Appetite for accountability in Tanzania:
Translating election-time signals into accountability values

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Introduction

In most countries with multi-party systems an election year presents (at least the possibility) of new opportunities and excitement: will the balance of power shift? Will newcomers and new ideas, at the sub-national and national levels, come to the center stage? Prior to the general elections in Tanzania in 2015, popular opinion among certain groups suggested that this might be the election when opposition parties could gain control of the executive. Indeed, the 2015 election was full of surprises, from the unexpected choice of a relative outsider, John Magufuli, as the CCM (ruling party) presidential candidate, to the subsequent defection of Edward Lowassa from CCM to the opposition. And although the ruling party (CCM), which has been in power since independence, maintained its grip on power, it was, by many accounts, the closest election in Tanzanian multi-party history.

Ideally, elections would mark just the beginning of accountability conversations between citizens and their elected leaders. But in many countries with nascent accountability mechanisms to link authorities and citizens, Tanzania included, elections present one of the few available opportunities for average citizens to have their voices heard by the government.[1] With very limited options to course-correct between election years, voting is arguably a critical moment at which citizens voice leadership and policy preferences to the government. Of course, such preferences are not formed in a neutral space: besides the political history dominated by a single strong party, Tanzanian political parties and politicians spend varyingly large sums of money to campaign in order to present positions, rally support, and discredit opponents. Although formally banned, there are plenty of anecdotes of campaigning politicians handing out gifts to potential voters, in addition to promises of improved services to particular constituencies, if elected. Campaigning was lively on the media as well, with the ruling party continuing to dominate the media space both print and broadcast (while some improvements in impartiality were noted, the media coverage of Tanzanian elections was judged to be largely partial to the ruling party).[2] But overall, information to the majority citizens tends to trickle in uneven spurts: newspapers are read at least once a week by 24% of Tanzanians, 78% get news from the radio and 33% from watching television; only 9% regularly get news from the internet[3], while an InterMedia[4] study estimated that 68% of Tanzanians get their information through "word of mouth."

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[1] This is borne out by data: we know that in many developing democracies, including Tanzania, poor people are more likely to vote than rich people. http://www.afrobarometer.org/

[2] http://www.mct.or.tz/index.php/component/content/article/42-news/rokstories/422-2015-elections-media-monitoring-report

[3] Afrobarometer Round 6, 2014; http://www.afrobarometer.org/

[4] http://www.intermedia.org/wp-content/uploads/Tanzania-Media-Environment_0.pdf

In this context, do elections actually provide citizens an opportunity to hold the government accountable, and to increase government responsiveness in the political system? And how do people make decisions among this varied and imbalanced input? At Twaweza East Africa, our interest is both in understanding the underlying rationale (and trade-offs) that Tanzanian citizens use in making electoral choices, as well as using this knowledge to inform strategies guiding our own work in social accountability. For an overview of our portfolio of initiatives and related research in the "open government" domain, see our Strategy document.

We partnered with the Governance Lab (GOV/LAB) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to dig into questions such as, how do ordinary Tanzanian citizens see politics and government? What do Tanzanian citizens think of as "engagement" and "participation" in politics? How do citizens interact with parties and political elites, and what kind of attributes do they value in their politicians? The collaboration spanned nearly two years and had numerous components, starting with an in-depth qualitative exploration of issues that matter to ordinary Tanzanians[5].

The qualitative research provided substantive insight which shaped our implementation decisions, and it also allowed for testing and refining the issues we wanted to dig into through independent research. One of the core questions was whether and how citizens value accountability-type characteristics of candidates before an election, and after an election. Are preferences over candidates different when one is answering/deciding in private compared to in public? In other words, how does a private condition, analogous to the ballot box, compare with a public condition, analogous to public political behaviors (e.g. group discussions or voting lines)?

This experiment is contributing important findings to our understanding of citizen-state relationships more generally[6], but it also provides great insight for designing social accountability initiatives as it examines whether, under what conditions, and to what degree, citizens value accountability from their elected leaders. This, moreover, suggests the types of approaches that might be effective in engaging citizens in accountability initiatives.

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[5] http://www.twaweza.org/go/learning-note-5-politics and http://www.twaweza.org/go/learning-note-6-politics
[6] For a paper using this data to examine the theories of why poor people in dominant-party states actually bother to vote, see: Rosenzweig, Leah. 2016. ``Voting for Status: Dependency and Political Participation in Tanzania.''

Methods

MIT GOV/LAB designed an innovative experiment using the conjoint methodology, and applying it to both individual respondents ("personal" setting) and a group of respondents ("group" setting). The experiment was conducted 2 weeks before the general election, and again, with the same respondents, 2 weeks after. The core of the conjoint experiment entailed presenting profiles of hypothetical MP candidates to respondents, who were then asked to select one of two candidates to vote for, or abstain, and then rate both candidates. This was repeated several times, and each time the hypothetical candidates would have six separate attributes, which randomly varied. The approach, and its application in Tanzania, is explained in more detail in Box 1 and 2, below.

The experiment was implemented as a two-wave panel survey of 1,393 respondents living in rural and semirural villages in three regions in Tanzania (Kilimanjaro, Mwanza and Mbeya). Of those, 939 respondents were interviewed at both wave one and wave two (i.e., the panel), as shown in Table 1. The enumeration areas were sampled randomly within each region (excluding urban centers), and are therefore representative of the rural population in the selected regions. The regions were selected for variation in village wealth and because they are politically competitive. However, because the regions were chosen purposefully (primarily on the basis of political competition, as otherwise the core hypotheses could not be studied), the results generated through this research are not representative of Tanzania as a whole.

Table 1: Number of respondents per wave and per region, and the number in the panel (participated in both waves)			
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Panel
All	1275	1144	939
Mbeya	408	381	319
Kilimanjaro	433	367	279
Mwanza	434	396	341

The surveys took place in October and November, 2015. The first wave of the panel was conducted shortly before general elections were held in Tanzania on October 25, 2015. The second wave began two weeks

after the election. Both waves followed the same structure. Each respondent was given a baseline survey, played the lab-in-the-field experimental (conjoint) `game' and immediately thereafter completed an endline survey. The baseline and endline surveys measured demographic variables, political and social attitudes and self-reported political behaviors. Analysis were conducted on the panel sample for comparisons between wave 1 and wave 2, and on the full sample when comparing private and public setting within a survey wave[7].

The rationale behind the before and after election survey rounds, and private and public settings, can be conceptualized into four overall categories, as shown in the table below. These categories mirror key moments of information and influence as related to the election cycle.

Table 2: Experimental settings		
	Before elections	*After elections*
Group / public	(A) political discussion before elections	(B) public taking stock after elections
Individual / private	(C) opinion polling	(D) exit polling

The private condition mirrors the privately-expressed preferences (such as normally gathered through opinion polling, or exit polling), while the public condition mirrors the discussions and public buzz during the campaign time, and expectations of leaders once elected. Given that there are few opportunities for Tanzanian citizens to engage with their leaders outside of election periods, we wanted to capture whether and how expressed preferences vary before and after the elections.

Box 1: Conjoint analysis
- Conjoint analysis is an experimental method that presents respondents with alternatives—for example pairs of candidates—that randomly vary on the basis of several attributes.
- Originally developed for marketing research, conjoint analysis has recently been used in political science as a tool for understanding preferences over multidimensional alternatives. (See Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014) for analytical details on the method.)
- One useful aspect of conjoint is that it's easy to make this type of survey experiment into a game, which is more engaging for respondents.
- This method also reduces the concern of social desirability bias (the tendency for respondents to answer questions how they think researchers want them to) because we are not directly asking respondents to tell us how they evaluate candidates. We are not asking them, for example, to tell us how much a candidate's religion matters in their decision. The "weight" (i.e. importance) of the religious attribute is revealed through the data.

See these posts on more details of the methods, including an open source code and app that were developed specifically for this research. CITE

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[7] We use linear regression to estimate the treatment effects because for any binary treatment the estimate based on a simple linear regression is equivalent to the difference in means. In our case, we can think about each candidate characteristic as if we're running a single binary treatment. Thus, linear regression provides a non-biased and non-parametric estimator of the causal estimate for the conjoint results.

Box 2: The Conjoint in Tanzania
• We asked respondents to compare the two hypothetical candidates presented to them and decide for whom to vote, or they could decide to abstain, voting for neither candidate. The candidates varied on the basis of six key attributes: religion, tribe, party, past performance in the community, past performance to individuals, and credibility of promises. Each attribute could take on one of two levels, or values, and these were randomly assigned in each profile.
• We selected these six attributes by thinking about hard tradeoffs that citizens have to make when voting in real elections; on the basis of what kinds of information citizens likely have about candidates, including immutable and mutable characteristics; and based on preceding qualitative research.
• The Conjoint analysis we conducted does not rely on explicitly stated motivations or preferences, but instead uses respondents' actions (their decision to abstain or to vote, and for whom) to identify how important each candidate attribute is in influencing citizen behavior.
• There were two ways (or "treatment conditions") we did the experiment: one, we had a group of respondents sit together and discuss candidates before voting simultaneously in front of each other. The second way was one-on-one with respondents at their home, in private, using a secret ballot technique.
• Each group (and each individual) played 6 rounds of the game, and each time the two hypothetical candidates would have newly-assigned (randomly, through a program) set of characteristics.
• The groups also had either a local elected party leader (balozi) or a primary school teacher as one of the participants; this was to capture the effect of formal and informal leadership on the group dynamics.
• Participants were given 5,000 Tanzanian shillings (about 2.50 USD and equivalent to the average daily wage in our sample villages) for their participation and were instructed that while the money was theirs. To mirror the real-life costs of voting (spending time at rallies, in voting lines, etc.), participants had to pay each time they cast a vote; this money would afterwards be given to either the school or clinic in their community.

Table 3 below shows the six attributes selected for research (based on the qualitative study), and the two options each attribute could take.

Table 3: Attributes and their variations		
Characteristic (attribute)	**Option 1**	**Option 2**
Religion	Muslim	Christian
Party	CCM (ruling party)	Opposition party[8]
Tribe	Sukuma	Chagga
Past performance-community	Gave social services to the community	Did not give social services to the community
Past performance-individuals	Gave money to individuals for social services, such as school fees	Did not give money to individuals for social services, such as school fees
Promises	Has a promise and an implementation plan	Has a promise but no plan

Figure 1 illustrates an example of one voting round on a sample paper ballot, like those used in the private condition. There are two candidates (A and B) and each has six attributes, and each attribute has been randomly assigned to one of the two levels. The first attribute is party. Candidate A is from CCM (the ruling party since independence) and candidate B is from an opposition party. The second attribute is the candidate's past performance in his community. Candidate A brought nothing to his community, while

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[8] We left the opposition party ambiguous because different opposition parties were active in different areas and were not particularly interested in the effects of specific opposition parties but opposition candidates, more generally.

candidate B brought social services, for example a school or a clinic to his community. The third attribute is credibility of promises. Candidate A has promises, like building a school and has a plan to fulfill this promise, while candidate B has promises for what he'll do if elected but no plan. The fourth attribute is tribe. Candidate A is Chagga, and candidate B is Sukuma (the two largest tribes in Tanzania). The fifth attribute is past performance to individuals. Candidate A gave "you" the respondent nothing, while candidate B gave you money for social services, for example to pay for school fees or to buy medicine. The sixth attribute is religion. Candidate A is Christian and Candidate B is Muslim.

Figure 1: Example of a ballot for one voting

At the bottom of the private condition profiles respondents indicated which candidate they would like to vote for—or they could abstain. If the respondent wanted to vote for candidate A she would circle "A" in the circle. If the respondent wanted to vote for candidate B she would circle "B" in the rectangle. If the respondent didn't want to vote for either candidate she would circle "X" in the triangle. In the public condition, respondents were collectively presented the candidate profiles using large index cards with the same images. After discussing the respondents would all vote or abstain—holding up index cards that read "A" or "B" if they wanted to vote for a candidate.

In order to cast a vote, respondents had to pay a small amount, either 100 or 200 Tanzanian shillings (costs varied between public and private settings), from the total of 5,000 Shillings they received at the start of the game. If a participant chose not to vote, she did not have to pay. Participants were explained that any money collected through the voting game would be donated to either a school or clinic in their community; any individual money left over was theirs to keep. The rationale for the payments was primarily to act as a proxy for the real-life "costs" of voting in terms of spending time going to polling stations, queueing, etc.; secondarily, to prompt participants to engage meaningfully with their choice of vote, since their vote was "costly" to them.

After each voting round, we also asked respondents to rate both candidates, regardless for which candidate, or whether, they voted. Enumerators explained the bucket to respondents by saying, "Say you are going to give this bucket to the candidate, and the amount of water in the bucket represents how good you think this candidate will be at getting things done once in office. Please draw a line to fill the bucket with water, to show how well you think that candidate will perform." Respondents in the public condition would use their finger to indicate on a large bucket picture how they rated each candidate.

Highlights of Findings

There were multiple dimensions to the research, and the data is rich in insights. Here, we present the most salient findings related to how citizens value accountability-type characteristics of candidates (as compared to others, such as party affiliation, as well as some immutable ones, like religion) before the election and after the election, and in private as compared to in public.

Is there a social pressure to vote?

In the experiment, all participants had the chance to vote in each "election" round, but they could also choose to abstain. We compare how likely participants are to abstain (not vote for either candidate presented) in the public as compared to the private setting. This is a good proxy measure of the social pressure to vote, as compared to individual preferences for voting or abstaining. In the survey before elections, there is no significant difference between the two settings: 13% of respondents chose to abstain the public setting, and 12% in the private settings. However, the costs of voting were not the same: in the public, each voting round was 200 Shillings, while it was 100 Shillings in private[9]. Although the results are not strictly comparable, they do suggest that even though the price of voting in public was double the price of voting in private, the social norm to vote compensates for the higher price.

In the post-elections survey, the cost of voting in the private setting increased to 200 Shillings in rounds four through six (in the public setting the cost of voting increased to 500 TSH in rounds four through six). Here we have an opportunity to compare similar circumstances: we focus on the first voting round in the public setting (that is, before participants see how others are behaving, and possibly adjust their own behavior), and the fourth round in the private setting, where the costs of voting was first increased from 100 to 200 Shillings, and therefore matched the cost of the public vote. Results are shown in Figure 2.

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[9] This difference was partly to mirror the reality that voting (which is a socially observable behavior) is more costly than expressing a private preference; for example, it's costly in terms of time spent in the voting queue.

Figure 2: The proportion of participants abstaining (not voting) in comparable public vs. private setting, second wave

28.0%

17.5%

Public   Private

As the figure shows, most participants *did* choose to vote in both public and private, even after the actual elections were over. However, participants in the private setting were significantly more likely to abstain than participants in the public setting. This supports the notion that voting is a valued *public* behavior, even if only symbolic, perhaps as it sends the signal of being involved in and caring about the community. Privately, however, citizens appear to be less compelled to follow the norm of voting when it comes at a financial cost.[10]

What type of candidates do people vote for?

The results are presented in four figures below. Figure 3 presents the results for the private setting, comparing pre-elections and post-elections phases. Figure 4 looks at the public setting, pre- and post-elections. Then Figure 5 shows the results for pre-elections, comparing private and public settings. Figure 6 shows post-elections results, comparing private and public settings. Characteristics which significantly raise the likelihood of being voted for in any of the phases and settings are marked in the figures with an asterisk (*). The differences between the phases or settings are noted in the text.

First, a note on how to read the results. The numbers in the figures are percentage points: they show the increase or decrease in the likelihood of a candidate with the stated characteristic getting a vote, as compared to a candidate with the opposite characteristic. So for example in Figure 3, we see that in the Private-Before combination (private vote, before the elections) a candidate which "Gave to the community" had an increased likelihood of being voted for by 25 percentage points over a candidate which "Gave nothing to the community." The same attribute but in the "Public-Before" combination (public vote, before the elections) increased the likelihood of being voted for by 33 percentage points. The attribute is significant both in private and public setting, as noted by the asterisk as well as coloring in the figure.

In terms of the overall findings, it's notable that three characteristics consistently increase the likelihood of garnering a vote across all phases and settings: having given social services to the community, having given money to an individual for social services, and having a promise with a plan. Equally as notably, religious affiliation and ethnic identity are consistently not significant in either increasing or decreasing

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[10] For a discussion on theory and analysis, based on this same data, as to why poorer citizens and those more dependent on local community social benefits, vote more than those less dependent, see Rosenzweig, Leah. 2016. ``Voting for Status: Dependency and Political Participation in Tanzania.''

the likelihood of being voted for. Political party is only significant in the private, post-election setting, where being from an opposition party is significantly associated with a lower likelihood of being voted for (hence the asterisk shown in parenthesis).

Comparing public versus private within each phase gives interesting insights. Before elections (Figure 3), there is a significant difference between how people vote in public and how they vote in private. Notably, the public-facing accountability characteristics (giving the community social services, and having a promise and a plan), while significant in both public and private settings, are more likely to garner votes in the public setting. The opposite is true for the private-facing accountability characteristic (having given you money for social services).

After the elections (Figure 4), the differences between public and private are less pronounced: there is no difference in "gave community social services" and "gave individual money for social services" (though the latter looks different – 18 percentage points vs. 14 percentage points, it is not statistically significant). Having a promise and a plan is more valued in the public setting (13 percentage points) than in the private setting (9 percentage points), and the difference is statistically significant. Also significant is that in the private setting, respondents were considerably less likely to vote for an opposition party (-9 percentage points), as compared to in the public setting (-2 percentage points); this difference is also statistically significant.

Figure 3: Phase one (before elections), private vs public setting: Percentage point increase (or decrease) in probability for voting for a candidate with the following characteristics.

Figure 4: Phase two (after elections), private vs public setting: Percentage point increase (or decrease) in probability for voting for a candidate with the following characteristics.

The trends across the two phases are worth noting as well, as shown in Figures 5 and 6. In the private scenario, the attributes are fairly stable, despite some variation in magnitude. In other words, individual respondents' preferences over candidate attributes are consistent across the two phases, before and after the election[11].

In contrast, when voting in public, the magnitude of the most important attributes changed significantly. Although "having given social services to the community" remains the top attribute, it significantly changes from increasing a candidate's likelihood of garnering a vote from 33 percentage points before the elections to 24 percentage points after the elections. Meaning, after the election, respondents are less rewarding to candidates who gave services to the community compared to those who gave nothing. In contrast, "having given money to an individual to access social services" increases the probability of voting for that candidate from 10 percentage points before elections to 14 percentage points after the elections. And "having a promise and a plan" reduces the probability of voting for that candidate from 19 percentage points before elections to 13 percentage points after the elections.

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[11] This is notwithstanding the fact that the attribute "opposition party" becomes significantly associated with lower likelihood of garnering a vote after the elections. The *difference* on this attribute before and after the elections (i.e., the difference between -0.05 and -0.09 is not significant).

Figure 5: Private setting, before and after elections: Percentage point increase (or decrease) in probability for voting for a candidate with the following characteristics.

Private setting
- Gave to community*: 25
- Gave to individual*: 14
- Promise+plan*: 11
- Opposition party*: -5
- Muslim: -1
- Sukuma: 0

Public setting
- Gave to community*: 26
- Gave to individual*: 18
- Promise+plan*: 9
- Opposition party*: -9
- Muslim: 0
- Sukuma: 0

■ statistically significant
■ not significant

Figure 6: Public setting, before and after elections: Percentage point increase (or decrease) in probability for voting for a candidate with the following characteristics.

Private setting
- Gave to community*: 33
- Gave to individual*: 10
- Promise+plan*: 19
- Opposition party: -3
- Muslim: -2
- Sukuma: 0

Public setting
- Gave to community*: 24
- Gave to individual*: 14
- Promise+plan*: 13
- Opposition party: -2
- Muslim: -2
- Sukuma: -2

■ statistically significant
■ not significant

Does the presence of local leaders influence the group?

A sub-question to the main hypotheses on voting preferences was about the influence of local leadership on group discussions and dynamics. After all, it's local leaders who are most closely present in people's lives and likely shape citizen's views on accountability and other attributes. We also hypothesized that there would be a difference between two types of local leaders, so we randomly selected either a local

elected party leader (called *balozi*) or a teacher from the local public school as one of the participants in the public groups. We measured their influence on voting based on the conjoint results (same dataset as discussed above), expecting there would be a difference depending on which leader was present. The results, however, do not signal strong influence on the selection of candidates: in the pre-election phase, the only significant difference observed was that the likelihood of voting for a candidate which "brought social services to the community" was higher if the teacher was present, as compared to when a balozi was present (by about 10 percentage points). There were no differences detected between groups with a balozi and groups with a teacher in how participants voted in the second phase (post-elections).

However, we also measured local leaders' influence in two additional ways. First, we asked group participants to nominate one person in the group to decide where the money spent on voting should be donated (the choice was either the local school or the local clinic). A significantly higher percentage of group participants preferred the teacher as compared to the balozi to control the money: on average, 42% of group members nominated the balozi, while 55% of group members nominated the teacher (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Proportion of respondents who prefer the teacher or the balozi to control the money "spent" on conjoint voting

Second, we asked public participants to rate the other group participants in terms of how influential they were in the game. The exact wording of the question was: "Based on your experience in the game, on a scale from 0 to 10 please tell me how influential you think each of the participants in your group was during the game? (For example, in influencing which candidate you chose to vote for or how you thought about the candidates.)"

On average, teachers and balozi are rated as having more influence (mean rating of 5.98 on 0-10 scale) than non-leader or "regular" participants (mean rating of 5.18; the difference is statistically significant). However, it's interesting to note that this result is actually driven by the teachers. We find that on average, teachers are rated as more influential in the experiment (mean rating of 6.83 on 0-10 scale) than balozi (mean rating of 5.31; the difference in mean ratings of influence is statistically significant; see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Rating group participants on influence, scale 1-10

Group	Rating
Non-leaders	5.18
Balozi	5.31
Teacher	6.83

Is there regional variation in the overall results?

As noted previously, the locations where the research was conducted (Mwanza, Mbeya and Kilimanjaro) were chosen because they were politically contested areas and because they offered rich variation in terms of wealth distribution (the enumeration areas within each region were sampled randomly, and urban areas were excluded from the sample). But of course in some ways these areas are different from the rest of the country, particularly from the areas where there was no real political contestation (e.g. CCM-party strongholds), which is why we do not generalize the findings to all Tanzanian voters. The selected areas are also different from each other. For example, Kilimanjaro has a higher concentration of Chagga ethnic group, while Mwanza has a higher concentration of Sukuma people. It could be, therefore, that respondents in Kilimanjaro vote for Chagga candidates, respondents in Mwanza vote for Sukuma candidates, but these preferences are "cancelled out" when the sample is pooled.

To examine this, we looked at the results by region; the results are presented in the table below, and explained in the text following the table. Table 3 shows the increase or decrease of the probability of voting for a candidate with a particular characteristic (vs. the opposite characteristic), in percentage points; the statistically significant ones are marked with an asterisk (*).

In the text we focus on the non-accountability characteristics (ethnic group, religion, party affiliation), because the three accountability characteristics remain strongest predictors of likelihood of voting for a candidate in all regions, in both public and private settings, and before and after the elections. In other words, the dominance of accountability characteristics remains; we now examine whether the non-accountability characteristics also play a role, by region.

Table 3: the increase or decrease of the probability of voting for a candidate with a particular characteristic (vs. the opposite characteristic), in percentage points, by region

	Kilimanjaro				Mbeya				Mwanza			
	pre-election		post-election		pre-election		post-election		pre-election		post-election	
	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private
Gave community social services	30*	24*	21*	28*	35*	21*	28*	24*	35*	29*	28*	25*
Gave individual money for social services	8*	12*	8*	16*	8*	14*	19*	20*	14*	18*	13*	16*
Has promises & a plan	23*	16*	16*	10*	25*	6*	11*	10*	10*	10*	13*	8*
Opposition party	-2	2	1	1	-3	-9*	-2	-14*	-5	-10*	-7*	-15*
Muslim	-1	-1	-1	2	-1	1	-4	1	-5	0	0	-1
Sukuma	-3	-3	-3	-3	1	-2	-4	2	3	5	-1	3

The picture for Mbeya

Before the elections, respondents in Mbeya place no preference on whether a candidate is Muslim or Christian, Chagga or Sukuma. These attributes have no significant effect on voting preference in either the public or private setting. In public, Mbeya respondents also do not signal a preference for political party (CCM or opposition), although in private, they are less likely to favor an opposition candidate (by 8 percentage points).

After the elections, and in the public setting, the accountability attributes remain significantly associated with voting, although their magnitude changes (as discussed previously, the overall trends are that post-elections, giving to the community diminishes in magnitude, while giving to an individual increases in magnitude). The additional difference is that in private, after the elections, Mbeya respondents are less likely to favor an opposition candidate by 14 percentage points (as compared to 8 percentage points before the elections).

In other words, Mbeya respondents favor the ruling party more, although this preference does not come out in the public setting. In the private setting, this preference increases after the elections.

The picture for Mwanza

Before the elections, Mwanza do not signal a preference of a candidate's religion (Muslim or Christian) nor ethnicity (Chagga or Sukuma) in either public or private setting. Party affiliation (CCM or opposition) is not significant in the public setting, although it is significant in the private setting, where an opposition candidate is less likely to be voted for by 10 percentage points.

After the elections, the picture is very similar, with religion and ethnicity still not significantly associated with voting preferences in either private or public setting. Belonging to the opposition party is associated with 7 percentage point decrease in likelihood of being voted for in the public setting, and a 14 percentage point decrease in the private setting.

In other words, similarly to Mbeya, Mwanza voters favor more the ruling party, particularly in the private setting (and in post-elections, in the public setting as well).

The picture for Kilimanjaro

Before the elections, respondents in Kilimanjaro placed no preference on a candidate's religion, ethnicity or political party either in private or in public. After the elections, the picture is the same for the public vote. However, after the elections in private, Kilimanjaro respondents are less likely to vote for a Sukuma candidate by 5 percentage points.

In other words, Kilimanjaro voters slightly favor Chagga candidates, but only after the election and only in the private setting.

In summary, what do the regional variations tell us? For the most part, the overall (combined) picture is confirmed: it's the accountability characteristics that are consistently significantly associated with the likelihood of getting a vote, as compared to the other attributes included in the study. The regional variations that do exist point mostly to a preference for the ruling party after the elections.

Is there variation between specific sub-groups?

Do voters always prefer candidates with characteristics similar to their own? There is evidence from around the world to suggest that voters tend to prefer candidates who are like them[12]. To understand better if there are such preferences in our sample, we examine the outcomes by gender, religion, education level, ethnic group, and political party affiliation.

When we segment the respondents according to whether they identify with the ruling party or with an opposition party, we see that both before and after elections, voters prefer candidates from the party with which they identify. This means that CCM-aligned respondents are more likely to vote for CCM candidates, and voters who preferred an opposition party were more likely to vote for an opposition candidate. Interestingly, this preference is expressed only in the private setting; in the public setting, there is no difference according to party affiliation. In the private setting, political party is a strong predictor of a vote: presented with an opposition candidate, a CCM-aligned voter is *less likely* to vote for that candidate by 7-11 percentage points.

We find no significant difference for gender, education level and ethnic group. Women and men do not differ in how they value the attributes of the candidates; the accountability attributes remain significant and of considerably high magnitude, while ethnicity, religion and political party do not play a significant role for either men or women. The same trend holds when we compare respondents with low vs. high education, and those who self-identify as Sukuma, Chagga, or a different ethnic group. Few respondents self-identified as Muslim (about 40% of the sample chose to not identify as either Christian or Muslim), making analysis by religion sub-group difficult. Still, when we compare respondents who self-identify as Muslim with those who do not, there is generally no preference expressed by religious orientation.

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[12] See for example Bailenson et al, Facial similarity between voters and candidates causes influence, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 72, No. 5 2008, pp. 935–961. Also Bradberry L. The Effect of Religion on Candidate Preference in the 2008 and 2012 Republican Presidential Primaries, PLoS One v.11(4); 2016, PMC4820110, accessed on 18 January 2017.

Conclusions and discussion

In terms of voting and abstaining, these are very interesting results in the context of the strong social narrative in Tanzania that voting is a socially obligatory. Indeed, the qualitative component of the research (prior to the experiment) highlighted that many Tanzanians perceive abstaining as a breach of social contract, whereby choosing not to vote also means giving up the "right" to complain about or discuss shortcomings of social services, leaders, or the government in general.

Traditionally, voter turnout has been very high in Tanzania, although in recent elections it has notably declined: 84.4% of registered voters voted in the 2000 presidential election, but only 42.7% voted in the 2010 election (though it must be noted that the number of registered voters increased significantly between 2000 and 2010)[13]. In the 2015 election, the proportion of registered voters who voted was 65.3%[14]. It's also noteworthy that self-reported voting rates are higher than actual voting rates. In the 2010 election for example, voter turnout was just 43%, compared to 81% who told Afrobarometer in 2012 that they had voted in the 2010 elections[15]. This, together with the declining overall voter-turn out, suggests that while the narrative of voting is still strong, actual behavior may be beginning to change. This is very interesting, as abstaining can also be interpreted as an overall critique of the country's governance: if citizens increasingly abstain more, what does that signal about their confidence that the government (of any political stripe) is able and willing to provide and take care of public goods?

In this context, understanding how citizens perceive and value accountability characteristics of candidates is a critical insight into the shifting narrative between citizens and state. The first overarching finding is that both before and after elections, and in public and private, **Tanzanian citizens in the three regions where the study was conducted were consistently more likely to vote for candidates with pro-social accountability characteristics, while religious affiliation and ethnic group had limited or zero significant effect.** We examined this relationship also by region, where the general findings were largely confirmed.

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[13] http://mtega.com/2014/09/chart-of-the-week-19-what-happened-to-election-turnout-between-2000-and-2010/ Accessed on 07/12/2016. Data drawn from http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/211/

[14] Ibid.

[15] IFES http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/211/ and Afrobarometer Round 5, 2012;

In Tanzania, public discourse since the days of Julius Nyerere (first president and "father of the nation") has maintained that ethnicity and religion play no part in politics or political decisions. Our experiment supports this claim: **in both public and in private, voters do not strongly consider ethnicity or religion an important attribute along which to cast their vote.**

On the other hand, what may come as considerable surprise to many Tanzanians is that voters in this experiment by and large did not choose party affiliation as a relevant attribute in the public setting.[16] This result can sound almost counter-intuitive given how loudly party rhetoric dominates the campaign and election space; indeed, party politics in Tanzania have been likened to "sports clubs" – i.e., party loyalties remain strong irrespective of the "club's" performance. But, while this may be true for die-hard fans, our data suggests that ordinary Tanzanians in this study choose to signal as most important the attributes relating to community well-being (providing social services), particularly in a public setting. This is interesting, and **it suggests that in public there is a great desire for consensus, including perhaps a level of masking of one's own preferences in order to support the "common good."** Privately, party preferences do emerge, but both in terms of magnitude and consistency of effect, accountability attributes trump party affiliation. This ought to be a critical insight for any incumbent, as well as aspiring, politician.

From the results, we can also observe that private preferences on candidate attributes are fairly stable across survey rounds. Not so for public preferences, and this contrast is very interesting.

The private condition was designed to mirror the privately-expressed preferences of voting; the analogies for these, in real life, are opinion polling before elections, casting ballots and exit polling, which are all conducted privately. These results likely reflect the true nature of individual preferences regarding the candidate attributes because the experimental design reduced social desirability bias in the survey. That is, by randomly varying the attributes and by asking the respondent to evaluate several pairs of hypothetical candidates and vote several times, we never asked directly whether the respondent cares about this or that characteristic. Each respondent's preference (vote or abstention) was also completely

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[16] We must note again that the sample is not nationally-representative; however, the sample is representative of the rural population of each of the three chosen regions. As such, it reflects the stated voting preferences of a significant part of the Tanzanian electorate.

secret such that even the enumerator did not know how the respondent acted. This means the private "weighing" of one attribute against the other is hidden from the researchers during data collection, and instead emerges in data analysis.

The public condition before elections mirrors the discussions and public buzz during the campaign time; after elections, it's the myriad of public debates after results have been announced, and speculation about what the new government will bring. While perhaps unusual in other settings, voting is a largely social phenomenon in Tanzania: voter lists are affixed to the front of polling centers (so community members can check on who is or isn't on it), queuing for voting often takes many hours in a group of one's peers, and those who have voted have their pinky finger inked. The latter is to prevent multiple voting, but it also serves as a powerful social signal of having done one's civic duty.

The experiment allowed us to compare voter preferences between public and private spheres, and as we observe in the results, preferences expressed privately do differ from those expressed publicly – that is, the personal alignment is different from the expressed social norms. **The data show that Tanzanian citizens in this sample favor accountability attributes more in public than they do in private.** This is particularly true before elections, and especially for those behaviors which have a public good – i.e., giving to the community, and having a promise and a plan. After the elections, those attributes, while still important, reduce in significance, while the accountability to individual citizen (given individual money for services) gains in significance.

These results could be interpreted to signal that the Tanzanian collective narrative is one of caring about the common good, although privately, citizens may value the common good less than they publicly express. On the other hand, it should also be noted that the collective narrative is not fictitious: **the attribute "gave social services to the community" is by far the most salient attribute across both private and public settings, and across both rounds.**

For organizations interested in promoting accountability, the findings suggest that conceptualizing accountability as a *social norm,* rather than an individual norm, and focusing on modelling accountability behaviors among selected groups may be more effective in promoting individual accountability behaviors (among citizens and authorities alike). Indeed, there is a rich and interesting body of literature on how explicitly targeting social norms – and people's perception of these norms – can be effective in changing actual behaviors[17].

This, however, merits careful consideration in the current Tanzanian context, where a certain type of demonstration of accountability has, in 2016, taken a very public and central stage, starting with the President's highly publicized unannounced visits to various public institutions, and equally highly publicized and (sometimes public) dismissals of allegedly under-performing public servants. These actions have subsequently also been mirrored by a number of Ministers. After about nine months in the office, the President was astoundingly popular, with an approval rating of 96%, and Tanzanian citizens appear to have considerable appetite for both his "cleaning up" actions in the public sectors, as well as for public dismissals of officials[18].

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[17] Tankard, M. and Paluck, E. 2016. "Norm perception as a vehicle for social change." *Social Issues and Policy Review*, Vol.10, Issue 1.

[18] Sauti za Wananchi @ Twaweza: The People's President? Citizens' assessment and expectations of the fifth phase government. http://twaweza.org/go/sauti-government-performance-2016

Putting aside the legality of such public actions, as well as the sometimes eager appreciation from the public in seeing formerly powerful individuals brought down on corruption, inefficiency, and other charges, the social accountability challenge in Tanzania appears to be of a different nature. In public, Tanzanians already value accountability; the signal is there in the high ratings of the President's actions, as well as in the data of our conjoint experiment. The challenge may be much more about shifting the norms *within key groups*, especially civil service officials as well as elected leaders, about what are acceptable and desirable behaviors, and then modelling and reinforcing those in public. The limelight, in other words, could be reserved not for reprimanding misbehaving officials, but on commending those who perform well. There is plenty of evidence showing that when people perceive that others around them are behaving a particular way – i.e. that the behavior is a norm – they are much more likely to behave similarly.

Citizens also have a critical role to play, through demanding of accountability from their leaders. However, citizen monitoring cannot substitute the uptake of accountability within government civil service, or among elected leaders. Partly this is due to information asymmetry: citizens are often not well informed as to what their leaders are actually responsible for, and accountable to. This could be corrected via information campaigns – after all, without appropriate information there is little basis for action. But to ignite citizen action (not just increase in knowledge or awareness) these campaigns would have to also address other determinants of behavior, such as motivation, efficacy, capacity, opportunity, and others[19] in a contextually appropriate way while challenging some deeply-ingrained values. Namely, in Tanzania there is a generalized distaste for conflict, and a generalized respect for authority; both have profound influence on how citizens behave vis-à-vis their leaders and the government. Opinion poll data have shown that citizens are generally not keen to demonstrate or take public action against the establishment (although they insist on their right of being able to do so), and that outside elections, most citizens believe that leaders across various parties should work together on development issues (although they also recognize the need for monitoring of government[20]). Overall, this suggest appetite more for incrementalism than revolution.

Through the lens of our study, Tanzanian political and social leaders might glean a few challenging insights. Those trying to contest established power may take note of the reticence of citizens to confrontationally challenge authority, and the overwhelming desire to "put differences aside" and work towards a common good. Those currently in power may mull over the findings that delivering results in terms of public services ("social goods") carries far more weight with citizens than playing loyalty cards along ethnic or religious lines or grand standing in terms of party platforms. All sides would do well to take seriously the value citizens put on performance and accountability, above and beyond other characteristics. Finally, political strategists, social scientists as well as organizations working in accountability alike ought to engage more with the growing disconnect between citizens and authorities: even though it's one of the few and far between options people have to signal directly their approval or displeasure to the government, voter turnout appears to be declining. Who is choosing to disconnect, and why? What does this mean about the citizen-state relationship? Fundamentally, what does it mean about Tanzania being a state in which sovereignty resides in the people and it is from the people that the Government derives all its power and authority[21]?

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[19] Carlitz and Lipovsek, 2015. http://twaweza.org/go/lpt-synthesis
[20] Sauti za Wananchi @ Twaweza: Democracy, dictatorship and demonstrations: What do the people really think? http://twaweza.org/go/sauti-democracy-and-dictatorship-2016
[21] http://www.judiciary.go.tz/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/constitution.pdf