

Information of Legislator Performance on Perceptions of Accountability by Constituents: Evidence from Tanzania

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Abstract

Does providing information on the performance of their legislators help voters change their beliefs accordingly? This paper presents analysis of the impact of a novel 30-minute television show that profiles Members of Parliament from Tanzania's *Bunge*. Using a difference-in-differences approach for as many as 394 respondents quantitatively surveyed in *Tarime Vijijini* and *Nzega*, constituencies held by the national opposition party CHADEMA's MP, Hon. John C. Heche and the ruling party CCM's MP, Hon. Hussein Bashe, respectively, I find positive effects on knowledge of respondents on various aspects of their MP including promises made and on beliefs on whether these promises have been fulfilled. There is some evidence of a few partisan differences in the extent to which respondents update their prior knowledge and beliefs.

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1 Introduction

Governance and accountability matter for economic development ([Khemani et al. 2016](#)). When thinking of politicians as agents of citizens, their principals, information on the performance of these agents in fulfilling policy promises made to their voters during elections is among the key aspects of ensuring that politicians are held accountable to their principals. [Banerjee et al. \(2011\)](#) provide information to voters on the performance and qualification of incumbent legislators and challengers and find positive impacts on turnout, vote share of the better performing and relatively more qualified incumbents, and a reduction in vote buying. Information, however, may have adverse effects on turnout as [Chong et al. \(2014\)](#) find in Mexico where voters disengage in politics because of being provided information on corruption of their politicians. Information on corruption in Brazil, however, had positive effects on political accountability with incumbents' likelihood of re-election decreased in the wake of audits of local government spending ([Ferraz and Finan 2008](#)). The effects were stronger in municipalities with radio stations, highlighting the importance of the media in strengthening accountability.

Impact of information on accountability in Africa is also mixed. While [Humphreys and Weinstein \(2012\)](#) finds that Ugandan voters are receptive to information about the performance of their legislators, these same legislators do not respond accordingly and do not face re-election incentives driven by an accountability mechanism, despite being informed that voters will be informed about their performance, [Platas and Raffler \(2017\)](#) find in the same Ugandan context that providing information through videos, although having no effect on voter turnout does move people's prior beliefs so that voters are more likely to nominate a better performing party candidate. In non-electoral settings, it is not obvious whether citizens may react to information with either greater private or collective action.

[Lieberman et al. \(2014\)](#), for instance, find that providing parents with information about the educational performance of their children does not improve private or collective action in holding service providers accountable for poor educational outcomes of students. [Bhandari et al. \(2018\)](#), however, find that voters are Bayesian in that citizens do demand

greater accountability from higher performing legislators but the complex interactions between voters and other actors in the electoral space may make for multiple political equilibria that highlights not the failings of voters to update their prior beliefs according to new information. It is thus not obvious, *ex ante*, first whether information will move individuals' prior beliefs about the performance of their politicians, and even if so, how that translates to greater action by citizens to hold their politicians accountable and whether politicians will in turn respond by being more accountable.

This paper details the impact of an information dissemination intervention in Tanzania implemented by a local non-governmental organization (NGO) called Twaweza East Africa. The intervention involved the showing of a 30-minute television show, called the Mbunge Live Show,¹ profiling two Members of Parliament (MPs) of the *Bunge*² of the United Republic of Tanzania to their constituents. The show focuses on how accountable MPs are to their constituents by describing the issues prevalent in their constituencies, the MPs' promises made during the last 2015 elections, and the extent to which the MPs have fulfilled these promises. It also describes the constitutional roles and responsibilities of MPs. The show also provides interviews with residents from the MP's constituency as well as an interview with the MP herself. The pilot episodes feature Hon. John C. Heche, an MP from Tanzania's leading opposition political party, *Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo*(CHADEMA) representing the *Tarime Vijijini* constituency (See Figure 1 for a Google Map of Tarime.) and Hon. Hussein Bashe, an MP from Tanzania's ruling political party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi*(CCM) representing the *Nzega* constituency (See Figure 2 for a Google Map of Nzega.).

Data was collected from 562 residents of both Tarime Vijijini and Nzega in two ways.³ First, a close-ended survey questionnaire with respondents was administered both before and after one-on-one private screenings of the show's episode. The second was through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) also before and after watching the episode. 417 respondents were interviewed in the quantitative survey and 145 respondents were additionally

¹Produced by Maa Media Company Ltd. with support from Twaweza East Africa.

²Parliament in Kiswahili.

³Data collection was conducted by Ideas in Action Ltd.



Figure 1: Google Map of Tarime, Mara Region.

interviewed in the FGDs. The quantitative survey questionnaire asked respondents about their socioeconomic demographics; political participation; promises made by their MP in the last 2015 elections; their evaluations of their MP's quality both in isolation but also in comparison to other MPs; the extent to which they are altruistic individuals; and finally, expectations and experience of the Mbunge Live Show.

I use descriptive statistics and a difference-in-differences approach to identify differences between respondents who voted for their MP in the 2015 elections and respondents who voted for the runner-up candidate, which in Tarime was the CCM candidate and in Nzega the CHADEMA candidate.

Results from the analysis are as follows. First, the Mbunge Live Show moves respondents' prior beliefs in the direction that Twaweza and indeed any proponent of the positive impact of information for governance and accountability would want. Watching the Mbunge Live Show episode that profiled their MPs, Hon. John C. Heche and Hon. Hussein M. Bashe had the following effects on respondents:



Figure 2: Google Map of Nzega, Tabora Region.

- for CCM but not CHADEMA supporters it increases respondents' ability to know and correctly name their MP with no partisan differences;
- for both CCM and CHADEMA supporters it increases electoral support for President Magufuli with CHADEMA (CCM) supporters being less (more) likely than CCM (CHADEMA) supporters in hypothetical elections held the day after the respondent interviews;
- for CHADEMA (CCM) supporters it increases (decreases) electoral support for their MP with CHADEMA (CCM) supporters being more (less) likely than CCM (CHADEMA) supporters in hypothetical elections held the day after the respondent interviews;
- for CCM but not CHADEMA supporters it increases electoral support for a CHADEMA Diwani with CHADEMA (CCM) supporters being less (more) likely than CCM (CHADEMA) supporters in hypothetical elections held the day after the respondent interviews;
- for CCM but not CHADEMA supporters it increases respondents' beliefs that Tan-

zanian politicians listen to people's opinions and concerns with no partisan differences;

- for CCM but not CHADEMA supporters it increases respondents' beliefs that President Magufuli listens to people's opinions and concerns with no partisan differences;
- for both CCM and CHADEMA supporters it increases respondents' beliefs that their MP listens to people's opinions and concerns with CHADEMA (CCM) supporters being more (less) likely than CCM (CHADEMA) supporters to believe that their MP listens to people's opinions and concerns;
- for CCM but not CHADEMA supporters it increases respondents' beliefs that their Diwani listens to people's opinions and concerns with no partisan differences;
- for CHADEMA but not CCM supporters it increases respondents' beliefs that there are sufficient opportunities for people like themselves to interact with President Magufuli with no partisan differences;
- for CCM but not CHADEMA supporters it increases respondents' beliefs that there are sufficient opportunities for people like themselves to interact with their MP with no partisan differences;
- for CCM supporters it increases respondents' ability to correctly identify all of their MP's campaign promises made in the last 2015 elections and as profiled in the Mbunge Live Show episode with CHADEMA supporters being more likely than CCM supporters to correctly identify the *hospital* promise;
- for CHADEMA supporters it increases respondents' ability to correctly identify all except the *umeme* promise of their MP's campaign promises made in the last 2015 elections and as profiled in the Mbunge Live Show episode with CCM supporters being less likely than CHADEMA supporters to correctly identify the *elimu*, *water*, and *hospital* promises;

- for CCM supporters it increases respondents' beliefs that their MP's campaign promises made in the last 2015 elections and as profiled in the Mbunge Live Show episode are being fulfilled in all except the *land* promise with no partisan differences;
- for CHADEMA supporters it increases respondents' beliefs that their MP's campaign promises made in the last 2015 elections and as profiled in the Mbunge Live Show episode are being fulfilled in the *mining*, *water*, and *hospital* promises with no partisan differences;
- for both CCM and CHADEMA supporters it increases respondents' self-reported knowledge of the campaign policy platforms put forward by their MP with no partisan differences;
- for both CCM and CHADEMA supporters it increases respondents' beliefs that their MP is qualified in his performance in fulfilling campaign promises made in the last 2015 elections with no partisan differences.

Second, respondents are no more likely to believe that the MP sent us to conduct the study and are in fact less likely to be uncertain about who sent us to do the study. Further, both CCM and CHADEMA supporters are less likely to think that the government sent us to do the study.

In terms of a roadmap for the rest of the paper, Section 2 describes the methods used in collecting and analyzing the data; Section 3 presents the data; Section 4 describes the difference-in-differences empirical specification; Section 5 presents the results of the analysis; and finally, Section 6 concludes.

2 Methods

2.1 Sampling

Respondents were not randomly selected from all eligible residents, 18 years and older, in each ward for the Tarime Vijijini constituency but were randomly selected for

the Nzega constituency. For Tarime Vijijini, we instead conveniently sampled individuals, 18 years and older, who in many cases had come to the ward center to register for their national identification cards.⁴ In so far as this represents most if not all of the adult residents in any given village on any given day then our sample may be seen as relatively representative of adult residents in Heche's constituency.

What is most important is that our sample does not look different from the general population of the Tarime Vijijini constituency residents in their proclivity to support their MP, Hon. John C. Heche. According to the National Electoral Commission (NEC), in the last 2015 election, John C. Heche of CHADEMA secured 51,830 votes; the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) candidate, Christopher R. Kangoye, secured 45,091; Alliance for Change & Transparency (ACT)'s, and Chama cha Haki na Usitawi (CHAUSTA)'s candidates securing 1,923 and 403 votes, respectively.⁵ So, in the two-party vote share between CHADEMA and CCM, Heche secured 51,830 out of 96,921 votes which is equivalent to 53.5% of the two-party vote share.

In our Tarime Vijijini sample, of the two-party vote share, 55.8%⁶ of respondents report having voted for Heche in the same 2015 elections. This 2.3 percentage point difference between support for Heche in the general electorate of Tarime Vijijini and in our Tarime Vijijini sample, is not statistically significant at the 95 percent level of significance ($H_a : \mu \neq 0.535, t - statistic = 0.0954$). It is also not a politically significant difference given Heche's two-party margin with the CCM candidate in the last 2015 elections is relatively larger at 3.5 percentage points.⁷

⁴Fieldwork coincided with this nation-wide exercise of registering individuals for their national identification cards.

⁵For further details see page 86 of the NEC Elections Results report which can be found [here](#).

⁶Across all answer choices, 54.49% of Tarime Vijijini respondents report having voted for Heche in the 2015 elections, which is even closer to the actual election results as reported by the NEC.

⁷Admittedly, Heche's 51,830 votes out of all 99,247 valid votes cast in the last 2015 elections gives him a 52.2% share of the total vote makes the 2.3 percentage point difference between our sample and the general electorate in Tarime Vijijini politically significant, even if it is not statistically significant. However, in personal conversations with officials who worked with Heche during his election have intimated that the votes for ACT and CHAUSTA were spoiler votes orchestrated by the opposition and so the true comparison is between the CHADEMA-CCM two-party vote shares.

2.2 Data Collection

Fieldwork for the study began on Tuesday, November 28th, 2017 and ended Tuesday, February 27th, 2018. Maa Media Company Ltd. aired mass public screenings throughout both constituencies, but only after our research team had already begun fieldwork, using one-on-one private screenings.

3 Data

3.1 Summary Statistics

The final data has sample sizes ranging from 54 to 416 because some questions are not relevant to some respondents and so there is missing information in certain variables including most importantly the outcome variables. There is also attrition between the pre- and post-surveys. Of the 186 respondents interviewed in the Tarime pre-survey, 17 did not complete a post-survey and of the 231 respondents interviewed in the Nzega pre-survey, 6 did not complete a post-survey for a total loss of 23 respondents effectively making the most the sample size can be for regression analysis 788 observations.⁸ Summary statistics are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3.

The sample is 51% male⁹ with the average respondent being almost 38 years old. Most respondents are currently married (71.4%) and most are self-employed (78%). Over half of the respondents (55.8%) head households with 6 members, on average. Respondents who have at least a primary school education are 72.1%. On average, 87.7% of respondents live in a household that owns a cellphone and almost two-thirds of respondents live in a household that owns a radio. On average, about 87.2% of respondents report going without cash income over the past year while 61.9% report going without enough food to eat over the same period.

About a quarter of respondents report accessing news from TV at least once in the

⁸788 observations comes from 394 respondents interviewed both pre- and post-episode so that the maximum number of observations in the regression analysis can be no more than 394×2 .

⁹There was a deliberate effort to ensure the number of respondents are balanced on gender hence this gender split.

Table 1: Socio-Demographics: Pre-Episode

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Observations
Male	0.510	0.501	0	1	416
Age	36.875	12.652	21	79	416
Currently Married	0.714	0.452	0	1	416
Distance to Govt	16.365	21.779	1	303	416
Distance to Job	271.882	426.680	0	995	416
Self-Employed	0.776	0.417	0	1	416
HH Size	6.272	3.193	1	30	416
HH Head	0.558	0.497	0	1	416
At Least Primary - Self	0.721	0.449	0	1	416
Own Car	0.022	0.146	0	1	416
Own TV	0.227	0.419	0	1	415
Own PC	0.027	0.161	0	1	415
Own DVD	0.157	0.364	0	1	414
Own Fridge	0.036	0.187	0	1	415
Own Gas Stove	0.036	0.187	0	1	415
Own Radio	0.643	0.480	0	1	415
Own Cellphone	0.877	0.328	0	1	416
Total Cellphones	2.184	1.198	1	9	365
Cellphone Internet	0.249	0.433	0	1	362
Gone Without Food	0.619	0.486	0	1	415
Gone Without Clean Water	0.582	0.494	0	1	416
Gone Without Meds	0.490	0.501	0	1	412
Gone Without Fuel for Cooking	0.269	0.444	0	1	416
Gone Without Cash Income	0.872	0.334	0	1	415
News - TV At Least Once	0.241	0.428	0	1	415
News - Radio At Least Once	0.520	0.500	0	1	415
News - Newspaper At Least Once	0.080	0.271	0	1	415
News - Internet At Least Once	0.106	0.308	0	1	415
News - Cellphone At Least Once	0.171	0.377	0	1	416
Contact - MP At Least Once	0.017	0.129	0	1	416
Contact - MP Office At Least Once	0.014	0.119	0	1	416
Contact - DED At Least Once	0.017	0.129	0	1	416
Contact - DED Office At Least Once	0.017	0.129	0	1	416
Contact - Diwani At Least Once	0.144	0.352	0	1	416
Contact - Diwani Office At Least Once	0.166	0.372	0	1	416
Received Response	0.927	0.261	0	1	123
Attend Protest	0.029	0.168	0	1	416
Observe Political Violence	0.100	0.300	0	1	410
Voted 2015	0.861	0.347	0	1	416
Voted CCM President	0.850	0.357	0	1	354
Voted CCM MP	0.720	0.450	0	1	353
Voted CCM Diwani	0.723	0.448	0	1	347

Table 2: Outcomes: Pre-Episode

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Observations
Know MP Name	0.920	0.272	0	1	412
Know MP Name - Correct	0.982	0.135	0	1	379
Politicians Listen	0.766	0.424	0	1	394
Magufuli Listens	0.870	0.337	0	1	400
MP Listens	0.786	0.411	0	1	397
Diwani Listens	0.781	0.414	0	1	402
Magufuli Interacts	0.332	0.472	0	1	376
MP Interacts	0.611	0.488	0	1	393
Diwani Interacts	0.865	0.342	0	1	407
Informed - Promises	0.686	0.465	0	1	370
Informed - Policies	0.479	0.501	0	1	263
MP Capable	0.589	0.493	0	1	416
MP Willing	0.625	0.485	0	1	416
P1: Mining	0.775	0.418	0	1	356
P2: Umeme	0.857	0.351	0	1	384
P3: Elimu	0.838	0.369	0	1	383
P4: Roads	0.844	0.363	0	1	391
P5: Water	0.820	0.385	0	1	367
P6: Hospital	0.813	0.390	0	1	359
P7a: Land	0.640	0.482	0	1	136
P7b: Bus Stop	0.800	0.401	0	1	200
P1: Mining Fulfilled	0.647	0.479	0	1	252
P2: Umeme Fulfilled	0.532	0.500	0	1	331
P3: Elimu Fulfilled	0.786	0.411	0	1	323
P4: Roads Fulfilled	0.562	0.497	0	1	340
P5: Water Fulfilled	0.473	0.500	0	1	298
P6: Hospital Fulfilled	0.694	0.462	0	1	278
P7a: Land Fulfilled	0.463	0.503	0	1	54
P7b: Bus Stop Fulfilled	0.751	0.433	0	1	169
MP Trust	0.744	0.437	0	1	410
MP Qualified	0.850	0.357	0	1	408
MP Corrupt	0.190	0.393	0	1	315
Sent Us - Twa	0.305	0.461	0	1	351
Sent Us - MP	0.239	0.427	0	1	351
Sent Us - Gov	0.239	0.427	0	1	351
Sent Us - Don't Know	0.156	0.364	0	1	416

Table 3: Outcomes: Post-Episode

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Observations
Know MP Name	0.995	0.071	0	1	394
Know MP Name - Correct	0.995	0.071	0	1	393
Politicians Listen	0.887	0.317	0	1	389
Magufuli Listens	0.897	0.304	0	1	389
MP Listens	0.931	0.253	0	1	393
Diwani Listens	0.860	0.348	0	1	392
Magufuli Interacts	0.408	0.492	0	1	377
MP Interacts	0.719	0.450	0	1	388
Diwani Interacts	0.893	0.309	0	1	393
Informed - Promises	0.934	0.249	0	1	392
Informed - Policies	0.773	0.420	0	1	269
MP Capable	0.820	0.385	0	1	394
MP Willing	0.850	0.357	0	1	394
P1: Mining	0.972	0.166	0	1	391
P2: Umeme	0.939	0.240	0	1	392
P3: Elimu	0.979	0.142	0	1	388
P4: Roads	0.926	0.261	0	1	394
P5: Water	0.913	0.282	0	1	391
P6: Hospital	0.980	0.142	0	1	392
P7a: Land	0.819	0.386	0	1	166
P7b: Bus Stop	0.996	0.067	0	1	224
P1: Mining Fulfilled	0.845	0.362	0	1	355
P2: Umeme Fulfilled	0.643	0.480	0	1	361
P3: Elimu Fulfilled	0.869	0.338	0	1	374
P4: Roads Fulfilled	0.672	0.470	0	1	363
P5: Water Fulfilled	0.655	0.476	0	1	345
P6: Hospital Fulfilled	0.863	0.344	0	1	365
P7a: Land Fulfilled	0.594	0.494	0	1	101
P7b: Bus Stop Fulfilled	0.875	0.331	0	1	216
MP Trust	0.860	0.348	0	1	392
MP Qualified	0.911	0.286	0	1	392
MP Corrupt	0.189	0.392	0	1	334
Sent Us - Twa	0.317	0.466	0	1	356
Sent Us - MP	0.289	0.454	0	1	356
Sent Us - Gov	0.244	0.430	0	1	356
Sent Us - Don't Know	0.096	0.296	0	1	394

past week while more than twice as many respondents report accessing news from radio at least once in the past week. Very few respondents (less than 2%) report contacting their MP or her office at least once in the last three months while as many as 16.6% of respondents report contacting the Diwani or her office. Of those who either contact the MP (or her office), the District Executive Director (DED) (or her office), or the Diwani (or her office), a majority of them (92.7%) report receiving a response.

Very few respondents (about 3%) report attending a demonstration or protest march during the past year and 10% of respondents report having heard or observed force or violence being used for a political cause in the past year. Many respondents voted in the 2015 elections (86.1%) and of those who voted most respondents (85%), more than the actual national percentage of votes, voted for the ruling CCM presidential candidate, John P. Magufuli. Less than half of respondents report voting for the ruling CCM MP candidate (72%) and the relevant CCM Diwani candidate (72%).

In almost all of the outcome variables in Tables 2, and 3, the percentages increase between pre- and post-survey responses. Whether or not these increases are statistically significant from zero will be explored in the results section 5.

4 Difference in Differences

To identify the impact of the Mbunge Live Show on various opinions of respondents I use the difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff or DiD) approach. The approach is ideal because in this case we have two different groups of respondents across two time periods. The two groups are respondents who report voting for either the CHADEMA or the ruling CCM party candidate for Bunge in the 2015. The two periods are before and after watching the Mbunge Live Show episode that profiles their MP.

A possible threat to the diff-in-diff is a lack of parallel trends before the treatment or intervention and possible differential effects of some other intervention during treatment across the groups. I cannot test for parallel trends because we did not collect opinions of respondents at least twice before showing them the episode. Given the relatively short

period of time between the pre-episode survey and watching of the episode it is not obvious whether parallel trends matter in this case. Differential effects of some other intervention are also not a concern in this case because of the relatively short period of time during surveying respondents before and after having watched the 30-minute episode. Moreover, the same set of enumerators surveyed both the CHADEMA and CCM groups of respondents.

Having said that, the DiD allows us to see differences in opinions between respondents who report voting for the CHADEMA and CCM MP candidates before and after. The DiD is estimated using OLS regression as follows:

$$Outcome_{iwt} = \alpha + \beta Post_{iwt} + \gamma CHADEMA_{iwt} + \theta DiD(CHADEMA)_{iwt} + \epsilon_{iwt} \quad (1)$$

where *Outcome* is an outcome variable for the *i*th respondent in ward *w*, at period *t*; *Post* is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation is for the respondent after having watched the episode, zero if it is before watching the episode; *CHADEMA* is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reports having voted for the CHADEMA MP candidate in the last 2015 elections, zero if the respondent reports having voted for the CCM MP candidate in the same elections; and *DiD(CHADEMA)* is the interaction $Post \times CHADEMA$, which compares responses given by respondents who voted for the CHADEMA MP candidate in the last 2015 elections *after* watching the Mbunge Live Show, relative to those who report having voted for the CCM MP candidate in the same elections. I run the same specification but also with the variable *CCM* and the corresponding diff-in-diff estimator, *DiD(CCM)*, which the latter's point estimate is almost always the same as *DiD(CHADEMA)*.

Please note that α is the estimate for the outcome variable for respondents who report having voted for the CCM MP candidate in the 2015 elections, *before* having watched the episode. Further, β is similarly for CCM respondents but in this case *after* having watched the episode while γ is for CHADEMA respondents *before* watching the episode.

5 Results

5.1 Full Sample

Results are presented in Table 10 through Table 18 include results for both Tarime and Nzega.

Before watching the episode, 92% of respondents claimed to know the name of their MP. 96.7% of them reported the correct name for their MP. After the episode, 99.5% of respondents claim to know the name of their MP and 99.1% of them supplied our enumerators with the correct name for their MP.

OLS regression results presented in Table 10 show that given the positive statistically significant coefficient on *Post* (β in the specification in Section 4) in the first row across columns 1 and 3, the Mbunge Live Show *increases* respondents' likelihood of reporting to know the name of their MP but also correctly name that MP, but only for CCM supporters. The constant in the same table or the α in the specification in Section 4 across all columns is also positive and statistically significant implying that respondents had already high baseline knowledge about the name of their MP even *before* watching the Mbunge Live Show. There are no differences by partisanship in the increase of knowledge of the name of one's MP as one looks across both sets of DiD coefficient estimates.

Table 11 presents results from OLS regressions of dummy variables that equal one if the respondent reports voting for either the ruling CCM presidential candidate, President Magufuli, or their MP candidate, or a CHADEMA Diwani in hypothetical elections to be held the day after our interview with the respondent.¹⁰

Looking at the coefficient estimates on *Post* in columns 1 and 2, we see that both CCM and CHADEMA supporters are more likely to support President Magufuli *after* watching the episode. Moreover, the point estimate on this β coefficient is almost twice as large among the CCM supporters than the CHADEMA supporters. The DiD CCM coefficient point estimate is positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent level of significance. This implies that although CCM and CHADEMA supporters are both

¹⁰*Kesho* is Kiswahili for “tomorrow”.

likely to update positively about their intentions to vote for President Magufuli if the elections are held the day after the interview, CCM supporters update more positively than CHADEMA supporters after having watched the episode.

The coefficient on *Post* in columns 3 and 4 show that the episode makes CCM supporters less likely to support their MP while CHADEMA supporters are more likely to support their MP in these hypothetical elections held the day after the interviews. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 99 percent (column 3) and 95 percent (column 4) levels of significance. One interpretation of this result is that the Mbunge Live Show may be allowing CHADEMA opposition party supporters to update positively after seeing what their MPs can in fact do (call it a *demonstration* effect) from a low expectation level while CCM ruling party supporters, coming with higher expectations, may feel that their MPs, given they hold the instruments of power, are underperforming relative to their potential.

The DiD CHADEMA coefficient does find a partisan difference. Specifically, CHADEMA supporters are more likely than CCM supporters to support their MP in these hypothetical elections. The coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 99 percent level.

For the Diwani regressions in columns 5 and 6, we see that CCM supporters increase their support for the CHADEMA Diwani and they do so relatively more than their CCM counterparts. The coefficient on *Post* in column 5 is statistically significant at the 99 percent level and the DiD is positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent level for CCM supporters in column 6.

Results of Table 12 presents OLS regressions of dummy variables that equal one if the respondent either somewhat or strongly agrees that politicians, President Magufuli, their MP or their Diwani generally listen to the opinions and concerns of citizens, and zero otherwise.

Results show that, after the episode, CCM supporters are more likely to agree that politicians generally listen to citizens and the point estimate is statistically significant at the 95 percent level. There are no differences by partisanship in agreeing that politicians generally listen.

Similarly, after the episode, CCM supporters are more likely to believe that President Magufuli listens to citizens, however this coefficient on *Post* is only statistically significant at the 90 percent level (column 3). There are, however, no partisan differences.

On whether they believe their MP listens, the episode does increase views that their MP listens to citizens of both CCM and CHADEMA supporters (columns 5 and 6). These coefficient estimates on *Post* are statistically significant at the 99 percent and 90 percent levels of significant for columns 5 and 6, respectively. There are partisan differences as CHADEMA (CCM) supporters are less (more) likely to believe their MP listens to citizens in the wake of watching the episode. These DiD estimates are statistically significant at the 95 percent level.

Table 13 reports OLS regressions of dummy variables that equal one if the respondent either somewhat or strongly agrees that there are sufficient opportunities for a person like themselves to interact with the President Magufuli, their MP, or their Diwani, zero otherwise.

There are no partisan differences across all columns, however CHADEMA supporters, after watching the episode, are more likely to agree that there are sufficient opportunities for a person like themselves to interact with President Magufuli while similarly, CCM supporters, after watching the episode, are more likely to agree that there are sufficient opportunities for a person like themselves to interact with their MP.

In the Mbunge Live Show episodes that profiles Hon. John C. Heche of Tarime Vijijini and Hon. Hussein M. Bashe of Nzega, there are several promises discussed by the MP. In total, there are 8 promises discussed in the episodes. We asked respondents about these promises using true-false type of questions to try and find out whether they can recognize all 8 promises as promises made by the MP. For each promise, the correct answer is true. We asked these questions, once again, both before and after watching the episode that profiles their MP. The promises are as follows:

- *P1 : Mining* Asking a question in Bunge requesting the government's help in resolving the problems with Acacia Mining Company including confiscation/appropriation of land, water contamination, and killings by police and private security forces in

Tarime; and to return Mine No. 7 which used to be known as “Resolute” which is now known as “Umoja Mining Group” in Nzega.

- *P2 : Umeme* Work toward improving access to reliable electricity.¹¹
- *P3 : Elimu* Work toward improving education by supplying desks, constructing new schools, student latrines, and teacher houses; and to remove school fees for students of Form 5 and 6.¹²
- *P4 : Roads* Work toward improving roads including construction of new roads and bridges.
- *P5 : Water* Work toward improving access to clean drinking water including the construction of a water tank and pump in Sirari, Tarime; and build a well in Uchama, Nzega.
- *P6 : Hospital* Work toward improving healthcare by improving services at the hospital in Sirari; and building health centers in every ward in Nzega, building doctors’ housing, for instance in Mbogo, Nzega.
- *P7a : Land* Work toward ensuring land is registered in Sirari only for Tarime respondents.
- *P7b : BusStop* Work toward building a new bus stop for Nzega town within the first year in office only for Nzega respondents.

Results on whether respondents are informed about these promises and whether these promises have been fulfilled at least to a small extent are presented in Tables 14 and 15 for correctly identifying a particular promise as having truly been made by the MP in the last 2015 elections and Tables 16 and 17, having either correctly identified the promise or uncertain about it, whether the respondent thinks the promise has been fulfilled at least to a small extent.

¹¹ *Umeme* is Kiswahili for “electricity”.

¹² *Elimu* is Kiswahili for “education”.

Results show that after watching the episode, CCM as well as CHADEMA respondents are more likely to correctly identify all but one (P2: Umeme for CHADEMA supporters - Column 2 in Table 15) the promises made by the MP, as detailed in the episode.

There are partisan differences for the hospital promise (P6) where CHADEMA supporters are relatively more likely to correctly identify this promise. The coefficient on this DiD estimate is statistically significant at the 95 percent level. There are also partisan differences that are marginally significant (at 90 percent level) for elimu (P3) and water (P5) in columns 3 and 5, respectively, in Table 15. In both cases, CCM supporters are less likely to correctly identify these promises after having watched the episode.

Results in Table 16 show that CCM respondents are moved positively to believe that their MP has fulfilled all promises at least to a small extent as evident on the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates on *Post* in the first row across all but one of the columns (column 7 on land).

CHADEMA supporters are only similarly moved on mining, water, and hospital as evident from columns 1, 5, and 6 of Table 17 for the coefficient on *Post*. There are no partisan differences across both Tables 16 and 17.

Table 18 reports OLS regressions of dummy variables equal to one if respondents think Twaweza, their MP, or the President's Office/Prime Minister's Office sent us to conduct this study, or they do not know who sent us. Results show that *after* watching the episode, both CCM and CHADEMA supporters are less likely to say they do not know who sent us (columns 7 and 8).

There is suggestive evidence (statistically significant at the 90 percent level) that there are partisan differences on respondents thinking the President's Office/Prime Minister's Office sent us to conduct this study. Specifically, CHADEMA (CCM) supporters are less (more) likely to think the government sent us. Given that CHADEMA supporters are not aligned with the ruling party government, the sign of these DiD coefficient estimates are encouraging that the episode does not reinforce party supporters to entrench within their party ideologies and be suspicious of the episode.

Other tables of other results are in the appendix Section 7. In those tables, we find

that there is evidence that the show increased respondents' information about promises (in general) made by their MP in the last 2015 election; and policies proposed by their MP in the last 2015 election; respondents' views that their MP is capable and willing to fulfill those promises; respondents' trust in their MP and views that their MP is qualified for the job. There are no partisan differences in any of the results presented in the tables.

5.2 Tarime versus Nzega

Results presented in Table 22 through Table 30 are for the Tarime-only data. Results presented in Table 34 through Table 42 are for the Nzega-only data.

There are more males in the Tarime data (62.7%) relative to the Nzega data (41.6%), however the typical Nzega respondent is older (just over 38 years old) than the typical Tarime respondent (just over 35 years old). Many more respondents in Tarime are married (77.8%) than are respondents in Nzega (66.2%). In Nzega, 74% of respondents are self-employed while 82.2% of respondents in Tarime are also self-employed. 57.8% of respondents in Tarime head households that typically have about 7 members, on average, compared to 54.1% of respondents in Nzega heading households of less than 6 members. Nzega respondents are, on average, less educated than Tarime respondents. About 6 out of 10 (63.2%) of Nzega respondents have at least a primary school education compared to 83.2% of Tarime respondents.

Cellphone penetration and radio ownership in Tarime is higher than in Nzega. 90.3% of respondents there own a cellphone with 74.5% of respondents owning a radio. This is compared to 85.7% and 56.3% of respondents in Nzega who own a cellphone and a radio, respectively. Respondents in Nzega (69.1%) are more likely to report going with enough food in the past year than respondents in Tarime (53%), however, the reverse is true when looking at respondents who report going without cash income in the past year (83.5% of respondents in Nzega versus 91.8% of respondents in Tarime).

Almost two-thirds of respondents in Tarime (63.6%) report accessing news from the radio at least once in the past week and no more than 1.6% of respondents report contacting their MP or his office at least once in the past three months while 15 times as

many respondents report contacting their Diwani or her office (30.3%) in the last three months. In Nzega, however, less than half (42.9%) of respondents accessing news from the radio at least once in the past week and no more than 1.7% of Nzega respondents report contacting their MP or his office at least once in the past three months. Respondents in Nzega who report contacting their Diwani or her office are similarly low, however, they are as many as 8 times larger (8.2%).

Political participation is high in both Tarime and Nzega. Among Tarime respondents, 90.3% of them report having voted in the last 2015 elections with only 44.2% of them report having voted for their current MP while 95.8% of Nzega respondents report having voted in the previous 2015 elections with 95.8% of respondents report having voted for their current MP.

Table 4: Tarime: Socio-Demographics: Pre-Episode

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Observations
Male	0.627	0.485	0	1	185
Age	35.162	12.125	21	68	185
Currently Married	0.778	0.416	0	1	185
Distance to Govt	14.984	17.332	1	120	185
Distance to Job	294.600	439.724	0	995	185
Self-Employed	0.822	0.384	0	1	185
HH Size	7.184	3.537	1	30	185
HH Head	0.578	0.495	0	1	185
At Least Primary - Self	0.832	0.374	0	1	185
Own Car	0.027	0.163	0	1	185
Own TV	0.288	0.454	0	1	184
Own PC	0.049	0.216	0	1	184
Own DVD	0.235	0.425	0	1	183
Own Fridge	0.049	0.216	0	1	184
Own Gas Stove	0.065	0.248	0	1	184
Own Radio	0.745	0.437	0	1	184
Own Cellphone	0.903	0.297	0	1	185
Total Cellphones	2.491	1.312	1	8	167
Cellphone Internet	0.378	0.486	0	1	164
Gone Without Food	0.530	0.500	0	1	185
Gone Without Clean Water	0.373	0.485	0	1	185
Gone Without Meds	0.503	0.501	0	1	181
Gone Without Fuel for Cooking	0.276	0.448	0	1	185
Gone Without Cash Income	0.918	0.274	0	1	184
News - TV At Least Once	0.326	0.470	0	1	184
News - Radio At Least Once	0.636	0.482	0	1	184
News - Newspaper At Least Once	0.103	0.304	0	1	185
News - Internet At Least Once	0.146	0.354	0	1	185
News - Cellphone At Least Once	0.265	0.442	0	1	185
Contact - MP At Least Once	0.016	0.127	0	1	185
Contact - MP Office At Least Once	0.016	0.127	0	1	185
Contact - DED At Least Once	0.032	0.178	0	1	185
Contact - DED Office At Least Once	0.027	0.163	0	1	185
Contact - Diwani At Least Once	0.222	0.416	0	1	185
Contact - Diwani Office At Least Once	0.303	0.461	0	1	185
Received Response	0.883	0.323	0	1	77
Attend Protest	0.027	0.163	0	1	185
Observe Political Violence	0.161	0.369	0	1	180
Voted 2015	0.903	0.297	0	1	185
Voted CCM President	0.726	0.448	0	1	164
Voted CCM MP	0.442	0.498	0	1	163
Voted CCM Diwani	0.462	0.500	0	1	158

Table 5: Tarime: Outcomes: Pre-Episode

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Observations
Know MP Name	0.934	0.249	0	1	181
Know MP Name - Correct	1.000	0.000	1	1	169
Politicians Listen	0.733	0.444	0	1	176
Magufuli Listens	0.838	0.369	0	1	179
MP Listens	0.711	0.455	0	1	173
Diwani Listens	0.860	0.348	0	1	179
Magufuli Interacts	0.423	0.496	0	1	163
MP Interacts	0.647	0.479	0	1	170
Diwani Interacts	0.944	0.231	0	1	178
Informed - Promises	0.728	0.447	0	1	147
Informed - Policies	0.380	0.489	0	1	71
MP Capable	0.384	0.488	0	1	185
MP Willing	0.454	0.499	0	1	185
P1: Mining	0.800	0.401	0	1	160
P2: Umeme	0.814	0.391	0	1	161
P3: Elimu	0.775	0.419	0	1	160
P4: Roads	0.867	0.341	0	1	165
P5: Water	0.755	0.432	0	1	151
P6: Hospital	0.662	0.475	0	1	142
P7a: Land	0.640	0.482	0	1	136
P1: Mining Fulfilled	0.589	0.494	0	1	112
P2: Umeme Fulfilled	0.662	0.475	0	1	130
P3: Elimu Fulfilled	0.76	0.429	0	1	125
P4: Roads Fulfilled	0.587	0.494	0	1	143
P5: Water Fulfilled	0.395	0.491	0	1	114
P6: Hospital Fulfilled	0.646	0.481	0	1	79
P7a: Land Fulfilled	0.463	0.503	0	1	54
MP Trust	0.617	0.488	0	1	180
MP Qualified	0.780	0.415	0	1	182
MP Corrupt	0.246	0.432	0	1	122
Sent Us - Twa	0.352	0.479	0	1	142
Sent Us - MP	0.190	0.394	0	1	142
Sent Us - Gov	0.282	0.451	0	1	142
Sent Us - Don't Know	0.232	0.424	0	1	185

Table 6: Tarime: Outcomes: Post-Episode

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Observations
Know MP Name	0.994	0.077	0	1	169
Know MP Name - Correct	1.000	0.000	1	1	169
Politicians Listen	0.819	0.386	0	1	166
Magufuli Listens	0.862	0.346	0	1	167
MP Listens	0.888	0.317	0	1	169
Diwani Listens	0.923	0.268	0	1	168
Magufuli Interacts	0.485	0.501	0	1	163
MP Interacts	0.713	0.454	0	1	164
Diwani Interacts	0.952	0.214	0	1	168
Informed - Promises	0.923	0.268	0	1	168
Informed - Policies	0.606	0.492	0	1	66
MP Capabale	0.704	0.458	0	1	169
MP Willing	0.740	0.440	0	1	169
P1: Mining	0.958	0.200	0	1	168
P2: Umeme	0.940	0.238	0	1	167
P3: Elimu	0.957	0.203	0	1	164
P4: Roads	0.976	0.152	0	1	169
P5: Water	0.952	0.214	0	1	167
P6: Hospital	0.964	0.187	0	1	167
P7a: Land	0.819	0.386	0	1	166
P1: Mining Fulfilled	0.801	0.400	0	1	146
P2: Umeme Fulfilled	0.736	0.442	0	1	148
P3: Elimu Fulfilled	0.850	0.359	0	1	153
P4: Roads Fulfilled	0.696	0.462	0	1	161
P5: Water Fulfilled	0.616	0.488	0	1	146
P6: Hospital Fulfilled	0.824	0.382	0	1	142
P7a: Land Fulfilled	0.594	0.494	0	1	101
MP Trust	0.772	0.421	0	1	167
MP Qualified	0.845	0.363	0	1	168
MP Corrupt	0.233	0.424	0	1	129
Sent Us - Twa	0.327	0.471	0	1	147
Sent Us - MP	0.259	0.439	0	1	147
Sent Us - Gov	0.293	0.456	0	1	147
Sent Us - Don't Know	0.130	0.337	0	1	169

Table 7: Nzega: Socio-Demographics: Pre-Episode

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Observations
Male	0.416	0.494	0	1	231
Age	38.247	12.922	21	79	231
Currently Married	0.662	0.474	0	1	231
Distance to Govt	17.472	24.754	2	303	231
Distance to Job	253.688	416.003	1	995	231
Self-Employed	0.740	0.439	0	1	231
HH Size	5.541	2.681	1	15	231
HH Head	0.541	0.499	0	1	231
At Least Primary - Self	0.632	0.483	0	1	231
Own Car	0.017	0.131	0	1	231
Own TV	0.177	0.383	0	1	231
Own PC	0.009	0.093	0	1	231
Own DVD	0.095	0.294	0	1	231
Own Fridge	0.026	0.159	0	1	231
Own Gas Stove	0.013	0.113	0	1	231
Own Radio	0.563	0.497	0	1	231
Own Cellphone	0.857	0.351	0	1	231
Total Cellphones	1.924	1.027	1	9	198
Cellphone Internet	0.141	0.349	0	1	198
Gone Without Food	0.691	0.463	0	1	230
Gone Without Clean Water	0.749	0.435	0	1	231
Gone Without Meds	0.481	0.501	0	1	231
Gone Without Fuel for Cooking	0.264	0.442	0	1	231
Gone Without Cash Income	0.835	0.372	0	1	231
News - TV At Least Once	0.173	0.379	0	1	231
News - Radio At Least Once	0.429	0.496	0	1	231
News - Newspaper At Least Once	0.061	0.240	0	1	230
News - Internet At Least Once	0.074	0.262	0	1	230
News - Cellphone At Least Once	0.095	0.294	0	1	231
Contact - MP At Least Once	0.017	0.131	0	1	231
Contact - MP Office At Least Once	0.013	0.113	0	1	231
Contact - DED At Least Once	0.004	0.066	0	1	231
Contact - DED Office At Least Once	0.009	0.093	0	1	231
Contact - Diwani At Least Once	0.082	0.275	0	1	231
Contact - Diwani Office At Least Once	0.056	0.231	0	1	231
Received Response	1.000	0.000	0	1	46
Attend Protest	0.030	0.172	0	1	231
Observe Political Violence	0.052	0.223	0	1	230
Voted 2015	0.827	0.379	0	1	231
Voted CCM President	0.958	0.201	0	1	190
Voted CCM MP	0.958	0.201	0	1	190
Voted CCM Diwani	0.942	0.235	0	1	189

Table 8: Nzega: Outcomes: Pre-Episode

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Observations
Know MP Name	0.909	0.288	0	1	231
Know MP Name - Correct	0.967	0.180	0	1	210
Politicians Listen	0.794	0.406	0	1	218
Magufuli Listens	0.896	0.306	0	1	221
MP Listens	0.844	0.364	0	1	224
Diwani Listens	0.717	0.451	0	1	223
Magufuli Interacts	0.263	0.441	0	1	213
MP Interacts	0.583	0.494	0	1	223
Diwani Interacts	0.803	0.398	0	1	229
Informed - Promises	0.659	0.475	0	1	223
Informed - Policies	0.516	0.501	0	1	192
MP Capabale	0.753	0.432	0	1	231
MP Willing	0.762	0.427	0	1	231
P1: Mining	0.755	0.431	0	1	196
P2: Umeme	0.888	0.316	0	1	223
P3: Elimu	0.883	0.322	0	1	223
P4: Roads	0.827	0.379	0	1	226
P5: Water	0.866	0.342	0	1	216
P6: Hospital	0.912	0.283	0	1	217
P7b: Bus Stop	0.800	0.401	0	1	200
P1: Mining Fulfilled	0.693	0.463	0	1	140
P2: Umeme Fulfilled	0.448	0.499	0	1	201
P3: Elimu Fulfilled	0.803	0.399	0	1	198
P4: Roads Fulfilled	0.543	0.499	0	1	197
P5: Water Fulfilled	0.522	0.501	0	1	184
P6: Hospital Fulfilled	0.714	0.453	0	1	199
P7b: Bus Stop Fulfilled	0.751	0.433	0	1	169
MP Trust	0.843	0.364	0	1	230
MP Qualified	0.907	0.291	0	1	226
MP Corrupt	0.155	0.363	0	1	193
Sent Us - Twa	0.273	0.446	0	1	209
Sent Us - MP	0.273	0.446	0	1	209
Sent Us - Gov	0.211	0.409	0	1	209
Sent Us - Don't Know	0.095	0.294	0	1	231

Table 9: Nzega: Outcomes: Post-Episode

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Observations
Know MP Name	0.996	0.067	0	1	225
Know MP Name - Correct	0.991	0.094	0	1	224
Politicians Listen	0.937	0.243	0	1	223
Magufuli Listens	0.923	0.267	0	1	222
MP Listens	0.964	0.186	0	1	224
Diwani Listens	0.812	0.391	0	1	224
Magufuli Interacts	0.350	0.478	0	1	214
MP Interacts	0.723	0.448	0	1	224
Diwani Interacts	0.849	0.359	0	1	225
Informed - Promises	0.942	0.234	0	1	224
Informed - Policies	0.828	0.379	0	1	203
MP Capabale	0.907	0.292	0	1	225
MP Willing	0.933	0.250	0	1	225
P1: Mining	0.982	0.133	0	1	223
P2: Umeme	0.938	0.242	0	1	225
P3: Elimu	0.996	0.067	0	1	224
P4: Roads	0.889	0.315	0	1	225
P5: Water	0.884	0.321	0	1	224
P6: Hospital	0.991	0.094	0	1	225
P7b: Bus Stop	0.996	0.067	0	1	224
P1: Mining Fulfilled	0.876	0.331	0	1	209
P2: Umeme Fulfilled	0.577	0.495	0	1	213
P3: Elimu Fulfilled	0.882	0.323	0	1	221
P4: Roads Fulfilled	0.653	0.477	0	1	202
P5: Water Fulfilled	0.683	0.466	0	1	199
P6: Hospital Fulfilled	0.888	0.316	0	1	223
P7b: Bus Stop Fulfilled	0.875	0.331	0	1	216
MP Trust	0.924	0.265	0	1	225
MP Qualified	0.960	0.197	0	1	224
MP Corrupt	0.161	0.368	0	1	205
Sent Us - Twa	0.311	0.464	0	1	209
Sent Us - MP	0.311	0.464	0	1	209
Sent Us - Gov	0.211	0.409	0	1	209
Sent Us - Don't Know	0.071	0.258	0	1	225

Looking at the regression tables in Appendix 7.2 and 7.3 with results for the Tarime- and Nzega-only data, respectively, we see that results are qualitatively similar across both locations with two important exceptions.

First, CCM respondents in Tarime are less likely to think their MP, CHADEMA's Hon. John C. Heche sent us to do the study. This is promising because it means that respondents from the main political party that opposes the MP may be less likely to believe the study is partial to the MP. There are no partisan differences for respondents in Nzega.

Second, in two different promises among Nzega respondents, the coefficient is negative. On the knowledge of the umeme promise, CHADEMA supporters are less likely to be informed about the promise. On the fulfillment of the elimu promise, similarly CHADEMA supporters are less likely to believe their MP has fulfilled the promise. In Tarime, on the contrary, these same coefficients are always either statistically positive or zero.

5.3 Qualitative Results

Respondents from the FGDs generally express positive attitudes toward their MP and the show. There are, of course, disagreements across many issues, despite a wide consensus. For instance, in Tarime, there was disagreements about the extent to which their MP has fulfilled promises for Borega residents and the extent to which he is prioritizing national rather than constituency politics. In Nzega, there is disagreement about the extent to which their MP has fulfilled to improve access to clean drinking water with residents in areas in and around Nzega town being more likely to report satisfaction with the fulfillment of this promise, relative to other more rural residents.

A key take away for me is that for both MPs, there is a need to distribute benefits of their work and development in their constituency across more locations, beyond any calculus of voting that they may be factoring in when campaigning and implementing their policies. This, admittedly, may be harder for Heche, who as an opposition MP, may have less access to resources as his counterpart in Bashe, who is a ruling party MP, and

also their relative personal wealth differentials.

Secondly, Heche needs to seriously consider how he trades off time for national over local politics and Bashe needs to ensure his promise to improve access to clean drinking water spreads beyond the urban locations and spills¹³ over to rural areas as well.

Third, both MPs have generally good performance reviews as seen in the FGDs. This is almost certainly a function of the fact that as Mbunge Live began this project, it naturally faced selection bias because the best MPs are the ones most likely to accept having their constituency performance profiled. As the show expands across other MPs, results from both the qualitative and quantitative data will surely change. I expect more outlier views as the show expands its coverage across MPs in the National Assembly. This is why it is critical to remove the need to have the MPs consent about being profiled, as much as Maa Media Limited can possibly manage to do to avoid any potential biases.

Below are Tarime- and Nzega-specific digestion of the qualitative data.

5.3.1 Tarime

Respondents generally agree that their MP is responsive to their needs and is generally doing a good job. One woman in Sirari said, “..our MP [Heche] is a giving person, and is someone who remembers us...follows up on his citizens following up on their problems listening to them and fulfilling what he has promised them...”

Respondents also generally agree that the Mbunge Live Show has provided them with new relevant information and should be expanded nationwide. One woman from Gorong’ a, for instance, says, “...we had forgotten what he had promised us...[the Mbunge Live show] shows us the promises [our MP] has promised and which ones he has implemented and which ones he hasn’t.” Another woman from Sirari says, “[t]he show is good, it is close to citizens listening to their views about our MP...it is good.”

Respondents from Borega, however, expressed views that the episode does not capture the full story as it pertains to their location. Although these residents agree that their MP has done well so far, they express less enthusiasm about work the MP has done in

¹³Pun intended.

their particular area. One man from Borega says, "...I congratulate our MP...because he has made great efforts even though in our area he has never stopped..."

Some respondents disagreed about the extent to which their MP has fulfilled his promises. One woman from Gorong'a asks bluntly, "...our MP promised us that he will build us a hospital here. Why hasn't he built it?" On the contrary, a woman in Sirari has more positive attitudes about the extent to which she feels her MP has fulfilled his promises. In particular, she says, "...when our MP assumed office he promised [to supply desks and build classrooms], honestly we have seen his promises on desks fulfilled, and also on construction of classrooms...on latrines he is also building, honestly overall we thank him on schools."

One man from Ganyange says, "[t]his video is very relevant to see what things our MP John C. Heche has done, things that he has promised and done in other villages, but like me here in our village where I live, Ganyange I still haven't seen promises that he has fulfilled yet." A different man seemed to slightly differ in his assessment by providing some nuance by saying, "...some times when he [MP Heche] promises and then he sees that...there still have problems that haven't yet been dealt with [by the MP] and so if I go visit that area citizens of that area will question [criticize him]..."

Respondents in Borega also expressed views relating to the tradeoff that MPs have to make with respect to focusing on constituency-level politics or national-level politics. A man also from Borega expressed the need for MP Heche to focus on issues relevant in Borega and not national politics when the respondents said that "...we hear the other day he has been arrested in Morogoro...we couldn't understand why he is holding meetings in Morogoro when that is not his district."

On the ability to contact their MP and experiences of having seen or met him, respondents had varied responses. A male respondent from Ganyange reports having contacted him on the phone. The respondent says, "personally found him one day and I have his numbers and I do talk to him but he usually tells me, 'I will come [to visit the area] at a certain time but he usually passes by and I don't even see him.'" Another man from Borega feels that accessing the MP is not easy for an ordinary citizen such as himself

when he says, "...only a few people have access to our MP [Heche]..and may be people with high authority..."

A few others in Gorong'a have also expressed that their MP has not visited them. One man from the area says, "Honestly, Hon. John C. Heche these days doesn't like to visit us that much I don't know why but it would be great if he would be visiting us once every three months...the MP should be visiting us because for example elephants come and eat our food we would be informing him of these problems and he would relay them [to government] so that we get compensated for the food we buy for our children; for instance, the other day elephants came and destroyed food and ate the food and finished the food and left and so a place to relay our problems is non-existent, you see?"

Another man from Borega reports that their MP has not made himself available through visiting the area. He says, "availability is difficult because for Borega since he bid farewell to us [to go to Bunge] he has not returned to do any meeting except we hear how he visits and holds meetings in Sirari and even there the police prevent him from holding the meeting and yet he finds alternative ways to get to the meeting [highlighting how important Sirari is relative to Borega]."

Another Borega man also expresses that the MP is not very present in their area. He says, "...since he [MP Heche] entered Bunge he has yet to hold a [public] meeting with citizens in our area. He has yet to address citizens except if he is passing through the area for a short period of time he can speak to citizens and then he leaves." Another man from Ganyange says, "...because there is a very long period when he [MP Heche] stays in Dar es Salaam for a very long period...our MP visits his hometown Sirari a lot but our area [not]..."

Many respondents trusted their MP and did not generally feel like he is a corrupt politician. Although generally respondents report trusting their MP, there were some explicit disagreements by a few respondents. One particular woman in Gorong'a says, "...Me, myself, I don't trust the MP."

5.3.2 Nzega

Respondents across Nzega had generally positive things to say about the show and about their MP, Hon. Hussein M. Bashe. One man in Ijanja says, "...I think it's good as it gives us a certain courage to know what our Honourable does, sometimes one might not see what he is doing at the same time he is doing good things to our fellows, so I think this show should be continued..." There were others who, although had positive assessments of their MP also asked for more to be done. Another man, also from Ijanja, for instance, says, "...this show has made us happy because it has made us to see the developments and what our MP does, but we were asking him to increase effort in our village because most of his promises are now implemented, here at Ijanja we have a dispensary that is at its final stage but till now we don't know when will it be complete so we were asking our MP to increase effort and care."

Others in Ijanja had strongly positive attitudes toward their MP. One woman from Ijanja says, "[h]onestly, we have a good MP, he is fulfilling his promises, he brought electricity, he is constructing roads, to me he is the best." Another woman also from Ijanja provides more nuance when she says, "[h]onestly some MP's promises aren't fulfilled yet, some are fulfilled..."

A woman in Itiro had more specific things to say about the fulfillment of promises made by their MP when she says, "we have watched our MP promises, he gave us four promises which are water problem, education, health, let me talk about those three first, on the side of clean and safe water here, honestly we don't use clean and safe water, we use water from the well which is not safe, so we ask him to fulfill this promise. Secondly, education issue which he has started to implement as they promised free education for secondary schools and now we don't pay school fees. Thirdly is electricity issue, it's a problem, for example at schools and teachers houses there is no electricity, so we are asking him to make sure he fulfill his promises, that's my views."

In terms of the show, many had little changes to make about the show. One woman in Itiro, however, exclaimed that it is best to air the episode in a meeting setting, where the content of the episode are delivered. She specifically says, "[m]aybe you would be holding

meetings, like right now you are here instead of calling few people, look here this woman can't hear properly so we need to tell her everything that is going on, some people can't see, so you would be holding meetings with the people so that you can discuss together."

While some find that the availability of their MP is quite sufficient, others find that their MP is not very accessible. One woman in Itiro says, "...the availability of MP is very rare, he is not always available." Another Itiro woman says that their Diwani acts as a messenger of the people to the MP. The woman says, "...the opportunities that can help us to meet with our MP maybe its through our leaders here like Diwani, who acts as a bridge between us and our MP, so maybe through Diwani, our MP will come to listen to our problems."

However, many respondents agree that the show has changed their views on the fulfillment of promises made by their MP and the expectations they have about their MP. One woman from Itiro says, "Yes, it [the Mbunge Live Show] has changed [my understanding and my expectations concerning his [MP Bashe] promises and my understanding about the implementation of my MP's promises], because we didn't know what he is doing in some other places."

An important issue raised in Nzega is the availability of water and the promise their MP made with regard with improving access to clean drinking water. Many women raised concerns that this promise has not been fulfilled. One woman from Miguwa says, "Because up to now we are using water from drilled wells which are sold, The water pipes her at our place has been here for long time. Till now we are struggling if you want to get water you must pay two hundred shillings. It has been a problem that disturbs us."

There are other promises that people cite as being either incomplete or delayed. One woman in Nzega Magharibi says, "[t]here is something that he hasn't fulfilled, we were told that they will construct street roads, but up to now they haven't, and about the bus stand we were promised it will be ready by January but up to now we are using the town bus stand." In addition to the water promise, the delayed launching of the new bus stand is another more modal promise cited as being incomplete or delayed.

It is important that for respondents who live either in Nzega town or near its environs,

the water promise is not cited as being incompletely fulfilled. Many respondents there are relatively more likely to report being satisfied with the fulfillment of the water promise. One woman in Nzega Ndogo for instance says, “[h]e [MP Bashe] brought water now we have water, we are thankful.”

The strongest promise for MP Bashe, however is on education where many respondents across various locations citing positive reviews of the fulfillment of this promise. One woman from Nzega Ndogo, for instance, says, “[t]he good thing about this show is it’s true, he is fulfilling his promises, they said there will be free education, and yes, it is, another high school was built, they have helped us a lot.”

6 Conclusion

In this paper, I present results from research conducted to evaluate the impact of a novel TV show called the Mbunge Live Show. The show’s aim is to largely inform citizens about the performance of their MP and to bring them closer to that MP including increasing the latter’s accountability to the former. Results presented show that the show’s episode seems to, on average, improve citizens’ knowledge and beliefs about the good performance of their MP, as proxied by views on promises made and fulfilled by their MP, with partisan differences in a few of the promises.

There are no consistent partisan differences. However, whenever respondents are moved to update their prior beliefs, CHADEMA supporters are more likely to be informed about promises than their CCM colleagues while both equally update their information on promises made by their MP and also the extent to which these promises are fulfilled.

This paper does not provide definitive evidence that information, through an episode such as the one studied in this paper, can affect citizens’ updating of beliefs and given actual voting or political engagement was not measured here, neither can this paper speak to changes in accountability. Anecdotes from *Nzega*, suggests some responsiveness from the MP in the wake of interviewing the MP and subsequent production. Follow up work needs to more concretely specify the mechanism to which we may expect citizens to hold

their MP accountable and how that same MP may respond to her citizens.

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Table 10: Results 1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Know MP Name	Know MP Name	Know MP Name - Correct	Know MP Name - Correct
Post	0.0747** (0.0166)	0.0296 (0.0230)	0.017+ (0.0104)	0.011 (0.011)
CHADEMA	0.0371 (0.0266)		0.0105 (0.0144)	
DiD CHADEMA	-0.0441 (0.0286)		-0.0064 (0.015)	
CCM		-0.0236 (0.0280)		-0.011 (0.0144)
DiD CCM		0.0455 (0.0284)		0.006 (0.015)
Constant	0.921** (0.0170)	0.948** (0.0225)	0.979** (0.0131)	0.989** (0.0109)
<i>Observations</i>	685	685	659	659
Outcome Mean	0.962	0.962	0.989	0.989
Outcome SD	0.191	0.191	0.103	0.103
R-Squared	0.0308	0.0297	0.007	0.007
F	7.885	.	.	.
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0265	0.0254	0.0023	0.0023

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Results 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Kesho Magu	Kesho Magu	Kesho MP	Kesho MP	Kesho Diwani	Kesho Diwani
Post	0.910** (0.0350)	0.581** (0.0576)	-0.322** (0.0643)	0.109* (0.0437)	0.191** (0.0525)	0.0425 (0.0481)
CHADEMA	-1.92e-15 (.)		-0.0393 (0.0576)		0.648** (0.0522)	
DiD CHADEMA	-0.329** (0.0674)		0.423** (0.0775)		-0.157* (0.0709)	
CCM		4.97e-15 (.)		0.0507 (0.0577)		-0.639** (0.0524)
DiD CCM		0.329** (0.0674)		-0.434** (0.0777)		0.148* (0.0712)
Constant	-9.16e-16 (.)	-4.86e-15 (.)	0.742** (0.0284)	0.694** (0.0502)	0.0747** (0.0170)	0.714** (0.0495)
<i>Observations</i>	467	467	462	462	462	462
Outcome Mean	0.223	0.223	0.701	0.701	0.327	0.327
Outcome SD	0.417	0.417	0.458	0.458	0.470	0.470
R-Squared	0.710	0.710	0.0630	0.0637	0.416	0.411
F	.	.	10.64	10.98	71.81	70.97
Adjusted R-Squared	0.708	0.708	0.0569	0.0576	0.412	0.407

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 12: Results 3

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pols Listen	Pols Listen	Pres Listens	Pres Listens	MP Listens	MP Listens	Diwani Listens	Diwani Listens
Post	0.130** (0.0284)	0.0722 (0.0588)	0.0359 ⁺ (0.0211)	0.0390 (0.0434)	0.190** (0.0275)	0.0793 ⁺ (0.0419)	0.0973** (0.0277)	0.0571 (0.0362)
CHADEMA	-0.0421 (0.0510)		-0.121** (0.0458)		0.0995* (0.0459)		0.128** (0.0437)	
DiD CHADEMA	-0.0674 (0.0651)		-0.00722 (0.0476)		-0.120* (0.0495)		-0.0501 (0.0448)	
CCM		0.0533 (0.0512)		0.133** (0.0460)		-0.0876 ⁺ (0.0464)		-0.116** (0.0443)
DiD CCM		0.0540 (0.0652)		-0.00698 (0.0482)		0.107* (0.0500)		0.0365 (0.0455)
Constant	0.800** (0.0256)	0.750** (0.0444)	0.911** (0.0183)	0.781** (0.0423)	0.753** (0.0278)	0.844** (0.0372)	0.747** (0.0277)	0.866** (0.0347)
<i>Observations</i>	671	671	672	672	673	673	679	679
Outcome Mean	0.844	0.844	0.894	0.894	0.859	0.859	0.823	0.823
Outcome SD	0.364	0.364	0.308	0.308	0.348	0.348	0.382	0.382
R-Squared	0.0340	0.0345	0.0359	0.0389	0.0590	0.0571	0.0273	0.0255
F	10.47	10.44	5.011	5.197	16.95	16.76	7.508	7.372
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0296	0.0302	0.0316	0.0345	0.0548	0.0529	0.0230	0.0211

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 13: Results 4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pres Interacts	Pres Interacts	MP Interacts	MP Interacts	Diwani Interacts	Diwani Interacts
Post	0.0383 (0.0337)	0.112 ⁺ (0.0577)	0.112** (0.0315)	0.0602 (0.0412)	0.0206 (0.0222)	-0.00340 (0.0301)
CHADEMA	0.0232 (0.0601)		0.126* (0.0561)		0.0874** (0.0316)	
DiD CHADEMA	0.0748 (0.0674)		-0.0400 (0.0508)		-0.0241 (0.0377)	
CCM		-0.0177 (0.0598)		-0.130* (0.0558)		-0.0885** (0.0315)
DiD CCM		-0.0733 (0.0669)		0.0565 (0.0517)		0.0241 (0.0375)
Constant	0.340** (0.0310)	0.360** (0.0511)	0.598** (0.0317)	0.726** (0.0459)	0.861** (0.0219)	0.948** (0.0225)
<i>Observations</i>	644	644	664	664	681	681
Outcome Mean	0.376	0.376	0.682	0.682	0.891	0.891
Outcome SD	0.485	0.485	0.466	0.466	0.311	0.311
R-Squared	0.00785	0.00722	0.0222	0.0220	0.0125	0.0129
F	2.091	2.002	6.901	6.738	3.122	3.223
Adjusted R-Squared	0.00320	0.00256	0.0178	0.0175	0.00812	0.00855

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 14: Results 5

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	P1: Mining	P2: Umeme	P3: Elimu	P4: Roads	P5: Water	P6: Hospital	P7a: Land	P7b: Bus Stop
Post	0.204** (0.0282)	0.0798** (0.0226)	0.105** (0.0207)	0.0782** (0.0214)	0.0676** (0.0228)	0.128** (0.0249)	0.219** (0.0593)	0.200** (0.0318)
CHADEMA	0.0485 (0.0498)	0.00833 (0.0417)	-0.0877+ (0.0484)	0.0511 (0.0402)	-0.00626 (0.0468)	-0.135* (0.0555)	0.161+ (0.0863)	-0.133 (0.196)
DiD CHADEMA	-0.0688 (0.0513)	-0.0215 (0.0456)	0.0894+ (0.0487)	0.0194 (0.0378)	0.0672 (0.0453)	0.122* (0.0558)	-0.0901 (0.0814)	0.133 (0.196)
Constant	0.772** (0.0285)	0.867** (0.0220)	0.870** (0.0218)	0.840** (0.0235)	0.838** (0.0245)	0.852** (0.0236)	0.554** (0.0670)	0.800** (0.0318)
<i>Observations</i>	640	661	661	671	649	644	275	349
Outcome Mean	0.881	0.906	0.911	0.896	0.880	0.899	0.735	0.903
Outcome SD	0.324	0.292	0.285	0.306	0.325	0.301	0.442	0.297
R-Squared	0.0835	0.0164	0.0614	0.0265	0.0209	0.0893	0.0549	0.122
F	21.42	4.971	15.13	13.94	8.984	17.37	7.004	.
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0792	0.0119	0.0571	0.0221	0.0164	0.0851	0.0444	0.115

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 15: Results 6

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	P1: Mining	P2: Umeme	P3: Elimu	P4: Roads	P5: Water	P6: Hospital	P7a: Land	P7b: Bus Stop
Post	0.135** (0.0427)	0.0577 (0.0391)	0.195** (0.0440)	0.107** (0.0323)	0.144** (0.0399)	0.247** (0.0494)	0.129* (0.0558)	0.286+ (0.172)
CCM	-0.0485 (0.0498)	-0.0103 (0.0414)	0.0877+ (0.0484)	-0.0381 (0.0409)	0.0192 (0.0472)	0.131* (0.0551)	-0.161+ (0.0863)	0.0845 (0.175)
DiD CCM	0.0682 (0.0512)	0.0225 (0.0452)	-0.0898+ (0.0486)	-0.0329 (0.0386)	-0.0809+ (0.0458)	-0.119* (0.0554)	0.0901 (0.0814)	-0.0845 (0.175)
Constant	0.820** (0.0409)	0.876** (0.0350)	0.783** (0.0432)	0.882** (0.0336)	0.822** (0.0405)	0.720** (0.0498)	0.714** (0.0545)	0.714** (0.172)
<i>Observations</i>	640	661	661	671	649	644	275	349
Outcome Mean	0.881	0.906	0.911	0.896	0.880	0.899	0.735	0.903
Outcome SD	0.324	0.292	0.285	0.306	0.325	0.301	0.442	0.297
R-Squared	0.0835	0.0164	0.0614	0.0254	0.0214	0.0884	0.0549	0.121
F	21.39	4.957	15.12	14.00	9.119	17.32	7.004	.
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0792	0.0119	0.0571	0.0210	0.0168	0.0841	0.0444	0.113

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 16: Results 7

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	P1: F_Mining	P2: F_Umeme	P3: F_Elimu	P4: F_Roads	P5: F_Water	P6: F_Hospital	P7a: F_Land	P7b: F_Bus Stop
Post	0.203** (0.0401)	0.126** (0.0381)	0.0972** (0.0307)	0.132** (0.0374)	0.170** (0.0371)	0.158** (0.0317)	0.153 (0.102)	0.127** (0.0394)
CHADEMA	0.026 (0.073)	0.172** (0.0650)	0.0330 (0.0541)	0.116 ⁺ (0.0631)	-0.0509 (0.0693)	-0.0437 (0.0779)	-0.0140 (0.143)	-0.161 (0.224)
DiD CHADEMA	0.006 (0.072)	-0.0352 (0.0659)	-0.0747 (0.0606)	-0.0657 (0.0669)	0.0781 (0.0777)	0.0757 (0.0770)	-0.00649 (0.144)	0.130 (0.182)
Constant	0.635*** (0.0383)	0.491** (0.0343)	0.778** (0.0290)	0.530** (0.0342)	0.473** (0.0366)	0.696** (0.0332)	0.478** (0.106)	0.761** (0.0371)
<i>Observations</i>	518	596	597	609	557	552	143	316
Outcome Mean	0.761	0.596	0.827	0.621	0.562	0.786	0.566	0.829
Outcome SD	0.427	0.491	0.378	0.486	0.497	0.410	0.497	0.377
R-Squared	0.0569	0.0334	0.0124	0.0205	0.0384	0.0460	0.0211	0.0331
F	12.94	7.815	3.496	5.471	11.44	12.30	1.469	4.163
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0514	0.0285	0.00743	0.0156	0.0332	0.0408	-0.0000559	0.0238

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 17: Results 8

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	P1: F_Mining	P2: F_Umeme	P3: F_Elimu	P4: F_Roads	P5: F_Water	P6: F_Hospital	P7a: F_Land	P7b: F_Bus Stop
Post	0.209*** (0.060)	0.0772 (0.0549)	0.0127 (0.0529)	0.0582 (0.0558)	0.246** (0.0674)	0.237** (0.0689)	0.147 (0.101)	0.250 (0.154)
CCM	-0.026 (0.073)	-0.178** (0.0646)	-0.0330 (0.0541)	-0.116+ (0.0631)	0.0593 (0.0689)	0.0612 (0.0778)	0.0140 (0.143)	0.267 (0.209)
DiD CCM	-0.006 (0.072)	0.0540 (0.0667)	0.0883 (0.0611)	0.0767 (0.0672)	-0.0754 (0.0770)	-0.0784 (0.0759)	0.00649 (0.144)	-0.123 (0.159)
Constant	0.661*** (0.062)	0.667** (0.0547)	0.811** (0.0457)	0.646** (0.0530)	0.417** (0.0584)	0.638** (0.0704)	0.464** (0.0957)	0.500* (0.206)
<i>Observations</i>	518	596	597	609	557	552	143	316
Outcome Mean	0.761	0.596	0.827	0.621	0.562	0.786	0.566	0.829
Outcome SD	0.427	0.491	0.378	0.486	0.497	0.410	0.497	0.377
R-Squared	0.0569	0.0332	0.0134	0.0201	0.0385	0.0463	0.0211	0.0428
F	12.94	7.651	3.868	5.425	11.48	12.28	1.469	4.536
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0514	0.0283	0.00840	0.0152	0.0333	0.0411	-0.0000559	0.0336

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 18: Results 9

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Twa Sent Us	Twa Sent Us	MP Sent Us	MP Sent Us	Gov Sent Us	Gov Sent Us	IDK Sent Us	IDK Sent Us
Post	-0.00405 (0.0286)	0.0293 (0.0354)	0.0236 (0.0300)	0.0663 (0.0442)	0.0378 (0.0244)	-0.0677 (0.0477)	-0.0471* (0.0187)	-0.0939** (0.0304)
CHADEMA	-0.0107 (0.0596)		-0.0115 (0.0571)		0.0844 (0.0586)		0.0386 (0.0451)	
DiD CHADEMA	0.0336 (0.0459)		0.0435 (0.0538)		-0.106+ (0.0540)		-0.0476 (0.0360)	
CCM		0.0156 (0.0592)		0.0158 (0.0567)		-0.0967+ (0.0586)		-0.0361 (0.0448)
DiD CCM		-0.0334 (0.0456)		-0.0426 (0.0535)		0.106* (0.0536)		0.0466 (0.0358)
Constant	0.298** (0.0311)	0.284** (0.0503)	0.261** (0.0299)	0.247** (0.0481)	0.216** (0.0280)	0.309** (0.0515)	0.145** (0.0221)	0.182** (0.0389)
<i>Observations</i>	601	601	601	601	601	601	688	688
Outcome Mean	0.298	0.298	0.276	0.276	0.243	0.243	0.126	0.126
Outcome SD	0.458	0.458	0.447	0.447	0.429	0.429	0.333	0.333
R-Squared	0.000334	0.000296	0.00214	0.00205	0.00414	0.00515	0.00968	0.00954
F	0.236	0.235	0.962	0.957	1.568	1.684	5.298	5.310
Adjusted R-Squared	-0.00469	-0.00473	-0.00288	-0.00297	-0.000861	0.000148	0.00533	0.00520

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

7 Appendix

There are three main Appendices— Appendix A (section 7.1), Appendix B (section 7.2), and Appendix C (section 7.3). In all sections and across all tables, if the coefficient for *post* drops out in either the CCM or CHADEMA DiD regressions for a given outcome, then please do not interpret the results in any meaningful way. The coefficient on *post* drops out because of multicollinearity.

7.1 Appendix A: Full Sample

This first appendix reports the set of results for the full sample that includes both Tarime and Nzega data.

Table 19: Appendix A1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Promises Info	Promises Info	Policies Info	Policies Info
Post	0.253** (0.0312)		0.272** (0.0359)	0.328** (0.0923)
CHADEMA	0.0445 (0.0568)		-0.147+ (0.0854)	
DiD CHADEMA	-0.0803 (0.0601)		0.0899 (0.0951)	
CCM		-0.127** (0.0429)		0.129 (0.0851)
DiD CCM		0.250** (0.0311)		-0.0490 (0.0989)
Constant	0.694** (0.0302)	0.824** (0.0305)	0.522** (0.0370)	0.390** (0.0766)
<i>Observations</i>	654	654	451	451
Outcome Mean	0.824	0.824	0.641	0.641
Outcome SD	0.381	0.381	0.480	0.480
R-Squared	0.0950	0.0789	0.0983	0.0978
F	26.41	35.83	26.14	26.57
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0908	0.0760	0.0922	0.0918

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 20: Appendix A2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MP Capable	MP Capable	MP Willing	MP Willing
Post	0.212** (0.0298)		0.209** (0.0279)	0.241** (0.0556)
CHADEMA	-0.0286 (0.0589)		0.00284 (0.0578)	
DiD CCM	0.0385 (0.0656)		0.0353 (0.0626)	
CCM		-0.0818 ⁺ (0.0472)		0.00589 (0.0578)
DiD CCM		0.213** (0.0299)		-0.0311 (0.0622)
Constant	0.600** (0.0308)	0.684** (0.0357)	0.620** (0.0305)	0.616** (0.0491)
<i>Observations</i>	688	688	688	688
Outcome Mean	0.701	0.701	0.727	0.727
Outcome SD	0.458	0.458	0.446	0.446
R-Squared	0.0596	0.0397	0.0607	0.0603
F	23.05	26.52	25.12	25.04
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0555	0.0369	0.0566	0.0562

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 21: Appendix A3

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP Trust	MP Trust	MP Qualified	MP Qualified	MP Corrupt	MP Corrupt
Post	0.0782** (0.0275)		0.0523* (0.0246)	0.0907** (0.0298)	-0.0304 (0.0298)	-0.0108 (0.0401)
CHADEMA	-0.0491 (0.0528)		0.0607 (0.0406)		-0.0318 (0.0526)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	0.0878 (0.0565)		0.0400 (0.0388)		0.00894 (0.0490)	
CCM		-0.0241 (0.0412)		-0.0483 (0.0412)		0.0318 (0.0526)
DiD (CCM)		0.0746** (0.0274)		-0.0381 (0.0387)		-0.0236 (0.0498)
Constant	0.771** (0.0265)	0.798** (0.0316)	0.825** (0.0241)	0.876** (0.0336)	0.205** (0.0290)	0.173** (0.0439)
<i>Observations</i>	684	684	681	681	555	555
Outcome Mean	0.807	0.807	0.872	0.872	0.182	0.182
Outcome SD	0.395	0.395	0.334	0.334	0.386	0.386
R-Squared	0.0192	0.00667	0.0210	0.0175	0.00233	0.00201
F	6.543	3.875	12.34	9.509	0.572	0.528
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0149	0.00375	0.0166	0.0131	-0.00310	-0.00342

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

7.2 Appendix B: Tarime-Only Sample

This second appendix reports the set of results for only the Tarime data.

Table 22: Results T1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Know MP Name	Know MP Name	Know MP Name - Correct	Know MP Name - Correct
Post	0.0845* (0.0333)	0.0329 (0.0252)	0.0882* (0.0347)	0.0649* (0.0283)
CHADEMA	0.0396 (0.0400)		0.0103 (0.0464)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.0516 (0.0418)		-0.0233 (0.0448)	
CCM		-0.0396 (0.0400)		-0.0103 (0.0464)
DiD (CCM)		0.0516 (0.0418)		0.0233 (0.0448)
Constant	0.915** (0.0333)	0.955** (0.0221)	0.912** (0.0347)	0.922** (0.0308)
<i>Observations</i>	311	311	290	290
Outcome Mean	0.965	0.965	0.955	0.955
Outcome SD	0.185	0.185	0.207	0.207
R-Squared	0.0292	0.0292	0.0344	0.0344
F
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0197	0.0197	0.0243	0.0243

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 23: Results T2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Kesho Magu	Kesho	Kesho MP	Kesho MP	Kesho Diwani	Kesho Diwani
Post	0.910** (0.0352)	0.581** (0.0578)	0.281** (0.0612)	0.0975* (0.0430)	0.101 ⁺ (0.0544)	0.0199 (0.0467)
CHADEMA	4.29e-15 (3.25e-09)		0.567** (0.0677)		0.573** (0.0684)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.329** (0.0677)		-0.183* (0.0748)		-0.0815 (0.0717)	
CCM		-7.89e-17 (.)		-0.567** (0.0677)		-0.573** (0.0684)
DiD (CCM)		0.329** (0.0677)		0.183* (0.0748)		0.0815 (0.0717)
Constant	-3.44e-15 (3.11e-09)	-7.22e-16 (.)	0.138** (0.0432)	0.705** (0.0521)	0.164** (0.0457)	0.737** (0.0510)
<i>Observations</i>	286	286	281	281	281	281
Outcome Mean	0.364	0.364	0.537	0.537	0.498	0.498
Outcome SD	0.482	0.482	0.499	0.499	0.501	0.501
R-Squared	0.645	0.645	0.268	0.268	0.288	0.288
F	.	.	38.86	38.86	27.84	27.84
Adjusted R-Squared	0.642	0.642	0.260	0.260	0.280	0.280

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 24: Results T3

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pols Listen	Pols Listen	Magu Listens	Magu Listens	MP Listens	MP Listens	Diwani Listens	Diwani Listens
Post	0.0971 ⁺ (0.0564)	0.0435 (0.0617)	0.0426 (0.0386)	0.0395 (0.0443)	0.401** (0.0682)	0.0520 (0.0420)	0.0984 ⁺ (0.0520)	0.0529 (0.0342)
CHADEMA	0.00774 (0.0695)		-0.123* (0.0577)		0.426** (0.0726)		0.102 ⁺ (0.0585)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.0536 (0.0837)		-0.00309 (0.0588)		-0.349** (0.0801)		-0.0455 (0.0623)	
CCM		-0.00774 (0.0695)		0.123* (0.0577)		-0.426** (0.0726)		-0.102 ⁺ (0.0585)
DiD (CCM)		0.0536 (0.0837)		0.00309 (0.0588)		0.349** (0.0801)		0.0455 (0.0623)
Constant	0.754** (0.0523)	0.761** (0.0458)	0.899** (0.0366)	0.775** (0.0446)	0.438** (0.0625)	0.864** (0.0369)	0.797** (0.0488)	0.899** (0.0322)
<i>Observations</i>	306	306	307	307	303	303	308	308
Outcome Mean	0.791	0.791	0.850	0.850	0.782	0.782	0.890	0.890
Outcome SD	0.407	0.407	0.357	0.357	0.413	0.413	0.314	0.314
R-Squared	0.00847	0.00847	0.0339	0.0339	0.191	0.191	0.0305	0.0305
F	1.274	1.274	3.383	3.383	16.54	16.54	3.082	3.082
Adjusted R-Squared	-0.00138	-0.00138	0.0243	0.0243	0.183	0.183	0.0209	0.0209

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 25: Results T4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pres Interacts	Pres Interacts	MP Interacts	MP Interacts	Diwani Interacts	Diwani Interacts
Post	-0.00816 (0.0675)	0.0980 (0.0617)	0.0993 (0.0765)	0.0660 (0.0419)	0.0277 (0.0293)	-0.0153 (0.0310)
CHADEMA	-0.145 ⁺ (0.0830)		0.177* (0.0792)		0.0275 (0.0385)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	0.106 (0.0915)		-0.0333 (0.0872)		-0.0430 (0.0427)	
CCM		0.145 ⁺ (0.0830)		-0.177* (0.0792)		-0.0275 (0.0385)
DiD (CCM)		-0.106 (0.0915)		0.0333 (0.0872)		0.0430 (0.0427)
Constant	0.516** (0.0630)	0.370** (0.0541)	0.547** (0.0627)	0.724** (0.0483)	0.928** (0.0315)	0.955** (0.0221)
<i>Observations</i>	291	291	297	297	308	308
Outcome Mean	0.460	0.460	0.687	0.687	0.945	0.945
Outcome SD	0.499	0.499	0.465	0.465	0.229	0.229
R-Squared	0.0139	0.0139	0.0367	0.0367	0.00245	0.00245
F	1.473	1.473	3.558	3.558	0.380	0.380
Adjusted R-Squared	0.00360	0.00360	0.0269	0.0269	-0.00740	-0.00740

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 26: Results T5

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	P1: Mining	P2: Umeme	P7: Elimu	P3: Roads	P4: Water	P5: Hospital	P6: Land
Post	0.194** (0.0499)	0.173** (0.0476)	0.148** (0.0495)	0.140** (0.0431)	0.213** (0.0589)	0.338** (0.0700)	0.219** (0.0593)
CHADEMA	0.0796 (0.0677)	0.0846 (0.0645)	-0.00131 (0.0697)	0.0787 (0.0590)	0.0898 (0.0743)	0.0885 (0.0847)	0.161+ (0.0863)
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.0842 (0.0657)	-0.111+ (0.0640)	0.0509 (0.0680)	-0.0467 (0.0536)	-0.0667 (0.0726)	-0.0810 (0.0876)	-0.0901 (0.0814)
Constant	0.762** (0.0541)	0.781** (0.0521)	0.778** (0.0528)	0.815** (0.0485)	0.727** (0.0606)	0.618** (0.0661)	0.554** (0.0670)
<i>Observations</i>	295	295	295	301	286	280	275
Outcome Mean	0.881	0.885	0.864	0.917	0.871	0.825	0.735
Outcome SD	0.324	0.320	0.343	0.276	0.336	0.381	0.442
R-Squared	0.0586	0.0395	0.0682	0.0539	0.0744	0.152	0.0549
F	7.349	5.500	9.732	6.956	8.538	15.96	7.004
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0489	0.0296	0.0586	0.0444	0.0646	0.143	0.0444

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 27: Results T6

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	P1: Mining	P2: Umeme	P7: Elimu	P3: Roads	P4: Water	P5: Hospital	P6: Land
Post	0.110*	0.0619	0.199**	0.0938**	0.146**	0.257**	0.129*
	(0.0427)	(0.0427)	(0.0466)	(0.0320)	(0.0424)	(0.0527)	(0.0558)
CCM	-0.0796	-0.0846	0.00131	-0.0787	-0.0898	-0.0885	-0.161 ⁺
	(0.0677)	(0.0645)	(0.0697)	(0.0590)	(0.0743)	(0.0847)	(0.0863)
DiD (CCM)	0.0842	0.111 ⁺	-0.0509	0.0467	0.0667	0.0810	0.0901
	(0.0657)	(0.0640)	(0.0680)	(0.0536)	(0.0726)	(0.0876)	(0.0814)
Constant	0.841**	0.866**	0.776**	0.894**	0.817**	0.707**	0.714**
	(0.0407)	(0.0379)	(0.0456)	(0.0336)	(0.0431)	(0.0530)	(0.0545)
<i>Observations</i>	295	295	295	301	286	280	275
Outcome Mean	0.881	0.885	0.864	0.917	0.871	0.825	0.735
Outcome SD	0.324	0.320	0.343	0.276	0.336	0.381	0.442
R-Squared	0.0586	0.0395	0.0682	0.0539	0.0744	0.152	0.0549
F	7.349	5.500	9.732	6.956	8.538	15.96	7.004
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0489	0.0296	0.0586	0.0444	0.0646	0.143	0.0444

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 28: Results T7

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	P1: F_Mining	P2: F_Umeme	P7: F_Elimu	P3: F_Roads	P4: F_Water	P5: F_Hospital	P6: F_Land
Post	0.282** (0.0817)	0.0505 (0.0701)	0.164* (0.0746)	0.172* (0.0790)	0.227** (0.0760)	0.178* (0.0859)	0.153 (0.102)
CHADEMA	0.244* (0.0966)	0.0637 (0.0887)	0.116 (0.0843)	0.180* (0.0866)	0.136 (0.0966)	0.0892 (0.114)	-0.0140 (0.143)
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.116 (0.101)	0.0286 (0.0890)	-0.117 (0.0916)	-0.127 (0.0982)	0.0000885 (0.105)	0.0139 (0.112)	-0.00649 (0.144)
Constant	0.447** (0.0733)	0.627** (0.0683)	0.681** (0.0686)	0.500** (0.0674)	0.317** (0.0734)	0.594** (0.0878)	0.478** (0.106)
<i>Observations</i>	231	252	251	275	237	202	143
Outcome Mean	0.701	0.698	0.801	0.655	0.523	0.762	0.566
Outcome SD	0.459	0.460	0.400	0.476	0.501	0.427	0.497
R-Squared	0.0991	0.0126	0.0233	0.0290	0.0664	0.0570	0.0211
F	9.595	1.334	1.953	2.630	7.357	4.764	1.469
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0872	0.000624	0.0115	0.0182	0.0544	0.0427	-0.0000559

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 29: Results T8

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	P1: F_Mining	P2: F_Umeme	P7: F_Elimu	P3: F_Roads	P4: F_Water	P5: F_Hospital	P6: F_Land
Post	0.166** (0.0595)	0.0791 (0.0548)	0.0471 (0.0531)	0.0450 (0.0583)	0.227** (0.0729)	0.192** (0.0721)	0.147 (0.101)
CCM	-0.244* (0.0966)	-0.0637 (0.0887)	-0.116 (0.0843)	-0.180* (0.0866)	-0.136 (0.0966)	-0.0892 (0.114)	0.0140 (0.143)
DiD (CCM)	0.116 (0.101)	-0.0286 (0.0890)	0.117 (0.0916)	0.127 (0.0982)	-0.0000885 (0.105)	-0.0139 (0.112)	0.00649 (0.144)
Constant	0.691** (0.0629)	0.691** (0.0566)	0.797** (0.0489)	0.680** (0.0543)	0.453** (0.0628)	0.683** (0.0735)	0.464** (0.0957)
<i>Observations</i>	231	252	251	275	237	202	143
Outcome Mean	0.701	0.698	0.801	0.655	0.523	0.762	0.566
Outcome SD	0.459	0.460	0.400	0.476	0.501	0.427	0.497
R-Squared	0.0991	0.0126	0.0233	0.0290	0.0664	0.0570	0.0211
F	9.595	1.334	1.953	2.630	7.357	4.764	1.469
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0872	0.000624	0.0115	0.0182	0.0544	0.0427	-0.0000559

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 30: Results T9

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Twa Sent Us	Twa Sent Us	MP Sent Us	MP Sent Us	Gov Sent Us	Gov Sent Us	IDK Sent Us	IDK Sent Us
Post	-0.122* (0.0513)	0.0327 (0.0394)	0.0467 (0.0396)	0.0727 (0.0485)	0.125* (0.0512)	-0.0743 (0.0528)	-0.101* (0.0419)	-0.101** (0.0332)
CHADEMA	0.155* (0.0647)		0.0260 (0.0626)		-0.199** (0.0736)		-0.000109 (0.0534)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.188* (0.0875)		0.178** (0.0669)		0.0377 (0.0808)		-0.0800 (0.0678)	
CCM		-0.155* (0.0647)		-0.0260 (0.0626)		0.199** (0.0736)		0.000109 (0.0534)
DiD (CCM)		0.188* (0.0875)		-0.178** (0.0669)		-0.0377 (0.0808)		0.0800 (0.0678)
Constant	0.462** (0.0698)	0.274** (0.0527)	0.0962* (0.0413)	0.274** (0.0527)	0.250** (0.0606)	0.288** (0.0535)	0.278** (0.0532)	0.198** (0.0421)
<i>Observations</i>	256	256	256	256	256	256	314	314
Outcome Mean	0.336	0.336	0.230	0.230	0.277	0.277	0.185	0.185
Outcome SD	0.473	0.473	0.422	0.422	0.449	0.449	0.389	0.389
R-Squared	0.0204	0.0204	0.0555	0.0555	0.0173	0.0173	0.0273	0.0273
F	2.585	2.585	4.463	4.463	2.846	2.846	6.027	6.027
Adjusted R-Squared	0.00875	0.00875	0.0442	0.0442	0.00561	0.00561	0.0179	0.0179

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 31: Appendix TA1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Promises Info	Promises Info	Policies Info	Policies Info
Post	0.197** (0.0640)		0.191* (0.0840)	0.285** (0.0946)
CHADEMA	0.0260 (0.0790)		0.0669 (0.124)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.0221 (0.0824)		0.0943 (0.127)	
CCM		-0.117+ (0.0688)		-0.0669 (0.124)
DiD (CCM)		0.197** (0.0639)		-0.0943 (0.127)
Constant	0.714** (0.0609)	0.831** (0.0323)	0.345** (0.0900)	0.412** (0.0860)
<i>Observations</i>	284	284	124	124
Outcome Mean	0.827	0.827	0.500	0.500
Outcome SD	0.379	0.379	0.502	0.502
R-Squared	0.0600	0.0297	0.0735	0.0735
F	6.982	5.200	5.322	5.322
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0499	0.0228	0.0504	0.0504

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 32: Appendix TA2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MP Capable	MP Capable	MP Willing	MP Willing
Post	0.350** (0.0669)		0.322** (0.0643)	0.264** (0.0580)
CHADEMA	0.355** (0.0705)		0.393** (0.0713)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.0798 (0.0903)		-0.0578 (0.0866)	
CCM		-0.484** (0.0600)		-0.393** (0.0713)
DiD (CCM)		0.350** (0.0668)		0.0578 (0.0866)
Constant	0.194** (0.0470)	0.678** (0.0373)	0.222** (0.0494)	0.615** (0.0514)
<i>Observations</i>	314	314	314	314
Outcome Mean	0.538	0.538	0.580	0.580
Outcome SD	0.499	0.499	0.494	0.494
R-Squared	0.193	0.153	0.220	0.220
F	34.10	35.44	39.97	39.97
Adjusted R-Squared	0.185	0.147	0.213	0.213

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 33: Appendix TA3

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP Trust	MP Trust	MP Qualified	MP Qualified	MP Corrupt	MP Corrupt
Post	0.161* (0.0706)		0.0507 (0.0642)	0.0883** (0.0307)	-0.0547 (0.0828)	-0.0229 (0.0430)
CHADEMA	0.237** (0.0768)		0.277** (0.0670)		-0.288** (0.0914)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.00552 (0.0876)		0.0376 (0.0712)		0.0318 (0.0933)	
CCM		-0.311** (0.0689)		-0.277** (0.0670)		0.288** (0.0914)
DiD (CCM)		0.161* (0.0705)		-0.0376 (0.0712)		-0.0318 (0.0933)
Constant	0.486** (0.0602)	0.797** (0.0337)	0.611** (0.0579)	0.888** (0.0337)	0.450** (0.0795)	0.162** (0.0451)
<i>Observations</i>	310	310	312	312	223	223
Outcome Mean	0.694	0.694	0.798	0.798	0.251	0.251
Outcome SD	0.462	0.462	0.402	0.402	0.435	0.435
R-Squared	0.0916	0.0758	0.142	0.142	0.0936	0.0936
F	11.44	10.18	17.33	17.33	4.592	4.592
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0827	0.0698	0.133	0.133	0.0812	0.0812

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

7.3 Appendix C: Nzega-Only Sample

This third appendix reports the set of results for only the Nzega data.

Table 34: Results N1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Know MP Name	Know MP Name	Know MP Name - Correct	Know MP Name - Correct
Post	0.0709** (0.0191)	1.05e-14 (1.94e-08)	0.0239+ (0.0143)	0.143 (0.133)
CHADEMA	0.0765** (0.0198)		-0.113 (0.134)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.0709** (0.0191)		0.119 (0.134)	
CCM		0.0536 (0.119)		0.113 (0.134)
DiD (CCM)		0.0714** (0.0192)		-0.119 (0.134)
Constant	0.923** (0.0198)	0.875** (0.118)	0.970** (0.0131)	0.857** (0.133)
<i>Observations</i>	374	374	359	359
Outcome Mean	0.960	0.960	0.981	0.981
Outcome SD	0.196	0.196	0.138	0.138
R-Squared	0.0330	0.0401	0.0233	0.0233
F
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0252	0.0323	0.0151	0.0151

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 35: Results N2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Kesho Magu	Kesho	Kesho MP	Kesho MP	Kesho Diwani	Kesho Diwani
Post	0.910** (0.0352)	0.581** (0.0578)	0.281** (0.0612)	0.0975* (0.0430)	0.101 ⁺ (0.0544)	0.0199 (0.0467)
CHADEMA	4.29e-15 (3.25e-09)		0.567** (0.0677)		0.573** (0.0684)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.329** (0.0677)		-0.183* (0.0748)		-0.0815 (0.0717)	
CCM		-7.89e-17 (.)		-0.567** (0.0677)		-0.573** (0.0684)
DiD (CCM)		0.329** (0.0677)		0.183* (0.0748)		0.0815 (0.0717)
Constant	-3.44e-15 (3.11e-09)	-7.22e-16 (.)	0.138** (0.0432)	0.705** (0.0521)	0.164** (0.0457)	0.737** (0.0510)
<i>Observations</i>	286	286	281	281	281	281
Outcome Mean	0.364	0.364	0.537	0.537	0.498	0.498
Outcome SD	0.482	0.482	0.499	0.499	0.501	0.501
R-Squared	0.645	0.645	0.268	0.268	0.288	0.288
F	.	.	38.86	38.86	27.84	27.84
Adjusted R-Squared	0.642	0.642	0.260	0.260	0.280	0.280

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 36: Results N3

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pols Listen	Pols Listen	Magu Listens	Magu Listens	MP Listens	MP Listens	Diwani Listens	Diwani Listens
Post	0.142** (0.0330)	0.375* (0.172)	0.0333 (0.0253)	0.0179 (0.192)	0.117** (0.0255)	0.375* (0.172)	0.0971** (0.0328)	0.125 (0.213)
CHADEMA	-0.104 (0.174)		0.0847** (0.0211)		-0.152 (0.174)		-0.156 (0.191)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	0.144 (0.175)		-0.176 (0.136)		0.169 (0.174)		-0.0971 (0.206)	
CCM		0.198 (0.175)		0.0633 (0.135)		0.246 (0.174)		0.232 (0.181)
DiD (CCM)		-0.238 (0.175)		0.00996 (0.193)		-0.263 (0.174)		-0.0330 (0.216)
Constant	0.818** (0.0293)	0.625** (0.172)	0.915** (0.0211)	0.857** (0.133)	0.866** (0.0256)	0.625** (0.172)	0.728** (0.0334)	0.500** (0.178)
<i>Observations</i>	365	365	365	365	370	370	371	371
Outcome Mean	0.888	0.888	0.932	0.932	0.922	0.922	0.768	0.768
Outcome SD	0.316	0.316	0.253	0.253	0.269	0.269	0.423	0.423
R-Squared	0.0567	0.0630	0.00707	0.00578	0.0586	0.0702	0.0213	0.0230
F	.	.	.	0.667	.	.	3.533	3.615
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0489	0.0552	-0.00118	-0.00248	0.0509	0.0625	0.0133	0.0150

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 37: Results N4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pres Interacts	Pres Interacts	MP Interacts	MP Interacts	Diwani Interacts	Diwani Interacts
Post	0.0525 (0.0387)	0.250 (0.154)	0.117** (0.0329)	2.09e-14 (0.178)	0.0179 (0.0286)	0.125 (0.118)
CHADEMA	0.0109 (0.175)		0.0985 (0.176)		0.0220 (0.136)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	0.233 (0.176)		0.0257 (0.137)		0.125 (0.136)	
CCM		0.0265 (0.158)		-0.136 (0.158)		-0.0407 (0.121)
DiD (CCM)		-0.197 (0.159)		0.124 (0.181)		-0.107 (0.121)
Constant	0.275** (0.0344)	0.250 (0.154)	0.616** (0.0368)	0.750** (0.154)	0.835** (0.0277)	0.875** (0.118)
<i>Observations</i>	353	353	367	367	373	373
Outcome Mean	0.306	0.306	0.678	0.678	0.847	0.847
Outcome SD	0.461	0.461	0.468	0.468	0.360	0.360
R-Squared	0.00986	0.00754	0.0181	0.0178	0.00407	0.00472
F	1.668	1.508	4.999	4.895	.	.
Adjusted R-Squared	0.00134	-0.000988	0.00999	0.00967	-0.00402	-0.00337

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 38: Results N5

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	P1: Mining	P2: Umeme	P3: Elimu	P4: Roads	P5: Water	P6: Hospital	P7b: Bus Stop
Post	0.207** (0.0342)	0.0458 ⁺ (0.0252)	0.0909** (0.0218)	0.0548* (0.0247)	0.0192 (0.0230)	0.0634** (0.0217)	0.200** (0.0318)
CHADEMA	-0.204 (0.191)	0.102** (0.0230)	-0.0463 (0.135)	0.00798 (0.136)	0.127** (0.0255)	-0.0920 (0.154)	-0.133 (0.196)
DiD (CHADEMA)	0.221 (0.191)	-0.0458 ⁺ (0.0252)	0.0519 (0.135)	0.0881 (0.135)	-0.0192 (0.0230)	0.103 (0.155)	0.133 (0.196)
Constant	0.776** (0.0336)	0.898** (0.0230)	0.903** (0.0224)	0.849** (0.0269)	0.873** (0.0255)	0.925** (0.0201)	0.800** (0.0318)
<i>Observations</i>	345	366	366	370	363	364	349
Outcome Mean	0.881	0.923	0.948	0.878	0.887	0.956	0.903
Outcome SD	0.324	0.266	0.222	0.327	0.317	0.205	0.297
R-Squared	0.120	0.0102	0.0446	0.00949	0.00599	0.0299	0.122
F
Adjusted R-Squared	0.112	0.00200	0.0367	0.00138	-0.00231	0.0218	0.115

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 39: Results N6

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	P1: Mining	P2: Umeme	P3: Elimu	P4: Roads	P5: Water	P6: Hospital	P7b: Bus Stop
Post	0.429* (0.188)	-1.21e-14** (1.22e-15)	0.143 (0.133)	0.250 (0.154)	0.125 (0.118)	0.143 (0.133)	0.286+ (0.172)
CCM	0.204 (0.191)	-0.103** (0.0231)	0.0463 (0.135)	0.104 (0.156)	0.00291 (0.120)	0.0677 (0.135)	0.0845 (0.175)
DiD (CCM)	-0.221 (0.191)	0.0460+ (0.0254)	-0.0520 (0.135)	-0.201 (0.156)	-0.111 (0.120)	-0.0791 (0.135)	-0.0845 (0.175)
Constant	0.571** (0.188)	1.000** (6.28e-16)	0.857** (0.133)	0.750** (0.154)	0.875** (0.118)	0.857** (0.133)	0.714** (0.172)
<i>Observations</i>	345	366	366	370	363	364	349
Outcome Mean	0.881	0.923	0.948	0.878	0.887	0.956	0.903
Outcome SD	0.324	0.266	0.222	0.327	0.317	0.205	0.297
R-Squared	0.120	0.0107	0.0446	0.0118	0.00333	0.0287	0.121
F
Adjusted R-Squared	0.112	0.00253	0.0367	0.00371	-0.00500	0.0206	0.113

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 40: Results N7

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	P1: F_Mining	P2: F_Umeme	P3: F_Elimu	P4: F_Roads	P5: F_Water	P6: F_Hospital	P7b: F_Bus Stop
Post	0.164** (0.0454)	0.147** (0.0452)	0.0788* (0.0330)	0.118** (0.0423)	0.162** (0.0422)	0.165** (0.0333)	0.127** (0.0394)
CHADEMA	-0.464* (0.222)	-0.115 (0.198)	0.194** (0.0315)	-0.255 (0.177)	-0.374** (0.140)	-0.316 (0.223)	-0.161 (0.224)
DiD (CHADEMA)	0.586** (0.223)	0.0907 (0.207)	-0.365* (0.175)	0.168 (0.177)	0.266 (0.193)	0.435+ (0.223)	0.130 (0.182)
Constant	0.714** (0.0430)	0.448** (0.0392)	0.806** (0.0315)	0.541** (0.0398)	0.517** (0.0415)	0.716** (0.0357)	0.761** (0.0371)
<i>Observations</i>	287	344	346	334	320	350	316
Outcome Mean	0.808	0.520	0.847	0.593	0.591	0.800	0.829
Outcome SD	0.394	0.500	0.361	0.492	0.492	0.401	0.377
R-Squared	0.0740	0.0236	0.0169	0.0221	0.0446	0.0601	0.0331
F	.	4.062	.	4.028	9.290	.	4.163
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0642	0.0150	0.00827	0.0132	0.0355	0.0520	0.0238

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 41: Results N8

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	P1: F_Mining	P2: F_Umeme	P3: F_Elimu	P4: F_Roads	P5: F_Water	P6: F_Hospital	P7: F_Bus Stop
Post	0.750** (0.218)	0.0714 (0.238)	-0.375* (0.172)	0.214 (0.174)	0.375* (0.172)	0.542** (0.193)	0.250 (0.154)
CCM	0.464* (0.222)	0.0159 (0.192)	-0.194** (0.0315)	0.255 (0.177)	0.396** (0.125)	0.387+ (0.197)	0.267 (0.209)
DiD (CCM)	-0.586** (0.223)	0.0829 (0.243)	0.459** (0.175)	-0.0927 (0.179)	-0.212 (0.178)	-0.376+ (0.196)	-0.123 (0.159)
Constant	0.250 (0.218)	0.429* (0.188)	1.000** (3.53e-08)	0.286+ (0.172)	0.125 (0.118)	0.333+ (0.194)	0.500* (0.206)
<i>Observations</i>	287	344	346	334	320	350	316
Outcome Mean	0.808	0.520	0.847	0.593	0.591	0.800	0.829
Outcome SD	0.394	0.500	0.361	0.492	0.492	0.401	0.377
R-Squared	0.0740	0.0236	0.0245	0.0240	0.0502	0.0653	0.0428
F	.	4.023	16.67	3.949	10.70	10.87	4.536
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0642	0.0150	0.0159	0.0151	0.0411	0.0572	0.0336

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 42: Results N9

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Twa Sent Us	Twa Sent Us	MP Sent Us	MP Sent Us	Gov Sent Us	Gov Sent Us	IDK Sent Us	IDK Sent Us
Post	0.0318 (0.0337)	2.33e-15 (.)	0.0201 (0.0377)	-1.84e-15 (5.50e-15)	0.00730 (0.0275)	-1.87e-15 (4.05e-15)	-0.0251 (0.0200)	-5.26e-15 (3.64e-15)
CHADEMA	0.182 (0.191)		-0.313** (0.0363)		0.224 (0.191)		-0.0929** (0.0216)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.0318 (0.0337)		-0.0201 (0.0377)		-0.00730 (0.0275)		0.0251 (0.0200)	
CCM		-0.127 (0.176)		0.315** (0.0364)		-0.300+ (0.181)		0.0934** (0.0217)
DiD (CCM)		0.0320 (0.0339)		0.0202 (0.0380)		0.00732 (0.0277)		-0.0252 (0.0201)
Constant	0.247** (0.0337)	0.375* (0.172)	0.313** (0.0363)	-1.72e-15 (2.97e-15)	0.205** (0.0315)	0.500** (0.178)	0.0929** (0.0216)	1.89e-15 (1.61e-15)
<i>Observations</i>	345	345	345	345	345	345	374	374
Outcome Mean	0.270	0.270	0.310	0.310	0.217	0.217	0.0775	0.0775
Outcome SD	0.444	0.444	0.463	0.463	0.413	0.413	0.268	0.268
R-Squared	0.00666	0.00399	0.0195	0.0223	0.0112	0.0229	0.00539	0.00588
F
Adjusted R-Squared	-0.00208	-0.00478	0.0108	0.0137	0.00246	0.0143	-0.00268	-0.00218

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 43: Appendix NA1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Promises Info	Promises Info	Policies Info	Policies Info
Post	0.273** (0.0355)		0.284** (0.0399)	0.548+ (0.292)
CHADEMA	0.0271 (0.175)		-0.388* (0.158)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.130 (0.246)		0.550** (0.158)	
CCM		-0.0590 (0.0954)		0.266 (0.177)
DiD (CCM)		0.269** (0.0354)		-0.256 (0.295)
Constant	0.687** (0.0349)	0.750** (0.0889)	0.555** (0.0402)	0.286+ (0.172)
<i>Observations</i>	370	370	327	327
Outcome Mean	0.822	0.822	0.694	0.694
Outcome SD	0.383	0.383	0.461	0.461
R-Squared	0.124	0.120	0.122	0.115
F	20.57	30.96	.	21.72
Adjusted R-Squared	0.117	0.115	0.114	0.107

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 44: Appendix NA2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MP Capable	MP Capable	MP Willing	MP Willing
Post	0.156** (0.0316)		0.162** (0.0288)	2.58e-14 (0.178)
CHADEMA	0.0976 (0.137)		-0.0617 (0.175)	
DiD (CHADEMA)	-0.156 (0.206)		-0.162 (0.205)	
CCM		0.0137 (0.130)		0.155 (0.175)
DiD (CCM)		0.157** (0.0317)		0.163 (0.180)
Constant	0.760** (0.0318)	0.750** (0.126)	0.776** (0.0310)	0.625** (0.172)
<i>Observations</i>	374	374	374	374
Outcome Mean	0.837	0.837	0.850	0.850
Outcome SD	0.370	0.370	0.357	0.357
R-Squared	0.0428	0.0455	0.0552	0.0677
F	8.102	12.77	11.23	11.92
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0351	0.0404	0.0475	0.0602

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 45: Appendix NA3

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP Trust	MP Trust	MP Qualified	MP Qualified	MP Corrupt	MP Corrupt
Post	0.0468 ⁺ (0.0265)		0.0496* (0.0230)	0.125 (0.118)	-0.0254 (0.0309)	0.0893 (0.0868)
CHADEMA	-0.165 (0.174)		-0.0535 (0.135)		0.144 (0.174)	
DID (CHADEMA)	0.239 (0.174)		0.0932 (0.135)		0.0254 (0.0309)	
CCM		0.0721 (0.0893)		0.166 (0.156)		-0.144 (0.174)
DiD (CCM)		0.0415 (0.0261)		-0.0750 (0.120)		-0.120 (0.0920)
Constant	0.880** (0.0242)	0.813** (0.0860)	0.911** (0.0215)	0.750** (0.154)	0.142** (0.0282)	0.286 ⁺ (0.172)
<i>Observations</i>	374	374	369	369	332	332
Outcome Mean	0.901	0.901	0.935	0.935	0.136	0.136
Outcome SD	0.299	0.299	0.247	0.247	0.343	0.343
R-Squared	0.0153	0.00856	0.0129	0.0238	0.00979	0.0185
F	.	1.896	.	2.152	.	1.194
Adjusted R-Squared	0.00733	0.00321	0.00483	0.0158	0.000731	0.00952

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$