received advances or mobilization funds at the beginning. In selecting the sample, we looked at materiality of the flow by size, relevance, and criticality.

We used this sample of sub-agreements and output based contracts to examine the agreements, terms and conditions, total value, and what was actually paid. The contracts were reviewed to examine: any problems, including delays, under-achievement, and under-spending; how Twaweza dealt with problems; and the extent of risk mitigation when partners could not deliver. We also interviewed the relevant contract managers at Twaweza specifically on this issue, as well as the partners/contractors on how the arrangements worked for them and their views on their experiences.

2.1.2 Area Two: Assessing the quantity, quality, and reach of the outputs produced.

The team combined OM with more traditional evaluation tools to examine Twaweza's considerable data on the 'quantity' and 'reach' of the outputs produced, and drew on the situation analysis undertaken before the start of the implementation to examine the outputs and analyze them in relation to the desired outcomes as well as assess their quality, relevance and reach.¹⁴ The outputs with different channels, especially mass media, were examined for quality, relevance and reach. Some of the other partnerships and output channels were examined qualitatively.

One of the principal foci regarding overall questions of Area Two (and partially in Area Three): Outputs, quality of outputs, has been on Uwezo and Twaweza roles, outputs, contributions to and outcomes in education, because the above and communications and media activities, were highlighted by Twaweza and document reviews, as areas of most expenditures and activities, with high reach, and also relate to some of the major positive results achieved. Separately the smaller subset of work on health and water were also examined. In all cases, focus in this area was to examine costs, reach and penetration by activity and in the aggregate.

¹⁴ Early on the team recognized that the word "outcome" was being used more ambiguously by Twaweza than its definition under the normally accepted OECD DAC terminology. The team found that Twaweza used the term very expansively to cover a mixture of activities and outputs, and outcomes - see Annex 6, for the list of activities, outputs and outcomes, provided by Twaweza for the evaluation. We understand an outcome as an *effect* that is produced from an activity or intervention, which produces an output. We consider research, survey, information collection, analysis as activities; when analyzed, reported and disseminated by Twaweza, in different forms, these are outputs. The subsequent results may be to: enhance citizens' knowledge; increase their voice; and enable actions by the citizens (citizen agency), improved media – and, then can be said to be outcomes, towards citizen agency, if that is the only goal. But, if these are *intermediate steps* towards further ends, such as improved health, then they should be labeled as *intermediate outcomes*. Ultimately in the report, we have broken the outcomes into different categories and do not further engage in lengthy debates on what is an "outcome" beyond the most traditional meaning that while activities and outputs are within the control of the organization, outcomes are not fully under the control of the organization.

2.1.3 Area Three: Assessment of contributions to overarching goals

Connecting outputs to changes beyond programme control, in other words to outcomes, is difficult to do and even more difficult to demonstrate, especially in a programme such as Twaweza. Twaweza appropriately planned to deploy a diverse and synergistic set of strategies, engaging with multiple partners, to create changed patterns in what people do and the way they do them. The evaluation looked for evidence of direct and strategic contributions made by Twaweza to the goals.

The methodology used to assess contributions to overarching goals is mainly a simplified approach to Outcome Mapping (OM), adapted as appropriate to the style and content of Twaweza programming. In addition to the focus on education mentioned in area two, we also examined the open government outcomes and the smaller and less successful outcomes in water and health to learn why some worked well and others did not. There is a longer discussion of OM and how it is used in the evaluation in Annex 6. The methodology was in keeping with the ToR, to use outcome mapping, only as far as possible, to “verify and evaluate results beyond the delivery of outputs”; to analyze, on a sample basis, the extent to which the “overall Twaweza programs is likely to stimulate the envisaged citizen agency and action as well as the wider accountability and transparency changes”; analyze and discuss the extent to which such change can be expected to be a sustained effect of the programme investment (“hard facts” not expected); and to assess Twaweza’s learning structure, including external evaluations, and how Twaweza has been learning and evolving based on feedback and evidence. The evaluation took its sample from Twaweza programme components from the five year activity matrix, based on “materiality” with expenditures, length of involvement, and Twaweza list of outcome achievements. The evaluation reviewed all related document and also engaged directly with the partners and stakeholders to confirm outcome changes, as well as the partnerships, their views of Twaweza value added and related evaluation questions.

The time frame of this evaluation was too limited to collect the full range of data to document and evaluate outcomes across the wide spectrum and layers of interaction of Twaweza programming. The evaluation team relied heavily on evaluative information they could harvest from documentary sources made available from existing files. But looking closely at selected outcomes, OM concepts were used to give indications on the extent of linkage among outputs and outcomes and thus the potential progress towards the achievement of the desired outcomes. OM was also used to overcome some of the time limitations. This was done by beginning work in area one on the organizational side and simultaneously (or in parallel) in area three on outcomes, with work in area two linking outcomes back to the organization through the analysis of activities. The simplified version of OM adopted used several steps in the “intentional design” process to examine how programme activities and outputs were intended to reach their intended audiences, and also the responses and results from such reach. The time and resources for this evaluation were sufficient for the team to develop a sense of the level of performance and outcomes achieved across a wide spectrum of activities and the many interrelationships in Twaweza programming. Relying heavily on interviews and evaluative information harvested from documentary sources made available from existing files, the evaluators cross-checked and verified findings by triangulating across sources.

We assessed the quality of the outputs and the processes by which they were produced (in area two), as well as tracking whether and how the target audiences were consulted about their information needs and interests, whether drafts or pilots were pretested, and how the context was assessed and used in designing the outputs. For the components involving large-scale production and mass dissemination of

outputs, quality assessments included the extent to which feedback mechanisms were built in to enable the programme to gauge receptivity, relevance, and most importantly, knowledge, action, and response. We conducted a very small experiment to observe how one output with high reach could potentially further contribute to the outcomes desired. Much work relied on the existing large scale monitoring exercises undertaken by Twaweza, most often by third parties. The evaluation examined in depth five major outcome stories on education and four on other public policy changes; all providing evidence on what Twaweza did and how and to what extent Twaweza contributions influenced and brought about social change, which combined the summary of the views of over 35 interview partners (donors, strategic partners, CSOs) on specific outcome narratives of Twaweza's work.

2.1.4 Area Four: Integration of findings – Conclusions and Recommendations

Findings were continuously cross-examined and checked against each other and with the wider set of pertinent literature and best practises to ensure both consistency and quality of individual findings. The data and analysis were also triangulated across the themes to ensure validity. The staging of work was designed to improve precision in the later stages of the evaluation, as stakeholder feedback on findings from each stage indicated interest for greater precision on certain specific questions and findings. This process was used to identify and analyse relevant issues and patterns and to develop integrated findings, which were the basis for the main conclusions and recommendations on the way forward for Twaweza and donors.

A complex task that faced the evaluation team was to define success in the Twaweza context and determine what criteria and standards should be used for judging its performance. Twaweza has many formal statements of values, outcomes, and goals, which needed to be understood in relation to its evolution. Sometimes an early mistake can be understood or justified as appropriate to the circumstances of organizational stage, if it contributes to learning, and, is not repeated. Depending on the situational context and the real choices and options available to a decision-maker, what seems clearly a mistake with the luxury of hindsight, could well have been perfectly reasonable and even optimal under the constraints of that time. Three steps were used to measure success and judge performance: first, we reviewed the stated goals and objectives of Twaweza; second, we interrogated them based on the best evidence that had been available to guide Twaweza's choices; third, where appropriate and relevant, we used our experiences in similar efforts as comparators to judge Twaweza's performance.

The conclusions draw out both some of the major successes and challenges of Twaweza's work in Tanzania for the period in question. Great care was taken to not be biased by the benefits of hindsight, not to second-guess choices that had been made in the past, and to minimize personalizing the conclusions.¹⁵ But we have attempted to explore what factors could have, or most likely, contributed to successes and challenges. The recommendations made follow directly from the conclusions and avoid any attempt to forecast the future.

¹⁵ Given the nature of Twaweza, a bold, ambitious initiative, designed and led by a founder Head, who is admired for his drive, hard work, vision among other characteristics, many successes are attributable to his direct contribution, but also not his alone as the efforts were supported by many individuals and organizations. Similarly, many challenges faced were contributions of multiple constraints that were faced.

2.2 Limitations

As noted in the ToR (Annex 1), the evaluation limited its analysis to Twaweza's work in Tanzania. No attempt was made to examine the organization's work in the other countries where it works. On occasion, independent evaluations conducted in the other two countries are cited when they illustrate similar results to those identified in Tanzania. The contributions of Twaweza's work to outcomes outside the region are mentioned briefly, when relevant. Examples include some LME documents that looked at activities, outputs, and outcomes in the other countries, when they illuminate Twaweza influences. The focus, however, remained on Tanzania. Finally, in the stakeholder survey, several persons with wider regional experience mentioned that more attention is required on the other two programme countries and this suggestion has been retained as a possible area for the attention of the new management in 2015. Given the time line for the evaluation it was not possible to conduct comprehensive assessments of each question, complete organizational assessment or a full OM. Twaweza undertook many highly interconnected activities, with many units and partners, and so it was not possible to fully untangle each and every one. While this was done to a considerable extent, each complete narrative thread is hard to report on¹⁶ within the various other narrative frameworks imposed by the evaluation questions.

Given the fact that Twaweza has moved away from its original Theory of Change (ToC), a comprehensive evaluation of the ToC was not attempted nor a replacement provided. Twaweza itself has produced a new ToC, which is touched upon in our report. But neither the ToC nor Twaweza's reorganization, which was ongoing during the evaluation, is addressed here.¹⁷

Since the field work for the evaluation was conducted during fall 2014, the evaluation has largely used the data sets, especially on expenditures that were available for the period until the end of 2013. Many ongoing programme activities have been reviewed to more recent periods, sometimes to mid-2014; other current work being undertaken by Twaweza has not been reviewed¹⁸. Twaweza had begun to revise and develop new strategies and plans for 2015 a few months before this evaluation, which continued during the evaluation period. It was agreed upon during initial discussions with evaluation stakeholders that a review of this ongoing planning would be premature. We do make recommendations for Twaweza going forward in 2015, with a few comments on the new ToC that has been proposed, but more work would be required to review its future plans. This work is best left to the new Head and the new governance structure that will be developed in 2015.

This report presents the unanimous view of the independent external evaluation team.

¹⁶ The challenges that the evaluation team faced in reporting in a clear and concise fashion the "contributions" of Twaweza could also be similar to what Twaweza has faced, with many stakeholders commenting "they did not fully understand what it did". In the next section we report on why it has proved difficult to be both concise and clear. Solutions to greater clarity in reporting must begin with an improved ToC. We emphasize that we do not mean a "simplified" or "less ambitious" one, but a clearer ToC, that better specifies goals and objectives, intermediate targets and the means for attaining them. When they are clearer, reporting should also become clearer.

¹⁷ The ToR, objective 6, asked to document the implications for the future ToC. The evaluation could have engaged more with the ToC and with Twaweza's thought processes. That was not done, as it would have required much longer discussions with Twaweza, which was not possible due to the other organizational demands on staff. The ToC is commented on in the conclusions and for further work in the recommendations.

¹⁸ Sometimes facts and reports are referred to, which occurred after the fieldwork was completed. These were noted during the feedback and revisions process from mid-December 2014 to the end of February 2015.

C. Twaweza: Background and Context

At its most basic, Twaweza is an “initiative” that officially began operating in 2009. Since its inception, it has operated as a “project” managed under the supervision of Hivos, supported by a multitude of donors (see table 3). Twaweza’s headquarters are in Dar es Salaam. All its activities take place in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. The principal activity of Twaweza is the promotion of access to information and expanded space for public action among citizens across East Africa, through research and experimentation, information sharing, brokering new partnerships, learning, and communication; and finally, it has a specific focus on improving service delivery for citizens.

3 A Brief Narrative

The story of Twaweza is relatively unique and cannot be understood without sufficient narrative background of its formation - the person and the ideas, which inspired this initiative; and then was followed, by its growth and evolution over the five years, with many challenges between ideas and their execution. It was an idea that was formally worked upon between 2007 and 2008 by Rakesh Rajani, its Head and founder, while he was between organizations. He took this time to analyse what was needed in his view to accelerate development in the three East African countries.¹⁹

The 2008 strategy document discussed Twaweza’s origins to have been from “over 15 years of civil society work done in Tanzania, and in particular the experience of Twaweza’s Head in leading the Kuleana Centre for Children’s Rights, HakiElimu and the (NGO) Policy Forum”; work that focused on policy engagement with expanding the space for citizen voice – “enabling citizens to better claim their rights, follow-up and secure increased transparency and delivery of basic services.” This past work provided for the conclusion that *enabling citizens to have access to information and engage with monitoring and public work is essential to enduring social change*. The second stimulus for Twaweza was a desire of several US based foundations and the International Budget Partnership (IBP), SNV and Hivos to expand their work in transparency, accountability, and citizen agency in East Africa, where Twaweza offered an opportunity to contribute. So Twaweza provided the vehicle for a joint initiative with multiple donors to work in the region. Finally, the concepts had built upon country assessments in Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya between February and August 2008²⁰, with workshops and consultations with over 160 people and with the concept revised several times, with “comments from about 75 thinkers and practitioners across East Africa and globally.”²¹

¹⁹ Many of these ideas are sketched out in the first strategy document “Twaweza! Fostering an ecosystem of change in East Africa through imagination, citizen agency & public accountability”, dated October 21, 2008. We use that primarily and the revised strategy document of 2011, where relevant. The 2008 document, on pages 98-102, provides a bio of Mr. Rajani. He has sometimes been described as a “serial social entrepreneur”, one who connects that connect his vision to that of many technological and social media entrepreneurs, and is well known from reports on Silicon Valley.

²⁰ The assessments were supported jointly by Hewlett, the IBP, and Hivos.

²¹ Ibid, pg. 86-87.

3.1 Twaweza Goals and Objectives

Twaweza defined its purpose – “by promoting wide access to information, citizen engagement, and public accountability, Twaweza will enable millions of ordinary citizens in East Africa to²²:

1. Exercise agency – i.e. access information, express views, and take initiative to improve their situation and hold government to account
2. Access basic services (primary and secondary education, primary health care, clean water) that are of better quality, and exercise greater control over resources that have a bearing on these services.”²³

There was an acknowledgement of **high ambitions**: the aim to **catalyze deep changes, at large scale, across three countries**. Twaweza recognized such changes would require sustained time and engagement and so sought for its effort an estimated minimum required period of ten years. It set its goals, objectives, and benchmarks with the same long term perspectives with outcomes provided for years 5 and with goals to be achieved in year 10. Twaweza provided the following metrics for 10 years (Table 1) and for 5 years (Table 2).

	Twaweza: 10 year goals (in 2008 strategy and the 2011 revised strategy)	
1	Millions of ordinary citizens in East Africa access and communicate information related to basic rights and services, accountability and other related matters	Specified in 5 year metric, Table 2.
2	Openly express and debate views on basic services/resources and issues of concern to themselves, and contribute to a better-informed public debate on these matters	Specified in 5 year metric, Table 2.
3	Monitor service delivery and other public institutions, and elicit greater responsiveness from government	Specified in 5 year metric, Table 2.

²²The original Strategy document 2008 and the revised document of 2011 are used here. We add that the changes in 2011 did not seem highly significant to us. We note that Twaweza did not define its purpose as “to” provide access to information, etc.; so information was *the main tool, an intermediate output and with debate as another intermediate step*, so as to exercise agency - hold governments to account, and, access basic services of better quality. This has created an ambiguity in judging its results as discussed later.

²³ Ibid, pg. 32.

4	Exercise influence over the management of public resources to provide effective and equitable service delivery	Basic education (primary and secondary) 85% of primary and secondary school teachers show up to school and teach 90% of funds meant for schools reach school accounts 20% report knowing what to do when teachers not present or funds don't reach schools Basic health (primary health care and public health/prevention) 75% of health workers in primary and district level facilities show up to work and deliver care 70% of (a selected set of) essential meds available at primary and district level clinics 20% report knowing what to do when medicines or staff are not available
5	Better access to improved basic service delivery - basic education, primary health care and water	80% of children in Grade 4 are able to read and count at the Grade 2 level (Uwezo) 90% urban and 70% rural have access to piped or covered water within 30 minute fetch time 50% are aware of water treatment means and enjoy increased access to water treatment options 20% report reduction in water insecurity and water-borne illnesses

Table 1: Ten Year Goals as set by Twaweza in 2008 and repeated in 2011²⁴

Citizen agency	Metric – 5 years (as in 2008 strategy document)	Metric – 5 years (as in 2011 strategy document)
1. Access to information:	40% of young people, men and women in 75% districts have increased access to information about news, services, entitlements and options	20% of young people, men and women in 50% districts have increased access to information about news, services, entitlements and options (Note: only change here, reduces ambitions for this one metric))
2 Exercising voice	20% of young people, men and women in 75% districts have increased opportunities to express their views and opinions in a public sphere/to public body	20% of young people, men and women in 50% districts have increased opportunities to express views in a public sphere/to public body (here only the scope is reduced from 75 to 50%)

²⁴ The 2011 document does not use the same tables as the 2008 document, nor does it say that any of the 2008 goals were dropped. Our disaggregation suggests that in 2011 Twaweza only made one small change in Table 2. Note also that the words used in Table 1, Column 2, Rows 4 and 5, are taken from the five statements in the 2008 document, preceding the tables. In addition the goals specified X% to experience better health and similarly to water, where the X was to be set subsequently.

3 Monitoring services and government	10% of young people, men and women in 50% districts have increased opportunities to monitor services/ public bodies and use the findings to promote improvements	10% of young people, men and women in 50% districts have increased opportunities to monitor government, public resources & service delivery
4 Making change happen	10% of young people, men and women in 50% districts have an increased sense of being able to make change happen, and can cite an example of having done so in the last 12 months	At least 10% of young people, men and women in 50% districts have an increased sense of being able to make change happen, and can cite an example of having done so in the past 12 months

Table 2: Twaweza Metric for Citizen Agency - 2008 and 2011 documents

A close look at column one in Tables 1 and 2 suggests a lack of precision in setting up these indicators. For example, if 40% of people improve access to information and 20% of citizens increasingly express their views or “voice”, given the size of the population of the 3 countries, then millions of people would already have achieved the same outcome in 5 years as specified for 10 years. Second, in the 3rd and 4th metric of “citizen agency”, the same people would have already have “used the findings to promote improvements” in services, achieving the development goals emphasized for year 10. This is not meant to be pedantic or a criticism of what could simply be poor editing and communications. As the evaluation progressed, a hypothesis was made that in fact such mis-specifications and a lack of critical attention to *certain specific details* are common and persistent in Twaweza documentation. This was also observed in the ToC diagrams - one simple circular loop developed in 2008 and a second “spaghetti” diagram²⁵ on the “ecosystem” – were retained until abandoned in 2013. They provided a very useful and attractive pictorial representation of the ideas, but that could not be called a ToC. It had become clear by 2011 that many elements and the “ecosystem effects” proposed and illustrated were highly challenging. The lack of a clearly articulated results chain required the team to make some assumptions on what Twaweza imagined was required to connect inputs to desired results. We suggest in the findings some factors that most likely contributed to the persistence of statements and representations, which if resolved earlier would have made for improved clarity for Twaweza and for stakeholders.

The 2011 Strategy document provided a summary of key changes to the 2008 Strategy (page 54). In our view, the situation analysis provided is largely repetitive, except adding popular culture is seen as “a potential powerful sixth network that reaches millions, particularly young people”²⁶, and the first Uwezo assessment completed is referred to. The document states that the “Theory of Change” provides “sharper understanding”, “tighter articulation” and a “sharper change pathway diagram”. Also, it believed that now – “Goals and outcomes and result frame covering all aspects of Twaweza clearly articulated”, were surprising words in retrospect. The numbers in column two above, were stated without any basis or model that we saw. The numbers are targets, without steps on how the targets would be reached or how they would be measured.²⁷

²⁵ Words used by Twaweza when it was abandoned in 2014, see minutes of Twaweza Twelfth Joint Advisory Board and Donor Partners Meeting, Thursday 4 September, 2014, page 8.

²⁶ That idea was not expressed again. But some attention to youth issues and activities focusing on youth could have been an expression of this insight.

²⁷ There was some new and useful information in the 2011 document, notable is an illustrative box containing examples of six partners that Twaweza planned to work with, which added information on how some partnerships worked.

3.2 Additional Specifications

To the defined results in Tables 1 and 2 – Twaweza also planned in 2008 several other outputs, such as to generate and disseminate knowledge about how:

1. information and citizen agency contribute to change
2. to stimulate state responsiveness and accountability to citizens
3. interventions can be scaled up and sustained
4. to promote learning that informs and improves practice

In addition it further defined Core programme result areas as:

1. Access to information

1. More ordinary citizens are able to access information about their rights, responsibilities and entitlements related to basic services, public resources, governance and other issues of interest to them.
2. Available information is popularized and disseminated widely.
3. Sources and content of information are more diverse, as are vehicles for transmitting information, especially at local levels.
4. Citizens have more opportunity to generate and disseminate information and views, including through use of new technologies.
5. Twaweza establishes a one-stop information centre on basic service delivery and accountability, providing useful comparative information and being used.
6. Clear evidence that information access is contributing to action and accountability.

2. Quality media

1. More in-depth and accurate reporting, with deeper investigative journalism and follow-up.
2. Improved quality of writing and better researched articles, with increased triangulation of sources.
3. Greater diversity of voices, particularly of and by poor/rural/excluded communities, in the media.
4. Increased reach of media, particularly in rural areas.
5. Enhanced and better informed debate of major public issues through media.
6. Clear evidence that media is contributing to action and accountability.

3. Monitoring/public watch

1. Greater understanding of citizens' right to and value of monitoring service delivery, government performance and public resources.
2. More practical options, tools and means for monitoring available to citizens.
3. Increased monitoring undertaken at both local and national levels.
4. Increased knowledge about/independent verification of the relationship between policy/laws/budgets and practice, and the effects of policy on people.
5. Clear evidence that public monitoring is contributing to action and accountability.
6. It planned to achieve its results by a focus on four programme domains:
7. Making practical information available at community levels;
8. Deepening media quality, plurality, reach and independence;
9. Enhancing citizen monitoring through 'public watch' activities;
10. Learning, documentation and effective dissemination of lessons

Twaweza’s approach was stated, “to promote learning-by-doing, link and develop capacity in the course of undertaking work, continually reflecting on practice, listening and learning, taking risks and making adjustments as needed.”

3.3 Five Partnerships and Ecosystem

This was an interesting feature of Twaweza’s approach to expanded reach, to begin with five key institutions, networks, and leaders that already have a substantial reach, (networks that ‘touch’ large numbers of people every day) and that have the capacity to act as agents of change. The idea was to partner with media (mostly radio, TV, newspapers, and, new media) and, with mobile phone networks, commercial goods distribution networks (such as for laundry soap, sugar and flour), faith-based organizations (Islamic associations and churches), and trades unions (particularly those of teachers) – networks that already have a presence in almost all communities and touch very tangible citizen concerns.

3.3.1 Partnership Criteria

Twaweza went on to define seven criteria for each partnership (applied in making judgements and approvals and codified into the review and approval processes):

1. Goal focus – partners have to have broad but clear goal that is either citizen agency focused or on key service delivery like health, education and water targets
2. Citizen agency focus – one or more of: citizen being informed; citizen monitoring policy and practice; citizen voicing/speaking out in public; citizens acting to make change
3. Reaches scale/strategic – be able to **go nationwide**. Numbers involved will vary but at last programmes need to reach one million people²⁸
4. Basis of partnership – partners’ contribution is in accordance with its comparative advantage
5. Powerful/innovation, creativity, imagination – the notion that creativity and strategic people make things happen like social entrepreneurs
6. Ecosystem effect – have multiple ways to be informed and act
7. Openness to learning – more possible with civil society like partners

3.4 Summary of Goals, Objectives, Metrics and Benchmarks

The above brief statements indicate the extremely ambitious results that Twaweza proposed to achieve - with a very large scope of work and tremendous reach, together with new, exciting, and innovative partnerships, which would create an “ecosystem of effects”. In more prosaic terms of evaluation benchmarks, it set itself to achieve 5 major long-term development goals over ten years. There were four intermediate outcomes in “citizen agency” alone, which happened to have many overlaps with the long-term goals. But again there were 22 further sub-categories for citizen agency and 4 major knowledge outputs, all to be achieved through 5 new types of partners, who must each fulfill 7 characteristics.²⁹

²⁸ Our emphasis is on the target for minimum reach.

²⁹ The seven desirable partnership criteria were embedded into the partnership development and selection process.

In judging results, the questions that arise include, for example - if only 2 partnerships worked out, is that in itself a failure and can it be called a failure if with only 2 partnerships all goals were achieved earlier? A second issue is that when these categories are not mutually exclusive, how should they be disentangled? In reporting on results, Twaweza often stated that the “glass” was both half full and half empty.³⁰ Not only was the glass often only half full, Twaweza never revisited the development goals³¹, metrics, and benchmarks to review if it had the correct metrics to measure accomplishments and shortcomings, nor did it articulate short-term benchmarks that could guide it and its stakeholders as to what may lie along the long road, before the end.

The lack of precision and the poorly articulated ToC clearly contributed to the “lack of understanding” by some key stakeholders of the Twaweza story. A further question as to if they also contributed to reduced success and learning by Twaweza will be discussed later in the findings. The full list above suggests a possible 700 attributes and influences together that could be mapped and examined. At a minimum, depending on how they are counted by influences, intermediates results, good to have attributes, and so on – at least 30 items to watch out for, narrate, show what worked and did not work, etc. When these many and unwieldy aims are combined with the weak ToC and additional challenges faced during implementation, such as staffing constraints, it means that many nuances and details can get lost in Twaweza presentations, making them difficult to follow. This evaluation also had to deal with the challenges posed in developing narratives which “clearly show outcomes with the contributions” and in “using outcome mapping” because of the long list of potential outcomes and assorted metrics.

³⁰ For example the introduction to the annual report for 2011 states it was “a year of the glass half full and half empty”. It said Twaweza had failed to develop as many partnerships as anticipated; or enough of an ecosystem effect; or spend its budget. At the same time, it “sharpened” approaches, influenced national policies in education, stimulated the public imagination, main evaluations got off the ground and began to generate valuable lessons. The report concluded “We could interpret the facts to tell a compelling story about 2011 in either direction; the truth in all likelihood is that we have both succeeded powerfully and fallen short”.

³¹ Revised goal statements were made (see page 15, Annex 1, of this report, Twaweza pivot note, 2 October 2013) which accompanied the ToR. In the revision, it was proposed “The current metrics for Twaweza and Uwezo would be revised”; for Citizen Agency – “continue to focus on its core information and citizen agency related mission, but do so with a greater level of articulation of the meaning of citizen agency as well as the pathways, actors, incentives, motivations and mechanisms that are expected to trigger change” but this was only proposed, and remains to be undertaken. It went on to say, “Twaweza continues with its focus on basic education and attainment of related goals”. The document suggested no change there, and it lowered Twaweza’s ambitions by declaring “Twaweza drop its commitment to achieving ambitious health and water goals”.

D. Evolution of Twaweza

The previous section summarised that Twaweza began as and remains an initiative, managed by Hivos. It began with one person and a set of ideas developed in 2008, many of which clearly set out a premise that Twaweza was an experiment, containing within it more experiments, large and small.³² While it remained technically a project managed by Hivos in 2014, it has also increasingly acquired the shape of an organization, with the aim to become independent. The target date, set for 2013 in 2011, was postponed. Twaweza is currently operating with the objective of becoming an independent non-profit company, limited by guarantee, and registered in Tanzania with rights to operate in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda, with a new date of 2015³³. This section summarises some of the key developments in its organizational history up to 2014 that are most relevant for the evaluation questions. It covers the evolution in governance, reporting, budgets, and staff and concludes with a brief description of the current structure.

4 Key Milestones 2009 - 2014

Twaweza began its operations formally in early 2009, with the appointment of the Head, followed by the appointment of an Executive Director, both of whom participated in the first Board Meeting of May 21-22, 2009. The strategy document of 2008 provided the initial blueprint for Twaweza. It defined itself as a “young and innovative initiative that believes strongly in transparency”,³⁴ and in “learning and experimentation”. The main Twaweza office was planned for and remains in Dar es Salaam, with smaller teams in Nairobi and Kampala. Twaweza planned to be ‘lean’ – with a total staff size across all three countries expected at 18 – and this had to be modified. It was to be guided by a single Supervisory Board, which would include local and international authorities and also representatives of Twaweza donors. The Board underwent many changes.

Twaweza made shifts along the way as it found that some of the original ideas did not work. For Twaweza, 2009 and 2010 can be characterized as the initial set up period, when staff were first recruited, offices were set up, furnished and equipped, management systems were developed, with initial processes and controls guided by Hivos, and activities were initiated. To have a swift start, Twaweza began with the existing framework of Hivos’ organisational policies, systems and procedures. While this may seem lengthy for a set up period, setting up and operating in three countries with an ambitious agenda is inherently complex. It was able to hire the first staff for Kenya in 2010 and in Uganda in 2011. The objective to have a very “lean” structure was challenging, as was finding and

³² The strategy promoted - risk-taking and innovation, and experimenting with new approaches.

³³ It has been reported that in 2015 Twaweza has made the transition to an independent entity with a new Board.

³⁴ The desire for transparency is illustrated by the copious documents Twaweza generates about its work and many of its successes and challenges.

retaining staff with the appropriate experience and skills, to be brought on board with sufficient continuity (both these points are illustrated in Table 7 below).

The year 2011 was important in that there was a revised Strategy document that year, updating the strategy document of 2008. The new document articulated some of the challenges faced in the two years of implementation (others were reported in annual progress reports). It highlighted the issue of “enhancing citizen agency”; the theory of change, partnerships and “ecosystems effects” remained unchanged. The Uwazi concept was revised and the period of work was extended by one year from 2013 to 2014 to allow more time. The level of staffing was increased significantly to around 35, almost double the numbers proposed in 2008. At the end of 2011, there was also a flood in the main office in Dar es Salaam, which destroyed many files, furniture, and equipment, leaving sludge and debris. Operations were delayed by three months. An unexpected consequence was a better equipped and functioning office, with new equipment and furniture, by the end of 2011. Starting in 2012, Twaweza appeared to have grown out of multiple teething problems, and the operations improved with increased staff. Additional highly skilled managers were brought in to direct key programming and support functions; they provided a more stable second tier of management, supporting the Head. “Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation” and “Communications” were identified as two separate programming areas, with a new manager for Communications; Uwezo was more integrated within Twaweza; and Uwazi was better defined than it had been earlier. Finally, with better office infrastructure and new and better IT systems and software to manage its operations, Twaweza operations and activities really took off. In 2013, there were finally a number of evaluation reports that questioned the ToC that Twaweza had used so far and the “citizen actions” it had hoped for. They suggested that the “citizen agency” component and its links to development outcomes need to be rethought, and that the Twaweza ToC was both unnecessarily complicated in some aspects and poorly articulated in others. This led Twaweza into an exercise to redefine its work and structures in 2014, which was underway during this evaluation and is not covered in this report.

4.1 Donor Support

Twaweza began operations with the early support of five donors: DFID, Hewlett Foundation, Hivos Netherlands, SNV and Sida, who had provided over five million US Dollars to the initiative by the end of 2009 (see Table 3 below). Irish Aid joined the group of donor supporters in 2011 and AJWS³⁵ in 2012, making a total of seven donor supporters. The last two donors are relatively small, providing for around 5% of the total funds. Sida is the largest donor with a contribution over one quarter of the total resources made available. The remaining four donor partners have provided broadly similar amounts, each contributing around 18% of the financial resources. By the end of 2013, the initiative had received a little less than 40 million dollars³⁶ from all the donor partners.

³⁵ American Jewish World Service.

³⁶ All dollars used in the report are in the US currency.

TWAWEZA DONOR FUNDS 2009-2013 USD (From Twaweza Annual Audit Reports)							
	Donor	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
1	DFID	650,040	890,520	2,973,460	-	1,623,337	6,137,357
2	Hewlett Foundation	1,400,000	2,800,000	-	1,000,000	2,000,000	7,200,000
3	Hivos Netherlands	502,653	953,250	1,365,000	1,289,500	1,980,000	6,090,403
4	SNV	1,316,500	2,100,000	975,000	1,950,000	-	6,341,500
5	Sida	1,306,170	2,306,400	4,489,500	-	3,792,500	11,894,570
6	Irish Aid	-	-	1,301,900	-	-	1,301,900
7	AJWS	-	-	-	350,000	350,000	700,000
	Total Donor Grants	5,175,363	9,050,170	11,104,860	4,589,500	9,745,837	39,665,730

Table 3: Financial Contributions of Donor Partners to Twaweza

4.2 Budgets and Expenditures

The original five-year budget that had been anticipated for 2009-2013 had been an ambitious US\$ 68 million. But as Table 4 (source annual audit reports) indicates, Twaweza lowered its spending goals in its annual budgets by almost 14% to a little less than US\$ 60 million Table 5 shows the allocation of the budget for the same years and also for 2014, where the numbers have been taken from the Annual Plans prepared.³⁷

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Grant Programs	3,200,000	6,195,000	8,701,700	10,618,700	10,850,737	39,566,137
Communication	325,000	382,000	254,150	321,000	1,452,100	2,734,250
M & E	394,000	1,104,000	800,000	1,498,000	1,419,600	5,215,600
Total Programme Costs	3,919,000	7,681,000	9,755,850	12,437,700	13,722,437	47,515,987
Staff Costs	1,094,000	1,164,500	1,235,500	2,382,319	2,300,000	8,176,319
Operational Costs	750,300	476,000	691,000	699,200	562,900	3,179,400
Total/Staff Operational	1,844,300	1,640,500	1,926,500	3,081,519	2,862,900	11,355,719
TOTAL	5,763,300	9,321,500	11,682,350	15,519,219	16,585,337	58,871,706
Contingency Reserve	88,000	200,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	588,000
GRAND TOTAL	5,851,300	9,521,500	11,782,350	15,619,219	16,685,337	59,459,706

Table 4: Twaweza Budgets 2009-2013 in US Dollars (from Annual Audit Reports)

³⁷ There are some discrepancies between the budget figures in the Audited Reports, in Table 4 and the budget figures in the Annual Plans, Table 5. As the numbers for the budgets were highly “aspirational” (see Table 6) the small differences between them are not material.

Table 5 provides the actual expenditures of Twaweza for the years 2009 -2013. It shows that Twaweza was only able to spend US\$ 28.4 million in the three countries during the same period. That compares with the original planned five-year budget conceived at an ambitious US\$ 68 million, and later revised in Annual Plans to around US\$60 million (see Table 4 above). In 2013, the most recent completed year for which full figures exist, Twaweza spent around US\$ 9 million per year on its programmes and operations in the three countries. It is noteworthy that for each of the years 2009 to 2013, for which audited figures are available, Twaweza always underspent its proposed budget by almost half. A possible positive trend may be discerned, in that while in 2010, when only 35% of the budget was spent, there was an improvement in each of the subsequent years. In 2011, it improved by almost 10% and then 5% for each of the years 2012 and 2013.

Actual	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2009-2013	Var%
Grant Programs	1,495,543	1,762,497	2,771,563	4,855,572	5,336,572	16,221,747	59%
Communications	53,773	114,792	100,351	58,784	627,481	955,181	65%
L M & E	201,902	346,947	452,848	430,727	953,772	2,386,196	54%
Total Program Costs	1,751,218	2,224,236	3,324,762	5,345,083	6,917,825	19,563,124	59%
Staff Costs	552,186	760,775	1,050,919	1,936,791	1,876,180	6,176,851	24%
Operational Costs	677,134	347,671	635,722	499,343	418,688	2,578,558	19%
Total/Staff Operational	1,229,320	1,108,446	1,686,641	2,436,134	2,294,868	8,755,409	23%
GRAND TOTAL	2,980,538	3,299,649	5,179,110	7,737,089	9,234,573	28,430,959	52%
% Variance (Expenditures to Budget)	49	65	56	50	45	52	

Table 5: Twaweza Actual Expenditures 2009-2013 (from Annual Audit Reports)

4.3 Staff

Table 6 below shows the staff in Twaweza between 2009 and 2014 and illustrates several issues between its original “plan” and the requirements for implementation that Twaweza faced and had to overcome. Its plan to be super ‘lean’ – with a total staff size across all three countries expected at 18 had to be modified by 2011. This only partly began with the need to absorb Uwezo operations fully within Twaweza in 2011. But even without anyone in Uwezo in Tanzania and Uganda, the number of positions had gone up to 23 in 2011 compared to the initial goal of 18 persons³⁸.

An additional challenge for Twaweza as an “organization” was the total number of persons with the appropriate experience and skills that needed to be searched for, found, and selected. These people then had to be trained and inculcated into Twaweza’s ways of working, culture, and mission. At the same time, Twaweza needed to maintain sufficient continuity.

³⁸ Note Uwezo was run separately until 2011, when it moved to Twaweza, and so 2011 figures are not fully representative.

Location	Organization	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Tanzania	Twaweza	7	12	14	23	27	27
	Uwezo	N.A.	N.A.	0	4	2	5
Kenya	Twaweza	0	2	4	6	2	2
	Uwezo	N.A.	N.A.	2	2	9	8
Uganda	Twaweza	0	0	3	5	5	4
	Uwezo	N.A.	N.A.	0	0	5	6
Total Staff		7	14	23	40	50	52
Vacancies					8	9	7
New (Growth)		7	7	9	17	10	2
Hired & trained		6	7	9	25	19	9

Table 6: Staffing at Twaweza 2009 to 2014 (source Twaweza)³⁹

This challenge is illustrated in the final row in Table 7, which reports that 50% of people in 2010 were new. In 2012 almost 60% were new and in 2013 almost 40% were new. Subsequently it will be seen that the challenge was not only in the numbers but also in gaps over the period in key positions, such as in LME, one of Twaweza's priorities.

4.4 Organization Structure

While Twaweza's overall goals, objectives, and related metrics have remained the same during the period being evaluated, its structures and processes to achieve them have undergone reviews and adjustment.⁴⁰ This section describes the key components of Twaweza structure as seen in 2014. The map below provides in a simplified graphic some of the key components and the basic approach of Twaweza. Uwezo and Uwazi conduct research and analysis, the former on annual assessments of basic educational achievements and the latter around the delivery of basic social services and government accountability. The results are communicated through the partners to citizens, civil society, and policy makers through a variety of methods. The improved information obtained through the research should amplify the findings through media, other partners, and discussions in civil society. Better informed citizens should result in an increased citizens' voice. This advocacy should in turn lead to improved policy and government actions. Ultimately, the combined effect should improve the delivery of basic services such as education, health, and water in terms of both improved access and quality. Over time, this should lead to a more healthy, educated, and confident citizenry that can hold government to account. The map also highlights the importance paid to learning and monitoring and evaluation by Twaweza.

³⁹ The Twaweza Annual Report for 2013 (page 28, web version dated 12 August 2014, states - it "required a total of 62 employees across the region. Of these, 21 positions were vacant as of early 2013".

⁴⁰ Each Annual Report and Plan provides with it the organizational and staff changes for the respective year.

MAP




Figure 3: Twaweza: Structure and simplified system map of actions

Operations: Responsible for all core internal functions - Human Resources, IT, Finance Procurement, Office and Asset Management, Policies and Systems has always been a core unit. The major changes along the years have been increased staff and functional sub-units to handle the large volume of work and, most positively, increased capacity and use of improved IT systems, which have contributed greatly to the ability to manage the relatively high volume of contracts, payments, and related activities efficaciously.

Programming/Partnerships: This unit is responsible for the bulk of Twaweza programmes and expenditures (that do not belong within Uwezo and Uwazi) through various partnerships with media, mobile phones companies, fast moving consumer goods companies, teachers and religious groups – the five defined partners and also others. The work done by this unit is reviewed through the reviews of activities, contracts, and work with partners, and linked to important outcomes.

Uwezo (“capability”): Uwezo, which conducts the learning assessments, began as a small experiment in the region in 2008. Rakesh Rajani, before founding Twaweza, reviewed for the Hewlett Foundation a proposal by Pratham, an Indian non-government organization, for the Annual Status of Education Report

in India. He was inspired by the approach to undertake large annual household assessments on learning outcomes from primary schooling. Uwezo began in Tanzania (and Kenya and Uganda) in 2008 as a small personally managed pilot project, adapting and testing the approach in the three countries. In 2009, it was organised more formally and was housed at TEN/MET, an umbrella education network located in Tanzania.⁴¹ In October 2011, it moved from TEN/MET to Twaweza. It had been organizationally separate, with different funders and board, but was gradually integrated into Twaweza. This is a flagship programme of Twaweza, and is discussed thoroughly later in terms of activities and contributions to Twaweza outcomes in education.

Uwazi (“transparency”) had earlier been named Infoshop. The original concept in 2009 was for a one-stop information “warehouse” for all citizens. This idea was abandoned in the 2011 revised strategy document, which focused Uwazi on budget work, sector analyses, and national surveys. In this change along with the formation of the formal strategic engagement unit in 2011, one can see retrospectively that Twaweza was adding a “public policy” dimension to its work, where analysis and evidence could influence key actors, who might be more inclined to respond to the evidence directly and through the media.

The transition begun in 2012 has resulted in its development as Twaweza’s research unit, managing the collection and analysis of data, in initiatives such as “Listening to Dar (350 household mobile phone survey in Dar es Salaam); the Sauti za Wananchi (“Voice of the People”) mobile phone polls (2,000 households in mainland Tanzania) and producing Policy Briefs.⁴² It also manages experiments such as the KiuFunza (“Thirst to Learn”) Random Control Trials of 3 interventions in education (covering 11 districts, 21 schools per district, 7 schools per intervention, plus 14 control schools. This repurposing of its work has resulted in some potentially outstanding successes discussed later in the findings.

Strategic Engagement: This is a small, recently formed unit, led by the Head of Twaweza, which focuses on national and global level strategic engagement with key actors including governments, civil society, media, academics, philanthropy, the private sector, and politicians, so as to influence thinking and policy. It builds relationships that serve to promote Twaweza and support policy advocacy. In particular instances, such as the Open Government Partnership, it has served as the basis for developing major strategic initiatives. It was created in response to the observation that Twaweza otherwise missed important opportunities by being too occupied with operations.

⁴¹ Uwezo Kenya and Uganda were similarly housed in Kenya and Uganda together with two other education oriented NGOs, namely Women Educational Researchers of Kenya (WERK) and the Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF).

⁴² It is notable that while this was announced, the Unit had no manager, and a vacancy in the remaining three positions was allocated. The Wananchi Survey was targeted to be monthly, and it was suggested “may be increased”. An interesting option put forward was to consider doing work for others against a financial contribution, so as to eventually make the survey self-sustaining.

Communications: The Communications unit was recently created (it was earlier within LME, even as late as in the 2011 Strategy revision (see chart page 51)). This has been responsible for conceptual, creative, and technical backstopping and a quality assurance function for Twaweza’s communication partners and products. It also serves the more traditional function of communicating about the organization and its work, through media launches, a website, and social media. Given the large focus on public and policy engagement, it has a relatively heavy load. With this change, and with seven staff in the unit, the capacity and delivery of Twaweza has improved considerably. Some of its work with innovative media partnerships is discussed under activities and media partnerships such as Mini Buzz, Ni Sisi (a public relations/advertising campaign)⁴³.

Learning Monitoring and Evaluation: “Fostering learning” was stated to be “foundational” for Twaweza in the 2008 strategy document. Twaweza consistently emphasizes learning as a priority.⁴⁴ It aims to “document and communicate contextual lessons, good practices, and insights – about what works and what doesn’t and why” that will be of use to others in the region and beyond. In addition, “a set of internal monitoring tools would be established” and “an independent body recruited to undertake a rigorous process of evaluation” (see chapter 6). Throughout, emphasis was stated to be on the “measurement of change, outputs, and outcomes”. Twaweza elaborated further – “For both learning and accountability for results, we view conceptual agility, risk-taking, innovation and honest self-criticism as important features of any change effort; and ‘failure’ as an opportunity to learn lessons and try something different; collect information on what works, why it works (e.g. How many people are reached by different information channels, what messages are getting through)” and feed it back into programming. Outputs and challenges are discussed in the findings as this was a specific evaluation question.

4.5 Governance

Twaweza was begun as an initiative supported and managed by Hivos, which provided for a ten million dollar grant.⁴⁵ It was to be guided by a single Supervisory Board, which would include local and international authorities and representatives of Twaweza donors.⁴⁶ The 2008 document emphasized

⁴³ Communications provides support across units. Minibuzz is managed under partnerships and Ni Sisi under communications.

⁴⁴ All strategy documents, plans, and, annual reports emphasized Twaweza aims, intent and efforts to promote LME.

⁴⁵ See 2008 Strategy document, page 2.

⁴⁶ Ibid, page 51, (and spelt out in Annex 1) had stated that the Supervisory Board “will be the highest governance body of Twaweza. It will approve the overall long-term (5 year) strategy and budget, and scrutinize annual plans and reports (including audited financial reports). It will engage with Twaweza at a higher strategic level, by providing feedback to proposals and reports; inform its conceptual and intellectual development, and link it with relevant international endeavours. The Board will appoint, support and hold accountable the Head of Twaweza. It will also oversee the appointment of independent evaluation entity and its terms of reference”. It would have about 10 members: 5 experts and 5 donor representatives. The Twaweza Head will be accountable to the

that the initiative would have ideally been housed within an established East African institution, but none appeared suitable to manage the proposed scope of work. Hivos was chosen for this task because of its contributions and “values, high standards and track record of 30 years of grant making in East Africa.” From inception, the goal was that Hivos would have overall legal responsibility, while Twaweza positioned itself as an independent initiative with its own mission, projects, and identity. Overall governance was to be provided by a “Supervisory Board”, whose terms were presented at the first Board meeting for Twaweza on May 2009.

By October 2009, at the second meeting of the Twaweza Board (the fall meeting is always by phone and not in person) an agenda item was presented that “Following clarification⁴⁷ of the legal status of what was originally called the Twaweza Supervisory Board ”a new structure would be created called the Twaweza ‘Advisory Board’. It also stated “the revised body now plays *a critical advisory role (rather than governance or decision-making function {our emphasis added})* that is sharply focused on substantive and strategic programmatic, evaluation, learning, and communication aspects. The overall legal, governance, and oversight responsibility lies with Hivos, consistent with the articles of incorporation under which Twaweza operates.” Exactly how governance should best be structured remained an issue for discussion for many years. At the April 22- 23, 2010 meeting of the Twaweza Board, it was confirmed⁴⁸ that it was an Advisory Board and that “it will no longer play a *governance or decision-making role, as overall legal, governance and oversight responsibility will lie with Hivos.*”⁴⁹

The issue came up again in the Board Meeting of May 2011,⁵⁰ where the role of the Advisory Board was clarified and Hivos was confirmed to have overall financial and administrative oversight.⁵¹ This suggests that there was a need for clarification and a possible feeling by Twaweza management that it was too

Supervisory Board of Twaweza overall, and to the Hivos Director of Programs and Projects (who is also a member of the Supervisory Board).

⁴⁷ This clarification and its reasons were not available in the documents provided to the evaluation.

⁴⁸ Minutes of Board Meeting, April 2010, Agenda Item number 11. The minutes also had a number of additional points on which we did not find any further discussion or documentation. It noted “The May 2011 meeting will be the last one where donors are present in the Advisory Board. Between April 2010 and May 2011 there should be one compulsory annual meeting between donors and Twaweza and one other meeting which can be virtual or face to face. Members of the Board felt that this was a healthy arrangement. Twaweza may invite donor representatives to sit on the Advisory Board.” It then noted that a question was raised about “what will happen when Twaweza becomes an independent organization, and whether the Advisory Board will then transform into a Governing Board”. There was another note – “at the moment Twaweza is identified with Rakesh and this dependence is a risk for Twaweza”.

⁴⁹ It added “scrutinizing of financial statements will form part of the role of the donor organizations”, but “statements would “still be available to the advisory committee (sic)”.

⁵⁰ See agenda items 5 and 11.

⁵¹ It stated – “The Advisory Board should not get involved with these matters, and instead keep its focus on strategic and program aspects, particularly theory of change”. “Both boards (our clarification – Advisory board and Hivos Board) need to provide space for the management to design and implement these strategic directions in an accountable manner”. The revised strategy document of August 2011, reported the changes in detail, emphasizing the role of the Advisory Board on “strategic, programmatic, evaluation, learning and communication aspects”, and the “conceptual and intellectual development”.

hemmed in. It was agreed that action was required to develop clear division of roles between Hivos, Twaweza, and the Advisory Board. At the same meeting, on a separate item (11), the Board discussed the proposed “Legal Structure towards an Independent Twaweza” to be done in 2011, while “the switchover from Hivos to the independent Twaweza will only take place at the end of 2013.”⁵²



Figure 4: A representation of issues for good and effective Governance

At the meeting (in Item 12), the nature of the Advisory Board was discussed again, concluding that after September 2011 this Board would no longer have any donor representatives. Donors would meet separately with Twaweza as a group from 2012, and the terms of this engagement were to be worked out. At the next meeting (11 May 2012), the separation was achieved by having a meeting of the Twaweza Advisory Board and Donors Jointly in the morning, followed by a separate meeting with donors only in the afternoon. The evaluation has no additional documented evidence in 2013 and 2014 on any further discussions on how the governance system that evolved worked in practice. It was a question posed to the sample of participants at these meetings in interviews and a questionnaire. Their views are reported in Annex 3 and some points that emerge are summarised under governance in the next section under findings.

⁵² In the discussions the Hivos director noted that a set of “organizational benchmarks need to be drawn related to administrative, financial and HR systems and management between Hivos and Twaweza management, which would need to be achieved prior to transition being completed” and he expected “a closer engagement between Hivos and Twaweza than had been the case in the past”.

4.6 Reporting

From the outset, Twaweza took pride in having “One report-one budget”. It intended to compile *one common set of plans, budgets, and reports* for everyone at the start of the programme year. This was intended to provide a comprehensive picture to all and to “reduce the reporting time so that Twaweza staff can focus energies on the achieving results.”⁵³ Twaweza set out the broad principles of its reporting as having one detailed annual report meeting all *reasonable* donor requirements, with a comprehensive account of progress made in relation to the programme proposal and annual work plan. All reports⁵⁴ would be fully public documents published on its website. The common reports and other major issues would be discussed at the annual meetings in mid-May and there would be a virtual meeting by telephone conference in September to discuss the mid-year reports.

4.7 Concluding Remarks

Before we move to the findings along with the evaluation questions and our assessments, we summarize here that establishing a new organization is by itself always a challenge and that a number of aspects had been underestimated at the start. Twaweza undertook to tackle several other challenges simultaneously. First, it was challenging the status quo in multiple ways – changing the culture, changing the climate for accountability, and improving services. Second, it was trying something new, large, and ambitious in three countries. And third, it aimed to work with new and different sets of actors/partners for an ecosystems effect. This and other sets of aims and objectives and their combination are all easy to state on paper as a strategy document (as summarized in Section C), but naturally much more difficult in implementation and in practice. The presentation of the evolution and milestones in this section suggests that staffing, building the organization, and providing for appropriate governance that gives strategic feedback to this collective initiative, with one report that serves different stakeholders, with dedicated communications unit coming on board only in 2012, are likely to be highly challenging factors.

⁵³ The staff would thereby be freed to “elaborate on the indicative directions, specify in more detail the activities to be undertaken and how funds will be spent; and adjustments to program and budgets”. To further reduce transaction costs, exchanges would be handled in these meetings rather than bilaterally; donors were not to be provided with separate reports, and donor missions and visits were discouraged, though donors were invited to “participate in ongoing work” where this would not cause disruption or “unduly influence outcomes”.

⁵⁴ It was stated to be “highly analytical and reflective”, have “a substantive discussion on the effectiveness of Twaweza strategy, lessons learned and implications for future” and the “financial report will conform to the International Financial Reporting Standards and be audited by an internationally reputable audit firm”.

E. Twaweza: Findings

Structure of the Section

The findings are targeted to respond to the specific questions posed for the evaluation and are organized in the same sequence. In this first section, 5, we address the principal evaluation questions one to three (EQ1-3), from area one relating to the organization and its development. Here the focus is on the current status of the organization. In section 6, we discuss and assess the findings related to some of the questions on EQ 4-8 on outputs, their quality and reach. In section 7, we present area three; some observed effects and contributions of Twaweza's outputs to outcomes, with the reasons. We point to the fact that it has a large and complex programme with multiple planned outputs; they often work together in their influences, with different partners, and synergistic combinations lead to the outcomes at a higher level. Hence most units have both individual activities, some lead to direct outputs, and others are comingled with other outputs, to generate outcomes that are observed. To remain true to the formulation of the evaluation questions, we organise the discussion here along the three areas, the "observed effects and potential contributions of Twaweza's outputs to outcomes" could be provided in other ways.

5. The Organization and its development

5.1 Organizational development benchmarks

The detailed assessment of the current status of each of the organizational development benchmarks and the related group of questions is based on observations, interviews, and document reviews.⁵⁵ The assessment and the current status of each of the organizational development "benchmarks" that Twaweza set for itself is provided in a detailed report provided separately.⁵⁶ Seven of eleven benchmarks are achieved, two are in progress, and one concerning the registration of an independent Uwezo has been dropped. Initially in 2011, Twaweza and its Boards agreed to integrate Uwezo as an integral part of Twaweza, but with operational autonomy within Twaweza. This integration was largely completed operationally in 2012, but the strategy, plans, and budgets have been maintained separately. It was reported that complete integration would be reflected in the overall Twaweza strategy, plans, and budget starting in 2015.

⁵⁵ Complete details have been provided in a 50 page report, originally annexed to this report and available with the Swedish Embassy and Twaweza. The process used and the methods of verification are provided in Annex 3.4. The word Twaweza labels as "benchmarks", are in the most part, lists of things that need to be done, or indicators and targets of desirable outputs, some to measure the progress of the organization (e.g. % of staff positions filled). They are all reasonable targets, but they do not provide for Twaweza's progress to be measured against any particular standard or reference and they do not include any development benchmarks.

The indicators and targets are deemed to have been reasonable for improving organizational performance. But organizational development is complex, and the “benchmarks” focus on only some of its dimensions. They include dimensions like legal status, human resources (HR) and financial management, facilities, communications, and monitoring and evaluation. All are relevant but insufficient measures of institutional performance. The institutional assessment done for Sida in 2011 and undertaken for this evaluation demonstrates many additional aspects of organizational performance that should be assessed.⁵⁷

The two “benchmarks” that have not yet been achieved relate to the independence of Twaweza. This was originally planned for 2013, but we were advised that it has been delayed following legal advice. Twaweza now plans for legal independence in 2015. We understand this is a matter for the management at Hivos to complete, and in the interview with the Hivos representative, we were assured that is proceeding with great care⁵⁸. Important tasks and milestones should be developed for the transition to the independent Board and its structure and functioning. The nature and functioning of the governance board should likely be reviewed in the interim based on the review findings that in the previous version the strategic advice and feedback functions did not work to the fullest extent.

Based both on our assessment and from the feedback from the stakeholder survey, Twaweza has made good progress on all the relevant indicators. Some are fully achieved and for some, *it is almost there*. Some of the benchmarks should be removed from the list, such as the independence of Uwezo, which had been planned but will now be integrated into Twaweza. New benchmarks should report on the integration and performance of Uwezo.

Twaweza’s policies, procedures, and workflows regarding HR, office management, financial management, programme investments etc. are fully documented, computerized, and functioning. It has sound systems for the management and control of activities, including: a sound financial management system, comprehensive programme and project management, and a monitoring and evaluation system. It is highly transparent, and the strategies, policies, and procedures that govern the organisation are readily available to staff. In addition, there is a process for reviewing and revising management policies and procedures, including delegation at a minimum of every two years for the review and approval of the Board. The ability to attract and retain the right people remains relevant, as does the ability to achieve clean audits. As shown in Table 7, Twaweza suffered from high staff turnover earlier so those benchmarks should remain.

The staff requirements, their growth, many vacancies and high turnover were already mentioned in section 4.3. Twaweza was reviewing the HR skills it will need to address in its new strategy and to support transition at the time of the evaluation. Twaweza staff contracts have been for two years and were to end as of December 31, 2014. The review of HR needs was undertaken to position Twaweza and

⁵⁷ Sida, System Based Audit for Hivos Tanzania – Twaweza Initiative, Draft Version (2011), Gracemary Bange.

⁵⁸ As mentioned earlier, it has been reported that in 2015 Twaweza has a new Board.

its staff to meet the new organizational goals and strategies being developed. This created a certain amount of insecurity during the evaluation period. We were informed that most staff were being retained and had received new contracts in November.

Over the last year, the Finance unit underwent a significant transition: several staff were replaced and the organization changed the accounting software it was using from Pastel, which had difficulties integrating with other Twaweza Management Information Systems (MIS), to the Xero Accounting Package, which is a robust, web-based system that allows real time access to financial data for managers in all three countries. In addition, the new Senior Accountant, a former auditor with an international firm, strengthened performance.

The current HR Manual and Financial and Administration Regulations were both approved by the Governance Board in March 2010. These manuals include the delegation levels. Twaweza's current policies and procedures are being reviewed and revised in order to ensure they align with the needs of the evolving organization. These revised policies and procedures will need to be endorsed by the new Board.

Workflows for most processes have been fully documented in order to implement them on Salesforce, and most are computerized and functioning. There are some gaps, however. For example, HR and procurement functions have not yet been fully computerized, but the process for reviewing and approving programme investments is operational. This is a Cloud-based system that can be accessed by staff from all three country's offices.

Audited financial statements have been prepared for Twaweza every year by international accounting firms: Deloitte and Touche audited in 2009, 2010, and 2011, and Ernst and Young were the auditors in 2012 and 2013. These reports are posted on the website. Each of the audits contains the auditor's opinion that "the accompanying financial statements presents fairly, in all material respects, the financial affairs of the initiative, and its financial performance and cash flows for the year in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards." This opinion is said to be "clean" or "unqualified" opinion and is given when the auditor does not have any significant reservations in respect of matters contained in the Financial Statements.

5.2 Effectiveness of the management and governance structures

For this evaluation, the team conducted a rapid assessment of organizational capacity using an online tool based on the IDRC institutional assessment methodology and a facilitated discussion with key management staff. This was also supplemented by document and contract reviews, site visits and one-on-one interviews with staff and also partners. This updates the previous Systems-Based Audit

conducted in 2011 and largely agrees with its findings on management. Here our focus is on assessing how well Twaweza is functioning rather than describing the system.⁵⁹

5.2.1 Management and Organization

We assessed the management and organizational capacity including leadership, structure, human resources, financial management, infrastructure/facilities, programme and process management, and inter-organizational linkages. We looked at the political, legal, and regulatory environments, as well as the social, cultural, and economic context. Based on the information we collected, the biggest challenges for Twaweza's performance are, first, communications and transportation infrastructure and, second, the difficulties in finding many candidates with the right skill sets in the local labour market. On the political side, even though it raises issues that the government often finds uncomfortable, and there will remain a degree of political risk, we believe Twaweza's strategic links combined with a degree of greater openness and competition in the political sphere make political risks low and manageable.

We were informed that the staff found Twaweza's mission and goals inspirational. The overall vision and objectives were well understood. But they wondered how well other stakeholders understood Twaweza. We assessed how well the organizational culture, incentives, and rewards align, and the staff views were largely positive: they appreciated that Twaweza promotes and practices transparency, for example, including through responding to the "Glasspockets" criteria⁶⁰. Staff felt that the incentive system rewarded good performance and that the expectations and appraisal system for rewards was clear and fair. However, the early termination of all contracts during the transition (during the evaluation period and subsequently renewed) was seen as de-motivating and stressful.

The leadership was highly rated by those interviewed. There are frequent meetings with staff to communicate ideas and decisions and increased delegation in recent years. Staff stated that their ideas were listened to and that they had considerable agency to move ideas forward on how to improve performance. The management team taking over during the transition felt that one of the strengths of strategic leadership in Twaweza was the ability of the team to disagree, argue, and come to a decision. The inclusiveness of processes like strategic planning, where staff and stakeholders were involved, was seen as an important step in building commitment and consensus. At the same time, the change in leadership also created a high degree of uncertainty. Staff concerns included the changes of the Head of Twaweza, delays in appointment, and when and how the new Board would be structured and operate.

Staff stated that, within Twaweza, reporting and accountability relationships were clear, job descriptions were clear, and HR policies and processes were understood. The assessments made suggest that Twaweza has a committed and qualified team of staff led by knowledgeable and experienced managers. It will be important to review the organization chart and human resources in the future to ensure that a

⁵⁹ Full details of the assessment undertaken are with the Swedish Embassy and Twaweza.

⁶⁰ Glasspockets is an initiative that champions transparency, see more at: <http://glasspockets.org/about-glasspockets#sthash.DzZIKhfc.dpuf>

good fit remains between them, the mission and strategy, and the initiatives selected. Twaweza has a well-developed HR Manual, which is available to all on the website, and there are job descriptions for every position and a clear process for recruitment. In addition to interviewing staff, we reviewed the current policies and manuals and found that HR management overall is progressive and effectively implemented. The current structure, relatively stable over two years, seems to work relatively well. There were uncertainties around the current transition, the new strategy, and a new structure (both under discussion during the evaluation).

The financial management system has a clear segregation of duties, a financial and administrative accounting manual with procurement guidelines and authority levels, and an electronic accounting system (Xero). The manual is available to all staff, managers throughout Twaweza have real time access to the financial information, and there are clearly defined delegation levels and processes. Overall, the organization's controls on cash and assets are well defined and pretty tight, in part to respond to concerns about pervasive corruption in East Africa. The audit reports do not identify major problems. The Management Letters from the auditors identify areas for improvement. None of the items were material compared to the size of budget.

However, more relevant and urgent is that the system is currently not fully integrated to provide updated planning information on use of the budget⁶¹. It tracks all budgets and expenditures, but only as individual contracts and contract status. It does not produce sums of the commitments made to date under signed contracts. This represents a potential risk that a manager could commit more than is budgeted and run into problems if all the contracts have to be paid in full. But also important, this is one of the reasons why Twaweza appears unable to compare contracted commitments to budget line items and expenditures under budget line items. This is more relevant to why the expenditures are always well below the budget in all years (see Tables 4 and 5). This lack limits the ability to feed current years expenditures into next year's budgeting process, where managers would use historical information together with new expectations to develop the next year's budget. The failure of Twaweza to prepare realistic budgets has been and continues to be a major weakness and a source of concern for all donors.⁶² Fixing the system and preparing more realistic budgets must be an important milestone for 2015.

Infrastructure and facilities were good. Our site visits revealed that Twaweza has pleasant offices and modern equipment (computers, furniture, and fittings) and staff had the equipment and software needed to do their jobs. Our assessment is that the facilities are sufficient to support operations, although staff noted frequent interruptions to electricity and Internet services. Twaweza takes steps to manage these problems, which are part of its operating environment, and the technical support staff is excellent at solving problems.

⁶¹ This is based on discussions with the accounts and IT staff, and it was stated that a new software module to enable greater integration and additional queries is being worked on.

⁶² Twaweza did report commitments and expenditures for major partners in its 2010 and 2011 Annual Reports.

Twaweza has strong programme management systems. It has clear guiding policies and strategies, and activities management is documented at each stage. New systems like "Salesforce" are making this even better. However, managers noted that monitoring and evaluation (M&E) had been a weakness over the period being evaluated. With new staff and a monitoring plan for each activity, this is better than it was, and there is now data on all programming. That said, the system is still evolving.

Process management is also strong. In addition to the manuals identified above, Twaweza has five-year strategic plans, Annual Action Plans with Budgets that are created collaboratively, salary scale with levels, an annual performance appraisal system, and an M&E system. Staff and management meetings are regular and frequent (weekly staff meetings, monthly management team meetings, monthly Head and managers meetings, quarterly managers meetings, and annual planning meetings for all staff). The management team reports that delegation has improved over the five-year period, which has improved the timeliness of decision-making.

"Partnerships" are an important part of Twaweza's work, with the vast majority of Twaweza's programmes implemented through partners. Twaweza has relationships with many organizations, many through its strategic engagement activities. It also has contractual relationships with multiple suppliers, including the evaluators, researchers, and survey firms supporting its monitoring and evaluation work. Twaweza also considers as partners those it works with to implement programming: mass media, mobile telephony, consumer goods networks, religious bodies, and teachers.

The final dimension assessed was organizational performance, which looked at *perceptions* of effectiveness, efficiency, and relevance. The Twaweza team felt that the organization had not been as effective as hoped. They noted that they had been very effective in the education sector but much less so in health and water, although they had had some achievements there too. Twaweza's work is relevant to its stakeholders and its target audiences. The government of Tanzania has become an important partner in the Open Government Partnership. In addition, some ministries are now asking Twaweza to help them with surveys. Five of the key partners indicated that they used Twaweza research, not just in their work with Twaweza but as an information source in reports and proposals.

In summary, we found that Twaweza's policies, procedures, and workflows regarding HR, office management, financial management, programme investments etc. are fully documented, computerized and functioning. There are sound systems for the management and control of activities, including a sound financial management system, comprehensive programme and project management, and a Monitoring and Evaluation system. It is highly transparent and the strategies, policies, and procedures that govern the organisation are readily available. In addition, there is a process for reviewing and revising management policies and procedures, including delegation, at minimum every two years for the review and approval of the Board. As systems can always be adapted in response to changes in the organization and the environment, making sure this is being done on a periodic basis would be a useful internal benchmark.

HR remains a challenge due to: the very high level of skills and experience required; competition for people of the requisite level from international NGOs and organizations; and continuing staff turnover. The rate of staff turnover and salaries and benefits as a proportion of operating budget could be maintained as two useful indicators. Planning and Financial management must be strengthened by ensuring the accounting system is more integrated and then towards more realistic budgets. Variances are far too high. Twaweza needs to continue to refine its budgeting process: spending only half of their budget indicates that planning and budgeting are not realistic and do not engender confidence. There have been small improvements but more remains to be done. A possible Indicator could be the trend in variance as a percentage of budget by budget categories with a 10% variance being a reasonable target. Continued clean audits and management implementation of recommendations from the Management Letter will be important.

Overall, in our judgement, Twaweza's management structures and systems are sound and largely meet the needs of the organization; however, staff retention and budgeting systems remain areas in need of improvement.

5.2.2 Governance

In section 4.5, we reviewed how the idea of having a single Supervisory Board changed between 2009 and 2011. Twaweza continues to operate as an initiative under Hivos, with a high degree of independence. This arrangement allowed Twaweza to begin operating quickly under Hivos' registration and to use its management procedures and systems to manage funds. Hivos has played an important role providing Twaweza with the needed base, support in terms of staff time and funds, and a substantial degree of supervision.⁶³ The Head of Twaweza reported to the Director of Programs and Projects at Hivos.⁶⁴ The same director and another staff member of Hivos constitute the two-member "Governance Board of Twaweza". This two person Board provides oversight and makes all decisions. It has the legal responsibility for ensuring statutory compliance and appointing external auditors and banks. It approves organizational policies, multi-year strategies, annual plans, budgets, and reports, and provides guidance to management on programme and operations, including issues related to management of programme budgets, expenditures, investments, monitoring and evaluation, and financial, administrative, and IT systems. It also reviews the performance of the Head on an annual basis and approves all management policies for Twaweza, which are reviewed every two years for needed updates.

We had noted that defining the ideal governance system for Twaweza proved surprisingly challenging and was revised annually between 2008 and 2012. There was a critical gap in the meaning of

⁶³ Hivos is a Dutch international development organisation founded in 1968. It signed the agreements with donors and is accountable to them for oversight. Currently donor funds flow through Hivos in the Netherlands to the Hivos-Twaweza Initiative.

⁶⁴ Currently Ben Witjes is in the above position. He was interviewed for this evaluation and he also provided his views in writing in the survey of key stakeholders. See the annex for key stakeholder views.

“governance”, which in our view, include all mechanisms in place to set up and evaluate performance against objectives, manage resources, and execute tasks efficiently and effectively, as shown in Figure 4. If the Advisory Board did in fact play an important role in “strategic and programme aspects, particularly theory of change”, it did have a governance role, while it clearly did not have a legal, financial, or administrative role, which was the role of Hivos. Strategic directions, allocated to the Advisory Board; Management, Execution and Compliance, divided up between the Head of Twaweza and Hivos; and Relationships and Reputation, mainly handled by the Head of Twaweza required greater integration⁶⁵. This also illustrates that being fully transparent, does not always promote “learning” to take place, as learning requires answers to why a change is being made, what the implications could be, and, what was found to happen after the change. The governance systems were found mostly adequate for ensuring legal and statutory compliance, in the review done (see verifications in Annex 2.4). They were found to be inadequate for providing strategic guidance to a complex initiative such as Twaweza (see Annex 3 stakeholder views).

There is a need to develop new mechanisms that allow for greater coherence between the stakeholders. It is important that any change is managed within the first six months of 2015 in parallel with the joining of the new Executive Director. This is an urgent requirement, unless Twaweza achieves its transition to independence and has a new Board in place before that. Should the transition happen sooner, there are a large number of planning requirements, including but not limited to: determining the size, structure, and composition of the Board; recruitment of persons with the appropriate skills mix; and rules of operation. It is always useful to plan for and conduct Board Induction training to make sure that all new Board members understand their roles and responsibilities and that they have sufficient information on Twaweza’s operations and programme to effectively oversee them. It is our understanding from the interview with Hivos that it is fully cognisant of its many responsibilities in managing such a transition. Should the process be delayed and the current structure be continued, several improvements to the work of the Advisory Board must be undertaken⁶⁶.

5.3 Financial and procurement system

Twaweza's financial management systems and processes, including the procurement processes, were assessed and found to be designed to carefully steward funds and ensure value for money. The purpose of the procurement policy is to enable Twaweza “to procure quality goods and services at the least expensive price, in a manner that is efficient, transparent, accountable and consistent with best business practices.” Both our assessment and the prior one in 2011 confirm that Twaweza has sound management systems and functioning management controls, including clear approval authorities for authorizing expenditures at different levels as laid out in the Financial Manual, which also contains the

⁶⁵ The reports we saw did not address the questions as to why the changes were required, what problems were to be resolved, and whether the challenges were in fact resolved.

⁶⁶ This paragraph was written when it was not known how and when the governance structure of Twaweza would change. It has been reported that early in 2015, Twaweza has now attained an independent status with a new Board.

processes for procurement. Management controls reflect an ethos of transparency and prevention of corrupt practices. The organizational culture includes a strong focus on cost-control and achieving results, and managers are cognizant of balancing these factors in their programming. Procurement decisions are made by a minimum of three people and approved by the person with the requisite level of delegated authority. In addition, the Accountant, who has not been involved in the selection process, verifies that Twaweza's policy has been followed before effecting payment on procurement.

5.4 Efficiency in Use of Funds and VfM

As noted in several sections, Twaweza is careful with the use of resources. The contracting processes and systems in place ensured that each expenditure, which we reviewed, was relatively efficient for the activity supported. In addition we were able to document two benchmarks for Twaweza's use of funds: staff remuneration and benefits and Sauti za Wananchi polls. We also provide an estimate of value for money based on a rough minimum estimate of value of one outcome to project expenditures.

- The remuneration and benefits survey showed that Twaweza salaries and benefits made up only 17% of Twaweza's annual operating budget, while the median rate for the ten comparator organizations was 27%; the average was 25%.
- Twaweza had the second highest operating budget, but only the fourth highest number of staff: the operating budget per staff was TZS 518.6 mil for Twaweza, while the median value for the ten comparators was TZS 143.2 mil. It is also important to note that Twaweza's budget for salaries, benefits, office rent, equipment, etc. was 29% of the total budget in 2009 but dropped to 25% in 2013.
- Twaweza pays high relative salaries but few benefits, for example, it does not provide company vehicles or transport allowances, but pays staff well enough that they can pay on their own for transportation. This is administratively efficient.⁶⁷
- Sauti za Wananchi national surveys cost about 15,000 dollars per survey compared to more than 125,000 dollars per for a commercial survey firm. The World Bank is replicating this method in other African countries and the Ministry of Education is now asking Twaweza to conduct surveys for it: this is an indicator of its success as well as the cost effectiveness of this approach.
- The total cost of programmes in Tanzania has been approximately USD 15 million over five years.⁶⁸
- This allowed Twaweza to generate useful information and then reach audiences ranging from 5 to 10 million citizens with over 100 very useful messages; the cost of the research and outreach is only about two dollars per citizen reached, or about 2 cents a message.

⁶⁷ Organizational Barometer Ltd., Tanzania Non-Profit Organizations, Remuneration and Benefits Survey, Twaweza Specific Report, 2014.

⁶⁸ Rough estimate made and confirmed with Twaweza, allocating 53% of total expenditures to Tanzania.

- It also allowed Twaweza to influence payment to schools. There are about 17 million school students whose schools are supposed to get capitation grants⁶⁹ of TZS 10,000 per student. Twaweza's research shows that schools are receiving less than half of this, on average. If, as planned, the government releases the TZS 10,000 per student directly to schools, the net gain for education in Tanzania should be about 46 million per year⁷⁰, or significantly more than the total cost of Twaweza operations in Tanzania for the five years.⁷¹

5.5 Sub-granting, output-based contracts, and value for money

Twaweza issues a signed contract or a purchase order for everything that will require a future payment above TZS (Tanzanian Shilling) 200,000. The evaluation team reviewed the contracts ledgers for 2009, 2010, and 2011 and the spreadsheets for 2012 and 2013, selecting individual contracts for more detailed review. In 2009, the organization signed 56 contracts. By 2013, the last full year of operations available, Twaweza issued 972 contracts and agreements. Agreements and contracts are entered into with Twaweza and are signed by the Head. Prior to signing an agreement, Twaweza either follows the procurement process or the programme process. Deviations from the processes are infrequent and minor according to both our sample and to past audits.

The majority of contracts were small, short-term, and transactional in nature (for the purchase of goods or services); there were, for example, many internships and consultancies in most years. The largest value contracts were partnership contracts, and we selected nine of the major partners in Tanzania for review. Criteria included size, coverage of all categories, and complementarity with the outcome mapping exercise. This group accounted for about one third of Twaweza's partnership expenditures in Tanzania.

Twaweza's partners are channels for communications. As noted above, Twaweza's messages are reaching up to a third of the population of Tanzania at a cost of around two cents a message, so overall the sub-granting and output based contracts are producing value for money. However, this varies: each partner contract has a specific purpose, discrete outputs, and a different price. File reviews show that

⁶⁹ These grants were set in 2002 at approximately \$10 per child enrolled in school, when the national Primary Education Development Program (PEDP) abolished school fees, as a substitute source of funds for textbooks and other teaching and learning materials. The PEDP, by abolishing school fees, reversed a decade old World Bank inspired national policy on education, and resulted in the rapid rise of primary school enrolment, reaching almost 100% by 2007, a landmark achievement. See earlier comments – also see footnote 69 below

⁷⁰ Primary school enrolment was 8.3 million in 2007 according to UN Chronicle, 2007 – at <http://unchronicle.un.org/article/towards-universal-primary-education-experience-tanzania/>; taking that number, at approximately 1,800 TSH per USD, the total transfer by the government to schools would amount to over USD 46 million.

⁷¹ DFID questioned that the “idea that Kiufunza/COD RCTs has / is likely to influence Govt. to release much higher volumes of financedoesn't currently hold water. Govt is budget constrained in 2014/15 due to many factors and in recent years has increasingly released less in cash and also promises to provide books in kind (and generally hasn't). We discuss later that we believe this is too pessimistic and the likelihood is higher.

Twaweza staff was very conscious of costs, checking the prices of inputs provided by their partners, for example, to ensure that the proposals were realistic. There are different delegation levels for different amounts. It was noted that all contracts were scrutinised in detail but it could not be ascertained whether the systems could be lightened to improve efficiency without increased risk of losses.

5.6 Systems and processes - grantees and sub-contractors

Twaweza's procurement process is used to identify contractors. Partners are identified either by Twaweza, which initiates a discussion around how they might work together, or by the partner, who contacts Twaweza with the idea. In both cases, Twaweza's partnership criteria apply. These are posted on the website.

- Twaweza develops programme ideas (its own or those coming from partners) into one page notes that are shared with managers before moving ahead with developing them further. As the idea works its way through the process, various members of the Twaweza team bring their differing expertise to bear, refining the idea. The partner is only asked to develop a full proposal if a decision is made to move forward on the idea. Twaweza then reviews the proposal, discusses improvements, and conducts due diligence assessments. The proposal is posted on "Salesforce" (a very efficient and transparent cloud-based software), where it can be reviewed, commented on, and improved by staff throughout the organization, including line managers, other managers, and the head. Final approval is in line with delegated authority levels and the Accounts unit reviews it to ensure the process was properly followed before effecting any payment. From idea to decision is expected to happen within 18 working days, and from decision to contracting within 43 working days.

Our review of partner files shows that Twaweza often spends a lot of time discussing the project and the contract, including the annex that details the outputs that will trigger payments and the quality and quantity standards that will be applied in assessing whether the output has been delivered as specified.

5.7 Contracts and problems

There have been some problems, especially in the early days. One case in point is the agreement with Daraja Development, which was signed in 2009. By 2011, it was clear that Daraja's Maji Matone programme (the only component of Daraja's programme supported by Twaweza) was not going to achieve its intended purpose. Daraja and Twaweza met October 31, 2011 and Twaweza agreed to advance 100,000 dollars based on an agreement that Daraja would produce a comprehensive learning report, close down citizen monitoring and promotion, and focus on research, analysis, and advocacy. In November 2011, Daraja informed Twaweza that it planned to completely redesign the Maji Matone programme. Between May 2012 and July 2012, the two corresponded on the proposal for Phase II, but there was no agreement. By November 2012, Twaweza informed Daraja they had lost confidence in its ability to deliver. As of December 2013, Twaweza is still trying to get Daraja to account for the

outstanding balance of \$119,501 or return the funds. A lessons learned study was produced and is quite useful. In addition, based on this experience, Twaweza revised their agreement template significantly.

There are under-spending and slow disbursement problems with some partners. GABA (Kingo Magazine) and Made in Africa TV (MIATV) say delays are sometimes caused by Twaweza's failure to turn around content ideas and approvals and sometimes by matters beyond the control of either party. MIATV, for example, gets paid on the basis of broadcasts, but has had its programming bumped for political or sports coverage. This creates cash flow problems for them as they have to continue to pay their overhead but cannot be paid until the output is achieved and invoiced.

In some cases, the partner failed to understand the basis of payment at the beginning. Again using GABA as an example, they failed to realize that they needed to track the feedback they were receiving on the Kingo issues discussing Twaweza topics, and so missed being paid for this.

Our initial analysis is that slow disbursement of committed funds accounts for about one third of Twaweza's under-spending variance. The length of time it takes to develop and negotiate good projects with partners accounted for a significant amount of under-spending, especially in the early days. By 2013 (the last full year for which financial statements are available), 62% of the under-expenditure by partners was due to delays in partner delivery and 30% was due to not bringing in new partners (largely because of a changes in strategy). The balance, 8% was due to partner's defaulting on the agreement and thus not receiving payment.

5.7.1 How Twaweza deals with these problems

Twaweza follows up with an organization when there is a problem through meetings, emails, and letters in an attempt to resolve the situation. The agreements contain the following clause: "where disagreement or conflict arises both parties shall seek to understand each other and find consensus amicably, including by consulting with a respected third party." Most partners indicated that Twaweza was easy to talk to and was flexible about extending end dates (no-cost extension of contract) when unforeseen events happened. Five of the nine partners reviewed had been given no-cost extensions on their contracts.

5.7.2 Mitigation of risk of non-delivery and for pre-finance

Twaweza pre-finances partners: agreements are set up with an advance payment provided on signature and a series on interim payments based on outputs during the term of the contract which are calculated with the partner to cover cash flow. By the final payment, Twaweza owes the partner money, so it operates a bit like a hold back, but otherwise Twaweza is usually advancing at least some of the money.

As seen with Daraja, this places Twaweza at some risk. Twaweza mitigates this risk by: 1) limiting the size of payments to new partners; 2) conducting due diligence assessments; and 3) embedding in its agreements the provision that payment is contingent on Twaweza's review and satisfaction. This last includes: assessment of the progress that has been made; determination that progress is likely to

continue to occur; and assessment of partner compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract. In addition, Twaweza often chooses to partner with proven partners: four of the partners reviewed had more than one agreement with Twaweza.

5.7.3 Partners views of their experience

Key partners were interviewed for their views on their experience (see table 8). Partners were interviewed by telephone or were sent an email questionnaire. Overall, the partners viewed their experience as positive (three out of nine) or very positive (four out of nine). Two did not respond. Six indicated they would be willing to partner with Twaweza again. A few illustrative views from the partner interviews are provided here. The Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC) is a new partnership. They met Twaweza through meetings around education research and began discussions about how they could work together. They conducted a due diligence assessment of Twaweza at the same time as Twaweza assessed them, to be sure of compatibility around ethics, values and ways of working. CSSC was impressed by Twaweza's willingness to work together to produce materials, and finds Twaweza "very responsive, fast, communications are very good, there is a lot of trust and sharing." They also like the approach to handling disagreements. CSSC has never done this sort of initiative before and finds it exciting. DAR 411 was approached by Twaweza, after being recommended by other clients using their services. DAR 411 started with a pilot project and went on to its current project after an evaluation on the pilot. They rated their work with Twaweza as "very positive," they have not had any problems with Twaweza and stated: "Twaweza has so far been one of the best clients we have worked with. They have been very professional, which is one of the key attributes missing in many organizations in Tanzania." GABA rated the partnership with Twaweza very positively, indicating that it has really increased circulation (from 10,000 to 250,000) and influence. GABA felt that access to Twaweza information and research had really improved the quality of the magazine's content. They would welcome the opportunity to continue to work with them. Sahara Media Group Ltd (SMGL) agreed to a four year partnership to elevate SMGL's Star TV and Radio Free Africa (RFA) to become excellent public service broadcasters. Twaweza provided information for Tanzanians that was disseminated through Star and RFA to enable them solve their daily problems and hold service providers to account, especially in health, education and water. The output based contract caused some problems due to differing perceptions among partners on what was appropriate content and whether or not it met the standards set. However, they were able to settle these differences amicably and the respondent for SMGL rated the relationship as "very positive." SMGL says that the partnership helped to improve the quality of its programmes and its focus on rural populations.

6. Activities and Outputs: Quality and Reach




Figure 5: Schematic Map of Twaweza Work, Partnership and Influence

The schematic map in figure 5 above has been an expansion of figure 3. It first rescales the size of the Twaweza units by their expenditures; it similarly rescales partnerships by scale of activities; and, outcomes by their relative importance (none of the above is exactly to scale). It also adds the names of specific examples of partnerships, and also outcomes, which have been examined and confirmed. The schematic also shows with a few arrows that there are multiple activities, undertaken by different units,

with various partners, which together combine to produce the outcomes. It must be emphasized here, that this is only a schematic, its purpose is to help explain and not be comprehensive, and hence, the partners in LME, and many other partnerships, are not listed in the figure. In the descriptions below we begin with examples of activities and outputs by units; then discuss partners, third outcomes; and finally LME. As there is a separate evaluation question on learning, monitoring and evaluation (LME) we provide our findings on LME in a separate section.

6.1 Some Outputs by Unit

Twaweza's is a large and complex programme with multiple planned outputs from its various programming areas. The figure above shows Twaweza's organizational units (as discussed earlier in Section 4.4 with the schematic diagram 3) together with new indications for activities and influences, together with examples of partnerships, and intended outputs and outcomes are added at a high level.⁷² Among the challenges in presentation are that most units have both individual activities, some of which directly lead to outputs, and activities that are comingled with the outputs of other units. Together, different outputs, again often combined in a synergistic manner, generate the outcomes that are observed. To remain true to the formulation of the evaluation questions, we organise the discussion here first by units and some exemplar activities; then by partners to address the "quantity, quality, and reach" of the outputs. Finally, we examine some of the major outcomes produced to assess, "to the extent possible, the observed effects and potential contributions of Twaweza's outputs to outcomes and our views on the reasons for the levels of achievement observed."

Policy Briefs

The study found that the information in the briefs is perceived as useful for policy-makers, as it provides a representative overview of the public opinions while the debated issues still are hot. In a sense, SzW briefs help to keep the politician's feet to the fire; in the words of one academic scholar, Uwazi is "informing the public about a social problem or any other disturbing situation."

A Member of Parliament stated that he always tries to get hold of the latest brief, and that the information provided in the briefs enables him to "formulate concrete arguments." In other conversations with politicians (outside this research), some MPs have even expressed the interest of including their own questions into the SzW rounds. (Source: Twaweza Monitoring Brief No. 2)

⁷² We use here the OECD/DAC definition, which is that outputs are "the products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes" and outcomes are "The likely or achieved short-term (immediate) and medium-term (intermediate) effects of an intervention's outputs."

Uwazi: Sauti and Kiu Funza

The restructured and re-visioned Uwazi has been transformed into an important research unit of Twaweza. It has supported some of the data analysis of the Uwezo assessments and produced several Policy Briefs. Uwazi has produced at least four policy briefs, seven Uwazi Monitoring Briefs, 16 Sauti za Wananchi (SzW) briefs, a report on the KiuFunza Randomized Control Trial (RCT), and a variety of other reports. A proposed tax by the government on SIM cards was opposed in a policy brief as being regressive, which contributed to the tax not being implemented.⁷³

It also developed and manages a major experimental activity under the name KiuFunza (“Thirst to Learn”) with Random Control Trials (RCT) of 3 interventions in education: the first providing capitation grants; the second providing a bonus to teachers whose students show gains in learning; and the third combining both incentives⁷⁴. The reports⁷⁵ on current outputs and potential outcomes as available suggest some outstanding successes.

The findings reported after the first year of the experiment showed that children in schools where both interventions were tested together showed significantly better learning outcomes than schools in which no interventions were carried out. The capitation grants alone led to fewer shortages of essential materials, but did not lead to improved learning in the first year. The bonus only scheme showed that teachers spent more time teaching, offering extra classes and additional tests, which were positive but not significant on learning outcomes.⁷⁶ The presentations were attended by representatives of the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MOEVT) and from the Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), MPs, donors and the DG of COSTECH, which partnered in the trials. The Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) - said “...the process of sending money directly to schools is being reviewed to plan for effective implementation. The government will work with stakeholders, including Twaweza, to see how best to implement the program successfully.” The representative of the Minister of Education and Vocational Training (MOEVT) and Kassim Majaliwa (MP), Deputy Minister PMO-RALG responsible for education, both emphasized that the Twaweza experiment had shown how the capitation grant could be administered more effectively and indicated that these steps “will be taken up without further delay, including strengthening auditing of use of funds at school level.”⁷⁷

⁷³ Sauti za Wananchi Brief No.7 September 2013, SIM Cards: a taxing issue; Citizens provide facts and opinions.

⁷⁴ The trials cover 11 districts, 21 schools per district, 7 schools per intervention, plus 14 control schools. The experiment was seen to be highly promising during the evaluation. While the complete results are expected only in mid-2015, Twaweza announced preliminary results in December (after the fieldwork for this evaluation).

⁷⁵ Sources – Twaweza website, <http://www.twaweza.org/go/kiufunzi-preliminary>, news dated 8 December 2015, accessed Jan 15, 2015; GUARDIAN, 11th December 2014, at <http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=75111>;

⁷⁶ Twaweza succeeded in delivering the capitation grants in full to all the schools in the sample. Teachers said they had lacked trust in the offer, but, having seen it work in the first year, they may be additionally motivated in the second year of the project.

⁷⁷ DFID raised a question if it was likely to influence Govt. to release much higher volumes of finance as the government is budget constrained due to many factors and in recent years has increasingly released less in cash

Uwezo

The Uwezo initiative began first as an *innovative adaptation* of the learning assessments tools from India to East Africa. It was successfully tested, and then piloted, at small scale, before being rolled out across three countries. That has been followed up with three annual and repeated assessments of learning results over time. Uwezo Learning Assessment Reports are available for 2010, 2011 and 2012 for all three countries.⁷⁸ It is a *successful implementation* of the largest national assessment of basic literacy and numeracy in Africa⁷⁹, and it has been a major success on many counts. It involved the testing, with family and community involvement, of about one million children.

Strategic Engagement

Strategic engagement activities were formally added to Twaweza in 2011 after it became clear that its research and messages were influencing government⁸⁰ as well as citizens. The outputs and outcomes from these activities include the drafts of the Tanzania first and second Open Governance Partnership (OGP) Plans, which were used extensively by the Government of Tanzania, contributing to Big Results Now (BRN) (discussed later as significant outcomes) and working with President Kikwete as well as parliamentarians on developing Tanzania's Freedom of Information law⁸¹. They also influenced the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) to promote RCT experiments to support evidence-based policy in the country, and COSTECH is supporting such a study on the value of using a Nokia phone-based app that could promote numeracy skills. It assisted the office of the Auditor General

and also promises to provide books in kind (and generally hasn't). There can be no forecasts made on government follow up, but we believe the statements above combined with that of the World Bank providing new resources with two donor partners augers well. World Bank press release at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/07/10/tanzania-world-bank-millions-children-school-education-program>, dated July 10, 2014, stated – “for the first time in education, the Big Results Now in Education Program will receive a US\$122 million IDA credit over the coming four years, as pre-agreed results are achieved”. It goes on to add by Arun Joshi, the World Bank Lead Education Specialist and Task Team Leader for the Project that the credit is for the Big Results Now initiative, “specifically designed to ensure that children in Tanzanian primary and secondary schools are learning better”. The Bank said that the governments of the United Kingdom and Sweden are supporting the programme, and, “...the Big Results Now in Education program is a direct, action-oriented response to heightened public concern about the quality of education in the country”.

⁷⁸ The assessment effort was completed for 2013 but the reports had not been made available in 2014. The field work for 2014 has been completed.

⁷⁹ Statement based on reviews of similar programmes in other countries.

⁸⁰ One change we were able to note in the revised statement of its strategy in 2011, is the recognition that governments and public officials are an important group who can be influenced by Twaweza, in addition to citizens.

⁸¹ Twaweza provided extensive support to the process of consultations and drafting the country's OGP action plan with strong commitments on freedom of information (FOI), open data and open budgets. It supported communications, and developed policy briefs. The briefs and flyers were given to the Government and distributed at two key events. In addition, it raised awareness by conducting a series of television, radio and newspaper campaigns and through citizen / public engagement. This is provided here to illustrate the linkages between units, their activities, outputs and some of the important outcomes.

to make more audit reports available and in a user-friendly format on its web site and the Parliamentary Accounts Committee to disseminate their findings and reports.⁸²

Programmes, Partnerships and Communications

Twaweza signed more than 30 partnerships agreements in Tanzania over the period 2009 to 2014, and the evaluation reviewed 9 in great detail where most evaluation questions were followed through with each partner. Specifically, for those in depth reviews we examined Twaweza inputs, whether they included ideas and money; how contracts were issued, establishing “payments by results”, defining and monitoring outputs, and checking for contributions to outcomes. Twaweza’s system is designed to ensure that both quality and price are considered in procurement, and partnership and contract negotiations are focused on results as well as looking at cost effectiveness. We found in each case a high degree of Twaweza involvement. It has continually reviewed, adapted, tweaked its criteria, and improved tools for managing partnerships.

	Partner	Category	Initiated by	Dates covered by agreements	Maximum Value of Twaweza contribution	Value disbursed
1	Daraja	Water and Mobile Phones	Daraja	Oct. 2009-Mar 2013	\$790,000	\$417,500
2	Made in Africa Television (MIATV) ⁸³	Media	Twaweza	Dec. 2009-Jun 2014	\$900,000	\$479,021
3	Sahara Media Group Limited (SMGL)	Media	Twaweza	June 2010-June 2015	TZS 1,000,000,000	TZS 839,828,244
4	Tanzania Printing Services (TPS)	Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG)	Twaweza	Dec. 2010-Aug.2012	TZS 50,000,000	TZS 50,000,000
5	Solar Aid	FMCG	Solar Aid	Dec. 2010-Oct. 2011	\$125,000	\$112,747
6	Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU)	Teachers	Ongoing Relationship	Apr. 2011-Feb.2013	\$75,000	0
7	GABA (Kingo)	Media	GABA	Dec. 2012-Dec. 2013	TZS 413,700,000	TZS 312,155,000
8	DAR 411	Mobile Phones	Twaweza	Dec. 2012-Oct 2014	\$63,711	\$19,149
9	Christian Social Services Council (CSSC)	Religious Leaders	Initial meetings.	June 2014-Dec. 2014	TZS 110,230,000	TZS 11,023,000

Table 7: Cases of Partnerships Reviewed

⁸² All points made in this paragraph are based on interviews with senior representatives of the organizations. They could also be tabulated along longer outcome tables, in tables 8 and 9 on outcomes.

⁸³ Producer of MiniBuzz. In 2009 initial agreement for TZS 2 mil was given to Kilimanjaro: company changed name.

The work has improved by having more staff, more training, and nurturing closer and more ongoing relationships. Around media partnerships, its contributions to new and creative programming are notable for reaching and engaging very large audiences, generating debate and thinking, and representing excellent value for money in term of “citizen voice”. Delivering creative development messages, supporting innovative ways to increase and widen reach, influencing the media landscape, all not a few times but again and again, achieving high acclaim, and reaching 25-30% of the citizens of the country, with highly efficient use of resources, could alone be counted as sufficient by many.

Not all of the partnerships were successful, as in the case of Daraja, but several were, especially in media and with fast moving consumer goods. These enabled Twaweza to reach audiences ranging from 5 to 10 million Tanzanian citizens again and again. These partnerships have also provided more opportunities for citizens to publicly express their views and opinions: Sahara Media Group Ltd. (SMGL) and Made in Africa TV (MIATV), producer of Minibuzz, have agreements with Twaweza to increase broadcasts from rural areas and to increase public affairs broadcasting that features the views of citizens.

The Minibuzz Case

Research on Minibuzz is illustrative of one highly innovative Twaweza activity within media partnerships and the results achieved. MIATV is the producer of Minibuzz. Twaweza collaborated with MIATV to produce an informal talk show set in a moving minibus to provide an alternative platform and space for ordinary citizens to exchange views, get informed and be inspired to take action. MIATV prepare lessons and learned reports based on sampling 30 to 50 viewers covering reach (did they watch?), penetration (what do they remember?) and whether they or someone they know took action as a result of a particular programme.

Minibuzz broadcasts for 30 minutes daily, five days a week. SMGL now agreed to at least bi-weekly short documentaries providing citizen perspectives, weekly in-depth reporting on current affairs, a monthly talk show, tri-weekly in-depth reporting on current news items, and monthly human interest stories. At least once a week Twaweza contributes messages and news of interest to its main purpose. The output here provides significantly more opportunities for citizens to express their “views and opinions in a public sphere/to a public body.”

The monitoring results show that 26 % of Tanzanians (13 mil people, or nearly half of those who watch TV regularly) have seen the show. 41 % of them (5.4 mil) watch the show once a week. The majority watch it to get information on current topics or hear the views of ordinary citizens: 18% reported this was the best part of the show. 85% of viewers (4.6 mil people) say it provides useful and practical information. 86% of viewers rated the topics on Minibuzz as very relevant compared to 65% for their preferred TV news broadcast. 85% rated the show as high as the TV news in terms of the practical use of the information received.

Fast Moving Goods

Innovative approaches with two fast moving good partners are notable. Over 40 million school exercise books have been produced with the Uwezo test and sold in Tanzania by Tanzania Printing Services (TPS), under a partnership agreement with Twaweza. This partnership was positively rated by the partner, who has continued to print the Uwezo test, and learning messages with an additional 24 million have been printed and distributed since the agreement ended. A small, unrepresentative, follow up by the evaluators in one school, suggested that while this was highly efficient and cost effective at getting the Uwezo message out to pupils and teachers, it needs follow up to provide additional outcomes.

Solar Aid distribution of “D.Lights” (solar lights) through schools in areas without electricity was very innovative⁸⁴. It was provided with a small incentive to additionally provide Uwezo tests in a brochure with its solar light. It showed that 83% did not have electricity at home; they are limited in their studies without electricity and there was insufficient money to purchase kerosene for lighting. The study showed highly positive changes where after the Solar light the students studied more at night, concentrated more on homework; completed and enjoyed doing homework and shared the light. This was a very efficient intervention that showed the potential impact of a critical resource to education outcomes and also limits to “information” campaigns.

Communication activities pervade Twaweza, for example, disseminating research results, producing and distributing one million calendars, and organizing monthly media launches and panel debates on current topics based on SzW data. The evaluation team focused on the results of the Ni Sisi Public Relations campaign in looking at communications. This was a large-scale media campaign conducted in all three countries (in 2012 in Tanzania and Kenya and early 2013 in Uganda). Twaweza produced specific content around its key messages and bought space on TV, radio, and in print media as well as using outdoor advertising (billboards, gates, benches, and walls) and on-ground activations via radio stations. The reach of this campaign was massive, reaching millions of Tanzanians increasing awareness of Twaweza and its main message. In addition, 43% of those reached could remember the tagline unprompted and an additional 35% remembered it if prompted, indicating increased knowledge of Twaweza and its citizen agency message.

7. Outcomes contributing to overarching goals

Twaweza has undoubtedly made the most significant contributions in two areas. One is on the question of whether the education system in Tanzania (and in East Africa) is working to produce learning and possible changes. There have been several important successful outcomes related to and via Uwezo,

⁸⁴ Source Partner Interviews; Contract review and Monitoring Exercise TWaweza, Solar Aid / TPS Partnership by Laura Smeets and Marens Beckers, May 2013. It examined the effect of the solar light on studying; recall and engagement of students and teachers related to the Uwezo test and to the exercise books that include the Uwezo test and to the ‘Ni Sisi’ - campaign. In general while they recalled the material, often the older, higher grade students did not attempt the Uwezo test, because they perceived the test as being too simple.

and supported by other Twaweza outputs such as the media and strategic engagement. The entire set of factors contributing to this achievement is summarized in the conclusions, as this was the most important case in our view. More details are provided in the research notes, and are summarized here. The evaluation TOR called for the team to verify a sample of these outcomes using OM. The following table summarizes our verification.

The second set of impressive outcomes is observed in three of the four outcomes listed in Table 2, under “Citizen Agency” - access to information; exercising voice; and monitoring services and the government. There are also some, more uncertain, results along the fourth category - making change happen, through citizen actions. Certainly its reach and influence at the level of awareness, on the issues it has taken up, have been outstanding and almost unparalleled success. Each of the above is discussed in the two sections below. A longer list of 60 activities, outputs and other outcomes were provided by Twaweza for our reviews and are listed in Annex 6. They were all reviewed and confirmed in the evaluation.

7.1 Outcomes: Education and BRN

No	Outcomes	Evidence of Twaweza’s Contributions
1	Change in policy makers’ and politicians’ thinking and concerns about primary education in Tanzania from enrolment to learning. This change was from a focus on inputs (such as # of pupils enrolled in school, classrooms built, and teachers trained) to a focus on the learning outcomes of education (such as reading, writing and numeracy competencies starting at a Grade 2 level of primary school).	Four annual Uwezo learning assessments completed between 2010 and 2013⁸⁵ demonstrated, for the first time in Tanzania, that while almost 100% of the children are now enrolled in primary schools, their basic literary and numeracy competencies are alarmingly low. The results were widely publicized and brought to the attention of policy makers in multiple and repeated fashion. This was verified by Uwezo’s communications log on the various meetings, engagements, and interventions involving key staff with government agencies and media organizations.
2.	The change in public perceptions on children’s learning competencies for	Verified through the channels provided by Twaweza’s multiple media partners, coverage of the assessments of literacy and

⁸⁵ But only three have been released. DFID noted that while Uwezo 2013 may have been done, no findings were available by Jan 2015. This is confirmed by the evaluators, and the evaluation agrees that time lag and delays in reports have often been a challenge for Twaweza. There are also a number of small but important issues with regards to presentation of the results of the Uwezo assessments. The work done and the available data can be analyzed in many additional ways, which can show additional insights to learning in Tanzania, at a more granular level. See conclusions and recommendations.

No	Outcomes	Evidence of Twaweza's Contributions
	writing, reading and arithmetic. An example of the earlier focus on enrolment is that Tanzania was awarded the Global Millennium Goals achievement award in September 2010 for its high enrolment and gender parity in education, a MDG goal.⁸⁶	numeracy skills has reached millions of people, and has stimulated public debate on the results and needed responses to the learning assessments. The widely cited qualitative monitoring undertaken in 2013 by Twaweza interviewed key figures in the education sector as well as research institutions and media on the relevance and showed the importance and resonance of Uwezo data.⁸⁷ There was significant media coverage of the issue, particularly around the launch of each of the annual assessment reports in print, TV, radio, and in public debates. Interviews with government officials and with Twaweza staff verify the extent of coverage and the central contributions made by Twaweza. For example, the Changamoto of Compass Communications often made media coverage of the said contributions.
3.	A shift in the policies and actions of Tanzania's Ministry of Education and Vocational Training The ministry has begun its own assessment of learning at the primary level and has shifted away from learning inputs to learning outcomes.⁸⁸ Government officials have included education as fourth among the 6 top priority sectors in its Big Results Now (BRN) initiative.⁸⁹	In April 2013, subsequent to the release and public discussions of Twaweza data and information on poor learning results, the ministry acknowledged that assessing reading, writing and numeracy at primary school level 2 for improving education is of high importance to Tanzania and is an important part of its development strategy for the country.⁹⁰ Gov't documents cite Uwezo data on education analysis and problem solving.

⁸⁶ The celebrations were reported in <http://sheikhrajab.blogspot.de/2010/09/tanzania-wins-education-mdg-award.html>. Tanzania wins education MDG award, September 22, 2010. The point here is not the value of the award, but the coincidence of the accolades for full enrolment with the dismal findings from the Uwezo learning assessment.

⁸⁷ Monitoring Brief3 – Uwezo 14051.

⁸⁸ Presentation of keys staff of BRN Ministerial Delivery Unit

⁸⁹ Education NKRA Lab Report April 2013

⁹⁰ BRN Ministerial Delivery Unit staff

No	Outcomes	Evidence of Twaweza's Contributions
4.	Four out of nine education initiatives within the Big Results Now priority have been directly influenced by Twaweza. The influenced areas are: 1. National 3Rs assessment; 2. School incentive scheme; 3. Capitation grants; and 4. Teacher motivation.	Twaweza's influence on Big Results Now (BRN) is widely attributed to: a) its active participation in the BRN 6-week "lab"; b) its introduction of new concepts of how to approach improvement of education issues (i.e., focus on learning outcomes, incentives for teachers & schools through dashboard ranking of schools and recognizing improvements); and c) the pilot tests cited by BRN key staff of Presidential Delivery Bureau.
5.	Policy change to improve government performance and accountability. Ministers' announcement during the week of Sept 29, 2014 about capitation grants going directly to schools, as under implementation.⁹¹	Twaweza's KiuFunza - Randomized Control Trials (RCT) experiments of year 2013 demonstrated that money sent directly to schools has a significant effect in that the funds are used well for intended purposes (e.g., purchase of books). Substantiation: Sauti brief #3 presents evidence from the survey on knowledge of capitation grant and % of it reaching schools. And an earlier Uwazi brief on the capitation grants reaching schools (in 2012) showed a very unsatisfactory situation in the quantity and timing of delivery. Twaweza's documentation of public engagement, media coverage, and meetings with government and partners.

Table 8: Education and Big Results Now

The contributions of Twaweza to the outcome were based on the high quality, large scale, and repeated evidence produced, which was needed to persuade enough people and policy-makers that enrolment does not imply learning. The findings were then fed back to the public via a multiple "ecosystem of messages"⁹², which combined the density and reach of messages, and "strategic engagements" to attract the attention of the government, media, and the public at multiple levels. These results have been achieved largely through innovative and cost-effective uses of old and new media, for which Twaweza deserves recognition.

⁹¹ Presentation of testimony by Presidential Delivery Bureau. The above has been added to with the release of the RCT study findings by Uwazi, in early December 2014, reported earlier.

⁹² Notes – here words and phrases in quotation refer to Twaweza statements in key documents. We deliberately refer here to multiple *messages and via multiple platforms*, but not to the ecosystem of five original "partners" emphasized in Twaweza's Theory of Change diagram.

We believe an additional factor that contributed to the success in achieving policy and public attention was the timing of the Uwezo activities. At a time when full enrolment goals were finally being reached, the policy debate on education in Tanzania (and most likely also East Africa and beyond, but that is outside our frame of verification) was most likely relatively ready to accept the Twaweza findings and to move on from the inputs that had already been achieved to discussing the learning outcomes. While we have no direct evidence of earlier public perceptions in Tanzania, a quick review of other countries where the debate has similarly shifted from enrolment to learning assessments shows that the shift broadly coincides with the period when full enrolment was, or almost achieved.

The above positive set of facts – the choice of issues, and timing; combined with activities such as the successful testing, piloting, scaling up, repetitions with scale, and quality control, within the Uwezo assessment; combined with strategic engagements with the government, and multiple media engagements, *all outputs contributed by Twaweza* – have made a very direct and major contribution to the noted shifts in perceptions and policy about education in Tanzania. The shift of focus has led the government of Tanzania to begin to undertake its own literacy and numeracy assessments. The outputs here together with strategic engagements together contributed to the related outcomes in BRN that Twaweza contributed to.

These are, we believe, all very useful and outstanding contributions and remain necessary conditions to achieving better results in education. In our view, if Twaweza had achieved only that, its results could be deemed to be impressive.

7.2 Outcomes: Citizen Agency

The table below provides a few examples of how Twaweza contributed to two of its defined citizen agency goals – information and voice.

Outcomes	Target	Baseline (2010-11 AIID)	Observed
Immediate Outcome (2010-2014): Citizens have access to more and better information			
Access to Information	Quality and diversity of voices covered in the media significantly improved compared to baseline: 20% of young people, men and women in 50% of districts have increased access to information about news, services, entitlements, and options.	For most people the most significant source of information is word of mouth. All other sources, including radio and mobile phones, feature only marginally.	26% of Tanzanians (13 mil people, or nearly half of those who watch TV regularly) watch Minibuzz to get information on current topics or hear the views of ordinary citizens. (Annex 15) Sahara improved the hours and the quality of the coverage, of education, health, and water topics - 23 new shows, 500 broadcasting hours across radio and TV each month, and over 1,000 Twaweza public service announcements in 2012. Kingo Magazine reaches 250,000 annually on 70 buses and contains 16 pages per issue of Twaweza messages: 55% of respondents on the buses reported having read the magazine and 95% of these

Outcomes	Target	Baseline (2010-11 AIID)	Observed
			reported they take the magazine home and share it with family and friends. Dar 411 pilot brought in 4,118 subscribers who are receiving messages via SMS. Scale up expects to produce 21,000 subscribers.
Increased citizen engagement and advocacy			
Exercising voice	20% of young people, men and women in 50% of districts have increased opportunities to express views in a public sphere/to a public body.	Citizens do not take action to improve service delivery. With a few highlighted exceptions, citizens are either too afraid to act, do not consider it their responsibility, or do not know what to do.	Minibuzz features the voices of citizens five days a week: 18% of viewers reported this was the best part of the show. Sahara introduced weekly programming that featured voices of citizens. 90% of the Sahara and Mlimani programming supported by Twaweza features the voices of citizens.
			Femina (youth-focused NGO), reached four million young people with messages and practical tips and information on how to tackle problems, including in basic services. Essays were written on problems and how to solve them, prizes awarded. Tamasha distributed 12 million copies of 11 cartoon booklets with inspiring examples of citizens tackling service delivery challenges (in education, health, and water).

Table 9: Some additional outcomes on Access to Information and Citizen Voice

Targeting audiences of 4 million students, Femina, (by EAML) produced 4 million booklets on water, health and education, and to encourage actions, engaged the students in an essay competition, inviting their views on basic community services delivery for water, health and education; to present one idea for improving the services; and finally to propose what the citizen can do to bring about change. The competition was organized by Twaweza during Dec 2012 – Dec 2013 and was linked to government commitment to innovation and also to Twaweza public engagement Ni Sisi. The 12 best students received prizes of 1 laptop each and another was given to their school. Another 25 were awarded the solar lamp prize.

At the immediate outcome level, it has increased the quality and diversity of voices covered in the media and increased citizen access to information about news, services, entitlements, and options. Twaweza has partnered with two large media houses (Mlimani Radio/TV and Sahara Media) to promote quality and improve coverage of social issues, particularly in relation to education, health, and water, and to increase the inclusion of citizen's voices, including rural voices, thus increasing diversity. Twaweza provided material used in the reporting (e.g., results from the Uwezo annual learning assessment survey). Media-related results are many and clear. A recent joint Tanzania Media Fund

(TMF) and Twaweza study, still in draft, demonstrated that the Twaweza Partnerships produced high quality coverage, including coverage of rural areas, and provided space for the voice of ordinary citizens.

7.3 The added value to Tanzania

Twaweza has added significant value in Tanzania and East Africa in engaging with policy makers and government officials. It has created a much larger space for the voice of civil society in Tanzania.

The quality and outputs of its research has been another important area of value added. Partners, media, other NGOs, and government officials often use and quote Twaweza's work according to our interviews. The credibility of this information contributed to the improvements in civil society-government relations. Civil society was seen as coming with something of value and with solutions, not just criticism. Twaweza's research outputs include Uwezo's assessment reports and additional monitoring reports and the newer briefs from the polls of SzW. This research has influenced both public opinion and government debate and is widely reported in the press. While media coverage was not initially well recorded, SzW received 47 tracked pieces of coverage in 2013, mostly in print media. By July, 2014, SzW had received 82 tracked pieces of media coverage. In addition, five of the nine partners interviewed indicated that they used Twaweza's research materials. SMGL, MIATV, GABA Africa (Kingo), and Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC) used research material provided by Twaweza directly in the programme materials created in partnership with Twaweza and distributed by them. Solar Aid (D. Lights) and CSSC also use the material in their reports, proposals, and other analysis.

Twaweza's impact on the media has been dramatic. The quality of analysis in public affairs and news reporting in East Africa is

often very low: media has a limited capacity to analyze complex policy issues.

Engaging two large media houses as partners in improving the quality of analysis, reporting, and coverage (getting the media out of the capital city and into the rural areas where people live) has been a significant achievement. The scope of

First of all and what I view as an overarching achievement of Twaweza in a country where the democratic space, notwithstanding the deemed multi-parties' in place, is shallow and innocuous, timely, electoral politics considered. I think Twaweza, more than any other NGO, has made serious inroads in promoting innovative processes of citizen participation that fundamentally interrogate the workings of the conventional democratic representation system. In context, Twaweza's specific programmes through 'Uwazi' or openness, notably 'Sauti za Wananchi' or 'People's Voices' and 'Ni Sisi' or 'It is Us' have ushered in innovative citizen agency around important social, economic and political issues of the day. They have engendered a new value and culture system of citizen-driven self-assessment about the national ecosystem in its broadest sense.

Stakeholder response from Annex 3

Twaweza's communications and public policy and advocacy relations is also a significant value added.

All stakeholders and interviewees confirmed that there is nothing exactly like Twaweza in Tanzania. There are others who do some of the same work, but none with the same scale, width of coverage of issues, and reach to citizens and public officials.

7.4 Views of donors and strategic partners

Donors

In general, the donors interviewed were very supportive of the vision and ideas of Twaweza. Many fully appreciated and supported strongly its roles and contributions in communications and public policy and advocacy. Some were not certain of other outcomes and were often somewhat disappointed in the lack of measurable impacts on the development goals. They generally had concerns regarding its low spending compared to budget. And some expressed confusion about exactly what Twaweza is achieving, saying they have a lot of information from Twaweza but are not clear on the framework that binds it all together into development outcomes.

Government

Government officials interviewed by the team expressed a high level of appreciation for Twaweza's work, especially in OGP and BRN, and also at the education ministry and at COSTECH. They also noted its contributions to education, confirming that Uwezo assessments, reports, and KiuFunza research have influenced both policy and procedures. One Ministry of Education official called Twaweza "a strategic agent for development for the country", and they are discussing using Twaweza's SzW to conduct research for them. There were some criticisms, with suggestions to do more. Key informants advised Twaweza to work on improving Key Performance Indicators of BRN and to concentrate less on researching what is already known (Uwezo) and more on measures to address the challenges. This would include advocating for public resource mobilization for financial and material support to education, health, and other BRN initiatives. This interest shows that many parts of the government consider Twaweza a valuable partner.

Partners

As discussed earlier, Twaweza's partners in general had a very positive view of the organization. Many have signed more than one agreement with it, some of those that have not, indicated that they would like to. The partnerships were not just about payments for delivery of Twaweza messages, but involved significant capacity building. Twaweza supported the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) to organize the dialogue in October 2014 with the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training and provided guidance on how to deal with changes in secondary schools, for example. GABA credited Twaweza with helping to increase its circulation from 10,000 per issue to 250,000 per issue. SMGL said that the partnership helped to improve the quality of its programmes.

8. Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation (LME)

LME has always been stated as a priority for Twaweza, starting with the initial strategy in 2008 and reiterated in each annual plan and each strategy document. This prioritization has indeed been reflected in placing LME as a core unit of the organization from the outset. The unit manages learning events for Twaweza staff (reading club, learning sessions, skills labs, food for thought, and annual immersion). It

has also been reflected in the allocation of resources for this work. Twaweza has also emphasized its commitment “to undertake rigorous, honest and independent learning” in its statements, which it has demonstrated in its reports, often not flinching from accepting that some ideas and initiatives did not work. But Twaweza also stated that “translating that commitment into practice has been much more arduous and difficult than anticipated in relation to: concept and design, identifying and recruiting suitable staff, developing frameworks and tools, creating ownership and a culture of curiosity within Twaweza, and getting things done.”⁹³ Thus one of the evaluation questions addressed is the role of the learning component of the organization, assessing what went particularly well/less well and what the implications are for future programming.

We wish to first highlight why some of the translation of commitments into practice has been much more difficult than anticipated. Two LME issues stand out starkly. The first lies in the original plans as well as the recruitment and continuity of managers and staff. We have mentioned that one of the design weaknesses goes back to the 2008 strategy document. It argued that Twaweza “will ‘work lean’ with a total of 18 programme and support staff across all three countries.”⁹⁴ At that time, it was not recognized that this was *too lean*, so there was a one person unit, with a senior “Learning and Communications Manager” for both LME and Communications functions.⁹⁵ We understand from the reports and discussions that Twaweza now has a third LME manager. The first appointments appear to have been of high quality, but each decided to move on for personal reasons within 12 to 18 months at Twaweza. This leads to the simple arithmetic that during the first 40-50 months of operations there was a manager at the job for only half to two thirds of the period with serious gaps in between. The function has been stabilized over the past 24 months or so, and the workload has been improved by carving out a new communications unit with its own manager. Improvements in each function are noticeable. These are excellent steps, and when we speak to continued efforts to stabilize operations, the LME and Communications stand out as good examples of what we mean.

The second weakness, also related to the aim to be very lean, is a function of the conviction that the Twaweza approach would lead to large scale, measurable change. This led Twaweza to focus on very large and reputable organizations, which could be trusted to manage and deliver highly reputable evaluation results, hopefully confirmed through “gold standard” RCT studies. The negotiations and contracting for these studies took longer than anticipated. They delivered their results between 2012 and 2013 and announced that actions by citizens were not happening as anticipated. Twaweza began a process of major strategic changes based on these findings. Twaweza announced that they now “know” that *some things “we are pursuing are not yielding positive results”*. A third weakness that we believe is

⁹³ See ToR Annex 2: Strategic pivot note.

⁹⁴ Strategy document, page 53. This is stated as a deliberate choice - keep internal costs and transaction time reasonable, and maintain a ‘collaborative spirit’ within a relatively flat structure. It is interesting to note that in the Q&A section of the same document the tenth question asked - given the high skill and work demands, how would Twaweza pull it off, without more staff; and, also find them with the required high level capability. To its credit Twaweza has continued to find staff with excellent capacity, but not always in time.

⁹⁵ As discussed elsewhere they have now been separated and each continues to have a heavy burden of work.

apparent from reviews of its evaluations of proposals are its belief, or concern, that many properties it wished to promote may well be non-linear and “emergent” – which means that until the property has emerged it certainly cannot be measured. While that is completely true, better engagement with theory could have suggested other progress markers that could be measured to improve the understanding of the effects of interventions.

A fourth challenge stems from defining and arriving at a suitable governance architecture required for this large, complex and multi-stakeholder initiative. In Section 4.5 we discussed how defining the governance system for Twaweza proved surprisingly challenging, and the structure was revised annually between 2008 and 2012. Until the end, there remained critical gaps in the components of “governance”, where strategic directions, including LME, were special charges allocated to the Advisory Board. Problems included: that membership and roles changed; that effectively there was only one annual face to face meeting; meetings by phone were challenging; that some members could not regularly participate at the meetings; key documents sometimes arrived late; and, while members had very different perspectives and interests, there were no mechanisms that appeared to have been created to record different views and to arrive at priorities for their resolution⁹⁶. Consequently, the Advisory Board could not in fact play an effective role in “strategic and program aspects, particularly theory of change”.

The main outputs to date have been the monitoring framework and work plans, 11 monitoring reports on Twaweza’s partnerships, monitoring briefs on Uwezo, SzW and Kingo and both internal and external evaluation reports: Lieberman-Posner-Tsai (MIT-UCLA) on evaluation of Uwezo’s approach; Amsterdam Institute of International Development (AIID) on the resonance of Twaweza’s overall approach in Tanzania; Georgetown University on the link between compelling/motivational information and public agency; and the Overseas Development Institute on the Political Economy of Stock Outs. It also commissioned a study by the Michigan group into the logistics and operations of Uwezo, which showed that Twaweza’s systems were appropriate for accommodating the large-scale of Uwezo operations, which involved multiple small transactions.

After several shifts, Twaweza states that it “now has concrete monitoring approach tools, three major external evaluation components and several small ones, and a set of ongoing staff activities to foster inquiry, critical reading, rigor and debate. Importantly, most staff has an appreciation of the role of monitoring in their work and a practical sense of how to use it.” The evaluation confirmed that the results from the Lieberman-Posner-Tsai and the AIID external evaluations, which became available in 2013, contributed greatly to an increased awareness and effort within Twaweza to link evaluation results with learning and strategy development. The commitment and effort are confirmed from the two

⁹⁶ The above findings and conclusions are based on the reviews of all Board documents publicly available to the evaluators, and on the interviews with and the electronic surveys of members. To quote a few (see Annex 3, question 4.a, and others from interview notes) – over the years, I was never sure if I was a member of the Advisory; I was always very interested in the discussions and in participating as it increased my own learning; I was never sure what was decided and the actions to be taken following the meeting.

documents from Twaweza attached with the ToR and the discussions reported in the strategic retreat undertaken in 2014 for staff with external experts.⁹⁷

The larger monitoring studies and fewer evaluation studies continually confirm high achievement in 3 of the 4 components of citizen action defined by Twaweza: delivering and uptake of information, systematic monitoring of reach, and some degree of public voicing. There has been little achievement on the fourth component - action. But without better definitions of the citizen actions, neither Twaweza nor its evaluations can bridge this gap, and this is the core challenge for Twaweza.

The review found that, while elements are indeed there, work is needed to determine the best mix of methods and types of 'evaluations' to fit its requirements. A target of the LME programme should be to determine the tweaks that are required, especially to go beyond the many operational and contract related studies that exist and gather evidence of Twaweza's reach (i.e., did the activities reach a certain/sufficient % of population targeted). There is too meager a set of efforts that examine whether behavior change occurred, and the few that do examine behavior change show low results. They appear to require changes in design in order to capture variability of responses to Twaweza outputs - in different areas, and among different groups, with different sets of interventions and so on. For Twaweza to fulfill its objective that learning is a major area of emphasis, the work must begin with defining learning, determining what needs to be learnt, who will learn, and how learning will take place within Twaweza, its partner organizations, and the communities it is aiming to assist. Some of the current activities, such as reading club, learning sessions, skills labs, food for thought, and annual immersions, cannot work unless each activity is contextualized by the who, why, and how of learning.

⁹⁷ Twaweza Strategy Retreat, Report of meeting held 11-13 February, 2014.

F. Conclusions

The aim of this section is to set forth both a summary of the evaluation findings along the questions posed, but more important, to provide clear statements and explanation of Twaweza's many considerable but uneven achievements and the challenges faced to date, especially those that remain to be addressed. We believe that it is important to set the stage appropriately before launching into our conclusions. We emphasize that the evaluation and the report have attempted both not to personalize the conclusions and to avoid the pitfalls of "perfect hindsight" - where in retrospect many decisions appear crystal clear. Twaweza, as any other agent, did in fact face multiple constraints in implementing many of the ideas. Constraints, including imperfect information at each point in time, inadequate staff, physical resources and structures at different times, as well as unpredictable responses by partners and citizens, afflict all execution efforts and cannot often be recognized until later. We have attempted to explain, given the evidence, what factors *most likely contributed* to both success and challenges. The goal is to tell a clear story about Twaweza's past in order to guide its success moving forward. So the conclusions are deliberately not exhaustive, as exhaustive details are already available in Twaweza's own documentation, with a distillation of it already presented earlier. We caution that in order to move forward towards recommendations for the future, it is possible we have tilted the balance in this section towards challenges that remain, and why and how they need to be addressed.

The conclusions are divided into four broad areas, namely: 1) Achievements and possible direction; 2) Theory of Change (ToC); 3) Learning strategy; and 4) Improvement of services for citizens, with some 5) Final remarks.

1. ACHIEVEMENTS AND DIRECTIONS

We would like to begin with the recognition that it takes an enormous effort to launch a new initiative of this scale and to establish a place for it within the mix of existing organizations. Twaweza began in 2009 as nothing more than a complex set of ideas, and they have built a functioning organization with a number of significant successes to its name. Twaweza's organizational structures and work processes over the past two years have consistently improved and are better suited to their activities.

We have provided an example with Uwezo, which faced many challenges during its implementation, many of which have been overcome. It had begun outside Twaweza, with many attributes of an independent organization (e.g., its own budgets, plans, accounts, staff, and monitoring and evaluation processes), when Twaweza was still an idea. In 2011, it ran into challenges having its organization housed separately in three different NGOs in three countries, so work was needed to move and house it within Twaweza, initially as a possibly temporary measure, before finding a new home. By 2014 Uwezo was almost fully integrated into Twaweza. The outcomes listed under education and BRN (in table 8) are, we believe, all very useful and outstanding contributions and remain necessary conditions to achieving better results in education. In our view, *if Twaweza had achieved only that, its results could be deemed to be impressive*. This achievement was made notwithstanding a flawed ToC and some

weaknesses in implementation, and it is especially notable given that the work had begun with only an idea; the organization, with real staff, processes, and culture had to be created in parallel that took the ideas to outputs and to outcomes.

Similarly, the originally conceived “Infoshop” idea did not work out; but Uwazi has evolved in new, and we found, highly successful directions. Two important results for the organization include the RCT initiative, testing three interventions to provide full results in 2015. The reports on current outputs and potential outcomes as available (discussed in section 6) suggest some outstanding potential for successes in 2015. Second, this also provided Twaweza with highly cost-effective and efficient tools developed to conduct citizen polls with high accuracy at a low cost, also discussed earlier.

Twaweza has succeeded in building an organization that performs many of its functions “well” to “very well”. We believe Twaweza has performed at high standards, when keeping in mind that performance levels must be judged against what could have been possible, within the options that were available and within known constraints, which necessarily provide upper bounds on what could be achieved. That is especially relevant compared to all the many different and the *most “aspirational goals”*, which it articulated for itself. Twaweza has made its mark in Tanzania and has delivered a number of outstanding results in the areas of its influence on public policy for education and the commitments of the government towards a more open government. It has supported and contributed to the increased climate of greater accountability of government. The process of organizational development, with increased depth and continuity in the staff, improved IT and systems, increased delegation of authority with still very tight controls on fiduciary responsibilities, begun almost two years ago and has provided excellent results. Ideally, while suitable controls must continue, the systems need to be tweaked and nudged in ways, which are “materially” more appropriate, that cannot be covered in detail here.⁹⁸

Delivering creative development messages, supporting innovative ways to increase and widen reach, influencing the media landscape, and reaching 25-30% of the citizens of the country, all with a highly efficient use of resources, could alone be sufficient cause for acclaim. And Twaweza did this not a few times, but again and again. Similarly, Twaweza has undoubtedly made significant contributions to the question of whether the education system in Tanzania (and in East Africa) is working to produce outcomes in learning. There have been several important successful outcomes and many achievements are described above and throughout the report.

But we believe that much remains to be done if Twaweza is to address the challenges described in the findings and many acknowledged in the Pivot Note, to achieve its full potential. Building on the existing

⁹⁸ There are two issues, and both are related to creating more space for staff to prioritize and to do what it does better. See Section 5.5, in concluding remarks, based on the field work, where the current systems could not often generate answers to financial queries relevant for planning and over view, with too much information on very small expenditures, which detracted other useful summative analysis of expenditures. Second, overall there is a bias towards outputs and reach, which have produced some excellent results, but there is no evidence that each incremental output is equally valuable.

groundwork, it will need to continue to improve the specificity of its goals, set new and more appropriate targets and indicators of progress, and improve benchmarks. It will also need to devote substantial new attention to theory, and work simultaneously on continued organizational improvements. For further analysis of the lessons, and for coherence, it needs to interrogate some of the same sets of issues – such as citizen agency and action; learning; and types of evaluation - much more deeply.

The work in education has been and should remain as a priority developmental goal for Twaweza. It will be referenced here to discuss some key challenges relating to theory, setting goals and developmental benchmarks, and implementation. As discussed, Twaweza and Uwezo have succeeded in demonstrating low student learning despite high school enrolment, disseminating this information broadly, changing public expectations related to learning, and finally changing government policy. It has succeeded in forcing the government to pay greater attention to learning rather than just enrolment, to take concrete action to improve matters, and even to seek help from Twaweza. So how can it contribute further? What should be done so it can contribute to solutions?⁹⁹

- First, there is a need to develop a new ToC specific to education goals, and clearer paths towards their achievement. The new ToC should explore education outcomes more deeply.
- Second, Twaweza must recognize that the ambitious impact goal (improved basic literacy and numeracy by 10 percent in three countries over four years) will be very difficult, even perhaps impossible, to achieve in the remaining four years of their ten year plan. With this pessimistic view, we do not suggest that Uwezo “pivot” away from their goal, but rather propose that their goal be reset with deeper investigations on what has and has not worked in Tanzania and elsewhere (keeping in mind evidence from elsewhere may or may not be relevant in Tanzania). Our view of the deep challenge in achieving the level of impact suggested here is based on a very quick look at high-quality reviews of empirical evidence on the causes and correlates of better learning outcomes from India (the source of the Uwezo inspiration).¹⁰⁰ The findings from India may not hold for East Africa and more rapid progress may be possible, but we would suggest based on those findings that even a 1% improvement at national levels could be too

⁹⁹ This actual question was raised in interviews at the Ministry of Education, who went further to question even the value of Uwezo, now that the government is doing its own assessments. We support the view that until the government tests are well established and given the differences between the two methods, the answer is not to automatically stop the Uwezo assessments without careful review.

¹⁰⁰ The most recent review of considerable literature on the evidence from India is by Karthik Muralidharan, *Priorities for Primary Education Policy in India's 12th Five-year Plan*, 4 April, 2013; it mentions many earlier rigorous RCT studies of Abhijit Banerjee, Rukmini Banerji and their colleagues, who have tested multiple interventions that aimed to improve learning outcomes with ASER and found only one that appeared to influence learning outcomes among Indian children. It required added effort to increase learning directly with children - youth volunteered to teach in camps, with children who attended, improving their reading skills substantially. We assume that as Mr. Muralidharan is the adviser on the Twaweza RCT study, he would be able to provide further advice, to guide future planning for Uwezo/education interventions.

aspirational. The point is that more appropriate and nuanced goals and markers, based on wider reviews and reflection, must be set in 2015 for education, with markers allowing deeper observations at more micro levels, some of which may well emerge from the ongoing RCT study, which already has preliminary results.

- Third, new interventions must continue to be thought through, piloted, and tested. Again, to give credit to Twaweza, it has in fact thought about this. It has tested, piloted, and is now undertaking the new and successful RCT experimental interventions, in Uwazi, as discussed in the findings.
- And fourth, while Uwezo is relatively well established, it is a large and costly annual exercise. Can the annual exercise be justified given there has been essentially no change in outcomes over the last four years? Should they stop doing the learning assessments or perhaps, do them only every two years? Given that the government is planning a parallel if fairly different assessment, this requires a re-assessment of the nature and frequency of the entire Uwezo exercise. We believe the annual learning assessments of 2013 and 2014 must be completed and released soon. In 2015 it must also be thoroughly reviewed and it should not be assumed that it must continue as before – perhaps its frequency, scope, methods need changes so that resources are freed up to do something different.

We do confirm the statement of the Head of Twaweza, that the “quality of work, organization, coordination and follow up, need to be strengthened”. Uwezo had continued too long as a separate entity within Twaweza and the process of integration with Twaweza must be completed as soon as possible. Uwezo, and all of Twaweza, “need to create space to do everything more thoughtfully, reducing competing demands of many logistical, contractual, and organizational issues”. As examples he said - Uwezo’s and KiuFunza’s work are linked, but conceptualization, design, and staff, largely separate, and so provide opportunities for synergies. We would add that there are many additional synergies between communications, partnerships and all other units within Twaweza. It is our view that doing work more thoughtfully, with greater synergy and higher quality, also more in time, *is not a matter of having more staff but rethinking organizational processes and the desired numbers of outputs, so as to allow staff more time to work differently*. For example, Twaweza can begin to examine what is the right number of media partnerships – they have been very successful, but does the next incremental partnership, add value or one less, would do as well; similarly many briefs have been well received but should the number of Sauti polls be set at one a month or one every two months.

TWaweza’S THEORY OF CHANGE

Despite Twaweza’s success in reaching large numbers of people with development messages, little “measurable citizen action” has been generated, and none have been measured *as* translated into improvements in the service delivery and related development goals. To understand this problem, it is necessary to examine more closely Twaweza’s Theory of Change (ToC). The idea was that, through the initiative’s work, findings and messages would emerge from citizens and then be amplified by the five

partner networks, thus establishing an ecosystem across the country that would grow from an ever-increasing set of feedback loops. Ordinary people would receive information through the five networks and would become advocates for change, eventually taking action to improve citizen welfare.

Governments would take action along with them, motivated by the messages and the demands of citizens. However, this idea¹⁰¹ has not borne out in reality, as was seen in the large “gold standard” RCT evaluations that Twaweza contracted. Our evaluation has identified the potential roles of citizens to be too broad and not based on observations¹⁰². To its credit, Twaweza accepted the findings of the RCT, immediately acknowledged the weaknesses in its ToC, made exemplary public admissions of the flaws, and rapidly moved to “pivot” and develop new strategies and goals.

An important point to note is that, despite persistent challenges in defining goals and outcomes, the fact that the hoped for new types of partnerships were more challenging than had been anticipated¹⁰³, the reality that the ecosystem idea did not hold, and the flaws in the ToC (some called it “naïve”), Twaweza made significant achievements. Neither the complete accuracy of the ToC, nor the complete success of every initiative and partnership was necessary for Twaweza to achieve the successes described throughout the report. While the various achievements noted have more value than could have been reasonably expected, that by itself should not prevent a look at how the ToC may have undermined efforts and that need to be dealt with.

The ToC reflects Twaweza’s bias towards reach and to new and often exciting ideas in communications. While the “ecosystem” of reinforcing mechanisms did not work, and citizen actions did not materialize to any noticeable extent, the media partnerships have almost always been some of its major successes and so a core strength of Twaweza. Unfortunately, messages reaching citizens remained in the end as the *primary* and almost the sole driver of “*citizen agency*”. And even within the agency model adopted,

¹⁰¹ The 2008 strategy document had highlighted the story of Asha and Juma (page 18) where a couple learns their child is not learning and then takes multiple actions to improve the education outcome. The absence of such stories in subsequent documents, even efforts to find them, is notable.

¹⁰² For example, a detailed 2010 review by ODI “So What Difference Does it Make? Mapping the Outcomes of Citizen Engagement” by John Gaventa and Gregory Barrett, October 2010, stated that while the idea that citizen engagement and participation can contribute to improved governance and development outcomes has been attractive among many practitioners, “the *impact of participation on improved democratic and developmental outcomes has proved difficult to assess*”(our emphasis added).

¹⁰³ Twaweza states that “the majority of its partners do not realize Twaweza’s theory of change”; “some do not deliver the quality or quantity”; “work is often delayed or below target”; and the “payments for outputs approach does not seem to serve as a sufficient incentive to galvanize better delivery”. It then concludes, correctly, securing and maintaining a partnership has taken a huge amount of effort’. We agree: Twaweza has in fact been constrained by ‘managing contracts’ and working with poor performing partners; which in turn, limited the time and space to learn. It concludes “the ecosystem effect (that Twaweza had in mind) would require such a high degree of sustained implementation, coordination, sequencing and creativity that it is simply *not feasible to make it work at large scale*”. Our emphasis here queries the logic chain here. Partners cannot be blamed for not understanding Twaweza’s ToC, which it has now abandoned. Second, for partners (and for citizens too) it partially describes the real world, where goals and objectives differ, within which it must perform. The solutions often lie in deeper, more layered understanding and approach to constraints and limits, thereby improving priorities for activities, partnerships, degrees of engagement required and so on.

the fourth conceptual element “citizens rise up, demanding change” has been the *core weakness* of its ToC. The ToC required “a magic sauce”¹⁰⁴ after that, which would lead to improved services. In our view, it is in the citizen action component and the over reliance on it for further consequence that the main flaws lie. There is little research or evaluation information available to us or cited by Twaweza that shows that this contribution is sufficient to foster “citizens’ “collective action”, “positive deviance”, “greater engagement” or the “voice” or that they “trigger systemic reform...”¹⁰⁵

Of course, information and voice can and have been found to *be important contributory factors*, as seen by the positive response¹⁰⁶ of the government to the Twaweza programmes in education and “open government”. But, in our view, deeper and sustained change at the level of people and communities almost always requires additional inputs, which are context and sector-specific, complement the information component, and are available at the very micro level of communities and individuals at the same time. So, the totality of the hypothesis failed to hold, leading Twaweza to question how they ‘do’ citizen agency. We are not convinced that “the evidence of successful change suggests a need for less openness and more focus”, as put forward by Twaweza. But it does require *greater clarity of thought; a “need to understand the systems” and contexts at the micro levels and a much wider body of knowledge that is not limited to the transparency and accountability fields, but also to domains such as innovation theory, especially social innovations and their diffusion, work in public health, in economics, psychology, decision-making, and political science, among others.*

Finally, given the scale and ambitions of Twaweza’s programme, it must be more attuned to the potentials for unintended consequences, go beyond the focus on reach and attempt to measure all outcomes better. Examples of possible unintended outcomes are suggested from one study conducted of two information campaigns.¹⁰⁷ It found a possibility that some campaigns can have the unintended consequence that those exposed are even less inclined to take action; another is suggestive of different

¹⁰⁴ These are words of the Head in his self-criticism. Otherwise we may also call it the “silver bullet”. There is a lengthy literature on the belief that silver bullets do exist; and surges of optimism, that one has actually been found; and how that has often been a source of difficulties in development theory and practice.

¹⁰⁵ In the October 2013 evaluators’ meeting the Head said – “the results may signal that our work and theory of change are in real trouble” – we would restate the same with different emphases – one “real trouble” was in the original theory of change, and that it was not sufficiently reviewed and tweaked in the opportunity provided to arrive at the revised strategy of 2011. Another completely different set, stemmed from the challenges that were faced in moving from an idea, to its actual implementation – one major area being having the right numbers of staff, having the right mix of abilities, depth, and the width of expertise required; with the right tools, inculcated in the culture required, trained and having sufficient continuity; an area that also required tremendous effort, not often acknowledged as being critical and which only improved sufficiently from 2012.

¹⁰⁶ The report, Using a Phone Panel for High-Frequency Community Monitoring: Experience with the Twaweza Listening Device, by Chris Elbers and J.W. Gunning, Jan 17, 2014, is one that finds some “agency” at the local level that leads to actions to improve education. The thesis is that the Twaweza information leads to “commotion” which in turn triggers public action. It is not possible here to fully review this preliminary paper and the future results should be incorporated in any revisions to the Twaweza approach.

¹⁰⁷ This study, Impact of Exposure to Makutano/Mother-in-law: Measuring the effect of Treatment on the Treated, by Nada Eissa and others, November 21, 2014, refers to Kenya and is provided here as an example.

unintended consequence – high exposure to certain ills made many believe the problems were being taken care of, perhaps already resolved. Similarly, potential unintended consequences in education from continued dismal assessment is for citizens to not act to improve, but to exit, the public system altogether.

An improved, more nuanced and evidence-based theory of change, additional specifications of inputs required for the changes which are context - and sector-specific -, relevant at the very micro level of communities and individuals at the same time, will assist to leverage the large scale information component that is Twaweza's strength, to achieve improved development outcomes in education, water and health. That in turn can assist in developing "progress markers" of change they wish to see, to develop more short term indicators of progress and assist in developing priorities between activities going beyond the current, almost exclusive emphasis on reach.

3. LEARNING STRATEGY

Learning is much more complex than what Twaweza has articulated in any of its documents, plans, and discussions papers. It is not measured by "hard quantitative nuggets" or defined only in terms of RCTs and gold standards, as it has stated. But it must go much further. Learning cannot be mandated or achieved through the multiple activities are listed to support this. Twaweza must not fall into the trap of using the words a "learning organization" as a sufficient descriptor for itself as it has become a standard buzzword for many, with low attention to results. For Twaweza's learning strategy to work, it must first be defined more precisely.

- **Who** is doing the learning (an individual staff member, the Head, or all staff, including those at different levels and with different needs)?
- **What** are the starting points for learning?
- **How** will people learn?
- **What** will they learn?

The recent strategy on LME is a big improvement, reflecting the value of having the right staff and retaining them for sufficient time. This has included restructuring to add a dedicated communications person(s). It still needs more work with more sharply articulated definitions, goals, and targets. Twaweza has a well-defined and well executed monitoring plan, which fully supports its contracting, payments. Multiple documents by third parties provide very convincing evidence on the reach of each activity supported together with evidence of VfM by activity. They also provide evidence of the work put in by Twaweza and its partners on innovative uses of the media and on citizen interest. They do not, in general, cover well what citizens do with this information, nor they do not provide sufficient information at the micro and disaggregated levels where different citizens would be expected to respond very differently. They have been unable to utilize the very rich data sets generated to answer context specific questions that Twaweza must learn in order to make its programme more effective.

Many unresolved and unrecognized tensions continue to exist within Twaweza. One that stands out is the tension between quality and thoughtfulness on the one hand and scale, and the bias against and quick dismissal of “all boutique programmes” on the other. Some of the thousands of pilots that have been derided by Twaweza for going nowhere may hide within them very thoughtful and successful ideas, initiatives, and pilots that should be examined by Twaweza to see if they do promote learning and innovation. Experimentation is often best done on smaller scales, as its own experience attests, and should only be scaled up with adequate evidence.

An important measure of its learning will emerge, and needs to be queried through iterative processes, and deeper engagement by its staff, the new head and its new governance structures as well with other experts and partners. It needs to iterate more systematically and deeply, and convince others that it has done so – between setting new goals and markers and benchmarks; arriving at a new and more useful theory of change; and, also always query if the difficulties lie at wrong goal definitions; inappropriate theory of change; in its implementation in a specific activity or overall processes.

4. IMPROVEMENT OF SERVICES

Twaweza had set unattainably ambitious service delivery goals in basic health, water, and education. While Twaweza has worked on all three areas, much greater activity has taken place and accomplishments made in basic education. This is due primarily to: the presence of Uwezo across the three countries and more recently KiuFunza in Tanzania; the number of Uwezo and other programme unit staff with training and/or competence in education; and the relationships and networks developed by these staff with key actors in the sector. Despite efforts, which did not work instantaneously, to recruit staff, to build working groups, to have meetings and otherwise engage in the water and health sectors, progress has necessarily been limited. In the water sector, we believe that Twaweza made a very promising partnership with high potential but it was recorded as a failure. We believe that work in this sector needs to be re-examined in greater depth as we found a more likely reason for failure was in the weakness of the partner, which faced internal challenges, as well as in its execution and follow up. In the health sector, Twaweza made a number of plans, but we believe its efforts were hobbled by many other challenges that it faced – its own staff constraints, its own lack of depth of capability in the sector, pre-occupations with many other challenges it faced in building up the organization, and finally, we believe, the failure in the water sector made it more cautious in embarking on a new sector, health, given its constraints.

In health, Twaweza reported in many annual plans, aims to create new partnerships, to hire staff to provide it with increased sector specific knowledge, but given the constraints discussed earlier, its inputs and activities remained low. It made an effort and produced a report on stock-outs of medicines but that alone was insufficient to lead to desired outcomes.

Going forward, Twaweza proposes to continue to focus on its core information mission. That makes sense as it caters to its core strengths. But even then, it must wrestle with the issue of citizen agency, which is an important element of its mission. If it continues to define citizen agency as the capacity of

citizens to act to change, it must walk considerably deeper down the pathways of actors, incentives, motivations, and mechanisms that are expected to trigger change. It must define what will change, where and how. We agree that Twaweza should continue with its focus on basic education and attainment of learning goals, at least for another four years. But here also, there is a critical and urgent need to engage with and learn from experiences across other countries - what has or has not worked elsewhere that can inform the choices going forward. Our review of the literature does not support the hypothesis that learning outcomes will necessarily follow the past successes of influencing public policy and awareness on learning outcomes. One study¹⁰⁸ appears to suggest that achievement of these goals will not be easy nor follow *exactly* the paths selected. We suggest that Twaweza reconsiders its decision to drop all commitment to health and water goals, and to limit its work on these goals to collecting “value added information”. We suggest that if Twaweza can devote resources to rethinking how it may approach the two sectors and how it may increase its depth of knowledge and also form new partnerships, it may be able to increase its ambitions and not limit itself to information.

5. FINAL REMARKS

Our final thoughts in conclusion are that much of the successes and many of the challenges of Twaweza lie in its founding DNA, contributed largely by the founder Head. It is to his credit that he imagined ambitiously and with confidence, acted boldly and with drive and determination, and carried with him the many stakeholders and supporters of the Twaweza initiative. Stopping to answer every criticism, solving or even plan for every possible challenge, would have completely stopped the ideas from coming to fruition. It would not have delivered a tangible organization, implementing and delivering on **many parts of the original vision**. For such a person, the idea that people are powerless to make change would be antithetical and cannot lead to the major achievements we cite. That does not imply that all achievements and flaws rest with a single person – they have many other contributors, including those working in Twaweza and those supporting it in many ways. The transition is an important period for Twaweza, with the founder’s departure and a new head of Twaweza.¹⁰⁹ We are certain there are a number of challenges, as in any transition, and also certain that the new head cannot imitate the previous and deliver in identical ways. Therein also lies opportunities for Twaweza to grow organically, to reach out for a better balance; to re-articulate some of the same goals, in learning and outcomes, but with greater specificity and nuance, for both improved and new achievements.

We have pointed to many issues, at many different levels. We believe our making lists of them, drawing up new targets, goals and benchmarks, on behalf of Twaweza would be unduly prescriptive and is completely inappropriate. Not only have we not been involved in the recent and continuing exercise within Twaweza towards similar ends, *the additional work must be done* by Twaweza, its staff, the new

¹⁰⁸ MIT Poverty Action Lab’s 9 Impact Evaluations on Pratham’s Programs.

¹⁰⁹ On 10 Dec 2014, Twaweza announced on its website the appointment of Mr. Aidan Eyakuze, a Tanzanian, as its new Executive Director, who will take up his new post on 1 March, 2015. It also stated he would replace “founder and current head” without clarifying if the position of the Executive Director, which had existed briefly in 2009 and earlier reported to the Head, had been redefined or only the title has been changed.

head, and its current and new governing members for it to have real value. If this report helps all of those actors - by suggesting areas; improving understanding of why they are important; and, how they could be addressed; keeping in mind that some elements are deep within the organizational founding DNA; and finally, that some can only be achieved at a cost of reductions in other dimensions - we believe the report would have been the most valuable.

We commend the donors for the multiple and differentiated levels and nature of support they have provided to Twaweza. Overall, their support has been strategic, visionary, very effective, generous, and relatively unstinting. Twaweza has been innovative, and as expressly stated in many documents by Twaweza, a very large “experiment” to see what can work in important areas of development, and also at scale, not simply a “small” “boutique” project that could never be scaled up. Again, the donors are to be commended that within the very large experiment, they also allowed for a fair degree of smaller experimentations, for new and innovative sets of ideas. We find their faith and commitments to have been very well rewarded by the return on their investments. Twaweza has grown to a highly professionally managed organization, with multiple achievements. We have rated many achievements as excellent and outstanding; on the organizational dimensions, further work is always an ongoing need, but on most dimensions it is “almost there”. Our assessment have been made against very high and multiple benchmarks that we have used here, keeping in mind, the ambitions, size, scope and scale of operations of Twaweza, and its own goal to be a leader in many areas.

We note that as in all multi-donor projects and programmes, there have been advantages of efficiency in fund administration and reporting. But we have also highlighted weaknesses in coordination between the stakeholders and weaknesses in strategic advice to Twaweza, which most likely contributed to the non-resolution of certain core contradictions and tensions in its work. Current arrangements need to be supplemented by measures that increase donor coordination and measures to improve communications between the donors themselves, both individually and as a group, and between the donors and Twaweza, because the loss in feedback and communications can often surpasses the gains from more efficient fund administration and reporting. We have found this as one contributory factor for the lacunae in clearer specificity of goals and intermediate targets.

G. Recommendations

The recommendations are provided at two levels: first, for the donor partners and Sida, the most immediate user of this report; and second, for Twaweza's other priority users, its new head and staff, Hivos management, and also its evolving governance structures. All recommendations follow from the findings and conclusions, stakeholder feedback, and with the limitations and boundaries stated.

For Donor Partners and Sida, the evaluation recommends that they:

- 1.9 Recognize that no other similar organization exists in the country that can replace Twaweza's work towards improvements in public policy; openness and transparency in government; and in education.
- 1.10 Continue support for Twaweza's efforts to improve and sustain public policy coverage and change, and to find ways of influencing engagement by civic society and the government towards still unattained development goals. Each donor will have its own budgetary and programmatic issues to consider, but based on the informal feedback, four out of five major donor partners expressed their intention to continue support.
- 1.11 Commit to supporting the successful programmes allowing for sufficient support for continued experiments, improved learning for Twaweza and by local partners.
- 1.12 Support Twaweza in the immediate term to revise its programming logic by placing it within context-specific analyses of the conditions, actors and contributions, within the larger systems that it seeks to change, with sharper outcome and goal statements, and markers to demonstrate progress or lack thereof.
- 1.13 Plan for the transitions within Twaweza and design support to encourage and secure commitments of the competent cadre of staff now in place, and the new Executive Director, to maintain momentum.
- 1.14 Allow for operational benchmarks that continue current ratios of staff costs to programmes, in the ballpark of 16-17% as in recent years.
- 1.15 Assess different options for improving the processes for feedback and strategic directions among the key stakeholders. In many cases, with multiple donors supporting a range of complex programming and outputs, appointing an independent reviewer, which can be done in different ways, has been found to be a very useful mechanism for improved governance, strategic directions and feedback. This is common in the World Bank's multi-donor trust funds.

- 1.16 Either through the above process, or through different mechanisms, undertake simpler reviews of Twaweza's work outside Tanzania in 2015; and, also consider regular annual reviews of the whole organization in the future.

For Twaweza:

- 2.9 Increase internal evaluative capacity. Review a range of alternative evaluation methods and adopt those that meet Twaweza's needs and circumstances. Build the organizational skills and confidence to select and apply appropriate methods for learning within Twaweza and among its partners and beneficiaries. Consider Outcome Mapping (OM) and other complexity-oriented approaches in this regard.
- 2.10 In addition to connecting monitoring and evaluation directly to organizational learning and programing adaptations, Twaweza could use experimentation and small scale pilot projects to develop and assess programming choices and improve effectiveness in programme delivery.
- 2.11 Set up behavioral and other markers of change which clearly define the kinds of progress Twaweza intends to help bring about. These could be monitored to provide feedback for developing and implementing strategies and for developing a deeper understanding of the responses by key actors and stakeholders.
- 2.12 Revisit the logic models of the new strategy to detail the full range of social actors the initiative needs to work with, and develop strategies in line with the specific changes Twaweza would like to see in partners and other social actors (beyond the words "collect, curate, transport, engage").
- 2.13 Clarify, define and operationalize the meaning and usage of key words and concepts, such as "citizen agency"; "partners"; "learning"; and, "outcomes".
- 2.14 Further interrogation must include awareness of many different possibilities of "unintended consequences". When one is engaged at scale, the scope for, and effects of "unintended consequences" are necessarily larger than for small experiments or activities, where it is more feasible to engage in much greater levels of detail.
- 2.15 Review the goals for health and water, as the evaluation findings did not provide the evidence that supports the Twaweza decision that with goals that are sharply defined and appropriate efforts, it cannot make positive changes in the above areas. The evaluation suggests that the goals in education are unlikely to be achieved as stated and need refinement.
- 2.16 Improve operational systems as noted and complete the integration of Uwezo. Use opportunities provided by process improvements, increased clarity and goal specifications, to reduce bottlenecks and to reprioritize staff time and activities, in order to have more space for synergies between the activities, deeper partnerships, and improve the quality and timeliness of outputs.

Annex 1: Evaluation Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF TWaweza 2009 – 2014

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Twaweza which means “make it happen” in Swahili describes itself as a citizen-centered initiative with the aim of large scale change in East Africa. Twaweza has a ten-year time frame (2009-2018) with two goals to enhance citizen agency and action to make a difference. The goals are described as:

- *Exercise agency - i.e. access to information, express views and take initiative to improve their situation and hold government to account.*
- *Access basic services (primary and secondary education, primary health care, clean water) that are of better quality, and exercise greater control over resources that have a bearing on these services*

Twaweza has concluded a strategic plan for the time frame of 2011-2014. In this document Twaweza describes that it in its core embodies the democratic ideal and believes in that change is driven by actions by motivated citizens. Twaweza believes these reforms are more effective than experts or policy driven technocratic reforms. The organization works with new and, what they call, unorthodox methods to create conditions of “ecosystems for citizen learning, debate and action” in order for citizens to improve their own situation and compel government to respond (strategy document, p.1).

The organization started its work in 2009 and Twaweza’s mission and theory of change is articulated in there Twaweza Strategy 2011-2014 as follows:

“Exposed to the ferment of information, ideas, stories of change and practical tools, citizens across East Africa are making things happen, holding governments to account and improving lives. Twaweza gets behind these initiatives to make them gain greater momentum, fostering information flows and public action, building on what works, trying out new ideas, and learning, documenting and sharing lessons.”

Twaweza has offices in Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and Kampala and is legally “housed within” HIVOS, a Dutch Development Agency and accountable to them. A process of transition to become independent is in process. The budget of the region for the Strategy period 2011-2014 is \$72 million according to the Strategy (strategy document, pg. 1).

Twaweza’s strategic programme has three components: 1) Partnership, which is the core programme; 2) Experiments, which is described as testing what works; 3) Uwazi, which is the generating and opening of data and analysis (strategy document, pg. 25). In addition, Uwezo, the annual learning assessment and related communication, has been fully integrated into Twaweza (it was a linked but separate initiative at the start of the strategic period). It is agreed that this evaluation will include Uwezo as well, since funding from a number of donors has covered both Twaweza and Uwezo.

The strategy document lists planned outcomes in many different areas (strategy 2011-2014, pg. 19). The specific goals for 2013 were articulated in the areas of health, education, evidence/open data and citizen action (annual plan 2013, pg. 3).

2.0 PROGRAMME HISTORY AND CONTEXT

Twaweza's current strategy and theory of change are based on an extensive situation analysis, the summary of which can be found in the current strategy (pg. 3). In essence, the situation analysis found that across East Africa, state failure to manage the economy and public funds and to deliver quality services as well as establish effective governance mechanisms – combined with the unprecedented ability of citizens to find, compare information, and act on it – has created a series crisis of confidence and political flux. Twaweza has sought to influence the newly opened space for debate and action by inspiring and enabling citizens to both hold authorities to account, as well as to solve problems through other, alternative ways. This thinking has shaped much of Twaweza's work in its first strategic period, although some lessons learned about where the theory of change has worked, and where it has not, are already emerging. A key input and reference to this learning process is the "pivot note" which was articulated mid-2013, and the main outcomes of the 2013 "Twaweza evaluators conference" – both of which can be found as annexes.

3.0 THE RATIONALE AND APPROACH FOR THE EXTERNAL EVALUATION

The current Twaweza strategic plan covers the period from 2011-2014 and the organization has already embarked on a process to align its activities and approaches to changes reasoned necessary to make. In particular, this has been reflected in the outcome of the first Evaluator's Meeting held in October 2013, and in the subsequent "pivot note" outlining the reasoning behind the changes mid-strategy (both documents as Annexes). Still, an aggregated external evaluation is an opportunity for Twaweza and its development partners to further advance and fine tune the understanding and approach to outcomes before the next strategy period.

The overall objective of the evaluation is to provide a comprehensive summary and aggregation of Twaweza's activities over the 2009-2014 period, as well as establish, on a sample basis, the links (substantiated by evidence) between the activities and (a) stated organization's objectives, and (b) other observed changes in the relevant sectors/domains.

Important to note is that this is not an impact evaluation of Twaweza. Twaweza has, under its Learning, Monitoring & Evaluation portfolio, commissioned a number of independent research institutes/teams to examine the impact of several of Twaweza's core components. More information on these studies can be found on <http://www.twaweza.org/go/evaluation>.

The evaluation will have an outcome mapping perspective on the various programmes as implemented in 2009-2014; it will also include "value for money" aspects, as well as an assessment of the organizational set-up.

The evaluation is expected to focus on the following three areas:

- 1) **Organizational development benchmarks.** Progress in relation to Twaweza's agreed benchmarks for internal development and outputs. The evaluation should verify the progress as

reported by Twaweza, and provide an overall analysis of how the organization has developed since 2009 with regard to internal management and control, human resources management, and procedures and routines for monitoring and evaluation.

- 2) **Outputs, quality of outputs, and reach.** As per the situation analysis undertaken before the start of the implementation, this portion of the evaluation (using outcome mapping approach) will examine the outputs and analyze them in relation to the desired outcomes; and will assess their quality, relevance, and reach. Value for money should be assessed taking into account the quality and quantity of outputs in relation to investments made by Twaweza, and Twaweza's general policy and practice to pay upon outputs delivered (not inputs), particularly in the Tanzanian context.
- 3) **Assessment of the contributions to overarching goals.** Depending on how far the outcome mapping exercise is able to verify and evaluate results beyond the delivery of outputs, the evaluation shall provide an analysis, on a sample basis, of the extent to which the overall Twaweza programme is likely to stimulate the envisaged citizen agency and action, as well as wider accountability and transparency changes. The evaluation is not expected to be able to provide "hard facts" in this regard, but it should analyze and discuss the extent to which such change can be expected to be a sustained effect of the programme investment. Furthermore, this component ought to include the assessment of Twaweza's learning structure, including external evaluations, and of how Twaweza has been learning and evolving based on feedback and evidence.

To assess the above three areas, the specific activities could include, but not be limited to, the following:

1. Review documentation produced by Twaweza particularly regarding implementation records and value for money, and examine in closer detail a sample of the claims
- 1) Conduct 25-40 in-depth interviews with a set of informants at different levels, including the policy sphere (e.g., relevant government officials, donors, NGOs), as well as the "middle" level of service provision and implementation – such as teachers in schools, journalists, community-based organizations.
- 2) Visit and conduct a number of in-depth interviews with Twaweza implementing partners (including media, and others)

For all three areas, the evaluation should not be restricted to the intended results of the Twaweza programme. It should take into account also any unintended, positive and negative, results as far as possible.

3.2 The Objectives of the Evaluation

1. To assess the organizational development benchmarks outcomes of the Twaweza programme.
2. To appraise the effectiveness of the management and governance structure of Twaweza as it stands presently and it's potential in the future.
3. To assess "value for money particularly focusing on Twaweza's system of sub-granting and output-based contracts, in relation to the changes envisioned.
4. To assess the quantity, quality, and reach of the outputs produced
5. To assess, to the extent possible, the observed effects and potential contributions of Twaweza's outputs to outcomes. Discuss reasons for levels of achievement observed.

6. To document the role of the learning component of the organization – what went particularly well/less well and implications for future programming and future Theory of Change.
7. Assess the added value to Tanzania (and East Africa) of the Twaweza activities, relative also to other CSO players.
8. Review how donors and strategic partners view Twaweza and its roles.
9. Make recommendations on the way forward to Twaweza as well as show key results to stakeholders and partners.

3.3 Specific questions of the Evaluation

These questions are to be worked out by the evaluation team/consultant, as part of the inception report.

4.0 SCOPE OF THE ASSIGNMENT

The Evaluators are expected to:

1. Provide an inception report highlighting understanding of the ToRs for the external evaluation, proposed methodology, and plan for execution, including:
 - a. Articulation of the “specific evaluation questions,” building on the main objectives, as per section 3.2.
 - b. Outline of proposed methods (e.g., desk/literature review of key documents, outcome mapping logic, in-depth interviews and/or group discussions, etc.), corresponding to the specific questions.
 - c. A sample of internal benchmarks (focus area one), partner agreements and contracts (area two) and wider aspects (area three) for in depth review
 - d. Suggestions of types and numbers of people to be contacted for the evaluation, including Twaweza staff, partners, other CSOs, external parties, etc.
 - e. An outline of the proposed analysis & synthesis of the findings
 - f. An outline of the structure of the report, including any summary tables and Annexes
 - g. The overall inception report is expected to be circa 10 pages.
2. Manage the data collection, analysis, and report writing.
3. Debrief with Twaweza and other key actors, review feedback and update report.
4. Submit final report with the analysis and conclusions of the External Evaluation process, which is to correspond to the objectives as stated in section 3.2.

Twaweza is responsible to:

1. Provide systematic documentation the external evaluator about the programme's operations, objectives, operations and implementation
2. Brief the evaluators on the Twaweza learning approach, including building a learning organization, and how the organization has been evolving through the use of feedback from implementing practice and external evaluations.
3. Provide feedback to the evaluators throughout the evaluation period.
4. Provide logistical support to the evaluation team.
5. Provide information to relevant Twaweza partners before and after about the evaluation process.
6. Plan for consultative and debriefing sessions with the evaluators at various times during the evaluation and at its conclusion.

5.0 METHODOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

5.1 Methodology

The evaluation should seek a holistic participatory organizational approach, both in terms of Twaweza's overall strategies and Twaweza's ways of operating over the period 2009-2014.

The consultant will design a methodology that is suitable and acceptable for conducting this enquiry, using relevant evaluation methods and techniques. The outcome mapping approach is suggested as a possible method. However, this may be discussed and agreed by the consultant, Sida, Twaweza, the Twaweza Advisory Board, and other development partners/stakeholders. The evaluation shall be carried out through analysis of available Twaweza documents and other documents considered necessary by the consultant. To ensure the methodology is inclusive, interviews shall be carried out with, but not limited to representatives of the organization, Twaweza strategic partners, audience members and other relevant stakeholders. The consultant should visit the programme fields and meet the beneficiaries of the programme in their various categories and other stakeholders, and devise participatory methods to gather information useful for the analysis and final assessment.

6.0 PROFILE OF THE CONSULTANTS

The consultant is expected to provide a team of international and local consultants not affiliated or representing Twaweza or any other stakeholder in any way. In terms of team composition, the consultants are expected to have the following key qualifications:

1. Evaluation specialist(s) with expertise in evaluation methodologies including outcome mapping, tracing and qualitative analysis
2. Evaluation specialist(s) with expertise in comprehensive organizational assessments including financial management and internal control
3. Excellent research and analytical skills, particularly in qualitative methodologies (e.g., process tracing, outcome mapping)
4. Civil society specialist(s) with very good understanding of citizen agency for social change, improved accountability and service delivery
5. Significant experience working in developing countries, including in East Africa
6. Expertise in the Tanzanian context of public sector accountability and service delivery at both central and local levels
7. Excellent writing skills in English
8. The team should include at least one consultant with fluency in Swahili
9. Previous experience of similar assignments; and
10. Lead consultant to have minimum of Masters' degree in a relevant field

It would be an added advantage if one or both consultants also have an understanding of the communication for development conceptual framework/theory of change and its animation philosophy and approach.

7.0 TIMEFRAME

The consultants shall prepare and submit a preliminary work-plan and budget for the evaluation. This will involve travel to at least one district, or interaction with a selection of partners, particularly where they have a large reach (such as media), an inception study for revision/analysis of existing documents and a proposed detailed methodology, consult and interview various people, analysis, preparation of a draft report, discussions with stakeholders for feedback on draft and preparation of the final report.

Before commencing the field work, a brief inception report shall be submitted to and discussed with Twaweza, the Embassy of Sweden and the representative of the Twaweza Advisory Board; these jointly shall form the working group for the evaluation. Immediately after completed field work, a debriefing meeting will be held between the Evaluator and the working group, as well as any other relevant stakeholders to validate the key findings. Thereafter, the first draft of the Evaluation report shall be submitted, not later than **26th of September 2014**.

8.0 REPORTING AND EXPECTED OUTCOMES

The report shall present the main findings and conclusions, and include recommendations essential for future development. The evaluation report shall be written in English and shall have the following structure:

1. Executive Summary- Summary of the end-of-funding evaluation with emphasis on main findings
2. Methodology used, people consulted, materials reviewed, etc
3. Assessed interventions- description of the assessed interventions, purpose, logic, history, organization, stakeholders and other relevant information
4. Key findings and Lessons Learnt – specific and general conclusions including a reflection on the organization's response to the midterm evaluation
5. Recommendations
6. The evaluation report shall not exceed 30 pages, excluding annexes.

The consultants will hold a debriefing on the highlights of their findings before a draft report is submitted. The draft report will be submitted to the Embassy of Sweden electronically and in 2 hardcopies no later than **15th October 2014**. It must also be submitted to Twaweza electronically the same date. Within two weeks after receiving the Embassy's and Twaweza's comments on the draft report, a final version shall be submitted to the Embassy, again electronically and in 2 hardcopies. The final report must be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing.

ToR Annex 1: Summary of Twaweza's First Evaluator's meeting (3-4 October 2013)

Twaweza's Varja Lipovsek, (Learning, Monitoring & Evaluation Manager) and Rakesh Rajani (Head), respond to this week's [series of posts](#) on their organization's big rethink. Source: Duncan Green's blog <http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/last-word-to-twaweza-varja-lipovsek-and-rakesh-rajani-on-how-to-keep-the-ambition-and-complexity-be-less-fuzzy-and-get-more-traction/>

That Duncan Green dedicated three posts on Twaweza's 'strategic pivot' may signal that our work and theory of change are in real trouble, but we prefer to take it as a sign that these issues are of interest to many people working on transparency, accountability and citizen-driven change. His posts follow a terrific [two day evaluation meeting](#). Here are a few clarifications and takeaways.

Spiritual matters first. We very much believe that Twaweza's soul remains intact: we want to contribute towards change in complex systems in East Africa, by promoting and enabling citizens to be active agents and shape their lives. Our experience over the past four years has made us question much of how we 'do' citizen agency, but we are not quite throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

For example, in our original approach we didn't want to be prescriptive about citizen action; we wanted to expand choices and leave it up to people to decide, what we called an 'open architecture' approach to social change. Sounds good; problem is that it doesn't work so well in practice and the evidence of successful change suggests a need for less openness and more focus. New evidence about [the bandwidth that poor people have](#) to make good decisions provides useful insights on what one can realistically expect people to do.

Moreover, we have learned that we need to better articulate what we mean by citizen action – including private v public and individual v collective. We take to heart the call from the evaluators meeting (and Duncan's blog) to both analyze what kind of action we have been promoting, and want to promote in the future, and whether we prioritize some above others, including our stance on the [desirability of voice or exit](#).

In essence, this is a move away from an unexplained "magic sauce" model where we feed some inputs (i.e. information) into a complex system, hope that the (self-selecting, undifferentiated) citizens will stir it themselves, and voila – a big outcome (such as increased citizen monitoring of services, and improved service delivery) will somehow pop out on the other end.

Precisely because the processes and systems we seek to influence are nuanced, multi-layered, and steeped in politics (from local to national to international), and precisely because we no longer believe there is a single recipe to the magic sauce, we need to do a number of things with greater clarity and thought.

Second, we need to understand the systems in which we work much better, to map them out; to do the kind of "[3i' analysis](#) to which Duncan referred (others call it [political economy analysis](#)). Part of this is also just simply doing our homework: engaging more with both the theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence from within the transparency and accountability field, but also wider such as in public health, economics and political science. We know that experiences are not automatically portable across contexts, but reading deeply can help us think sharply.

Third, we accept that our original Manichean emphasis on ‘officialdom’ vs. ‘lived reality’ (government vs. people, formal governance vs. hustling) is neither an accurate representation of reality, nor a helpful way of shaping action. Enabling citizen agency means maneuvering precisely in that space between supply and demand, between citizens and state.

However, in our East African context, confidence in engaging with the formal sectors has been eroded by years of unresponsive and corrupt systems, so much so that even when there is a genuine opportunity to engage or provide feedback, citizens often don’t do so. It’s critical for us to understand the barriers and motivators for citizens to act– but equally, we need to understand the barriers and motivators from the system/sector side, and look for opportunities where the two can connect to get things done.

Duncan’s point on taking advantage of critical junctures is well taken; and although we did not mention it during the meeting, we have been responding and engaging with topical and political issues, particularly [in Tanzania](#), for example in relation to the crisis in education, the new phone card SIM tax, and pricing of malaria medicine.

Fourth, we must be wiser about where we think we can contribute the most, while at the same time take risks and foster innovation. This last point is important. In seeking to engage with complex systems in a complex world, we need to do two things simultaneously: keep a hard line on a handful of hypotheses (both in terms of implementation and measurement – next point), as well as be nimble in experimenting with innovative approaches.

Part of this is what we are calling the “positive deviants” lab; part is the “programming lab”. The former will be an initiative to find, understand and – when possible –replicate examples of citizen action and engagement across East Africa. The latter will be an effort by us and our implementing partners to be more nimble and experimental in identifying new directions and implementation models, setting up tighter feedback loops between recipients and implementers. As our Advisory Board member [Lant Pritchett](#) tells us, you never get it right the first time. So the point is not to design the best intervention, but to develop intelligent antenna to learn and adapt fast.

Fifth, we recognize a real tension between the desire for quality, thoughtfulness and iteration on the one hand and scale on the other. The last thing we want to do is create a set of boutique programmes or our own [Millennium Development Village](#). The East African landscape is littered with thousands of pilots that went nowhere. But we think there is a way to do things in a way that has scale built in from the beginning; ingredients include simplicity (to allow easier understanding and replication), a political economy analysis of the drivers and levers of change, and keen attention to incentives and crafting winning coalitions.

The upshot of all this is to privilege learning in the organizational DNA. Sure we are, at heart, about implementation and getting things done. But it is precisely because we want to get things done better that we take measurement and learning so seriously (though we take the point on [balancing the two](#)). We believe that the type of analytical thinking that is inherent in evaluation is also incredibly useful in implementation. It permeates the points made above: understanding complex environments and systems, defining better citizen agency, and articulating hypotheses of how to promote it. So how to develop a learning posture across the organization? We agree with Duncan that if learning is boiled down to the quest for hard quantitative nuggets, we will have missed not only the big picture, but

the core of the complexity we seek to understand. What we are aiming to do, particularly next year, is to set up a learning architecture which will use a variety of metrics, methods, and tools; which will build on the theory behind the implementation choices, allow us to learn quickly as we implement and to vary implementation accordingly, and to look for and capture different kind of outcomes.

In sum, these changes are not about retreating from grand ambitions; they are about assessing where we have gotten so far and shifting tactics. We feel a deep responsibility to be thoughtful about our job, to do it well – the stakes are high for us, but much higher for the people whose realities we want to improve. If we didn't hold ourselves accountable to high implementation and measurement standards, then we truly run the risk of squandering the chance to do something really powerful. Stay tuned.

See the following link for presentations given at the event, list of participants, and more:

<http://www.twaweza.org/go/evaluators-meeting>

ToR Annex 2: Strategic pivot note

Discussion Note on Proposed Strategic Pivot at Twaweza

2 October, 2013

In this note we propose to make a number of major strategic changes to Twaweza's work, to commence earlier than planned. The note outlines the basis for and the shape of these changes. It is divided in four sections. Section 1 describes why make the changes now. Section 2 reviews experience and lessons from the different units to date, what's working well and what isn't. Section 3 discusses the Twaweza goals and metrics. Section 4 proposes an initial sketch of the revised Twaweza components. Because the note aims to articulate the case for changing course, it places greater emphasis on the areas of difficulty rather than lauding over our successes. This note does represent the formal view of the organization; rather it is a working document meant to trigger reflection and construction.

1. Why make the changes now? Why not wait for the evaluation results?

The original timeframe was to continue our work as planned until the end of 2014, and use the results of the external evaluation to develop a new strategy to take effect in 2015. We could still do that. But our view is that it would be more sensible to make certain key changes earlier because a) we know already that some things we are pursuing are not yielding positive results and are unlikely to do so in future, b) the change would allow time and space to deploy some of the more effective ways of working, and c) shifting course earlier means Twaweza can use 2014 as a year of conscious experimentation and testing so that the new 2015-18 strategy is better informed than would have otherwise been the case. The evaluation findings to date are in part informing this new thinking and will continue to do so; we do not envisage that any of the changes proposed below would be altered by the final evaluation findings.

2. What is working well? What is not doing so well?

Many aspects of Twaweza's work is going very well, and receiving wide recognition. However, several other elements are struggling, getting traction but not to the quality and extent required by our ambitious theory of change. Below we outline these observations by organizational unit.

Programmes

The Twaweza partnerships, which use or consist of the five key networks (mass media, mobile telephony, religion, fast moving consumer goods and teachers), lay at the heart of Twaweza's theory of change. The core idea here is that by 'piggybacking' on these five networks, we place our bets on institutions that are already reaching and are respected by millions of citizens. The partnerships are meant to both engage citizens with information of such high quality and imagination that it would enable people to see things differently; compare, analyze and be inspired to speak out and take action; and that it would create an 'ecosystem effect' that would continually reinforce key messages and opportunities. Over the last four years we have continually reviewed, adapted, tweaked and reorganized our work – developing criteria and tools, recruiting and training more staff, nurturing relationships, changing perspectives, etc. – most notably by adopting the 'two track approach' last year at this time.

What have we achieved? There are some clear, powerful successes. About 15-18 (out of 60) of our programme partners across East Africa, mostly related to media, are doing terrific, creative work that

make our theory of change come alive – reaching and engaging large audiences, generating debate and thinking, daring to ask provocative questions and creating new opportunities for citizen voice and action. While their ultimate impacts are not yet demonstrated, all indications suggest that these investments represent excellent value for money and opportunities for further improvement and learning. They also tend to be led by leaders who are motivated to work hard, persevere, innovate, be open to change and iterate.

However, in contrast, about half to two thirds of our partners fall under two patterns. Some are doing truly valuable work, but not in terms of realizing Twaweza’s theory of change as envisaged. Others are simply not delivering the quality or quantity needed; their work is often delayed or well below target, and our payments for outputs approach does not seem to serve as a sufficient incentive to galvanize better delivery. As one staff member put it, often ‘working with these partners to deliver results feels like pulling teeth.’

We find ourselves in a bind. In order to achieve the ecosystem effect, we need to have many partners realizing their goals, and to continue to increase the number of partners. At the same time, securing and maintaining a partnership takes a huge amount of effort. Given current circumstances, Twaweza’s energy is being sapped by ‘managing contracts’ and working with poor performing partners, rather than identifying and crafting improvements in partners’ and Twaweza’s work. There is limited time and space to learn from the smaller group of partners who are doing inspiring work aligned with Twaweza’s thinking. The tweaks and adaptations that we have made over the past years have helped move the work forward in several ways, but not sufficiently so to overcome the core challenges described here

It has also become clear that even if we were to be super-organized and lucky to find powerful partners, the ecosystem effect would require such a high degree of sustained implementation, coordination, sequencing and creativity that it is simply not feasible to make it work at large scale. Moreover, as we have learned from our experience and that of others, there are holes in the critical ‘synapses’ of our theory of change – what are the key motivations and incentives for citizens, why would people want to act, how would obstacles be overcome, how would collective action be mounted and sustained, etc. These questions need careful thought and articulation, but with our current large portfolio, we cannot give them the attention they deserve. Similarly, getting the answers right likely requires Twaweza and partners to iterate better – trying things out, developing and using keen feedback loops, adapting in an agile manner and communicating effectively – all aspects that we know we need, but do not have the bandwidth to do well given the current landscape of partners and challenges of the ecosystem effect.

Uwezo

Uwezo (‘Capability’ in Swahili) – the largest national assessment of basic literacy and numeracy in Africa – has been a major success on many counts. In each of the past four years, large-scale national education assessments of children aged 6-16 years have been undertaken, and a total of about one million children tested. We have gathered and presented the evidence persuasively that children are in school but not learning. This has informed and shifted the policy debate on education in East Africa and beyond. Several other countries in Africa are looking to adapt the Uwezo model, and governments such as Tanzania have now determined to undertake their own basic literacy and numeracy assessments. The core education metric for government, donors, academics, media and increasingly citizens is no longer child enrolment, but what is the child learning? This perspective is an essential foundation to getting better results from education and a key success of the Uwezo initiative.

That said, Uwezo faces a number of key challenges. Foremost, Uwezo envisaged that it would lead to improved basic literacy and numeracy by 10 percent in 4 years. Evidence suggests no dent has been made on this metric, yet. This requires a re-examination of our theory of change. Second, while Uwezo has expended considerable effort in communicating findings at local and national levels, and succeeded in doing much more than most research efforts, the quality, organization, coordination and follow up of communication work needs to be considerably strengthened, with a keener sense of the information-to-agency synapses alluded to above. Third, the assessment itself is such a large and costly exercise (in human, financial and organizational terms), that it raises two sets of questions: a) how can the process logistics be made more efficient, streamlined and cost effective?, and b) are we sure, as has been raised before, that an annual exercise is justified given essentially no change in outcomes each year? These concerns become particularly acute in light of their potential opportunity costs – what is not being done well or is neglected when we are so occupied with managing the assessment? For example, would our time be better spent doing more analysis of the large datasets (at present a very small aspect of the data is crunched), and different forms of sustained public communication and policy engagement?

As with Twaweza's programmes, perhaps the most pressing concern is the need to create space to do Uwezo thoughtfully, in a manner that more sharply interrogates the value proposition of each of its components, and articulates, experiments and iterates better. For example, 'instant feedback' of assessment findings to parents and communities has been a key signature of the Uwezo approach, but initial findings suggest that its effectiveness is limited. Would it not be worthwhile to research and understand better the experiences of others working in similar contexts, and to use that information and our own experience to vary and compare interventions? An essential aspect of this is agile monitoring and putting that data to use. Uwezo has, for close to one year, a robust monitoring framework. However its implementation has been somewhat patchy, largely because of competing demands of handling many logistical and organizational aspects of the Uwezo survey across approximately 400 districts in three countries.

Finally, Uwezo's success in demonstrating low learning levels raises the question 'so what'? What should be done? Uwezo's theory of change takes the view that the public and policy pressure generated by the communication of Uwezo findings will cajole other actors, including government, to pay greater attention to learning and to seek help (where necessary) and take concrete action to improve matters. But in practice we face two problems. First, there are not partners with sufficient clout and credibility to respond to this challenge. Second, among many, the case for quality education triggers arguments for largely more of the same inputs -more money, more (certified) teachers, more buildings, more desks - calls that are rarely supported by rigorous evidence and that in fact may represent poor use of money. By 'evading' the question of what should be done, we risk our work unleashing greater expenditure on ineffective inputs and we forego the opportunity to steer resources for likely greater impact.

Experimental Interventions 'KiuFunza'

This is one of the newer areas of our work, 18 months in conceptualization and about 10 months of implementation. To date KiuFunza ('Thirst to Learn' in Swahili) is a large randomized control trial that seeks to improve literacy and numeracy outcomes in Grades 1-3 through three arms of work a) offering a cash incentive payment to teachers for every pupil who does well i.e. cash on delivery, b) providing capitation grants to school accounts predictably as per policy, in full and on time, and c) a combination of a) and b). This programme, which is much more tightly designed and implemented, has generated considerable interest and is going largely according to plan. Unlike Twaweza's other programmes, it is focused on 35 schools in each of 11 selected districts and implemented by ourselves in concert with a

limited set of professional partners. Importantly, it helps generate the evidence for and answer the question ‘what should be done to improve learning?’

In going forward, three sets of issues arise. First, as KiuFunza grows, how do we best determine and craft the interventions to be tested? Other interventions being considered include teacher training, reading camps, short-term contract teachers and information/governance interventions. Because RCTs are expensive, there is greater onus on making sure what is tried is well considered. The current design benefits from almost two years of thinking, built on significant prior work done by others. We will clearly need to make sure that we are well read and that our work draws from findings elsewhere.

Second, at the same time, findings are not un-problematically transferable across contexts and we will need to pay close attention to what is or can work in East Africa, drawing from local case studies and expertise. Third, while the Uwezo, programmes and KiuFunza work is linked within one organization, its conceptualization, design and staff management is largely separate, and does not maximize opportunities for strategic and communication synergies. Twaweza/Uwezo has gained respect and credibility in the region, which could be used to greater effect – including with and for KiuFunza - through more coordinated articulation of evidence and policy implications.

Uwazi: Mobile Phone Survey ‘Sauti za Wananchi’ and Policy Briefs

Uwazi has evolved tremendously in the past four years, and progressively become more tightly focused in its role. In 2012, two major aspects – budget and sectoral analysis – were essentially dropped (with some exceptions) due to human resource constraints and the desire to do fewer activities well.

After two years of design, testing, gestation and piloting, Sauti za Wananchi (‘Voices of Citizens’ in Swahili) – Africa’s first nationally representative, high frequency mobile phone survey – finally took off in Tanzania in early 2013. Sauti has generated keen interest because of its potential to generate systematic, reliable data on what’s going on the ground, and have that data inform both the public and policy makers quickly and effectively. Like KiuFunza, it is largely working well as envisaged, with surveys being conducted each month, good response rate being maintained, data being analyzed and written up and launched, and the findings receiving media attention. Like KiuFunza it has a relatively tight design and is managed by Twaweza in conjunction with a professional partner that runs a call center to collect the data.

Finally, Uwazi also plays a key organization wide role in data quality assurance and analysis. In addition to its own work, Uwazi supports Uwezo principally and other units on issues of sampling, data tools, data cleaning, analysis and at times write-up.

Its successes aside, Sauti too could be improved. First, the generation of questions to ask needs to be sharper, better informed by staff and key experts, and more attuned to both the issues of the day and policy calendar and key opportunities. Second, the launch of the Sauti reports could be further improved, through better formats, cultivating a constituency interested in the findings, and distributing results in a targeted fashion. Third, as Sauti moves into its next phase of doing a second survey each month for third party clients, we will need to carefully work out and iterate how to develop such partnerships in a manner that best furthers Twaweza objectives and keeps things manageable.

The Uwazi policy briefs are well known among certain circles and receive relatively high attention in the media. Their 'style' communicates key ideas in clear, compelling ways and has generated positive feedback for the issues Twaweza works on, such as Uwezo, Sauti za Wananchi and related findings. Beyond that, and their 'they-make-the-organization-look-good' value, a number of questions arise about their effectiveness in relation to Twaweza goals. The range of topics covered and number of briefs produced at present may undermine depth and quality, their connection to Twaweza's programme goals and strategy is somewhat tenuous, and coverage of the evidence underlying 'what works' is limited.

Strategic Engagement

This is a small unit, led by the Head of Twaweza, which focuses on national and global level strategic engagement. It involves engaging with key actors in international development – including governments, civil society, media, academics, philanthropy, private sector and politicians – so as to influence thinking and policy, 'read the signs' of trends and learn from others to inform Twaweza's work, and to cultivate relationships that serve to promote Twaweza and mutual interests through policy advocacy and other means. It can also 'open doors' and promote networking that aids the attainment of the programme components mentioned above. In a few instances, such as the Open Government Partnership, it serves as the basis for developing major strategic initiatives.

This engagement has helped Twaweza develop conceptual depth and innovation, stimulate intellectual curiosity, reinforce the value of learning and evaluation, and enhance organizational credibility. At the same time, to be more effective the work needs several improvements. First, more time needs to be set aside to craft and take proactive measures; too often the organization has missed important opportunities from being too occupied with operations. Second, Twaweza is at a stage of its development where a greater number of senior staff are needed to play a more active role in this strategic engagement. This includes both existing managers and likely recruitment of 1-2 senior level East Africans in policy engagement roles, which itself is recognition that policy actors need greater emphasis than in the original theory of change. Third, Twaweza needs to expand on and invest in its relationships with key policy actors across East Africa.

Communications

The Communications unit fulfills three core functions in Twaweza. First, it provides conceptual, creative and technical backstopping and a quality assurance function for Twaweza's wide range of communication partners and products. Second, it has a lead role in crafting and managing the *Ni Sisi* ('It's Us' in Swahili) or Stories of Change campaign that promotes the notion among that public that changes comes from people. Third, it fulfills a more traditional function of communicating about the organization and its work, including media launches, website and social media. Because almost every substantive activity at Twaweza is about public and policy engagement and therefore communication, this unit fulfills an essential and heavy responsibility.

In practice, the communications capacity and delivery of Twaweza has improved considerably in the last year, particularly since the set-up of a dedicated communications unit. A new communications strategy, constructed in terms of key audiences and goals, is in place. Staff with focused expertise have been recruited and the unit has been consolidated. In turn, this is helping to make programmes, Uwezo, Uwazi and other units do sharper work, better inform the major campaign work, and significantly increase the media launches. Nonetheless, none of the three functions of communications are at an optimal level. The building of the unit over time, which now has 7 staff covering the three countries, is

expected to help in this regard. So will developing systems, workflows, tools and a network of resource people (translators, editors, graphic artists, film-makers, etc.). But the scope of work is so large, and the intensity of effort required so high given the volume of communication outputs (in two languages), that something will likely need to give.

Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation

This is a core unit of the organization. From the outset, the philosophical commitment of the organization to undertake rigorous, honest and independent learning has been clear. But translating that commitment into practice has been much more arduous and difficult than anticipated, in relation to concept and design, identifying and recruiting suitable staff, developing frameworks and tools, creating ownership and a culture of curiosity within Twaweza, and getting things done. After several major changes, Twaweza now has concrete monitoring approach tools, three major external evaluation components and several small ones, and a set of ongoing staff activities to foster inquiry, critical reading, rigor and debate. Importantly, most staff have an appreciation of the role of monitoring in their work and a practical sense of how to use it.

We will not discuss evaluations further here because they are the subject of a separate agenda item and the two day conference on Oct 3/4. However, three overall questions arise in light of our experience to date and the changes proposed above. First, how does one design a monitoring and evaluation approach that is appropriate for an iterative, agile posture to programming, with the aim in part to ensure that flexibility does not become an ‘anything goes’? Second, what is the best mix and size of ‘evaluations’ to fit Twaweza’s requirements, again, particularly in light of the proposed changes above? How will the current set of evaluators need to adjust their objectives and methods? And what are the appropriate evaluation timeframes needed to strike the right balance, not making conclusions too prematurely but also not waiting too long when course correction would have been helpful earlier on? Third, Twaweza’s approach implies an increasing bias towards prospective evaluation in the form of independently testing hypotheses, rather than a traditional looking back assessment of whether the organization met fixed objectives. Is this shift in emphasis welcomed, and what are its implications for evaluation design?

3. Goals

Twaweza seeks to achieve two sets of goals: a set of citizen agency goals by the end of 2014, and a set of service delivery outcome goals by 2018, with progress made towards them by 2014.

The citizen agency goals reflect Twaweza’s core focus on citizen agency, and are broken down into 4 components (uptake of information, systematic monitoring, public voicing and action). Over the past 4 years Twaweza has contributed to the attainment of these goals through many means. But what we have learned is that we need to better unpack what we mean, for each set of activities, by each one of these four aspects. Without this articulation, the risk is that conceptualization can get mushy, and measurement become difficult. This is not easy to do, nor do we mean to just look for easy (and less interesting) measures. Rather it means grappling thoughtfully with the pathways of change, its key actors and applicable incentives and motivations, and the assumptions that inform why and how certain interventions will trigger action at particular nodes or synapses.

Twaweza has three sets of very ambitious service delivery goals in basic health, water and education. Each one further articulates 3-4 targets per sector. In practice, while Twaweza has worked on all three areas, much greater activity has taken place and accomplishments made in basic education. In key part this is due to the presence of Uwezo across the three countries and more recently KiuFunza in Tanzania, the number of Uwezo other programme unit staff with training and/or competence in education, and the relationships and networks developed by these staff with key actors in the sector. Despite efforts, to recruit staff, to build working groups, to have meetings and otherwise engage in the water and health sectors, progress has been limited. While individual activities have had significant impact, overall it has become clear that we lack and are unlikely to be able to build the sort of access and effect we have on the education sector. As a result, the health and water outcomes are unlikely to be realized; and pretending to attain them when there is no realistic feasibility may not be a good use of scarce organizational resources.

4. Sketch of a Revised Twaweza Approach

The analysis above, coupled with close reading of theoretical and empirical material related to these issues, provides the main starting point for sketching the new Twaweza strategic approach 2015-18. Accordingly, we propose the following:

4.1 Goals

The current metrics for Twaweza and Uwezo would be revised along the following lines:

Citizen Agency

That Twaweza continue to focus on its core information and citizen agency related mission, but do so with a greater level of articulation of the meaning of citizen agency as well as the pathways, actors, incentives, motivations and mechanisms that are expected to trigger change.

Basic Education

Twaweza continue with its focus on basic education and attainment of related goals, and harmonize these across the organization (Twaweza and Uwezo) and countries.

Health and water

Twaweza drop its commitment to achieving ambitious health and water goals, and instead limit its work in these two sectors to a) using Twaweza's unique data/voice collecting infrastructure (more below) to collect specific value added information on health and water, and b) the extent to which continued citizen agency pursuits contribute to these sectors.

Learning and Evaluation

Learning – for the purposes of both improving delivery within programme and informing global thinking) continue to be an even greater focus for Twaweza, with more sharply articulated goals and targets.

4.2 Programme components

In the proposed structure, Twaweza's work would three clusters of work and an overall animating theme as follows:

I) Unearthing Reality: Data and Voice

A real problem in development, whether managed by governments, civil society, private sector or others, is that we often do not have a very good idea of what is going on in communities, and what people think and want. Citizen or constituency feedback is increasingly seen as essential. Twaweza's Uwezo platform across east Africa and Sauti za Wananchi platform in Tanzania will serve as the solid foundation for credible monitoring and data and people's voice. Its purpose will be to learn the truth of what's working and what isn't, i.e. surface the realities/problems and provide a rigorous channel for people's views. Its high frequency and large/ national scale present particularly advantages. A data quality assurance and analysis function would also be part of this cluster.

For 2014, we are considering scaling back the Uwezo national countrywide assessment, so as to use this 'year of learning and experimentation' to better think through and sharpen several Uwezo components. These include reviewing the entire assessment process and its components, so as to realize greater rigor, quality and efficiency; varying and experimenting with different approaches for doing the same thing (e.g. varying length of engagement at household level, piloting different types of instant feedback at household and community levels, piloting use of technology in data collection), and for comparing costs, gains and trade-offs; developing a deeper data analysis, publication and communication strategy and plan; and clarifying components of the theory of change in relation to the value added by Uwezo being a citizen driven survey. This would entail conducting a number of tests and pilots that are carefully designed, watched and compared; perhaps adapting and repeating them a few times, so as to gain the benefits of using an agile, iterative development process to solidly inform the Uwezo approach from 2015 onwards. Finally, 2014 would also be used to interrogate internally and in consultation with partners some of the key questions raised in the May 2013 Board meeting regarding Uwezo's overall structure.

II) Learning Labs: Experimenting with what works

The second cluster will have a number of components which all seek to get specific things done. The overall interest is still on solutions that are scaleable and sustainable, not boutique. But the approach is different in that it seeks to work with careful prototypes and test ideas carefully and iterate over time to keep getting it more right, in real world conditions, and in a manner that engages and informs key constituencies.

Programme Partnerships Learning Lab:

That Twaweza divide its current partners into three categories as follows: a) active/ delivering/ learning, b) partners doing valuable work but that does not fit well within Twaweza's revised strategy/theory of change, and c) lapsed, dormant or otherwise non-delivering partners. In going forward we propose that we work closely with group a) for purposes of strengthening quality/ creativity and effectiveness and for learning and testing; that it work with group b) to identify alternate investors (e.g. Hivos, MAVC, OSI, Omidyar, etc.) and possibly provide a tie off grant; and for group c) close off partnerships by 31 December 2013. This will allow time to focus on 15-18 partners (less than one-third the number of partners at present, ironically same number as was proposed in the original strategy), which should result in greater attention to tweaking quality and creativity, and deepen learning. The learning would be rigorously documented by staff and external parties, with care given to its effective and honest communication.

Positive Deviance Learning Lab:

Incorporate major elements of *Stories of Change* (under Communications unit at present) and create a programme based on rigorous identification and verification of persons and groups that have brought about the change despite the circumstances (the outliers, positive deviants); and document these cases thoroughly and with rigor (not just unsubstantiated anecdotes). Prizes (re: XPrize) may be considered to incentivize to attract and challenge groups to solve intractable challenges – both technical and successful deployment/execution at scale. A limited set of cases that have been verified as solid and innovative could be considered for replication at a small scale, to serve a ‘R&D’ function. Should success be replicated, these could then be considered for either ‘gold standard’ verification by ‘feeding’ ideas to KiuFunza and/or policy consideration by government and other programme partners.

KiuFunza Experimental Interventions

A third programme component is to continue with KiuFunza. In 2014 this will include doing the second year of the current capitation grant and cash on delivery intervention, that seek to address the challenge revealed by Uwezo data, as well as designing other education interventions. These would be informed by a careful reading of the local contextual priorities and opportunities, as well as experience of other research across the world. In future years this could draw from the programme labs (above).

The work would likely continue to partner with JPAL, IPA, EDI and other similar entities to ensure quality and rigor, and the credibility we need. We may also seek to move the implementation of experiments to an entity such as IPA, and instead structure our roles to be a) contribution to idea development; b) links with policy actors, c) communication and d) support with fundraising. As at present, care will be taken to take into account political economy factors in relation to the feasibility of the intervention as well as its scalability and wide adoption. Providing space for students from East Africa and globally to engage will be an important part of the project.

III) Communications: Public and Policy Engagement

This work would focus on two core areas as follows:

Deepening quality of Twaweza’s public engagement

Enhancing citizen agency through communication will be a central focus. However we will approach this with heightened curiosity and an appetite to learn. Our activities, particularly through programmes and communication will be grounded in experimentation and iteration, of different approaches, content and aspects of our theory of change. The notion of rigor will be applied to all our communications interventions, with many of the same principles that are currently applied to data collection and research - we will be thoughtful and evidence-based. The Communications unit’s primary function will be to play a supportive development and quality assurance role to all other units. Specifically, the unit will work:

- To increase quality and creativity of programmes intervention experiments;
- To try new ways of utilizing the Uwezo data and network;
- To support dissemination of learning from our programme labs and experiments;
- To support work in making data and research more open and accessible to citizens;
- To create new content types and investigate new ways of reaching people that enhance citizen agency;
- To promote and disseminate findings and lessons we learn along the way;

- The Communications unit will continue to function as the keeper of organizational content, inputting into all outputs, as well as generating its own ideas and activities.

Enhancing Twaweza's policy engagement

Policy engagement has been a feature of Twaweza's approach from the outset, but it has often not been strategically design or joined up across the organization. In the new strategy the aim is to develop a conscious and more deliberate policy engagement approach, with clarity about purposes, goals and key actors/moments that nonetheless is flexible enough to adapt and respond to contingencies and opportunities. The policy work would build more explicitly from the data/voice and programme learning labs, and annual plans will often link up work across the three areas across a clearly articulated pathway of change. Open data, open development and open government are core concepts that are seen as enabling public and policy transparency and engagement, and would be explored through this work. Policy communication, including visualizing data, careful work with media, and effective use of website and social media would be key features.

Relationships in place with key actors and processes, such as the Open Government Partnership and engagement with strategic boards, would be maintained and others cultivated in relation to organizational priorities. These engagements, as noted above, provide intellectual input and credibility, which both inform Twaweza's work and give it more credibility and wings. Responsibility for this role would be widened within the organization, to be led by the Head but to include senior managers and possibly 1-2 policy analysts. The Communications unit would support policy engagement through development of effective, audience focused materials, advising on advocacy strategy and organizing key events.

IV) The Common Animating Theme: Learning

Across the three clusters of work outlined above and throughout the whole organization, learning becomes the common, animating theme. Twaweza seeks to learn what's the reality on the ground and what people think; to learn what works, what doesn't and experiment with what could solve problems and get things done; and to engage public and policy makers in the learning and its implications even as we learn how to engage better. The purpose of the learning is dual – to inform and improve our practice (and sharpen our theory), and to contribute to the thirst for global knowledge on transparency, accountability, citizen engagement and service delivery. Our primary posture is therefore of an abiding intellectual curiosity and a thirst for ideas, experience and critique; a commitment to search for evidence and rigor even as we appreciate the messiness and complexity of change that rarely follows linear paths; an openness to revising our thinking, admitting mistakes and changing our mind; and an underlying humility and confidence that is not afraid to be honest, thoughtful and creative.

In practice this entails, in part, building on the monitoring and evaluation frameworks and partnerships that we have developed over the past few years. Many of these will likely provide even better value as the newer Twaweza architecture lends itself to such inquiry and adaptation. Learning staff would form an essential component of the *learning lab* approach: it's the "learning" part of the formula. Whereas the programmes unit will largely take on the "lab" part, that is, the implementation. LME and programmes would jointly decide on which "experiments" to engage with, with LME likely responsible for setting up the iterative learning architecture around them. However, the type of experimental/iterative thinking and planning that comes with this approach will have to be integrated into the working and planning processes of the programmes unit, as well as into the Uwezo unit (in

particular as relevant to monitoring of communication initiatives). LME will also continue to engage with Uwazi on assessing the quality, reach and possible effect of the data-related outputs (such as briefs).

At the same time, we will also have to review whether the objectives, design, structure and methodology of the evaluation partners are still relevant in the new configuration or how they need to adapt. It is one thing to desire this approach, but we are mindful it's quite another to inculcate such a culture – and provide the practical space, time and incentives – to realize it.

Conclusion

This note represents the initial thinking of Twaweza management, developed in consultation with Board leadership and staff input. It is subject to change. Its purpose is to generate reflection and critique that will help us develop a more solid and better informed 2015-18 strategy.

The note lays out the rationale for making key changes to our approach and programmes based on our reading of what's working well and what isn't, and drawing on what we have learned, aspects that go to the heart of our theory of change. It outlines why we need to embark on the changes now; and suggests that 2014 be used as a testing, experimentation and preparation year (particularly the first half) to inform the thinking of the new 2015-18 strategy. It sketches the initial logic and key components of the new strategy, that we believe is likely to be sharper, tighter, more coherent, and more feasible. The main changes involve lessening the burden of managing a high volume of partners and activities; letting go of the more ambitious health and water goals, and abandoning the idea of achieving the ecosystem effect as both theoretically and practically unfeasible. These are replaced with a tighter model of generating reality (data/voice) and experimenting with what works through programme labs, two clusters that will form the basis of the third cluster that is deeper public and policy engagement.

The proposed way forward places learning, an abiding curiosity and rigor at the center of Twaweza endeavor. This will involve building on what we have achieved but taking it a quite a bit further in concept, culture and practice. Developing and sustaining such a posture and way of working is both extremely exciting and daunting; we sense that if we pull it off this could be something very powerful, but we also know that doing so will require us to summon a remarkable level of intellectual muster and stamina.

Annex 2: Information Sources

2.1 Key Documents

Twaweza Annual Plans, Reports, Board documents and Strategy Documents below are considered to be key documents. All 151 documents listed below were reviewed and used to form the assessments. Many of the documents in the third list were also reviewed.

1	Twaweza Annual Workplan 2009.
2	Twaweza Annual Plan 2010.
3	Twaweza Annual Plan 2011.
4	Twaweza Annual Plan 2012.
5	Twaweza Annual Plan & Budget 2013.
6	Twaweza Annual Report 2009.
7	Twaweza Annual Report 2010.
8	Twaweza Annual Report 2011.
9	Twaweza Annual Report 2012.
10	Twaweza Annual Report 2013.
11	Twaweza Original Strategy 2008
12	Twaweza. "Staff." 2014. < http://twaweza.org/go/staff >.
13	Twaweza and Uwezo Annual Matrix Reports.
14	Twaweza Revised Strategy 2011
15	Hivos Tanzania-Twaweza Initiative Reports and Financial Statements 2010.
16	Hivos Tanzania-Twaweza Initiative Reports and Financial Statements 2009.
17	Hivos Tanzania- Twaweza Initiative Reports and Financial Statements 2011.
18	Hivos Tanzania Limited Twaweza Initiative Reports and Financial Statements. 2012.
19	Hivos Tanzania Limited Twaweza Initiative Reports and Financial Statements 2013.
20	Pivot Note, 2013.

2.2 All Twaweza Documents provided and Examined

No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically	No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically
1	1. Agenda.pdf	30	140328_Mtanzania_15_15636.pdf
2	1. Board Meeting Agenda.pdf	31	140402_Majira_7_1573f.pdf
3	10 Ni sisi Capaign JWT presentation.pdf	32	140402_Mwananchi_6_15769.pdf
4	10. Ni Sisi Stories of Change.pdf	33	140402_The Citizen_2_15770.pdf
5	11. Dates of Next Meeting.pdf	34	140402_The Guardian_1and2_15751.pdf
6	11. Governance Update.pdf	35	140402_Uhuru_9_15775.pdf
7	11a. Twaweza Steering Committee revised.docx	36	140403_Habari Leo_7_157f8.pdf
8	11AdvisoryBoardMinutesDRAFTdd+as27052014.docx	37	140403_The Citizen_8_157eb.pdf
9	12. Senior Advisor Change Management Role.pdf	38	140410_Mwananchi_7_15a6b.pdf
10	12. TwawezaAdvBoardMeetingDates2010-11.docx	39	140415_Daily News_2_15bff.pdf
11	12thAdvisoryBoardMinutes15092014.pdf	40	140415_Jambo Leo_3_15c17.pdf
12	12thBoardpack&StrategyEssentials.pdf	41	140415_Majira_3_15beb.pdf
13	12thBoardpack&StrategyEssentials.pdf	42	140415_Mwananchi_5_15bf6.pdf
14	13. Dates for the next board meeting.pdf	43	140417_The Citizen_8_15d6c(1).pdf
15	140304_Jambo Leo_10_148f5.pdf	44	140417_The Citizen_8_15d6c.pdf
16	140305_Jamhuri_12_1498a.pdf	45	140417_The Guardian_3_15d61.pdf
17	140305_Majira_3_14988(1).pdf	46	140422_The African_2_15e6e(1).pdf
18	140305_Majira_7_14989.pdf	47	140422_The African_2_15e6e.pdf
19	140305_Nipashe_5_14978.pdf	48	140424_Majira_1,4_15f13.pdf
20	140305_Tanzania Daima_5_14995.pdf	49	140424_Majira_3_15f14(1).pdf
21	140305_The Citizen_3_14963.pdf	50	140424_Mwananchi_4_15f2f.pdf
22	140306_Mtanzania_5_14aa0.pdf	51	140424_Nipashe_1,5_15f16.pdf
23	140311_The African_8_14ca9.pdf	52	140424_The Guardian_1_15f1e.pdf
24	140315_The Citizen_pg 10_14ffe.pdf	53	140507_Jambo Leo_13_164c9.pdf
25	140321_Majira_9_15319.pdf	54	140507_Jambo Leo_3_164c6.pdf
26	140323_Majira_4_153c2.pdf	55	140507_Majira_17_16490.pdf
27	140323_Mwananchi_5_153a9.pdf	56	140507_Majira_3_1648b.pdf
28	140325_Mwananchi_9_15457.pdf	57	140507_Mwananchi_5_164b7.pdf
29	140325_The Citizen_17and20_15453.pdf	58	140507_Nipashe_3_16481.pdf

No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically	No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically
59	140507_Tanzania Daima_2_164be.pdf	88	140702_Daily News_2_17926.pdf
60	140507_The Citizen_4_164b1.pdf	89	140702_Jambo Leo_6_17940.pdf
61	140507_The Guardian_1and2_1647b.pdf	90	140702_Mtanzania_2_17935.pdf
62	140513_Mtanzania_10_16707.pdf	91	140702_Nipashe_3_1790f.pdf
63	140514_Nipashe_15_16747.pdf	92	140702_Nipashe_4_17911.pdf
64	140518_Tanzania Daima_2_168da.pdf	93	140702_Tanzania Daima_3_1794a.pdf
65	140519_The Citizen_12_16900.pdf	94	140702_The Citizen_7_17931.pdf
66	140520_Mwananchi_15_1696e.pdf	95	140702_The Guardian_1and2_17920.pdf
67	140521_Tanzania Daima_2_16a39.pdf	96	140702_Uhuru_16_17945.pdf
68	140521_The Citizen_5_16a2b.pdf	97	140704_Business Times_4_179bb.pdf
69	140521_Uhuru_10_16a3f.pdf	98	140710_Mwananchi_19_17c5b.pdf
70	140525_Jambo Leo_3_16b1e.pdf	99	140715_Jambo Leo_10_17d89.pdf
71	140526_The African_6_16b47.pdf	100	140715_Mwananchi_17,18_17d76.pdf
72	140527_The Citizen_19_16c01.pdf	101	140802_The Citizen_1,4_18a74.pdf
73	140601_The Guardian_12_16dd5.pdf	102	140803_The Citizen_3_18a95.pdf
74	140604_Habari Leo_5_16ea4(1).pdf	103	140803_The Citizen_6_18abe.pdf
75	140604_Jambo Leo_3_16eb7.pdf	104	140806_Majira_5_18c6d.pdf
76	140604_Majira_1and4_16ea7(1).pdf	105	140806_Majira_p3_18c6c.pdf
77	140604_Mwananchi_2_16e9c.pdf	106	140806_Mwananchi_6_18c7f.pdf
78	140604_Raia Mwema_3_16ec2.pdf	107	140806_Nipashe_12_18de1.pdf
79	140604_Tanzania Daima_3_16ebb.pdf	108	140806_The Citizen_3_18c75.pdf
80	140604_The Citizen_10_16e8b.pdf	109	140806_Uhuru_10_18cb8.pdf
81	140605_Tanzania Daima_3_16f61.pdf	110	140807_Mtanzania_5_18d73.pdf
82	140605_The Guardian_3_16f31.pdf	111	140807_The Guardian_3_18db0.pdf
83	140606_Jambo Leo_10_16faf.pdf	112	140808_Business Times_1_18e28.pdf
84	140610_Mtanzania_23_170e3.pdf	113	140811_The African_2_18eee.pdf
85	140616_Mtanzania_21_1725a.pdf	114	140813_Daily News_3_19013.pdf
86	140616_Nipashe_2_1723e.pdf	115	140815_Daily News_4_19218.pdf
87	140616_The African_6_17269.pdf	116	140815_Jambo Leo_3_1923b.pdf

No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically	No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically
117	140816_Tanzania Daima_2_19278.pdf	145	3a. Annual Report 2012 Final draft.pdf
118	140821_Jambo Leo_15_19475.pdf	146	3b. Twaweza Draft FS 2012.pdf
119	140828_The Citizen_3_19788.pdf	147	4. Anchoring health+water Uwezo style.pdf
120	2. Minutes 6th Twaweza Annual Board meeting.pdf	148	4.1. Extra D.light.docx
121	2. Twaweza Board Meeting October 29 2009 minutes.docx	149	4.2. Extra Dhamira.doc
122	2009 Twaweza audited Financial Statement.pdf	150	4.3. Extra Masoko.docx
123	2010 Twaweza audited Financial Statement.pdf	151	4a. Twaweza Annual Plan and Budget.pdf
124	2011 Annual Report partners.PNG	152	4b. Uwezo Annual Plan and Budget.pdf
125	2011 Twaweza audited Financial Statement.pdf	153	5. Improving Learning Outcomes in Tanzania.pdf
126	2012HalfYearReportLetter240812tt.docx	154	5a. LME update.pdf
127	2013 Contracts Register.pdf	155	5b. AIID Sikiliza Report 1+2.pdf
128	2013 Contracts Report.xlsx	156	5b.Presentationeducationinterventions160512.pdf
129	2013 Twaweza expenditure by country.xlsx	157	5c. Georgetown guide outline.pdf
130	2013 Uwezo expenditure by country.xlsx	158	6. KiuFunza update.pdf
131	2014 Contracts Report.xlsx	159	6. Wananchi Survey Concept Note.pdf
132	2a. Minutes of the 8th Board Meeting.pdf	160	7. LME Update.pdf
133	2a. Twaweza Third Board Agenda.docx	161	7. Uwezo East Africa Update.pdf
134	2b. Matters Arising.pdf	162	7b.PresentationMEUpdate16052012.pdf
135	3. Half year brief final 2009.docx	163	7d. Immersion090512Draft.pdf
136	3. LPT Kenya Phasel Report.pdf	164	8. Uwezo+ Update.pdf
137	3.1. Daraja.doc	165	8a. 2011AnnualReport.pdf
138	3.2. D.Light.doc	166	8b. Twaweza FinancialStatements2011DRAFT.pdf
139	3.3. Dhamira.doc	167	9. Review of Twaweza Theory of Change.pdf
140	3.4. Envaya.doc	168	9. TwawezaAnnualPlan2012.xls
141	3.5. Mia TV.doc	169	9b. TwawezaAnnualPlan2012.pdf
142	3.6. Masoko.doc	170	9b. TwawezaProgramsWorkflow.pdf
143	3.7. Sahara.doc	171	AcT MTR report FINAL.pdf
144	3.8. Tamasha.doc	172	Activity & Outcome Table - 031114.docx

No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically	No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically
173	Activity & Outcome Table Varja - 031114.docx	197	Agenda 4d.Twaweza Milestones 2009-10.pdf
174	AdvBoardMembersBios151014.docx	198	Agenda 5. corrected Twaweza 2011annual plan.pdf
175	Advisory Board Member Survey Ben Witjes.docx	199	Agenda 5. Twaweza 2011annual plan.draftMay2011.pdf
176	Advisory Board Members-Bios.docx	200	Agenda 5. Twaweza Organogram expected Jan 2011.pdf
177	Agenda 1. Advisory Board Members.docx	201	Agenda 5a. Tanzania Baseline Update.pdf
178	Agenda 1.bios 140911.docx	202	Agenda 5b. LPT Evaluation.pdf
179	Agenda 1.Twaweza Organogram April2011.pdf	203	Agenda 5c. AIID Evaluation.pdf
180	Agenda 10. 2012 Proposed Meeting Dates.docx	204	Agenda 6-9 Note.pdf
181	Agenda 10.Learning FrameworkMay2011.pdf	205	Agenda 6a Halfyearreportletter2011.docx
182	Agenda 11. TwawezaProposedNewLegalStructure.pdf	206	Agenda 6a. Twaweza External Evaluator Appointment.pdf
183	Agenda 12. Twaweza Adv.Board.TOR.pdf	207	Agenda 6b. halfyearssummary.bvereport.090911AK.pdf
184	Agenda 13. TwawezaBoardMeetingDates2011-12.pdf	208	Agenda 6b. Twaweza Evaluation Approach concept note.pdf
185	Agenda 2. Agenda.pdf	209	Agenda 7. Uwezo EA.Proposal Update.draft 010911.pdf
186	Agenda 2. Proposed agenda 140911.docx	210	Agenda 8. TwawezaAgreedNewLegalStructure.docx
187	Agenda 2.Twaweza Fifth Board Agenda.May2011.pdf	211	Agenda 9. TwawezaAdvBoard+DonorEngagementSep2011.docx
188	Agenda 3. Minutes of the April 2010 Advisory Board Meeting.pdf	212	AIID Evaluation proposal.pdf
189	Agenda 3.Twaweza Advisory Board Minutes October 2010.pdf	213	AIIDBaseline-small.pdf
190	Agenda 3a. Minutes BoardMay2011draftvk+rr.docx	214	Ambassador Juma Mwapachu bio.docx
191	Agenda 3b. MattersArisingAdvBoardMay2011rr.docx	215	Analytics twaweza.org Audience Overview 20140101-20141124 20130101-20131124.pdf
192	Agenda 4. Twaweza Draft Strategy 070911.pdf	216	Analytics twaweza.org Audience Overview 20140101-20141124.pdf
193	Agenda 4. Twaweza Mid year 2010 brief.pdf	217	Annual Assessment 2012.pdf
194	Agenda 4a.Twaweza Annual Report 2010.Board draft.pdf	218	Attendance and logistics 16 September board meeting.spreadsheet.draft070911SM.xlsx
195	Agenda 4b.Summary Key Twaweza.Partnerships2010-1.pdf	219	Audited Financial Statement 2012.pdf
196	Agenda 4c.Deloitte.Hivos-Twaweza FinaldRAFTed.pdf	220	Ben Witjes Sept visit.agenda.draft090911sm.docx

No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically	No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically
221	BLOG LINKS.docx	249	Employment Contracts 2014.xlsx
222	Blog links-SikilizaAIID-recvd150114.docx	250	Evaluation Team Meeting with Varja & Interview 13.10.2014.docx
223	BMConfirmations.xlsx	251	EvaluationPartnersBudgetExpenditure261114mk+KdG.xlsx
224	BMConfirmations_contact details.xlsx	252	Example of A Salesforce approval document.odt
225	Board 160911.confirmationform.docx	253	FINAL REPORT - URN evaluation060814Winsor+MK+VL.pdf
226	Board report Sept 2010.docx	254	Finance workflow_ Mobile Money190114KMdraft1.pdf
227	BoardMay2013.pdf	255	financial analysis.docx
228	BoardPackFINAL.pdf	256	financial analysis.xls
229	BoardPackMay2014Final.pdf	257	Fox_SAcc_What_does_evidence_really_say_August_4_2014_changes_accepted.docx
230	BoardPackOctober2013FINAL.pdf	258	Getting education right in Tanzania, Education Donor GrpDec,2008.pdf
231	Budgetvariance2011.explanation.pdf	259	Glasspockets Inspired Transparency.pdf
232	Charts organ.capacity twaweza.pptx	260	governance transition UWEZO.odt
233	Charts.pptx	261	Half year brief final_uwazi_2010.doc
234	CitizenAgency-EN-FINAL.pdf	262	HalfYearReport2012All240812tt.xls
235	Citizens making stuff happen.pdf	263	HivosTz HRmanual_policy document_final220811SM.pdf
236	ck July2010 report.docx	264	HivosTzFinAdminRegs_policy document_final220811SM.pdf
237	communication on salesforce.docx	265	How CSOs get it wrong, Aid Effectiveness 2007.pdf
238	communication on salesforce.docx	266	IDRC-Organizational Assessment IDL-31375.pdf
239	Communications-activities and results.doc	267	Immersion 2012.draft 090512 SM+VK+SM+sm+SM.pptx
240	Contracts.xls	268	Individual interview protocol.docx
241	Corruption-EN-FINAL.pdf	269	Initial outcomes, sources.docx
242	DFID case for support.docx	270	Integration-EN-FINAL.pdf
243	doc20130913124041.pdf	271	INTERNAL DOC - Interview KR Kate Dyer 2014-10-10.docx
244	Donor commitment and disbursement toSepr 2010-2.xlsx	272	interview schedule.docx
245	Dr.Moyo bio.docx	273	InvestmentprocessWorkflow.Template.110113KdG.xlsx
246	DraftReport SIDA.TwawezaAssessment.pdf	274	InvestmentprocessWorkflow.Template.110113KdG.xlsx
247	Education-EN-FINAL.pdf	275	Jan de Witte bio.docx
248	Employment Contracts 2013.xlsx	276	Kell EGAP paper.docx

No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically	No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically
277	Kenya Half year brief.docx	304	minutes_donor meeting_11May2012.docx
278	Kenya multiround analysis 140618.pdf	305	minutes_joint board meeting_10May2012.docx
279	Kenya Program Q4 Plan.docx	306	minutes_joint board meeting_11May2012.docx
280	Kevin Bohrer bio.docx	307	Minutes10thAdvisoryBoardMeetingjm+as+rr.docx
281	Key informants- Twaweza Assessment.docx	308	Minutes9thBoardMeetingFINAL.docx
282	KiuFunza 2013 results FINAL 05112014.pdf	309	MinutesAdBoardDonor060912.docx
283	KiuFunza.pdf	310	MinutesAdBoardDonor060912tt.docx
284	Lant Pritchett CV.pdf	311	MinutesAdBoardDonor110912tt+rc.docx
285	LME Expenses2013.xls	312	MinutesAdvisoryBoardMeeting100512tt.docx
286	LME standards - draft 081014.xlsx	313	MinutesDonorsMeeting110512tt.docx
287	LPT Evaluation proposal.pdf	314	MinutesJointBoardMeeting10-110512tt.docx
288	LPT KenyaQual_060414-Final.pdf	315	MinutesJointBoardMeeting10-110512tt+rr.docx
289	LPT Measurement Instruments.docx	316	Monitoringbrief2-SzW07052014FINAL-web.pdf
290	LPT PP 160911.pptx	317	Monitoringbrief3-Uwezo140514ty+rc+vl.pdf
291	LPT Presentation to Twaweza Board.pptx	318	Mukuru-Report-June2014.pdf
292	M&E.docx	319	Mukuru-slides.pptx
293	MattersArising240812tt.docx	320	NaturalResources-EN-FINAL.pdf
294	McGee & Gaventa - 2011.pdf	321	Ni Sisi Engagement by Twaweza.pptx
295	Measuring PR dimensions.PNG	322	OverviewPP.draft150911sm.pptx
296	MediaCoverage 2014.xls	323	Participants Board Advisory.xlsx
297	Members of Advisory Board.xls	324	Partner Assessment.doc
298	Metric Framework.doc	325	Partner Assessment.docx
299	MiniBuzz-forWeb14042014rc-Series.pdf	326	Partner interviews.docx
300	Minutes Advisory Board Sept.16 2011.draft071011sm.docx	327	Partner List.xlsx
301	Minutes April 2010_hh.docx	328	Partners financial.xlsx
302	Minutes April 2010_hh2.docx	329	Partnership activities and reach.doc
303	minutes_advisory meeting 10May2012.docx	330	Plan 2012 presentation board.pptx

No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically	No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically
331	positive deviance.pdf	358	Survey of Advisory and Board Members of Twaweza.docx
332	PP Board Meeting 160911.pptx	359	SzW2014 R2 Constitution-KIS-FINAL-2304.pdf
333	PR measurement.PNG	360	SzW-Brief7HealthCentres-EN.pdf
334	Presentation to Board May 2012.ME Update.draft100512VK.pptx	361	Table geographic breakdown of budgets.docx
335	PresentProgramsPP.draft150911kdG+rr+sm.pptx	362	Telephone conference form.doc
336	Programs budget variance background for boardmeeting.KdG.xls	363	theory of change some thoughts.rtf
337	ProposedAgenda220812JM.docx	364	Theory of change.odt
338	ProposedAgenda220812JMt.docx	365	Theory of change.pptx
339	ProposedAgenda300812.docx	366	TwaUw Monitoring 2014 workplan 031014MK+ NK.xlsx
340	Report 4192918953625_18788.pdf	367	Twaweza – Georgetown Partnership.docx
341	Report Institutional_17335.rtf	368	Twaweza Advisory Board Meeting logistic note 130911.docx
342	Rukmini Banerji bio.docx	369	Twaweza Annual Plan 2009.ods
343	Ruth Levine bio.docx	370	Twaweza Annual Plan 2009.pdf
344	Sauti+NiSisi.docx	371	Twaweza Annual Plan 2009.xlsx
345	sida's-evaluation-policy.pdf	372	Twaweza Annual Plan 2009.xlsx
346	Sikiliza Project presentation.pdf	373	Twaweza Annual Plan 2010.pdf
347	Sikliza_Presentation_Board_09_05_2012.ppt	374	Twaweza Annual Plan 2010.xlsx
348	Situation Analysis.pdf	375	Twaweza Annual Plan 2010.xlsx
349	SocialMediaFollowers.xlsx	376	Twaweza Annual Plan 2011.pdf
350	SOLAR AID OFFICE MAP 2013.pdf	377	Twaweza Annual Plan 2011.xlsx
351	SolarAid 13 06 05 Research Report_FINAL.pptx	378	Twaweza Annual Plan 2011.xlsx
352	Standards_25052014rc+rr.docx	379	Twaweza Annual Plan 2012.xlsx
353	Standards-Reference24052014rc.docx	380	Twaweza Annual Plan 2012.xlsx
354	SummaryFindings 2010.pdf	381	Twaweza Annual Plan 2013.pdf
355	SummaryFindings 2012.pdf	382	Twaweza Annual Plan 2013.xlsx
356	Summary-Findings- 2014.pdf	383	Twaweza Annual Plan 2013.xlsx
357	Summary-Findings-2010.pdf	384	Twaweza Annual Plan 2014.pdf

No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically	No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically
385	Twaweza Annual Report 2009.pdf	412	twaweza salesforce assessments1.png
386	Twaweza Annual Report 2010.pdf	413	twaweza salesforce chatter.png
387	Twaweza Annual Report 2011.pdf	414	twaweza salesforce chatter1.png
388	Twaweza Annual Report 2012.pdf	415	twaweza salesforce chatter2.png
389	Twaweza Annual Report 2013 - no cover.pdf	416	twaweza salesforce chatter3.png
390	Twaweza Budget Summary 2009-2013.xlsx	417	twaweza salesforce contacts.png
391	Twaweza Budget Summary 2009-2013.xlsx	418	twaweza salesforce dashboards.png
392	Twaweza Finance Work Flow 2014200114KM.pdf	419	twaweza salesforce decision memos.png
393	Twaweza Financial Statements_2013.pdf	420	twaweza salesforce decision memos1.png
394	Twaweza Half year brief 2010.docx	421	twaweza salesforce organizations.png
395	Twaweza Management letter.pdf	422	twaweza salesforce organizations1.png
396	TWAVEZA Monitoring framework-revised-290114.docx	423	Twaweza Social Media Policy 290512sm.docx
397	TWAVEZA Monitoring framework-revised-290114.docx	424	Twaweza.brochure120911.pdf
398	Twaweza Organizational Chart- October 011014gs.pdf	425	Twaweza2011FullYearReport-FINAL.docx
399	Twaweza Organogram If25022010.pdf	426	Twaweza2011MatrixReportFINAL.pdf
400	Twaweza original strategy final 22_10_08 small.pdf	427	Twaweza8boardmeetingpack.pdf
401	Twaweza Outcomes.doc	428	Twaweza-AIID-FindingsPaper-170114.pdf
402	Twaweza Outputs.doc	429	TwawezaAnnualPlan2012_FINAL.pdf
403	Twaweza Remuneration Survey.xlsx	430	TwawezaBoardPackOct2013.docx
404	twaweza salesforce approval system.png	431	TwawezaBudget+Income100512rr+ak,after board22052012FINAL.xlsx
405	twaweza salesforce approval system1.png	432	TwawezaBudget+IncomeDonorTable250512rr.pdf
406	twaweza salesforce approval system2.png	433	TwawezaGÇÖs Learning Architecture ppt.draft150911VK.pptx
407	twaweza salesforce approval system3.png	434	TwawezaProgramSharpening310812.docx
408	twaweza salesforce approval system4.png	435	TwawezaProgramSharpening310812rr.docx
409	twaweza salesforce approval system5.png	436	TwawezaStrategy2011-2014.pdf
410	twaweza salesforce approval system6.png	437	TwawezaStrategy2015-18Essentials.pdf
411	twaweza salesforce assessments.png	438	TwawezaStrategyPivot (pgs24-33).pdf

No	Electronic Files seen by Name organized alphabetically
439	TwelfthAdvDonorMeetingPackSept2014.pdf
440	TZ_2010_AnnualAssessmentReport_KeyFindings.pdf
441	TZ_2010_AnnualAssessmentReport1.pdf
442	TZ_2011_AnnualAssessment-Report.pdf
443	TZ_Uwezo2012ALAReport.pdf
444	UG_2011_AnnualAssessmentReport.pdf
445	Uwezo Financial statements 30 June 2011.pdf
446	Uwezo Financial statements 30 June 2012.pdf
447	Uwezo EA Proposal Final.docx
448	Uwezo East Africa 2011 Report.pdf
449	Uwezo East Africa 2012 Report.pdf
450	Uwezo East Africa 2013 Report.pdf
451	Uwezo East Africa_Twaweza advisory Board meeting_16.09.2011.pptx
452	Uwezo Financial statements 31 December 2012.pdf
453	UWEZO LQASReportFinal.pdf
454	Uwezo PP 160911.pptx
455	Uwezo Report 2012.pdf
456	Uwezo Standard Manual 2013.pdf
457	Uwezo Tanzania governance transition.docx
458	Uwezo Tanzania.pdf
459	Uwezo TZ Financial Report June 2010.pdf
460	UwezoEAProposalFinal 300911rr.pdf
461	Varja List Sep 26 Oct 10.pdf
462	Wananchi Survey board meeting 2012.pptx
463	Worku Behonegne bio.docx
464	World Development 2014-Lieberman,Posner,Tsai.pdf

2.3 Persons Interviewed

Partners and Other Stakeholders:

Name		Organization
1	Renatus Sona	Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC) , Communications Specialist
2	Kiiza Mutungi	DAR 411, co-founder and managing director
3	Simon Mkina	Daraja, Director
4	James Gayo	GABA (Kingo) , Director
5	Mark Zuckerman	MiniBuzz/MIATV, Producer Tanzania
6	Nathan Lwehabura, Research	Sahara
7	Mary Batterman	Solar Aid, Joint Operations Director
8	Yasin Nurmohamed	Tanzania Printing Services Ltd (TPS)
9	Prosper Lubuva	Tanzania Teacher's Union (TTU)
10	Ben Taylor	Consultant, Twaweza; Earlier, Daraja.
11	Suzan Mlawi	President's Office: Deputy permanent Secretary Chairperson of Presidential Delivery Bureau
12	Christina Wambali	President's Office Secretariat of Presidential Delivery Bureau
13	Anastazia Rugaba	President's Office: Coordinator of Presidential Delivery Bureau
14	Hilda Mkandawile	Ministry of Education & Vocational Training: Ministerial Delivery Unit
15	Ludovic Utoh	Former Controller and Auditor General
16	Zitto Kabwe	Chair, Public Accounts Committee
17	Hassan Mshinda	Director General, Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH)
18	Bakari Karata	Moshi District BRN Coordinator
19	Hamisi Waziri	Moshi District BRN Education Dept
20	Gratian Mkoba	TTU Chairperson
21	Zaituni Mzava	Head Teacher of Keko Primary School
22	Keko Primary School std 5 pupils	Interaction with 42 std 5 pupils on Uwezo test
23	Catherine Semkwao	TEN/MET Coordinator and Uwezo Board Member
24	Beatrice Mallya	Finance and Administration
25	Maria Sarungi	Compass Communications
26	Yusufu B. Mjunga	Sales Dept of Tanzania Printing Services
27	Suleman Sumra	Former TEN/MET Coordinator & Board Member
28	Rogers Shelukindo	Lusco of Lushoto
29	Hatibu Lugendo	GEP of Korogwe
30	Richard Mabala	Founder of Tamasha (Taasisi ya Maendeleo Shirikishi ya Vijana or Youth Participatory Development Centre), Arusha

Twaweza Head Office staff:

Name		Position
1	Rakesh Rajani	Head
2	Kees de Graaf	Regional Programs Manager
3	Aisha Sykes	Senior Advisor, Organizational Sustainability
4	Fatma Alibhai	Executive Assistant to Head
5	Youdi Schipper	Research and Uwazi Manage
6	Elvis Mushi	(Research Officer / Sauti za Wananchi
7	Varja Lipovsek	Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation Manager
8	Risha Chande	Communications Manager
9	Evarist Kamwaga	Communications Officer
10	Glory Saria	Operations Manager
11	Janice Kalemara	Administrative Officer
12	Theo Mshabaha	Administrative Assistant
13	Karim Manji	IT Officer
14	Pushpa Vishani	Human Resources Associate
15	Richard Modest	Senior Accountant
16	Esther Prosper	Accountant
17	Emanuel Benjamin	Accounts Assistant
18	Nancy Leshabari	Accounts Assistant
19	Zaida Mgalla	Tanzania Country Coordinator, Uwezo
20	Happiness Nkwera	Program Assistant, Uwezo
21	Gabriel Mbulanya	Senior Program Officer - Research, Uwezo
22	Richard Temu	Program Officer - Research, Uwezo

See also Annex 3 for list of additional 14 Donors and Advisory Board Members surveyed and/or interviewed.

2.4 Verifications Done

1. Site Visit Check List Twaweza Tanzania Office:

1. Collect copy of staff list, vacancies, list of all positions, description of positions, including qualifications/ specifications and salary ranges for positions
2. Review computerized management systems for HR and financial management
3. Review furnishing, equipment, ICT etc to get a sense of how well office is equipped and functioning
4. Collect copies of additional documentation on systems and procedures:
 - 2013 Annual Report
 - 2013 Audited Financial Statements
 - Delegation of responsibilities
 - Website Policy
 - Social Media Policy
 - Asset Management Procedures (e.g. vehicle maintenance)
 - Documentation on standards and quality assurance (policies, guidelines, manuals)
 - Documentation on internal monitoring system (policies, guidelines, manuals)
 - Uwezo plans

2. Review of Annual Plans and Annual Reports

The evaluation team analyzed and summarized progress for the years 2009 through 2013 using the following matrix.

Planned Outputs and Outcomes	Achieved Outputs and Outcomes	Budget	Actual	Comments
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3. Review of Board Minutes

4. Audit Reports

The evaluation team analyzed any concerns raised by either the Board or the Auditor in the reports.

5. Review of Management Policies, Manuals and Guides

The evaluation team reviewed the management policies, manuals and guides in order to understand the management and operations of Twaweza.

6. Appraised the Effectiveness of the Management and Governance Structure:

The appraisal of the effectiveness of the management and governance structure was also undertaken using a facilitated (focus group) discussion with key management staff. For this the evaluation team used a highly selective and shorter version of the organizational assessment data collection tool -

<http://www qlbs.com/webq/IPDET/LandingPage.html> as the basis for a half day facilitated discussion with key management staff including the Management Coordinator, Tanzania Program Manager, Learning and Communications Manager and Operations Manager.

An email/phone survey of recent Governance and Advisory Board Members has been sent out. See Annex 4, following. Responses are awaited. Some members were interviewed in person during the Inception Phase.

Interviews with Key Media Partners; Detailed review of sample of Sub-Grants; Partner and Output-Based Contracts

Annex 3: Survey: Donors and Advisory Board Members

	Board Member/ Donor Partner	Organization	Meetings attended	Interview Oct.	Survey Nov.	Follow up Dec.
1	Anette Widholm Bolme	Sida	10 to 12	Yes	Yes	Yes
2	Aran Corrigan	Embassy of Ireland	7, 8	Yes	Sent	
3	Ben Witjes (Chair)	Hivos	4 to 12		Yes	Yes
4	Dana Schmidt	Hewlett Foundation, USA	8,9,11,12		Sent	
5	Dipak Naker	Raising Voices	6 to 10		Yes	Yes
6	FIEKE JANSEN	Hivos	2011 2012		Yes	Yes
7	Ian Attfield	DFID	8,10,11,12	Yes	Yes	
8	John Male-Mukasa	Uganda Bureau of Statistics & Independent	1 to 11		Sent	
9	Juma Mwapachu	Independent	6 to 11		Yes	
10	Kate Dyer	AcT/KPMG	9 to 12	Yes	Yes	Yes
11	Kevin Bohrer	Hewlett Foundation, USA	1 to 8, 10 to 12		Sent	Yes
12	Lant Pritchett	Harvard University	6 to 11		Sent	
13	Owen Barder	Centre for Global Development	1 to 11		Sent	
14	Paul Maassen	Hivos	2008 2009			Yes
15	Salil Shetty	UN Millennium Campaign	1 to 3		Sent	
16	Sam Wangwe	Daima Associates, REPOA	1 to 8	Yes	Sent	
17	Sipho Moyo	ONE	6 to 11		Yes	
18	Smita Singh	Hewlett & Independent	3 to 11		Sent	
19	Valerie Frissen	Erasmus University & TNO	1 to 9, 11		Sent	
20	Zabdiel Kimambo	DFID	1 to 9, 12		Yes	

Of the list of 20 persons selected and contacted - survey was sent to 19. 4 persons were interviewed for scoping and defining the key questions of primary stakeholders, 9 out of 19 completed survey. 2 out of the remaining 11, preferred interviews in lieu of the survey; 8 persons did not respond.

7 out of the 9 persons completing the survey were subsequently followed up with a long interviews.

At least one consultation was held with 14 out of 20 selected key stakeholders.

	Compendium of Feedback from Advisory and Donor Members who responded to the survey.		
A.1	Please indicate the period during which you have been a member of the governance arrangements for Twaweza:		
Responses: 2012 to present; Oct 2010 to present; 2011 to mid-2014; 2011 to 2014; 2010 to 2013; 2012 to 2014; Sep 2013 to Present; Twaweza's inception to date			
		No	No response
A.2	To the question if they had an objection to the disclosure of their name:	4	5
	In your view, during the time you have been involved with Twaweza, what are its most outstanding achievements? Please list or describe as many as you choose.		
1	Principally UWEZO – in terms of establishing a credible methodology for testing children’s learning and critically from that shifting the terms of debate in educational planning from a focus on quantity (principally enrolment figures) into issues of quality and ‘are children learning?’		
2	The Uwezo reports and their impact on policies in the three countries; selection and support to a number of outstanding partners such as the Daladala minibus, Sujaaz; the ability to build a robust policy-oriented research programme around education (capitation grants etc.); the ability to acknowledge failure (water point initiative; strategic pivot); the impact on the Open Government agenda at global level.		
3	Continue to roll out UWEZO and Sauti za Wnanchi at scale, with credible results dissemination Improve / maintain relationships with Tanzania government leadership so that they feel less threatened by information communicated and engage with TWaweza : e.g. Form IV results enquiry, 3Rs communications. High quality research programme, notably Kiufunza RCTs Targeted media campaigns and engagement, supporting OGP/OD initiatives		
4	First of all and what I view as an overarching achievement of Twaweza in a country where the democratic space, notwithstanding the deemed multi-partyism in place, is shallow and innocuous, timely electoral politics considered. I think Twaweza, more than any other NGO, has made serious inroads in promoting innovative processes of citizen participation that fundamentally interrogate the workings of the conventional democratic representation system. In context, Twaweza’s specific programmes through ‘UWAZI’ or openness, notably ‘Sauti za Wananchi’ or ‘People’s Voices’ and ‘Ni Sisi’ or ‘It is Us’ have ushered in innovative citizen agency around important social, economic and political issues of the day. They have engendered a new value and culture system of citizen-driven self-assessment about the national ecosystem in its broadest sense. In the area of whether the education system in Tanzania and some countries in East Africa is working in terms of learning outcomes, Twaweza’s ‘Uwezo’ or ‘capability’ organisation arm, has for three years since 2011 produced shocking results about the high levels of non-learning taking place in primary schools. The results have attracted serious attention of governments and donors in terms of assessing impacts of budget outlays for basic education and challenging the conventional dominant goal of improving enrolments. The third main achievement of Twaweza, and accolades to them, has been in forging alliances with key partners as enablers and catalyst of its strategic programmes. This may appear as		

	something simple but it is not. Crafting support alliances with the media, mobile phone companies, religious leaders etc as platforms and avenues for reaching out to and engaging citizens has been Twaweza's strategic pillar in advancing its programmes and operationalizing its theory of change.
5	A. On the ground monitoring and real time reporting of public service delivery especially in education. No one does what Twaweza does in quite the way Twaweza does it. B. Effective engagement with policy makers and others accountable government officials. It is the citizenship involvement and the awareness that happens in districts and communities. Very powerful tool Kids and parents being able to report when teachers don't show up Need to see that scaling in many organization.
6	Pushing the debate nationally, regionally and internationally on different topics. Twaweza came out bold, smart and willing to take a different approach, and this really pushed debate on all levels on how the processes behind development cooperation, the role of the citizens, how the NGOs in East Africa have become a business in its own and challenging power structure -Trying to engage with different sectors and groups to reach people. Sometimes this failed badly, but sometimes after a lot of effort this worked out. The other sectors are unions, companies, religious leaders etc. -Experiment with new approaches and see how it worked, and if it didn't work reiterate on things. I have seen many NGOs keep on trying to do what they have always done, some with more success than others. What I have seen with Twaweza is that they keep on working with a concept but if one option doesn't provide the solution, reiterate and see how it can work. Taking into account that development doesn't work in isolation but that there are many factors that influence how life works. -Being able to work with a mix of different actors. On the one hand find front-running initiative like ShuJazzFM and support them getting off the ground, and on the other work with more older and established organizations. -Raise awareness on specific topics that are close to people's daily existence in a smart way. In the case of Uwezo, shows that yes the number of schools has increased but the quality has actually gone down and that the children are getting worse in reading and writing. The upside is that it became big news and put the government under pressure, yes Uwezo did not see it lead to citizen agency. I personally have always felt that you cannot always expect the change to come from the people; you need to choose the appropriate vehicle, in this case the media. I do think that when I left, Twaweza has not seen citizen agency, but was reiterating and figuring out a strategy to get citizens. -The immersions very important for all the staff to experience the real live outside the mayor cities and question how their intervention works in the rural context. I think this has been very important as city live in East Africa is still far removed from the countryside
7	• Uwezo survey and emergent discourse around learning outcomes • Sauti za Wananchi and the creation of a sense of accountability. • Public media based awareness that engagement matters.
8	No response.
9	OGP and transparency agenda especially at a global level and to some extent at Tanzania - Managed to shift a policy dialogue into focusing less on inputs and more on educational outcomes with its Uwezo initiative

	- Innovation around Sauti za Wananchi, Daladala TV etc
3. In your view, during the time you have been involved with Twaweza, what are some of the key challenges that it has overcome, and what challenges does it still continue to face?	
1	Matching its level of ambition (three countries, three sectors) with what it can practically manage, leading to a narrowing down to a prime focus on Tanzania and on education. Achieving clarity on the distinction between what Twaweza can control from what it can influence from what it is interested in. Many of the five originally identified vectors of change (mobiles, teachers etc) are indeed critical, but not necessarily interested in Twaweza's overall vision. Achieving a groundswell of popular support may not happen around these issues – issues like land area much more 'live' for many citizens. Threaten their education system and it's not good, but threaten their access to land and you get immediate response! Both of these I would see as challenges better understood rather than overcome – so still a work in progress.
2	• Rapid staff turnover in the first 2-3 years partly due to management style, mistakes in recruitment but also moving into unknown territory. Largely overcome. • A flawed and naïve Theory of Change which more or less assumed that citizens (e.g. parents vis-à-vis the education system) are able/willing to digest information and act on it. There was sufficient scientific evidence at the start of the programme contradiction some key assumption of the ToC. This also meant that some of the expensive early research (e.g. by the AIID) was misdirected. The strategic pivot set this straight in a major way. • Micro-management by Rakesh – overcome by recruiting capable senior managers whom he trusted. • Unbalanced approach to the three countries – this remains a serious issue.
3	Scaling up operations to become a professional organisation, with robust systems and processes. - appears to be largely achieved. Improving its relationship with government, to be trusted as an interlocutor, not an adversary. Still a work in progress, but upwards trajectory.
4	Twaweza's main challenges have largely centred on how best to balance organisational ambitions driven by the desire to influence mindset change mainly in Tanzania's political eco-system and building organisational capabilities that fit such ambitions. The late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere once quipped that 'to plan is to choose', an important mantra where there is tension between ambitions and resources. Twaweza suffered from the lack of a clear choice and balance. Thus whilst 'Uwezo' was a landmark intervention and innovative programme with huge success in East Africa in the assessment of basic literacy and numeracy, it has had to be off-loaded partly because of institutional capacity deficits. The same can be said of the review of the 'Kiufunza' programme whose financial demands may be daunting. The programme strategic review leading to Twaweza's 2015-2018 Plan has thus been crucially informed by this particular experience. Clearly, Twaweza must radically determine what its priorities should be because it definitely faces institutional capacity deficits. It is not clear to me whether donors such as HIVOS will continue to financially back Twaweza to the levels seen in the past three years. This could be a significant challenge.
5	One big challenges for a long time, and was soon addressed was that Rakesh was TX and TWaweza was Rakesh. Strong leader that represents all that the organization so much so that it becomes synonymous. Fear for the board what happened if he leaves? But has been quickly addressed. Ongoing challenge is finding a replacement, and when there is, his shoes aren't going to be the easiest to fill. TWaweza will struggle to reassess. But at the same time, Rakesh has worked intensely and deliberately at strengthening TWaweza as a brand and organization.
6	Overcome:

	-Establishing as a new organization which is challenging the status quo of both governments and civil society. Twaweza has earned its spot, but this will always be a challenge when trying something new -Working with different actors. This was easy on paper but more difficult in practice, as they are different cultures, people speaking a different language and have different interests. It was a long road but in the end there were some good partnerships established, specifically with consumer product companies, media and unions. The relationship with the religious groups are more challenging -Laid the ground layer that is needed for citizen agency, information on how things really work. Independent collection, processing and distributing of information on key livelihood issues. Challenges still continue: - How to get people active. In the Twaweza Theory of Change they emphasize that only 3% of all people become active citizens, and you need this 3% to change power structures and get the masses involved. However, the question is how do you activate these 3%. When I left this was in part to change the strategy to also focus explicitly on key influencers and intermediaries, as this was not a target group in the beginning - When to work with and when to work around the system. Each country in East Africa has its own social and cultural dynamic. For instance when trying to address things in Tanzania, information alone will not work, it is a very hierarchical society where people are afraid to speak out against their superiors and the people I have met have been creative in finding solutions without challenging the hierarchy. So what will work the best to make system change? - How to move from Tanzania again to the other countries. It was decided to focus primarily on Tanzania at first and then branch out to the other countries again.
7	• Gathering, digesting and disseminating usable information • Capacity to use that information within public policy • Reaching a threshold momentum to make citizen engagement in public policy development a credible force. • An important challenge that still remains to be addressed is the issue of the mechanism through which 'citizen engagement' will emerge. While Twaweza has a metric through which it tries to gauge this (public imagination, information, etc.), it is also important to invest in delineating the practical and specific mechanism through which the observed effect might be emerging; to complement the input end of the chain of influence with detailed understanding of the point of consumption. What additional minor inputs might leverage the bigger investment? What could be done at the 'point of sale' moment that could yield more efficient harvest? Understanding of the micro-level of the transaction will have implication for the macro-level design of the strategy. Twaweza excels at the latter but could invest more in the former.
8	Gains: Increased institutional stability Stronger management Group Challenges: Struggling to find its core Overall governing structure might not give the needed accountability mechanisms Changeability to its original approach – which raises the question if Twaweza is going for the "low hanging fruit" instead of fully try out (endure) its ideas and find alternatives approaches to?

9	Complex theory of change on how change happens, strong focus on learning and being ready/open to acknowledge failure e.g. Uwezo evaluation in Kenya Need to better articulate what it really see as its comparative advantage and how different elements of its programme e.g. Uwezo, uwazi, sauti fits together. Including its regional vs national focus
4. a) Do you (or did you, if you are no longer involved) find Twaweza's governance structure most appropriate to its needs? Please explain your views, especially if you feel some adjustments could have been useful.	
1	I have to be frank that I've never been quite clear about the structure and who is actually making which decisions. I find the discussions really interesting and worthwhile, especially around the learning. However, since AcT is not a donor to Twaweza, I am not part of the discussions around budget, and I don't actually know who is.
2	The mix of donors/independent Advisory Board was not always productive. Participation of AB members varied quite a lot. The arrangement agreed upon between Hivos and Twaweza meant that Twaweza was more or less able to operate on its own terms, which in some cases meant that Rakesh had too much independence, e.g. when hiring & firing staff; setting salaries and other terms and conditions of service. This were officially approved by the Hivos board and we did push back in some cases, but there was limited scope for manoeuvre in that respect.
3	Very consultative approach, the intertwining of regional vs national workplans and UWEZO's separate budget/work plan evolved , but with hindsight requires streamlining.
4	For one, Twaweza has been lucky and unlucky to be led by a thoughtful, articulate and inspiring Chief Executive. In the past two years, Twaweza has recruited some bright young Tanzanians who are quick learners and taking up responsibilities. It is now key for Twaweza to re-align its organisation both to fit its revised goals and programmes and its human capacities and capabilities. As said in management theory, 'structure follows strategy'.
5	no response
6	Many things have changed since I left Twaweza, so it is a bit difficult to make a comment on this.
7	no response
8	Advisory Board could be seen as "friends" rather than critically scrutinising and given advice to be hold to account for Donor Partners and Board meetings mix-up not optimal. Hivos arrangement for too long
9	Twaweza has a good mix of international and national/regional advisors drawn from academia, think tanks and practitioners. It has been housed under HIVOS, so all governance aspects well catered for.
4 b) In 2011 a proposal was put forward to reconstitute Twaweza's status from that of a HIVOS project to an independent legal entity, registered in Tanzania with the ability to continue working in the three East African countries. This process was to be completed by the end of 2013. It has been stated that this was postponed on several occasions and now to 2015. In your view, what were the considerations discussed regarding the advantages or disadvantages for Twaweza in becoming an independent legal entity? Should it have happened earlier? Are there any important issues to consider in taking this step in 2015?	

1	I have not engaged with Twaweza's decision making on this issue. In principle, it would be better for an initiative to be a legal entity in the countries where it is based, so long as this would not leave it vulnerable to being closed down if it started to move in a direction that government found uncomfortable, particularly since 2015 is likely to be a volatile and potentially unpredictable year in Tanzania's fortunes.
2	I was part of the decisions, so am in full agreement with them. In our (Hivos's) view there need to be sufficient safeguards in terms of oversight during the start of the independent Twaweza organisation: a functioning board etc. This will take some time, hence additional measures re being proposed (some oversight to be exercised by Hivos during the transition).
3	This may partially reflect the reality that many changes and activities take a long time to undertake in Tanzania, facing institutional inertia. Since my involvement this has usually been perceived as a positive direction to go, but with some risks of 'going solo' if relationships with government or the space for debate and voice without intimidation deteriorated. Sequencing this in tandem with a new appointment of Head in 2015 will be important.
4	This decision was taken just before I joined Twaweza; However, it makes sense to me given my experience as President of the Society for International Development. Increasingly, wittingly or otherwise and operating in dynamic environments with volatile eco-systems, organisations like Twaweza need to forge structures that assure them of independence which goes beyond that of legal status. This is not to say that Twaweza should relinquish its partnerships with international bodies like HIVOS. The issue about when Twaweza should take such a legal transformation may have some bearing on the change of top leadership. I am not sure of the immediate aftermath financial implications in terms of HIVOS support upon such legal change taking effect.
5	Advantage: simply more direct accountability of TWaweza itself. Also, that it has come of age and matured in the last couple years as an organization The downside being, different sources of funding, or may continue to get from HIVOS. If strings are cut, Hivos. Doesn't understand why it didn't happen in 2013. There had been good planning and setting dates in 2013. 2015 was postponing makes it more doubtful, when it had been thought
6	I think it will be good if Twaweza becomes an independent entity. As it is trying to make system change in East Africa, which will be more credible and better if it was then also a local entity. I think that it is good they did not become independent in 2013 as being under the umbrella of a larger organization also gives Twaweza more stability and the opportunity to get their stuff in order. Setting up an organization of the size of Twaweza is not easy and it is a luxury to do that under another organizations. 2015 is coming soon and there will be mayor changes in the management with Rakesh leaving. I would therefore not push the independence, but see what the new director feels comfortable with. As being under the umbrella have positive and negative things. The positive thing is that you have a bit more autonomy of the government. And working on transparency issues that could give you more leeway. Or maybe the new director is comfortable in transitioning quick

7	• Twaweza has an East Africa focus therefore should have East African identity for its own credibility. It could be dismissed as foreign interference. • East African organization should be accountable to East African priorities and context as opposed to a fiduciary Board located in Netherlands. • Delay was simply to ensure that there was programmatic and management maturity to spin off as an independent entity. • The sums of money involved are large. Hivos has established mechanism for accountability/fiduciary responsibility that Twaweza will now have to ensure.
8	Have been on board for too short to have a qualified answer
9	Twaweza has always had its own identity despite being housed under hivos. This was for logistical legal purposes only. Twaweza is a locally designed programme outfit and as such it need to have its own legal identify
4 c) Considering the fact that Rakesh Rajani, its founder and CEO, is stepping down at the end of the year in 2014, what do you think are the most critical issues that Twaweza must deal with?	
1	Twaweza seems to be very much an organisation cast in Rakesh's image. Clearly the first issue must be recruitment of someone of sufficient calibre to take on the role – which means someone who is able and willing to shape the initiative according to their own lights. I don't think it will work to think in terms of now the strategic direction and monitoring framework etc are almost set, it is a case of finding someone 'simply' to manage that going forward. Finding someone with the credibility to work with the range of different stakeholders that Rakesh has – both nationally and internationally will be a huge challenge. Beyond that, the facts that the challenges mentioned above in Q3 still remain to be answered – and why a person of high calibre and keen sense of direction is required.
2	Induction of the new CEO, getting oversight in place immediately as the new CEO will otherwise be without this and this will set a bad precedent, but also create an atmosphere in which the CEO feels he can decide without reference to a board and this will be difficult to rectify once the new board becomes functional and asserts itself. For the new CEO: to reach out to the other countries in East Africa; maintain the international linkages in the Open Government arena etc.
3	Strategic direction and focus, whilst giving new leadership sufficient space and autonomy to implement an evolving vision. Retaining good relationships with influential government decision makers and leaders in a year of political change. Maintaining institutional development as a regional leader as a CSO and professionally managed organisation.
4	Managing transitions is the biggest challenge organisations face when a founder, pioneer and inspiring leader quits. Rakesh is key in this process. 1. He should help to ensure that Twaweza has a good replacement and properly inducts him into Twaweza. 2. Rakesh should agree to be a Board Member of Twaweza in its legally restructured form so as to continue to offer support in ideas. 3. Twaweza benefitted a lot from the image, identity, credibility and legitimacy among government, donors, philanthropists, civil society etc. as a result of Rakesh's personal character, intellect and vivaciousness at the national and global levels. His replacement may not enjoy immediate similar benefits; it will take time to forge such engagements.

5	Consolidating the team and its ability to fly on its own and remain cohesive and maintain a common vision and mission. Thinks that work has already been done, but it will come out in play after he leaves. As ready as they can be
6	no response
7	• The new CEO has ownership of the vision and firm grasp of where Twaweza should go. • That vision should be cognisant of what its strength are and where its relative advantage is yet also not straightjacketed to the past. • The new leader will have to establish an independent identity rather than trying to replace Rakesh. • The organization must take care to ensure that transition minimizes normal anxiety and uncertainty when a founder exits. • The organization must invest in ensuring that the vision is owned by the entire organization and not just key protagonists within the organization. That means a substantive investment in making the vision, its nuances, the attendant language and its sustenance a priority. It also means at some moments (not always) slowing down and bringing people along rather than leaving them to their own devices or spin in their own perplexity. This may also contribute to anchoring talented people to the vision and mitigate the staff turn-over/talent drain.
8	Position itself in the debate without Rakesh's strong personal profile in the forefront. Work "on the ground" will probably go on, not dependent on Rakesh
9	Finding a right replacement at the CEO position. Someone with the vision to take Twaweza forward and build from the strengths that already set
5. Were you satisfied with the reports and information provided to you for the performance of your duties? Please provide details for your views and if you required additional information.	
1	Information was great in terms of level of detail to engage in discussions about strategic direction, what was working, what was not. Paperwork admirably frank and clear. As a jumping off point for discussion it was great, but as above I've not always been clear what was wanted or required beyond this.
2	Papers for Board meetings were almost always arriving late, which made proper preparations (including taking views of others within my organisation) difficult
3	Narrative and communication informally of good quality, some issues around: 1/ timeliness of reporting and information from UWEZO annual rounds: long time lag lessens information value. 2/ financial information has proven challenging at times to interpret and justify pipeline support, given lower than anticipated expenditure rate.
4	Twaweza is intellect powered and driven. Its reports, both for the Advisory Board as well as for different types of dialogues and for public consumption, are the best in the NGO community. There is no doubt about this.
5	Really impressive, pleasant and professional environment of getting business done.
6	no response
7	no response
8	Twaweza has a history which you have to understand in order to fully appreciate the reports. The Reports do not necessarily put the external reader first, like simple provision of basic explanations and positions to the different programmes. The Matrix Report is of semi-high detail and is following-up on activities undertaken which also can serve additional purpose and understanding of what Twaweza actually does.

	Reports are interesting, analytical and honest (all of which is appreciated) but not always structured or analysed to give a higher understanding of what is happening on the ground, or reflecting to what extent Twaweza activities are on the right track in terms of reaching higher goals and aims. This, paired with a degree of back-referencing and assumed pre-knowledge, to some point make the reports a bit difficult to assess for someone who is not involved on a day-to-day basis. Positive examples and gains could also play a more prominent role in order to enhance the understanding of this complex programme.
9	Twaweza's reports needs to be better structured, annual milestones and results frameworks clearly set and reported against
6. a) Were you satisfied with the discussions at the six monthly meetings regarding strategic advice provided to Twaweza by yourself and your colleagues in performing the governance function? Please explain.	
1	Not certain about that governance function. Since I have not been involved in budget discussions, it has been more in the way of an advisory reference group.
2	Largely satisfied. The quality of these meetings improved over time: less defensive; more staff involvement; better inputs from participants; clear separation between donor and AC matters.
3	no response
4	Twaweza's meetings through teleconferencing were a challenge; sometimes postponed and when they took place one felt the lack of body language and telephone interruptions hindered productivity. I guess the international membership of the Advisory Board was a contributing factor to this challenge.
5	no response
6	Here I have no comments; I was never at the 6 month meetings.
7	• Discussions were substantive and maintained a tone of accountability. • Back ground material provided context for engagement and opportunity for input in a fast moving environment. • It maintained a mature balance between credible advising and simply endorsers of the pre-developed plans.
8	N/A. It's not my primary role to give advice since donor partners are not part of governing structure
9	No response
6 b) Were you satisfied with the feedback provided by Twaweza, on actions taken or not taken, through the six monthly and annual reports and presentations to you and your colleagues towards fulfilling your roles under the governance function? Please explain.	
1	Great clarity in expression and communication of the thinking the organisation had undergone, but again not certain on the governance function.
2	Largely satisfied. Information was of high quality. We had regular interaction with Rakesh who involved the Hivos board on all key issues, although sometimes late and precooked. Preparing decisions well for Hivos (Tanzania) board meetings was important of course, of if things are overly prepared than a board may get the feeling it's becoming a rubber stamp.
3	no response












4	As noted before, it is difficult to fault Twaweza for masterly of detail and intensity of reports, documents and papers it prepares. The limitations in the governance system arose out of its international outlook and thus communications challenges.
5	Found the levels of accountability and explaining things to the board very professional and very thorough through carefully. Very entertaining as well!
6	See answer above
7	no response
8	n/a
9	No response
7 b) Based on the above assessment, what adjustments if any, need to be made to these benchmarks or should there be other additional or new benchmarks?	
1	I believe Hivos and/or Twaweza management would be in a better position to answer these questions, and that part of the function of this evaluation will be to surface strengths and weaknesses in these areas to the governance function.
2	The focus is by far too much on organisational benchmarks. The development results benchmark is the key one and should have at least had as much weight as the others taken together. So needs to be split to become more meaningful. Policy influence; influencing the public debate; changes in public services; etc.
3	I think financial probity and ability to meet and adhere to international accounting and fiscal standards is the main area of focus for systems development. This is on an upwards trajectory, but needs continued progress
4	You can actually gauge these benchmarks from responses to your earlier questions.
5	Quality over quantity and maintain the standard. Scaling their work to cover other areas. Wouldn't add more benchmarks necessarily.
6	I think these are out dated from me. I think it is important to reassess on how to reach the citizens and how to trigger activity. It could be more guided or more to do with inspiration, but in the new strategy they are addressing this issue I also think that it will take work to go through the transition of Rakesh moving out and a new director stepping in. This is because Rakesh has been the driving force behind getting Twaweza off the ground, there is a stable team now, but it will still have an impact. I actually think it is a positive move, as it is good to have founders move out of the programmes they started; it is healthy after years to have some fresh wind and new insights
7	The new ED will have to ensure that the balance between a strong operational infrastructure and visionary organization is sustained. A new benchmark for: • staff identification with Twaweza, • understanding and articulation of Twaweza vision • Ability to contribute to the vision
8	No response.
9	Most of the above are Organizational Development OD type benchmarks. It will require an OD expert to assess and let us know what is the status and what else needs to be done As donors we require milestones that are more programme results and development related and those in relation to its theory of change

8.	Are there any other comments that you wish to make that we may not have asked you about?
1	I think you and I have discussed informally including with Kishekya and you have my views.
2	If needed, feel free to contact me by phone or Skype.
3	No
4	No. Twaweza has reached a high watermark in its work. Its name is well established and admired even when it rocks the sensibilities of many! How Twaweza now makes the critical transition in life after Rakesh is something that we have to wait and see. I am optimistic.
5	no response
6	no response
7	11. <i>I saw that your organization Raising Voices, in Kampala, Uganda, works in a different area - prevention of violence against women and children.</i> <i>Your site says your work - to influence the power dynamics shaping relationships between women and men, girls and boys by catalyzing social change in communities, but is much older. And there is a Twaweza in Uganda.</i> <i>Are there lessons from yours to Twaweza or vice versa that you/they learnt?</i> Despite clear difference, there is a common element to our work, which was attracts me Twaweza. How do individuals exercise personal power? That is the question that has been preOccupying us at Raising Voices regarding interpersonal relationships /private domain. In Twaweza's case they have taken the exercise of power in a public domain as their area of focus. But the decision to claim one's power regardless of personal or public domain has common antecedents: <i>The political and social environment matters. Very few people have the wherewithal to go it alone. Most will act if they see sufficient number and significant others act. The idea of momentum. How do you generate that momentum? How do you create acting less risky? We have explored the hypothesis that it is about personal networks: your neighbour, friend, religious leader, uncle, teacher etc. Twaweza has emphasized having information (initially through public media-five networks). What we learned is (just published RCT results) for people to act. Information is useful but not sufficient. They need reinforcement from people trusted by them, they need a climate within which risk taking is possible, they need sufficient security that the social norm is shifting in their direction and they need to have something personal at stake (their safety, learning outcomes).</i> We definitely learned a lot from Twaweza, particularly around how to measure the effect of your intervention, how to be tolerant of failures and invest in asking searching questions that get to the detailed understanding of the underlying mechanism through which new ways of behaving emerge. I hope that through participation in the Advisory Board and in conversations with staff such as Rakesh and Kees and others, we have been able to emphasize that the packaging of the information, the messengers, how the receipt is experienced, the specific interpersonal moment and language all contribute to the effectiveness of the information. <i>Finally, the large external RCT studies seemed to suggest that Twaweza influence at the local level was low or not measurable.</i> <i>Yet, the World Bank highlights several "successes" in education and health from citizen engagement in Uganda.</i> To be honest, having lived in Uganda, I am sceptical of World Bank claims that citizen

	engagement has made a dent in public policy in Uganda. Most of the key decisions in education have been around what is being funded (particularly by bilateral donors). I do believe that there are some highly committed and thoughtful policy-makers who have tried to look around at what the evidence says and what the public may want. But that is a very different proposition than saying public engagement caused the change. If anything, the predominant feeling in Uganda appears to be of shrinking space for influence not expanding
8	No response.
9	Twaweza is very visible – locally and internationally - and does its work very professionally. They need to keep this up


The following tables provide the numerical response to questions 4 to 7:

	No response	No	Largely Yes	Yes	
4 a) Do you (or did you, if you are no longer involved) find Twaweza's governance structure most appropriate to its needs?	1		6	2	
	No response	Not Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Fully Satisfied	
5) Were you satisfied with the reports and information provided to you for the performance of your duties?			4	5	
6 a) Were you satisfied with the discussions at the six monthly meetings regarding strategic advice provided to Twaweza by yourself and your colleagues in performing the governance function?	2		2	5	
6 b) Were you satisfied with the feedback provided by Twaweza, on actions taken or not taken, through the six monthly and annual reports and presentations to you and your colleagues towards fulfilling your roles under the governance function?	2		1	6	

7) Benchmark Questions	No response	Don't know	Not at all	Needs more work	Almost there	Completely	
Twaweza has a well-functioning HR management system	1	4		2	2		
Twaweza has a well-functioning financial management system	1			1	6	1	
Twaweza's procurement systems ensure value for money		3		1	3	2	
Twaweza's office is well equipped	1	2			1	5	
Twaweza's office functions well	1	2		1	2	3	
Delegation, authority and accountability is clear at Twaweza	1	2		1	4	1	
Twaweza uses its website effectively to advance its objectives	1				3	5	
Twaweza uses social media effectively to advance its objectives	1	1			3	4	
Twaweza is good at quality control and assurance	1	4			3	1	
Twaweza has good internal monitoring systems	1	3		1	2	2	
Twaweza is focused on effectively achieving development results		1		1	4	3	

Annex 4: Twaweza and its Theories of Change

Development is complex and Twaweza is a complex and innovative response. Twaweza's core insight is that countries cannot develop if their people are hungry, sick and uneducated. Development in East Africa means government must deliver basic services like health, education and clean water. Citizens must be able to hold government to account for the delivery and quality of these services. However, holding government to account requires a healthy, educated and confident citizenry: Twaweza plans to step in and transform this into a virtuous developmental cycle. In Twaweza's conception, citizen agency



is an end in itself and an effective means to improve quality of life outcomes. In turn, better basic services, more effective use of public resources and accountable government will contribute to strengthening human capability and citizen agency. Twaweza sees citizen agency, better services, improved resource management and accountability as mutually reinforcing.

Twaweza captured this idea in its original strategic plan 2009-2018 as shown in Figure 1. It identified two interlinked goals: To enable millions of people in East Africa a) to exercise greater agency i.e. be able to take initiative to improve their situation and hold government to account, and b) to access improved


basic services (particularly basic education, primary health, and clean water).

The same document contained Twaweza's first Theory of Change diagram, shown in Figure 2.¹¹⁰

- Over the period being evaluated, as Twaweza learned it adapted its programme and its Theory of Change. In 2011, Twaweza revised its strategy for the first time.


The 2011 Strategy clarified Twaweza's goals as enabling millions of ordinary citizens in East Africa, particularly those who live on less than \$2/day or are otherwise marginalized, to:

- exercise agency – i.e. access information, express views and take initiative to improve their situation and hold government to account



¹¹⁰ Twaweza! fostering an ecosystem of change in East Africa through imagination, citizen agency & public accountability, 2008.

- access basic services (primary and secondary education, primary health care, clean water) that are of better quality, and exercise greater control over resources that have a bearing on these services.
- It also refined the Theory of Change (see Figure 3). In 2014 Twaweza once again revised its strategy at a strategy retreat in a document referred to as the strategy pivot. Subsequent to this, Twaweza has again reworked its Theory of Change (Figure 4). The evolution of the Twaweza theory of change is shown below.



life of the project strategic engagement with government, among other key development actors, became an important aspect of the programme, as can be seen in Figure 4, where changes to policies, plans and budgets is now an intermediate outcome of Twaweza activities.

- Figure 4 also shows, at the outcome level, a contraction of the results Twaweza believes it can claim: better services and healthy, educated and confident people are no longer part of its sphere of influence.

- Twaweza posits, in Figure 3, that by getting its messages, based on research, out to the public, using multiple communications channels, it can 1) increase awareness and knowledge, 2) change opinions and attitudes, and ultimately, 3) inspire action. The next step in the chain, the hypotheses that citizen action will result in better services, and eventually lead to healthy, educated and confident people is a more difficult proposition.

- One of the major changes seen in the evolution of the Twaweza theory of change is that, while the original strategy did not target messages directly to government, over the



Annex 5: Outcome Mapping: Brief Description and how used

Outcome Mapping (OM)

OM is a framework used in planning and assessing development programming. It was developed by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) for clarifying the intentions and the outcomes of its development research granting programmes. OM tools enable an intervention to learn about its influence on its direct partners as it defines outcomes as the changes in those partners' behaviours and interrelationships related to the overall changes in state or well-being sought.

OM differs from other logic models in several ways:

- 1) It specifically delineates an intervention's sphere of influence, as distinct from its 'sphere of concern' - the wider system of roles, actors and interrelationships in which it operates;
- 2) Rather than focusing on the intervention and its objectives, it focuses on the actions and interrelationship of the actors who will drive and maintain the intended changes;
- 3) It uses sets of milestones to mark the intended path of change for each engaged actor;
- 4) It defines outcomes as changes in the patterns of behavior and interrelationships of those actors;
- 5) It calls for a set of diversified strategies, designed specifically to support changes directly and contextually relative to each of those engaged actors.

OM is also oriented towards documenting and learning about the social transformations on which ecological, economic, social or technological change depend. Unlike approaches for measuring outputs (what did the project produce?) and so-called impacts (has it changed human or ecological well-being?), OM focuses on *planning for and measuring intended and emergent outcomes* in terms of the behaviours and actions of the people reached by the programme. OM makes people the central focus of development and accepts unanticipated changes as part of the process. It connects outputs and actors to help programmes to understand and assign credit for the changes to which they contribute. It is typically used by projects or programmes where relationships with and behaviours of collaborators and beneficiaries are fundamental to delivering their mission. It helps those engaged in assessment and learning processes think systemically and realistically about what they are doing, enabling them to adapt their strategies to improve effectiveness in bringing about desired outcomes. OM approaches can be adapted to a wide range of contexts, including situations such as this one where the programme was not designed using OM.

Purpose, approach and limitations of using OM in the Twaweza evaluation

Questions have already been raised concerning Twaweza's "open architecture" approach to social change, where information inputs are fed into a complex social system in the hope that the citizens will self-identify as concerned, organize themselves and *"a big outcome (such as increased citizen monitoring of services, and improved service delivery) will somehow pop out...."* (Summary of Twaweza's First Evaluator's meeting, 3-4 October 2013, Dar es Salaam, 2013). With its focus on actors, their interactions and influences, Outcome Mapping is an appropriate approach for addressing such

questions. Its tools are particularly well suited to examining stakeholder responses to programme strategies and outputs.

The Terms of Reference (TORs) for this external evaluation of Twaweza explicitly call for the use of an Outcome Mapping perspective in summarizing and assessing Twaweza programmes and activities over the 2009-2014 period. While an OM framework could be applied, in principle, to address many of the evaluation questions (EQ) specified in the TORs, including those on organizational development and performance (EQ 1 and 2), we used the OM approach mainly to address aspects of EQ 4 and 5. The way OM was applied in this evaluation was shaped by several factors:

- the limited time and resources available for conducting the evaluation;
- the availability of Twaweza staff to participate in the evaluation;
- the topics covered in the monitoring and evaluation information available on file; and
- the kinds of strategies and outcomes delivered by Twaweza.

Specifically here is how OM could be applied to evaluation questions 4 and 5:

EQ 4: To assess the quantity, quality, and reach of the outputs.

Twaweza has produced a rich set of data on ‘quantity’ and ‘reach’ of its outputs. The evaluation looks at the comprehensiveness and reliability of this information and the extent that it has been used to guide the management of the programme components. Assessing the ‘quality’ of the outputs from the standpoint of content, relevance, clarity, etc. presents challenges, though. The OM perspective helps here to not only look at HOW the results were brought about, but also to assess the dynamics with which the strategies were implemented and how their intended results are expected to be interacting with the contextual situation. So, rather than using experts to review and opine on the quality of the outputs, the evaluation looked for evidence on quality as follows:

- 1) active responses by the target audiences who were reached (i.e. trends in demand, critical feedback, use, quotation, further distribution, etc.);
- 2) data from small surveys of reached audience members for their perceptions of the usefulness and value of the outputs. This should include collecting examples of how the outputs were used and the experiences generated; and finally
- 3) the quality of outputs and interventions could be assessed by looking at the processes by which they were produced. This would include addressing questions such as: How did Twaweza and its partners go about in developing their interventions? Are their strategies informed by research? Are they based on a thorough understanding of their target audiences? Were the target audiences consulted about their information needs and interests early in the production process? Were drafts or pilots pretested? Were language and cultural factors assessed and used in designing the outputs? Were Tanzania’s existing design and production capacities utilized and enhanced through the production processes? Were sufficient strategies or activities put in place to foster sustainable resilient, actor-owned changes? Did Twaweza track and evaluate the dynamics of the changes (i.e. do they monitor responses to interventions through mechanisms built into their interventions)?

EQ 5: To assess, to the extent possible, the observed effects and potential contributions of Twaweza's outputs to outcomes. Discuss reasons for levels of achievement observed.

The OM approach is, of course, particularly useful when exploring the linkages between outputs and outcomes. The evaluation looked to identify and sample Twaweza programme components where:

- 1) Twaweza participants or staff suggest outcomes have been achieved; and
- 2) Twaweza documents report on activities that included engaging directly with stakeholders in the expectation of seeing changes in identifiable individuals, groups or organizations.

Of course, the time frame of this evaluation is far too limited to collect the full range of data to document and evaluate outcomes across the wide spectrum and layers of interaction of Twaweza programming. The evaluation team therefore relied heavily on evaluative information they could harvest from documentary sources made available from existing files. Thus, a comprehensive evaluation of Twaweza's Theory of Change (ToC) was not possible. But looking closely at selected outcomes, OM concepts can give some indication on the extent of linkage among outputs and outcomes and thus the potential progress towards the achievement of the desired outcomes.

Hence, the evaluation follows a simplified version of Outcome Mapping adapted as appropriate to the style and content of Twaweza's programming and complementing the other output-oriented evaluation methods. It is employed to help us (the evaluators) and the users of this evaluation to understand more clearly how and to what extent Twaweza has supported their partners to change as described in their ToC, so that their partners can better fulfill their roles contributing to the achievement of their (and Twaweza's) overarching development goals. In other words: specifically what changes does Twaweza leave behind once it ends its engagement and moves on to other issues and places?

The OM concepts applied to the Twaweza evaluation

Rather than applying the full OM framework, we used several concepts from the "intentional design" process to examine a number of selected outcomes. We hoped to be able to document and assess; a) whether programme activities and outputs reached their intended audiences; b) the responses to and actions influenced by these activities and outputs, and c) the extent to which Twaweza appears to have contributed to ongoing changes in the actions and interrelationship of its intended audiences. The following are the relevant OM concepts:

Outcomes: *Changes in behaviour, relationships, activities or actions of the people, groups and organizations with which the programme works.*

The OM approach helps to think through a programme "backwards", from the visionary, ideal future to the reality of the current situation. Instead of asking: "What do we really want to achieve in the long term and what do we have to do to achieve our goals?" with OM we ask: Of those actors who could be part of that ideal future, which ones can we work with? And of those we work with, what would they need to do differently in order to help create and maintain the world we want for them (and they want for themselves). How can we help them move in that direction? And finally, what would we see happening as they start to make those changes in their patterns of action and interrelationships?

Boundary Partners: *Those social actors (individuals, groups or organizations) with whom a programme works directly to influence behaviour patterns and interrelationships.*

This concept serves as a first level of partner analysis to clarify which actors Twaweza engages with directly in order to influence how these actors play their roles, fulfill their responsibilities and interact with each other into the future. This would include looking at how Twaweza serves or otherwise interacts with its boundary partners. Normally, this would not include contractual relationships, unless the contract is part of a larger, capacity-building, motivational or other strategy intended to change behavior beyond the contract.

Progress Markers: *Sets of actions indicating progressing transformation in the way the Boundary Partners fulfill their roles, responsibilities and interrelationships.*

As a second level of partner analysis, this concept is used to examine the observable responses of actors influenced by Twaweza. It is outside the scope of this study (and many outcome-focused evaluations) to look at changes in knowledge and attitudes; with Outcome Mapping we go directly to behavior changes. Applying Progress Markers, we would look at the responses of the stakeholders during and after engagement with Twaweza activities. Do the relevant stakeholders change their patterns of behaviour, their interrelationships? Do they begin to demand or provide services differently? Do they seek or support changes in other actors. To the extent feasible, we would include the behavior changes of citizens, men, women, youths and children, Twaweza's ultimate target audience and beneficiaries.

By looking at stakeholder responses, the evaluation could comment on the reach of Twaweza's outputs (numbers distributed to specific target audiences or users) and on the quality and relevance of the outputs. Attention could also be paid to Twaweza's monitoring and learning processes. By looking at the extent to which Twaweza recorded and used stakeholder responses to, and uses of, outputs, the evaluation could comment on the extent to which adaptive management was evident in Twaweza's programme delivery and strategic leadership. Progress Markers would not be likely applicable to generalized outcomes such as public debate in the media, but they could be applied to the policy processes engaged by specific actors.

Strategy Maps: *Six cell matrix for classifying the kinds of strategies applied to support the desired changes.*

At the third level we look at the cases where Twaweza expected to influence new patterns of behavior among stakeholders. The activities intended to contribute to the desired changes, or to ameliorate factors inhibiting the desired changes, can be categorized and analyzed using the OM Strategy Map. Programme components aimed at informing or fostering awareness are identified along with those changing an actor's regulatory or material situation along with those strategies intended to provide independent or ongoing support. These three kinds of strategies can be aimed directly at the stakeholder or at reducing risk and building a supportive contextual or operating environment (see Table "Example of a Strategy Map" below). In situations where the desired changes have not been observed, the strategy map offers a way of generating ideas for modifying the programme to increase the chances of progress. While due to the factors identified on page two of this annex, this kind of analysis is beyond the scope of this evaluation, we believe that using this concept may be of help in

Twaweza's future work, especially if it decides to diversify its strategies and shift to capacity-building among specific stakeholders.

The way the OM concepts described above can be applied to this evaluation depends greatly on the answers to the following basic questions:

- How does Twaweza understand and use the concepts, 'outputs' and 'outcomes' in its monitoring and reporting activities?
- Can we differentiate those 'contractual' partners who provide services, products and channels for Twaweza's programmes and activities from those stakeholders among whom Twaweza intends to leave behind changed ongoing capacity, agency and roles?
- When Twaweza contracts the development and distribution of educational materials in order to stimulate sustained public dialogue and civic engagement, which stakeholders does it work with outside of the domain of contractual agreements? In other words, once programme outputs have been produced who does Twaweza work with to build and maintain the citizen agency and ownership related to those outputs?
- What strategies were implemented to support and sustain the changes in stakeholder commitment, competence and agency?

Data collection and interpretation of findings

Data collection for EQ 5 focuses on a few specific areas of activity or on specific outputs where outcomes are expected or are known to have been observed. In these cases, attention is placed, not only on identifying the changes relative to each of the involved stakeholders, but also on the contributing and inhibiting factors, both internal and external to Twaweza's interventions.

During the interviews with informants, stories of change are elicited, to record from the informants' own perspectives and experiences the perceived changes. In data analysis these stories are used to provide context and illustrations for the quantitative and qualitative analysis of responses to the more specific, individual survey questions.

The OM approach in this evaluation provides Twaweza with

- An exemplary OM framework;
- 6 outcome stories providing evidence on what Twaweza does and in how far and how Twaweza contributes to bring about social change.
- Summary of the views of xx interview partners (donors, strategic partners, CSOs) on specific outcome narratives of Twaweza's work.
- An analysis of the extent to which the outcomes are reflected by Twaweza's ToC.

The evaluation team recognizes that evaluation findings often have different meanings and implications for different stakeholders depending on their perspectives. The relevance and value of findings can be increased when opportunities are created for engaging stakeholders in interpreting and making sense of the data and information assembled for the report.


Potential future use of OM

Using OM could help Twaweza think systemically and realistically about what it is doing – which changes it could bring about in the partners and target groups it works with. This would enable the organization to be realistic about the roles its activities can play in empowering citizens in the development of the country's governance and in the well-being of its communities. Further it would give Twaweza a means of developing and adapting its strategies aimed at bringing about its intended outcomes.

Building on the exploratory use of OM in this evaluation, Twaweza could apply the tools to establish a functional OM framework to help it clearly and realistically clarify its intentions. It strikes the evaluation team that it would be especially useful for Twaweza to use OM to help it define the types of relationships it has with its partners – differentiating boundary from strategic and the other kinds of partner relationships it works with and possibly developing a simple model of how actors interact (social network analysis, see below); to describe the responses expected (Progress Markers) and the interventions Twaweza is using to influence change (Strategy Maps).

Example of a social network graphic, here showing all possible interactions among Twaweza and other social actors. This analysis could be done to depict the social actors and interactions involved in influencing a particular outcome.

The OM approach could help to further develop Twaweza's ToC. This was revised only recently, anchoring it on two core domains - open government and basic learning. Twaweza will be using a problem-driven approach, i.e. identify problems to work on and then use a reverse logic way of thinking to gather evidence, stories and ideas and to seek to influence intermediate outcomes in children's learning, responsive authorities and active citizens. Knowledge generation will be key in helping them sharpen and improve their work.



However, the current ToC is imbalanced in that it does not detail the full range of social actors the initiative needs to work with to foster a resilient, engaged system of actors, roles and interrelationships. Further it does not identify the strategies (besides “collect, curate, transport, engage”) it employs, or the specific changes Twaweza would like to see in their partners and other social actors to foster a legacy that might remain even after Twaweza has moved on. The absence of contextual influences and risk management provisions is a further requirement in a ToC that could be addressed.

Some areas of the diagram are vague about how the intermediate outcomes relate to and influence each other. It has also been critiqued that the ToC does not include the higher, overarching goals of Twaweza (vision) and that the reverse logic model may not help to tell the stories about how the outputs of Twaweza have in fact supported social change. The OM framework may provide an approach

to add information to the ToC and provide “flesh” to its existing “bones”. Selecting specific outcomes and the respective social actors, the ToC graphic might be used to ask what their expected behaviours would be, what progress towards the overarching development goals might look like. This kind of specificity would help Twaweza decide and indicate how it could monitor the outcomes it shares with its partners and intended beneficiaries.

Annex 6: Twaweza Activities, Outputs and Outcomes

Initial Information provided by Twaweza on Oct. 6, 2014

Initial notes, suggested materials, and possible informants

1. What are significant national-level outcomes we think Twaweza has contributed to, that ought to frame the investigations? Some key examples:
 - Tanzania's OGP 1st and 2nd second plan; working with World Bank and DFID on making data transparent (eg see both govt site www.necta.go.tz and www.shule.info)
 - President Kikwete announcement on developing Freedom of Information law (initially in London Oct 2013, reinforced at UN Sept 2014), cabinet paper prepared and approved by IMTC, something stuck for 15 years, that we helped move.
 - Water points functioning mapping published online
 - Policy makers and key public influencers understanding that schooling is not the same as learning; Reframing thinking about education from enrolments to quality measured in terms of learning outcomes. See phrasing in national govt plans, language of leadership, BRN benchmarks
 - Ministers' announcement week of Sept 29, 2014 about capitation grant going directly to schools; earlier in 2011/2 having secondary school capitation grants be released and disbursed to schools
 - BRN education component has 4-5 of its 9 components directly influenced by Twaweza, including publication of results in color coded
 - "Radar" books tracking website
 - The Sauti data/briefs influencing and informing national public debate on key issues, such as the constitution, EAC, water expenditure and progress, corruption, education and health. Evidence media and social media coverage.
 - Media programmes informing and influencing public c debate (see monitoring briefs eg MiniBuzz, data on Sahara)
2. In terms of sub-national/regional/district outcomes, connecting with core implementing partners within Uwezo (see point 3 below) for their view of Twaweza's contribution to the education sector in their district.
3. In terms of citizen level outcomes: the baseline TZ survey & the upcoming follow up will be the best evidence we'll have of changes in citizen agency.
4. In terms of our core partners. The key document here is the 5-year output matrix, which can be queried. We will suggest a list of programme partners with whom we've worked with well and others less so, in these categories:

- Media partners
- Policy level partners
- Core Uwezo and KiuFunza partners

Table 2: Revised Table of Outcomes provided by Twaweza Nov. 2014

(Version of 04 November 2014)

We hope this information will be helpful to tell a few of the Twaweza stories. We see each output as having its own story, often woven together through work of several units. In addition, we have created two new areas: Organizational learning (with its own outputs), and Innovations. Particularly in innovations, you will see that it features mostly the Programmes unit: it's the unit in which we experimented the most with different models and approaches; as such, it is also the unit where many things did not work out (as the flipside of innovation is failure). Finally, please note that many of the stories can be told in considerably more detail; let us know which story is of interest to you, and we will make sure that we connect you (in person or skype) to the right person internally, as well as to external sources.

Some notes: (summarized by the evaluators) – there are separate overarching Outcome areas. Then separate sub-outcomes within overarching outcome areas. Marked (no longer there) “Twaweza’s contributions which we believe are most compelling / essential for that particular outcome area”. “We have added a line on “evidence” following many of the outputs, to note where we believe there is compelling evidence of what we have done, and also of what we have learned as a result. Note, however, that there is supporting internal monitoring / evidence for most outputs. We have noted units & individuals for internal verification, as well as suggestions for external verification (that last column is not complete – many names were given in an earlier table, and we can fill this out as needed)”

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	Category of Outcomes	Twaweza contribution (outputs)	Primary Unit / internal verification	Suggested external verification (contact details in earlier table)	Evaluator Comments
	Outcomes in Governance, Public Policy				
1	Tanzania's OGP 1 st and 2nd second plan	Preparing drafts of the Tanzania 1 st and 2 nd plan (final versions very close to those prepared by Twaweza)	Strategic Engagement (Rakesh & Evarist)	Susan Mlawi	Review and reported upon.
2	Developing Freedom of Information law (Pres. Kikwete in London Oct 2013, reinforced at UN Sept 2014), cabinet paper prepared and approved by IMTC	Working with progressive MPs from ruling as well as opposition party Working with the Parliamentary Accounts Committee	Strategic Engagement (Rakesh)	Zitto Kabwe January Makamba Angellah Kairuki Mathias Chikawe Judge Joseph Warioba	Reviewed. Met with Zitto Kabwe
	Outcomes in Education				Major review done
3	Reframing thinking about education from enrolments & inputs to quality measured in	4 years of rigorous, independent Uwezo data demonstrating that learning outcomes are not improving (national and East Africa reports; also district-level report cards, and in 2014 a district and MP ranking poster)	Uwezo (Zaida, Rakesh)	Prof Sifuni Mchome Dr Joyce Ndalichako	Major review done

	Category of Outcomes	Twaweza contribution (outputs)	Primary Unit / internal verification	Suggested external verification (contact details in earlier table)	Evaluator Comments
	terms of learning outcomes. This is reflected in phrasing in national government plans, language of leadership.				
4		<i>Evidence on the above:</i> Uwezo's communications log on the various engagements and interventions in government functions/ meetings, by key staff (Zaida Mgalla and Rakesh Rajani).	Uwezo (Zaida, Rakesh)		Checked
5		<i>Evidence on the above:</i> A qualitative exercise in 2013, interviewing key figures in the education sector as well as research (universities) and media, on the relevance, importance and resonance of Uwezo data. Available as a Monitoring Brief.	LME (Varja)		Major review done
6		Significant media coverage of the issue, particularly around the launch of the annual report (print, TV, radio debates, etc.)	Uwezo (Zaida) /Comms (Risha)		Confirmed.
7		<i>Evidence on the above:</i> Keeping track of media coverage (print & broadcast) through an independent 3 rd party. Monthly and annual compilations available.	LME (Varja)		Major review done
8	BRN education component (4-5 of its 9	Twaweza's active participation in the BRN 6-week "lab" and introduction of new concepts in how to approach improvement	Strategic Engagement		Major review

	Category of Outcomes	Twaweza contribution (outputs)	Primary Unit / internal verification	Suggested external verification (contact details in earlier table)	Evaluator Comments
	components directly influenced by Twaweza)	of education issues (i.e., focus on learning outcomes, incentives for teachers & schools through dashboard ranking of schools, and recognizing improvements)	(Rakesh, Evarist)		done
9	Demonstrating accountability: “Radar” books tracking website	On-line, timely and transparent tracking of the distribution of books to schools all over the country was Twaweza’s suggestion.	Strategic Engagement (Rakesh)	DFID TZ	Checked.
10	Policy change to improve accountability: Ministers’ announcement week of Sept 29, 2014 about capitation grant going directly to schools	Evidence from the Sauti za Wananchi survey on knowledge of capitation grant, and % of it reaching schools (Sauti brief #3). And an earlier Uwazi brief on the capitation grants reaching schools (in 2012).	Uwazi (Youdi)	Prof Sifuni Mchome Dr Joyce Ndalichako	Checked.
11		KiuFunza experiment, demonstrating in Year 1 that money sent directly to schools has a significant effect in that the funds are used well for intended purposes (e.g., purchase of books)	Uwazi (Youdi)		Checked.
12		<i>Evidence on the above:</i> Analysis of quantitative data together with monitoring reports.	Uwazi (Youdi)		
13	General awareness among TZ citizens on the importance of learning outcomes as a	Uwezo assessments, which train district partners (local civil society organizations) and 8,000+ volunteers annually on learning outcomes. Results in a national report every year (in 3 countries; also an East Africa report, comparing the 3	Uwezo (Zaida)		Checked.

	Category of Outcomes	Twaweza contribution (outputs)	Primary Unit / internal verification	Suggested external verification (contact details in earlier table)	Evaluator Comments
	benchmark of the quality of the education system This is about outputs.	countries).			
14		Dissemination of Uwezo results and generally focusing education discussion in media on outcomes, through the media partnerships (e.g., Sahara media; in section below)	Programs (Kees)		Checked.
15		Printing of Uwezo tests on 40 million exercise books with TPS to reach parents & teachers. (*also in innovations)	Programs (Kees)		Checked. Partner interviews. Visit to school and interviews.
16		<i>Evidence on the above:</i> as part of the SolarAid assessment, also covered awareness & engagement with the booklets. Available as report.	LME (Varja)		Reviewed.
17		Solar Aid partnership: distribution of information about Uwezo, as well as subsidizing solar lamps (we were interested in the link between lamps, ability to do homework, and better learning outcomes)	Programs (Kees)		Reviewed.
18		<i>Evidence on the above:</i> A qual-quant study covering distribution of lamps & link to homework (also included awareness of the Uwezo tests in the school exercise booklets, and recall of NiSisi campaign). Available as report.	LME (Varja)		Reviewed.

	Category of Outcomes	Twaweza contribution (outputs)	Primary Unit / internal verification	Suggested external verification (contact details in earlier table)	Evaluator Comments
	Outcomes in Citizen agency				
19	Contribution to TZ citizens having access to quality information regarding basic services, and current issues; and contribution to TZ citizens exercising voice This is about outputs.	Sahara media: improving the coverage, and the quality of the coverage, of education, health, and water topics in the media; and also to feature / showcase voices of citizens (e.g., as “inserts” in the news, and other programmes).	Programs (Kees)	Bakari Machumu Ernest Sungura Tido Mhando Maria Sarungi Jenerali Ulimwengu	Reviewed.
20		<i>Evidence on above:</i> Sahara’s own story about what Twaweza enabled it to be.	Programs (Kees)	Nathan (Sahara)	Reviewed.
21		<i>Evidence on above:</i> over the last 2 years, several attempts to capture quality of the media outputs we support. This year (2014), partnered with Tanzania Media Fund (in July) in a joint exercise, where 200 clips of Twaweza-supported media have been coded & analysed. Draft report expected by 10 November. (*also in innovations)	LME (Varja)		Checked.
22		Kingo magazine: a popular, accessible magazine, covering a range of relevant topics (issues dedicated to water, education, the new constitution process) (*also in innovations)	Programs (Kees)		Seen.

	Category of Outcomes	Twaweza contribution (outputs)	Primary Unit / internal verification	Suggested external verification (contact details in earlier table)	Evaluator Comments
23		<i>Evidence on above:</i> a qualitative exercise (focus group discussions) on how Tanzanian citizens perceive Kingo & understand/engage with the topics. Complemented with a quantitative exercise based on buses where Kingo is distributed.	LME (Varja)		Seen.
24		Sauti za Wananchi: the first reliable and regular opinion polling mechanism in Tanzania (collecting of data). Prior to Sauti, Twaweza created & supported “Listening to Dar” – similar concept as Sauti but only in Dar es Salaam.	Uwazi (Youdi)		Reviewed.
25		Monthly media launch & panel debate on current topics, based on Sauti za Wananchi data. These are monitored through an independent media monitoring company.	Communications (Risha)		Attended and reviewed.
26		<i>Evidence on the 2 above:</i> A qualitative exercise in 2013, interviewing key people in the policy and media arenas on the awareness of Sauti, and perceived usefulness & relevance of data. Available as a Monitoring Brief.	LME (Varja)		Seen.
27		MiniBuzz: giving space to views and opinions of ordinary citizens on a regular basis (broadcast 5 times per week on TV). (*also in innovations)	Programs (Kees)		Extensively reviewed.
28		<i>Evidence on the above:</i> Monitoring MB (in 2013) in 3 different ways (coverage, perceived quality & relevance); available in a Monitoring Brief.	LME (Varja)		Extensively reviewed.

	Category of Outcomes	Twaweza contribution (outputs)	Primary Unit / internal verification	Suggested external verification (contact details in earlier table)	Evaluator Comments
29		(Regarding access to education information, refer to Uwezo assessments above)	Uwezo (Zaida)		
30	Public imagination on the possibility of citizens driving change So is this	Femina (youth-focused NGO), we have supporting them for 3+ years to continually reach young people with messages and practical tips and information on how to tackle problems, including in basic services. Femina has own M&E department, which is pretty strong; we have been reviewing and inputting into their monitoring.	Programs (Kees)		Reviewed.
31		NiSisi mass media campaign on inspiring citizens with the idea of their own agency	Communications (Risha)		Seen.
32		<i>Evidence on the above:</i> JWT (external agency) research on reach & understanding of message; also a Sauti za Wananchi round on reach & recall	Communications (Risha)		Reviewed.
33		Tamasha: Design of 11 cartoon booklets with inspiring examples of citizens tackling service delivery challenges (in education, health, and water). Printing & distribution of 13 million of the above.	Communications (Risha) / Programs (Kees)		Reviewed.
34		<i>Evidence on the above:</i> Monitoring of distribution & recall of the booklets to primary schools. Available as a draft Monitoring Brief.	LME (Varja)		Reviewed.
35		2012 calendars with message “who will change your world /	Programs (Kees)		

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		NiSisi" – printed & distributed 1 million, also as inserts in popular newspapers and through Teacher Union. Anecdotal, were told that the teachers used the calendar as placards during the 2012 strike.			
	Outcomes in Health	Twaweza contribution (outputs)	Unit		
36	Contribution to highlighting the issue of stock-outs of essential medicine	Political economy study of stock-outs conducted jointly with UK's Overseas Development Institute; the resulting paper & brief influencing BRN's new health section (together with the Sauti brief, see below)	LME (Varja)		Reviewed.
37		Sauti za Wananchi poll on stock-outs	Uwazi (Youdi)		Reviewed.
38		Media campaign to address awareness of the costing of Malaria medicines (part of essential meds package) – public service announcements on radio & TV PSAs, 1 Kingo magazine issue on health, and the 2013 annual calendar with health messages (1 million copies printed, distributed to hospitals and through partners).	Communications (Risha)		Seen.
39		Youth Initiatives Tanzania (NGO partner): a monitoring exercise checking on price of the Malaria medicine (in Dar es Salaam); launch of the findings with key stakeholders: WHO, Ministry of Health, Medical Stores Department.	Uwazi (Youdi) / Communications (Risha)		Seen.
	Outcomes in Water				
40	Contribution to	Daraja: trying a new system for citizen-led reporting on non-	Programs (Kees)		Interviewed

	Category of Outcomes	Twaweza contribution (outputs)	Primary Unit / internal verification	Suggested external verification (contact details in earlier table)	Evaluator Comments
	highlighting the issue of access to improved water sources so is this	functioning water points	& Ben Taylor (formerly with Daraja)		
41		<i>Evidence on the above:</i> well documented case study on why the MajiMatone programme did not work as anticipated.	Strategic engagement (Rakesh) & Ben Taylor		Interviewed
42		Sauti za Wananchi poll on water accessibility	Uwazi (Youdi)		Interviewed
		Kingo magazine issue on water; Tamasha citizen agency booklets on water accessibility.	Communications (Risha)		Seen.
43		Support to Ministry of Water to make available online the national map of water points (also part of BRN)	Strategic engagement (Rakesh) & Ben Taylor		Checked.
	Organizational Learning as an Outcome				
44	Streamlining Uwezo operations & finances	Michigan group – evaluation of logistics & operations of Uwezo. Realized Twaweza's systems were not accommodating the Uwezo large-scale operations (lots of small transactions.)	Uwezo (Sara Ruto – regional Uwezo coordinator, Zaida, Rakesh)		These could probably be called inputs.

	Category of Outcomes	Twaweza contribution (outputs)	Primary Unit / internal verification	Suggested external verification (contact details in earlier table)	Evaluator Comments
45	Changing our strategy & TOC	Starting in 2013, with the evaluator's conference, a serious re-think of some of the core components of the TOC. 2014 added to this period for the purposes of learning & adapting. See the pivot note, as well as the 3 blogs posted by Duncan Green on the topic, and the 4 th , which is Twaweza's reply.	LME (Varja), Rakesh	Smita Singh Owen Barder Lant Prichett Dipak Naker	These could be called inputs leading to the output of a strategy document. All four contacted and only one was available for comments and interviews. .
46	External evaluations of "big" questions in TOC Input	Engagement with 3 groups: Lieberman-Posner-Tsai (MIT-UCLA) on evaluation of Uwezo's approach; Amsterdam Institute of International Development on the resonance of Twaweza's overall approach in Tanzania; and Georgetown University on the link between compelling/motivational information and public agency.	LME (Varja), Rakesh		Reviewed.
47	Monitoring structure & feedback	Monitoring plans & their implementation; the evolution of monitoring at Twaweza. Evidence of lessons from monitoring influencing programmes / implementation, and future measurement.	LME (Varja)		Inputs to programme delivery
48	Internal learning structure	Securing opportunities for staff to actively learn: reading club, learning sessions, skills labs, food for thought, and annual immersion.	LME (Varja)		Inputs to organizational improvement.

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	Etc.				
	Organizational Innovations				
49	Experimenting with Fast moving consumer goods model: can we partner with these companies (given the different focus), can we cost-effectively utilize the strongest distribution networks in Tanzania, and can it be premised on a value proposition? (i.e., not financial). Not outcomes	Exercise books printed with Uwezo tests, by Tanzania Printing Services.	Programs (Kees)		Seen, contracts reviewed, interviews with partner and with school.
50		Sumaria Speedo Pens packaged with a Uwezo test leaflet & branded poster of Uwezo and Sumaria. Signed agreement, made materials & distributed through parent company. However, could not track distribution to end point (kiosks all around the country), due to a multi-layered cascade model.	Programs (Kees)		Seen.
51		Kingo magazine: had very limited distribution originally; with Twaweza's support it developed distribution mechanisms on	Programs (Kees)		Checked.

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		inter-city buses.			
52	Improving media quality & content with base support (as opposed to the norm, which is journalist training, and which by different accounts yields little results) output	Framework agreements with media houses (Sahara, Mlimani), seeking a conceptual agreement on the important of covering social issues and incorporating citizen voices, and giving wide grants allowing for meeting of these social objectives.	Programs (Kees)		Reviewed.
53		Minibuzz: a new model of talk shows & news discussion	Programs (Kees)		Reviewed.
54		Comedy: Vuvuzela TV clips and Uncle Kochikochi (radio satire); addressing social issues through comedy. These were tried but did not succeed as planned. Radio satire had low coverage; the TV clips production was long, and audience limited.	Programs (Kees)		Reviewed.
55	Experimenting working with religious networks: can we align with these groups on social issues of common interest?	We have tried to reach out to a number of networks of different affiliations; so far, have succeeded in making inroads only with the Christian Social Services Coalition (CSSC), with whom we are currently designing and piloting materials to motivate prayer groups (small, local organizations) to monitor the quality of services delivered through CSSC hospitals & health centres (which is up to 40% of all health care providers in the country). There are no outputs yet, as the partnership is	Programs (Kees)		Reviewed and interviews done. An outcome here would be CSSC members taking on this monitoring role and use & production? of

	Category of Outcomes	Twaweza contribution (outputs)	Primary Unit / internal verification	Suggested external verification (contact details in earlier table)	Evaluator Comments
		ongoing.			materials
56	Experimenting with ICT for development What would be the output here...?	Daraja (MajiMatone) is our best example here (profiled above, in water sector). It came at a time when the accountability field globally was (and in some spheres still is) unconditionally raving about how ICT-based solutions were going to revolutionize accountability. The Daraja example gave a very important counter-weight to the story: that technology is only a small part of the solution, and that the fundamental relationship and between citizens & government needs to be understood and trust slowly built. See also our post on Feedback Labs: http://feedbacklabs.org/tag/twaweza/	Strategic engagement (Rakesh) & Ben Taylor, Programs (Kees)		Reviewed through contracts, documents and interviews.
	Contributions to global knowledge				
57	Knowledge on practice	World Bank: co-creating a handbook on mobile phone surveys based on Sauti experience.	Uwazi (Youdi)		Noted.
58		Participating in learning networks – e.g., TALearn (TA/I), GPSA (World Bank)	LME (Varja), Programs (Kees)		Reviewed.
59	OGP global	Part of original group developing the concept, operationalizing it; overseeing its global growth. In 2014, RR was the Civil Society chair for OGP.	Strategic Engagement (Rakesh)		Noted.
60	Input into global	Participation in several high-level Board panels – Hewlett	Strategic		Noted.

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	accountability organizations	foundation, International Budget Partnership, Making All Voices Count, ONE, Omidyar.	Engagement (Rakesh)		

Evaluator Note: In an email to Twaweza on 19 November 2014 it was suggested that this table appeared to mix up the common definitions of outputs and outcomes. We then made the decision to accept an expanded definition of outcomes for “citizen agency” than we would normally. This is one example of why some times Twaweza’s narrative is difficult to follow. The response is that we both understand the issue, and this is not due to incorrect conceptual understanding but because of a lack of time due to the high volume and pressing work demands. The above table has been used in the report.